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ABSTRACT 
 
The latest processes of globalisation have brought major changes in the world’s social 
fabric. Today, places are connected by an intricate web of relations and flows, 
determining their development possibilities. The natural resource rich countries and 
regions have been plugged into these global production networks, but despite their 
natural wealth, they have not successfully reached a sustainable development path. 
Orthodox economic theories have assuming positive externalities from FDI flows fail to 
capture this outcome. However, recent developments in the Economic Geography 
literature provide an analysis of uneven development in the guise of the Global 
Production Networks approach. This literature acknowledges the decisive role of power 
in producing a strategic coupling between the host region/country interests and the 
extractive multinational enterprises, something crucial in the extractive industries.  
This research focuses on the mining industry, as a way to advancing a better 
understanding of the relationship between the extractive industry and sustainable 
development of host regions. For this, it uses the Chilean copper mining as a case study. 
Hence, this research tries to contribute to the general question of how the mining industry 
affects uneven regional and national development in the context of the latest 
globalisation process by: first, incorporating the GPN in analysing the extractives 
industries; second, unpacking the concept of bargaining power, to explain issues related 
to value capture; third, providing empirical evidence about the successive bargains 
taking place between the mining MNEs and Chilean State in different nodes, and their 
implications for sustainable development; and fourthly, establishing the role of the State 
in the successive bargains taking place with the mining MNEs in the current Chilean 
copper mining GPN. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Since the late twentieth century, globalisation has brought major changes in the world’s 
society, culture, politics and economy. The birth of several transnational institutions (IMF, 
World Bank, WTO), the creation of the ‘Washington Consensus’, the consolidation of 
large multinational enterprises (MNEs) 1, and the progressive withdrawal of the 
governments from Keynesian policies are among the most important features of this 
period. All of these installed an overall consensus about the positive effects of 
globalisation on the macroeconomic development, a perception broadly bolstered by the 
current economic literature, mainly focused on the study of the virtuous impact of the 
MNEs in the development of the industrial regions in developed countries. 
Furthermore, globalisation has changed the way in which states and MNEs bargain 
within the global production networks (GPNs) that they belong to. This change has been 
remarkably fast and strong in the extractive industry, especially after the incorporation of 
the modern international institutions that have affected this process (IMF, World Bank, 
WTO), which have favoured the interests of MNEs over the local communities, by 
promoting the neoliberalization (Peck & Tickell, 2002) of local markets, trade and 
legislation. The logic was to attract foreign direct investments (FDI) into these regions, in 
order to improve their socio economic conditions and reach sustainable development.  
These policies have been promoted by the ‘Treasure Chest Theories’, of international 
trade and neoclassical approaches, which have been the pervasive explanation for 
studying resource based economic development lately (Bridge, 2004a, 2008). These 
theories usually assume that host regions will benefit from open markets and FDI, due 
to the positive externalities created by the MNE’s presence, like knowledge and 
technological spillovers that should improve local firms’ productivity. Hence, these 
external sources of investment and markets available for mineral products ‘provide 
opportunities for a resource rich region to ‘plug into’ the global economy’ (Bridge, 2008) 
bringing the chance of opening such global markets to local suppliers linked to the 
                                               
1 This research utilizes the term MNE instead of Transnational Corporation (TNE) used notably by the 
UNCTAD, since most of the enterprises considered in this research still have strong cultural, political and 
economic linkages with their countries of origin.  
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extractive MNEs. Such linkages with the local economy will also stimulate growth and 
the apparition of new specialised firms - helping to diversify the local economy, achieve 
sustainable growth and higher levels of socio–economic wellbeing (Bridge, 2008; 
Gunton, 2003; Javorcik, 2004; Li & Liu, 2005).  
For the mining industry specifically, they argued that with its emphasis on technology 
and capital – intensive production, the industry could create and support the emergence 
of a ‘national innovative capacity’ or the ability of countries to produce and commercialize 
knowledge over the long term. This should create a platform from which innovative 
potential can be launched in other sectors and parts of the economy, contributing to 
sustained economic growth and the apparition of clusters of new activities (Lagos & 
Lagos, 2010; World Bank & International Finance Corporation, 2002). 
Nevertheless, this literature has been heavily criticized due to the diffuse definitions of 
‘innovative capacity’, ‘knowledge spillovers’ and ‘clusters’, the lack of empirical work 
measuring these concepts, its neglect of power asymmetries in the industry, and, most 
importantly, the negative results that extractive regions in developing countries have had 
during the last decades (Phelps et al., 2015; Rosser, 2006). Moreover, most of the 
strictest neoliberal policies have taken place in developing extractive countries, 
especially as a part of the structural adjustment policies, promoting large inflows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the privatisation of State firms and strategic 
resources. This has left the host regions of FDI at the mercy of powerful global economic 
forces that they are unable to control. Likewise, development theorists have largely 
overlooked space as a critical dimension of analysis, focusing mainly in the aggregated 
level and forgetting that cities and regions are essential agents of the development 
process (Scott & Storper, 2003).  
Consequently, it is because of the unfulfilled promises of the international trade 
/neoclassical literature that a second body of literature appeared, to understand why the 
host regions were not reaping the socio economic benefits of their mineral wealth. 
Thence, resource rich regions and countries have faced a paradoxical situation, in which 
the more resource endowments they hold, the more difficult it is to achieve sustainable 
growth and development (Sachs & Warner, 2001; Bridge, 2004a). Such a situation has 
been treated as a ‘curse’ for resource rich regions, and it has been studied by the 
literature called ‘Resource Curse Thesis’ and ‘Dependency Theory (Teoría de la 
Dependencia)’ (Auty, 1980; Cardoso & Faletto, 2007; Ross, 2001; Ross, 1999; Rosser, 
2006; Sachs & Warner, 2001).  
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According to this literature, countries rich in natural resources show an uneven and 
unsustainable growth path; and large income inequalities that constrain further 
development and make them dependent of the MNEs home countries. The main 
conclusion is that ‘cases where resource extraction has driven broad based forms of 
regional development should be understood as important exception rather than a general 
rule’ (Auty, 1980, 2007; Bridge, 2008; Ross, 1999; Rosser, 2006). Moreover, these 
theories usually have a national scope and study the underperformance due to state 
failure, rather than a regional scale, leading to a policy consensus that is the state and 
its institutions the ones exerting the most crucial influence over the impact of the 
extractive resources on national development.  
For the mining industry in particular, these theories have been applied to study the 
development effects of MNEs presence. Some authors have claimed that rich ores cause 
political and economic dependence to the minerals (Cademartori, 2002, 2008; Cardoso 
& Faletto, 2007; Weisskoff & Wolff, 1977). The eagerness of local governments to attract 
FDI facilitates the concentration of bargaining power in MNEs’ hands which may lead, in 
extreme cases, to uneven development through the formation of enclaves and 
unsustainable growth. In recent years, this literature has often been dismissed because 
of their ‘anti – mining bias’ (Bridge, 2008; Davis, 1995), but its rich tradition and 
incorporation of crucial elements like power asymmetries in the bargains between local 
institutions and mining MNEs, make it relevant for framing this research. Moreover, this 
framework has reached something of an analytical stalemate in the past few years, since 
it has not been able to provide new insights for the causes of dependent growth and 
unsustainable development (Bridge, 2008). 
Withal, an essential weakness present in both approaches, is the lack of an integrated 
view of the whole production network, its actors and relationships, from the local to the 
transnational level. This broad perspective is vital for understanding how the different 
actors in different levels affect the development outcomes in the extractive industry, and 
how the benefits of this industry are distributed along the network. Such a gap can be 
addressed considering the adaptation to the extractive industry of the Global Production 
Networks (GPN) approach, in a way that the relationship between the extractive industry 
and regional development to be addressed – something which ‘has been identified as a 
neglected area in economic geography’ (Gunton, 2003; Walker, 2001).  
What can be now called the ‘GPN 1.0 approach’ explicitly turns the attention to uneven 
development along the nodes involved in a particular industry, by focusing in how the 
power asymmetries between the actors can determine the level of embeddedness and, 
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ultimately, issues of value in terms of who captures it and where. Value capture is crucial 
for the sustainable development of both the regions and countries hosting the FDI and 
will ultimately be decided by the dynamic bargains taking place among the actors: MNEs; 
the state; and civil society in the different nodes of the network. If the bargaining power 
exerted by the actors is somehow balanced, there will be chances of reaching a strategic 
coupling between their strategic objectives, meaning high chances of reaching 
sustainable development. Contrarily, when there are bargaining power asymmetries, 
chances are that one actor will benefit at the expense of another (Bridge, 2008; Coe et 
al., 2004). 
Hence, the GPN approach provides a way to deepen the discussion about the perceived 
negative effects or ‘Dark Side’ of the extractive industry, which remain largely 
understudied today (Bridge, 2004b). However, despite the crucial relevance of the 
concept of bargaining power in the GPN approach, this has not been unpacked, even 
less empirically studied. This distribution of power and its influence over the bargain 
between the host states/regions and the MNEs is particularly important in the extractive 
industry, especially in mining (Moran, 1974; Yeung & Coe, 2015). In this dynamic 
process, the balance of power tilts depending on several strategic resources and 
constraints related to each actor of the industry, the stage of exploitation and the place 
where the negotiations take place. An initial bargain occurs before the exploitation of the 
mineral, where the MNEs and local institutions agree the terms and conditions of the 
initial investment under the national laws and international trade agreements. Such 
conditions could determine the long term development outcomes for the host region, 
especially if they remain static.  
Furthermore, additional bargains might take place once the investment is made, since 
the host State and local institutions have the chance take advantage of the large sunk 
costs in the mining industry, and get better socio-economical retributions for the 
exploitation of finite natural resources. This means that, under certain conditions, the 
state can influence national and local benefits from the extractive GPNs. Most of these 
conditions are related to the actual bargaining power of the State to make it happen, 
which is based on its control over strategic assets and capabilities, as well as the 
constraints it faces (Coe et al., 2008b, p. 446).  
Bargaining power asymmetries that favour the MNEs have been a common 
characteristic in traditional national enclaves, which historically had extremely negative 
consequences for the local and national development due to the unsustainable nature of 
the growth produced. As a result of this uneven bargain caused by power asymmetries, 
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weak governments, institutions and lax legislation can have disastrous consequences 
for the local economy, since they lead to an unsustainable and uneven growth, creating 
an illusion of development instead of sustainable clusters in mining regions. This raises 
the question about whether the enclave form has been completely overcome or not.  
Hence, according to the previous discussion which is summarized in Figure 1, there is 
still room for advancing a better understanding of the relationship between the extractive 
industry and sustainable development of host regions. In this sense, this research tries 
to contribute to the general question of: how does the mining industry affect uneven 
regional and national development in the context of the latest globalisation process. It 
does so by answering four specific research questions: 
1. How can the GPN be incorporated into an analysis of extractive industries, specifically 
mining, and in determining the chances of reaching sustainable development in the host 
region and country? 
2. How can the concept of bargaining power in the GPNs be conceptually unpacked in 
order to explain issues related to value capture, such as where and how is value being 
captured and by whom? 
3. What kind of empirical evidence about the successive bargains taking place between 
mining MNEs and the Chilean State in different nodes can be provided, and what are the 
implications for sustainable development of the outcomes of these bargains? 
4. What is the role of the State in the successive bargains taking place with mining MNEs 
in the current Chilean copper mining GPN? 
 
The main contribution of this thesis to economic geography flows from answering these 
four questions as developed next. 
 
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
To answer the previous research questions, the research takes Bridge (2008) pioneering 
work on incorporating the GPN approach to the study of the extractive industries, as a 
base for exploring how GPN analysis can be used to understand the uneven 
development seen in some dependent mining nations and regions, focusing on the 
relationship between the mining MNEs and the state. The basis to this contribution is 
depicted in figure 1.  
17 
 
The international trade, extractive and network literature have paid little attention to 
power asymmetries in the advancement of theory. This research fills this gap by using 
the GPN as a broad framework of analysis while focusing on its conceptual category 
power. Specifically, it unpacks the crucial concept of power, and how this determines 
value capture. Studying the distribution and exertion of power between the agents is vital, 
since it will cause a specific form of agglomeration that may promote or hinder regional 
development. Hence, to ‘unveil the black box of power’ this research proposes some 
operational definitions of bargaining power, while also adapting and integrating the extant 
ideas on bargaining into the GPN framework.  
In particular, the study focuses on the sources of bargaining power, as well as the way it 
is dynamically exerted and distributed among the actors in the extractive GPN. There is 
a special focus on the dynamic bargain between the local state/institutions and the 
mining MNEs on one hand, and between the international institutions and national/local 
institutions on the other. This is to address the relevance that such international actors 
have had over the development policies in the last decades. By following the bargaining 
literature, the research recognizes the role that the strategic resources hold by each actor 
can play as potential bargaining power, which can (or cannot) be exerted while facing 
each actor’s particular constraints, providing a way to have some empirical measure of 
the bargaining power exerted by them. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the theories, concepts and possible outcomes of the 
extractive industry debate. 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
 
Furthermore, the strength of the actors involved and the strategic resources that are the 
source of the bargaining power are the focus of theoretical development regarding the 
strategic coupling or decoupling between the MNEs’ and local interests. This is especially 
relevant for policies related to the role of the state in actively/passively promoting 
sustainable growth and development.  
Moreover, the Chilean copper mining GPN is used as the case study, since it is 
considered the most important copper producer of the world, one of the most important 
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metals, has a long history with the mining industry, and a world reputation of a successful 
example of economic development. The country, with its highly specialised productive 
fabric and its extremely FDI-friendly environment, makes it possibly the best case with 
which to examine the exertion of power within GPNs. In this way, as summarised in Table 
1, the relevance of the Chilean copper industry is multi – level, since: it is the main 
producer and holds its biggest reserves worldwide; its growth, exports, FDI flows and tax 
revenues are heavily dependent on the copper industry nationally; and the Antofagasta 
region - where most copper is produced and found – has a long history of mineral mono 
– dependence and enclave formations, where economic growth has been constant, but 
not sustainable.  
Table 1: Summary of the relevance of Chilean copper industry worldwide, 
nationally and regionally (2013-2014). 
  Amount Unit of measurement 
World relevance of copper industry    
Participation in world reserves (2014) 30 % 
Participation in world production (2014) 30 % 
National relevance of copper industry    
Share of Chilean GDP (2014) 11.2 % 
Share of total employment (2014) 3.2 % 
Share of total Chilean exports (2014) 54.2 % 
Taxes and mining contributions (2014) 4,728 MMUS$ 
Contribution to tax revenues 8.9 % 
Total investment in big copper/gold mining (2013) 14.783 MMUS$ 
Regional relevance of copper industry    
Share of regional GDP (2015) 57 % 
Share of the national mining production (2013) 48 % 
Participation of mining over total regional exports (2013) 96 % 
Regional average income per capita (2013) 9,000 US$ 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from COCHILCO, USGS, Consejo Minero and 
OECD.  
 
Historically, these mining enclaves has brought dire socio – economic consequences to 
the region, but the recent extremely high copper prices of the commodity super cycle 
have led some international institutions to declare Antofagasta, as a region, and Chile, 
as a country, as examples of development based on extractive resources (CEPAL, 2009; 
OCDE, 2009), and the belief that a mining cluster has taken shape. However, mining 
enclaves were born from a deep relationship between the Chilean State and the mining 
MNEs exploiting the ores, leading to considerable social and environmental costs 
assumed by the region and labour force, which highlights the need of re – evaluating the 
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role that both, the State and the mining MNEs, should play in promoting regional and 
national development in a modern copper mining global production network. 
Consequently, this research provides empirical evidence about the relative strength of 
the mining MNEs and state; how the bargains take place in each relevant node of the 
Chilean copper mining GPN: London, Santiago and Antofagasta; and some of the 
outcomes these successive bargains have had for the sustainable development of the 
host region and nation. 
 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Regarding to the organization of this thesis, Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the 
debate about the effects of mining on national and regional development, while also 
introducing the GPN literature which provides crucial elements to address this issue. In 
this chapter, the thesis also seeks to incorporate the mining industry specifically to the 
GPN approach, by following Bridge’s (2008) pioneering work. Chapter 3 aims to 
theoretically unpack the concept of power, by promoting three operational definitions 
based on the power debate literature. Chapter 4 details the methodology used in the 
research, as well as the main data sources. Chapter 5 provides an historical description 
of the Chilean case, and its participation in several mining GPN by way of context for the 
bulk of the original empirical research. Chapter 6 identifies the main strategic power 
resources held by the Chilean State and constraints on deploying this power for its 
bargains. Chapter 7 identifies the strategic resources of the mining MNEs and the 
constraints upon their use. Chapter 8 analyses how the Chilean State and the mining 
MNEs use their strategic resources while facing their constraints in the successive 
bargains taking places in the three different nodes studied in this research, while also 
providing a brief description of the outcomes of such bargains. Chapter 9 concludes this 
research by summarizing its main findings as well as the challenges and opportunities 
for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE GPN APPROACH AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The latest globalization process has caused a major metamorphosis over the 
development possibilities for regions and states, changing the way in which MNEs, State 
and local/international institutions interact. Because of the scope of these changes, a 
broader theoretical framework is needed. However, the current research on economic 
development, especially for developing countries, is focused on state–centric 
assumptions and analyses. This approach forgets that the relations at a meso and micro 
scale are essential for the development process, not just in advanced countries but also 
in less – developed parts of the world (Henderson et al., 2002; Scott & Storper, 2003). 
To overcome this limitation, any new theoretical approach has simultaneously to address 
the complex dynamics of the uneven development and its variety of institutions and 
interest groups involved, operating at multi–scalar level: transnationally, nationally and 
sub– nationally (Coe et al., 2008b; Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2002). Such an 
approach must also address the dynamic and asymmetrical power relationships of the 
agents involved that produce specific geographical outcomes, which can ultimately 
define the living conditions and development outcomes for the host region of the FDI 
(Coe et al., 2008b; Henderson et al., 2002).  
Additionally, it should provide tools for studying what firms do, where they do it, why they 
do it, why they are allowed to do it, their governance structures, internal power struggles 
and how they organize the doing of it across different geographic scales, (Henderson et 
al., 2002; Phelps & Fuller, 2000). This must be assessed to have a better comprehension 
of how their logic influences the outcomes of the bargaining between them and local 
institutions. 
Theoretical attempts to address all these issues have been made through the 
development of the chain and network approaches. Among the former, the main 
representatives are two: the Global Commodity Chains (GCC) concerned to understand 
how global industries are organized in the production and distribution of a particular good 
or service (Bair, 2005; Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994); and the Global Value Chains 
(GVC), more focused on investigating governance structures in different global industries 
(Bair, 2005; Coe et al., 2008a; Gereffi et al., 2005). However, the chain approaches have 
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been criticized because of their conceptualization of production and distribution 
processes as mostly ‘vertical and linear’.  
Among the network literature, the GPN approach2 has become its most relevant 
representative. Whereas the chain approaches offer a vertical and linear conception of 
the production network, the GPN framework considers all relevant actors and 
relationships when deploying the network metaphor (Coe et al., 2008b; Henderson et al., 
2002; MacKinnon, 2012). As Sturgeon posits (2001, p. 10) ‘a chain maps the vertical 
sequence of events leading to the delivery, consumption and the maintenance of goods 
and services… while a network highlights the nature and extend of the inter–firm 
relationships that bind sets of firms into larger economic groupings’.  
Hence, what can be called the ‘GPN 1.0’ approach conceptualises the economic 
processes present in the production network in terms of their linkages, flows and 
feedbacks, rather than a simplistic aggregated or linear perspective, allowing to 
understand how places are being transformed by flows of capital, labour, knowledge and 
power, and how, at the same time, places and their institutions are transforming those 
flows as they locate in place–specific domains (Coe et al., 2008a; Coe et al., 2008b; 
Henderson et al., 2002). 
Recently, GPN 1.0 has been refined in what Yeung and Coe (2015) call the ‘GPN 2.0 
approach’. In their work, they establish that, in many ways, GPN 1.0 remains an 
inadequately developed theory of global production networks since it has not explicitly 
developed and specified the causal mechanisms linking the conceptual categories of 
value, embeddedness, and power to the dynamic configurations of global production 
networks. Hence, they propose that the competitive dynamics between firms and non–
firm actors produce four actor–specific strategies for organizing GPNs and is a first 
attempt to address some of the weaknesses of the GPN approach(Coe & Yeung, 2015; 
Yeung & Coe, 2015), something further developed in Yeung (2016). However, this 
chapter tries to deepen GPN 1.0 rather than GPN 2.0, especially regarding the 
conceptualization and study of power in the changing bargain that takes place among 
the GPN actors due to its relevance for regional development.  
 
                                               
2 The GPN draws on actor–network theory (ANT) (Law, 1999). 
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2.2 A GLOBALIZED WORLD OF NETWORKS  
 
Both chain and network literatures have dealt with the issues previously described. The 
chain approaches have been criticised for depicting linear structures; and for being 
focused mostly on the governance of inter–firm transactions, while not considering other 
actors outside the production chain in the analysis (Henderson et al., 2002). Conversely, 
the GPN approach provides a broad relational framework for studying the intricate 
economic globalisation and its aspects. This framework aims to ‘incorporate all kinds of 
network relationship’ and to ‘encompass all relevant sets of actors and relationships’ in 
the study of the regional development effects of a determined industry (Bridge, 2008; 
Coe et al., 2008b; MacKinnon, 2012). The GPN approach also offers an open and 
geographically sensitive perspective that goes beyond the more restricted and linear 
frameworks offered by the GCC and GVC approaches (Henderson et al., 2002; 
MacKinnon, 2012). This sensitiveness allows the links between the micro (firms), meso 
(regions) and macro level of extractives production to be examined.  
The main aim of the GPN approach is revealing the multi-actor and multi-scalar 
characteristics of global production, through the analysis of three conceptual categories: 
power, value and embeddedness, and how these influence the formation of a ‘strategic 
coupling’ between the MNEs’ interest and regional assets, which would ultimately lead 
to a sustainable growth and development (Coe et al., 2008a; MacKinnon, 2012; Yeung, 
2016). The strength of this approach resides in its incorporation of the complex 
interactions among the economic, political, social and cultural institutions and groups 
which are part of the production network. Such multi–scalar arrangement of actors and 
its dynamic interplays are characterized by asymmetrical power relationships, which 
produce specific geographical outcomes and development possibilities (Coe et al., 
2008b). 
The exercise of power between the actors of the GPN is crucial in determining the value 
creation, enhancement and capture, as well as the level of embeddedness of the MNEs 
in the host region, all of which is related to the ‘strategic coupling’ and virtuous growth 
and development (Coe et al., 2008b, p. 180). Nonetheless and despite its relevance, the 
concept of power, its sources and distribution have not been developed at length in the 
extant GPN literature, being loosely defined and not supported by relevant empirical 
research. This work tries to fill this gap, by ‘unpacking’ the concept of power through the 
construction of an operational definition, and an empirical study about what are its 
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sources, and how its changing distribution shapes value capture, embeddedness, and 
ultimately sustainable regional development.  
 
2.2.1 GPN definitions and categories 
 
Any approach that intends to explain globalized production processes in depth ought to 
consider the complex social, economic, political and cultural relations of the agents and 
institutions involved. These actions and interactions operate ‘at multi–scalar levels and 
territorialities and through dynamic and asymmetrical power relationships [emphasis 
added] to produce specific geographical outcomes: the material world in which people 
struggle to make their lives’ (Coe et al., 2008b, p. 271). The GPN framework makes such 
an effort, through its conceptual categories which allow the study of the development 
chances of the many agents involved. 
Likewise, the GPN is defined as ‘the globally organized nexus of interconnected 
functions and operations by firms and non – firms institutions through which goods and 
services are produced [consumed] and distributed’ (Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 
2002). Such a definition considers the increased organizational complexity of these 
networks, and its increasingly global geographic extension. Furthermore, GPNs integrate 
firms and their sub–units, national regional economies and other actors that participate 
directly or indirectly on the production process.  
This integration takes place in predominantly imbalanced structures where regional and 
national boundaries become blurred, and it will have critical implications for the 
development chances of the economies involved. Such interactions are highly influenced 
by the socio–political context of the geographies where they occur which are mostly 
‘territorial specific’, whereas the production networks themselves are not (Henderson et 
al., 2002). Moreover, GPNs operate through several state boundaries and in different 
scales, partly influenced by ‘regulatory and non–regulatory barriers’ and ‘local 
sociocultural conditions’. This characteristic ‘create structures which are discontinuously 
territorial [emphasis added]’ (Henderson et al., 2002 , pp.446), which occur in a context 
of stark asymmetries of power (Coe et al., 2008b) adding further intricacy to their 
analysis. 
Furthermore, the GPN literature posits that the existence of ‘regional assets’ are a 
necessary precondition for regional development. These assets can be attractive for 
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MNEs and produce economies of scale and scope embedded in within specific regions, 
under specific conditions. In this line, economies of scale can be achieved through highly 
localized concentrations of specific knowledge, skills and expertise. This concentration 
can lead to industrial agglomeration and sustainable growth (Coe et al., 2004). However, 
they could also lead to negative effects, such as dependency, unsustainable growth and 
negative externalities, especially when agglomeration revolves around one or few major 
MNEs (Phelps et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, economies of scope may be present if regions are able to reap the 
‘intangible benefits of learning and the cooperative atmosphere embedded in these 
agglomerations’, also known as ‘spillover effects’ (Coe et al., 2004, p. 470). In this case, 
several high value–added activities may be developed in order to promote cooperation 
and learning processes, which can help to diversify the local productive fabric through 
the apparition of technologically advanced local providers of goods or services. 
Consequently, economies of scale and scope have the potential to promote regional 
development if they can complement the strategic needs of the trans–local actors 
participating in the GPN. This potential is directly related with the ‘creation, enhancement 
and capture of value [emphasis in original]’ (Coe et al., 2004, p. 473) all which depend 
on the power distribution and the degree of embeddedness of the actors involved. 
The GPN approach reduces the complexity of the dynamic interaction of its members by 
addressing them using the conceptual categories of value, power and embeddedness. 
These categories provide a way to achieve a deeper grasp of issues related to network 
governance and power relationships (Coe et al., 2008b). The comprehension of these 
conceptual categories, and their role in producing a ‘strategic coupling’ between the 
‘regional assets’ and the ‘strategic needs’ of the agents involved is crucial for the 
industrial transformation and development possibilities of the host region (Yeung, 2016).  
 
2.2.2 GPN’s conceptual categories 
 
The way in which the three conceptual categories of value, power and embeddedness 
interact and can influence regional development is developed here. In this sense, 
regional development is directly related with the creation, enhancement and capture of 
value. This process is a product of the bargaining that takes place between the agents 
of a particular GPN, where they use their bargaining power to achieve their particular 
strategic needs. The chances of achieving a strategic coupling between the different 
strategic needs will depend upon the outcomes of the bargain, which is articulated deeply 
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influenced by the concrete socio – spatial contexts in which the GPN is embedded (Coe 
et al., 2008b; Yeung, 2016). 
 
2.2.2.1 Value 
 
The term value incorporates both Marxian notions of surplus value and orthodox 
definitions of economic rent. It refers to several forms of economic rent identified by 
Kaplinsky (1998) that can be obtained through market and non – market transactions 
(Coe et al., 2004).  
Value creation refers to the economic return or rent generated by the production of 
commodities for sale, involving the conditions where the conversion of labour power into 
actual labour through the labour process takes place (Henderson et al., 2002; 
MacKinnon, 2012). Value creation is not only produced through the labour process, it 
can also take the form of policy, human resources, organisational, marketing, 
infrastructural, financial, relational, resource and technological rents identified in 
Kaplinsky (1998). Value may be created, for example, through the control of particular 
product and process technologies; the development of certain organizational and 
management capabilities; the harnessing of inter – firm relationships; and the 
prominence of brand – names in key markets (Coe et al., 2004). 
The conceptualization of value as economic rent has, according to Coe et al (2008b), 
two prime implications for the regional development analysis. First, in a GPN where 
different actors can create and retain different forms of rents, some regions can have 
better chances of creating and capturing those rent that are based on their particular 
regional assets. Thus, regions do not need to create or retain all forms of rents, but 
specialize and become competitive only in the ones they can produce economies of 
scale and scope. Second, value can take different shapes when it is transferred through 
the GPN. This multiplicity suggests that value creation and capture analysis should 
unpack the different forms of rent that these values encapsulate in order to have a better 
understanding of its contribution to regional development.  
The second aspect, value enhancement, has to do with the necessity of firms to compete 
for a market share, which can be achieved through processes of knowledge and 
technological transfer, industrial upgrading, the provision of more advanced 
infrastructure and the upgrading of specialized skills and production capabilities in the 
local labour pool and productive fabric (Coe et al., 2004; MacKinnon, 2012).  
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All this raises the issues of value capture, the third aspect, in terms of which actors and 
locations in the networks are able to appropriate and retain value, highlighting questions 
of ownership, power and control (Henderson et al., 2002; MacKinnon, 2012). It is one 
thing for value to be created and enhanced in given locations, but it may be quite another 
for it to be captured for the benefit of those locations. This means that value capture can 
be a deeply controversial matter, especially considering the asymmetrical power 
relationships usually present in the GPN relationships.  
The capture of value is related with matters of state policy and corporate governance in 
given national contexts, as well as ownership and profit retention inside the region. These 
issues also reflect, in some degree, the extent to which key firms are locally owned and 
embedded in the regional economy. Furthermore, value capture is a result of the 
dynamic bargaining process that takes place between the MNEs and the rest of local 
and non–local actors of the GPN, which is determined by their bargaining power. 
Therefore, power and control are critical in the analysis of the distributional aspects of 
regional development and the sustainability of the GPN (Coe et al., 2004; MacKinnon, 
2012). Despite of its relevance, the bargaining process and power asymmetries have not 
been studied in depth by the GPN literature. A deeper description about how power 
relates to value creation, enhancement and capture is developed in a later section about 
power. Moreover, all these issues related to value creation, enhancement and capture 
are shaped by the degree and kind of embeddedness of the key firms and agents.  
 
2.2.2.2 Embeddedness  
 
In this sense, GPNs do not only connect economic and non–economic actors, but they 
also link aspects of the social and spatial contexts in which those actors are embedded. 
These local and translocal relations take place among actors with diverse social 
backgrounds and inserted in wider networks, which are spread over different spatial 
scales (Henderson et al., 2002; Hess, 2004).  
Furthermore, spatial proximity in these relations facilitates the exchange of information, 
experience and knowledge, which is vital for the stimuli of regional growth and 
development. Proximity enables the sharing of strategic resources available only in face 
to face interactions, which can generate positive externalities and virtuous forms of 
agglomerations (Harrison, 2007). Three dimensions can be defined in order to 
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understand these interactions: societal, network and territorial embeddedness (Hess, 
2004). 
Social embeddedness relates to the origins and background of the participants of a 
particular GPN. It reveals the importance of the broad societal characteristics of the place 
where an actor comes from: the history, cultural heritage, political situation and economic 
structure of their ‘birthplace’ shapes their values and behaviour. This ‘genetic code’ 
represents the local/regional/natural ‘culture’ and it strongly influences actors’ 
performance within their respective societies and outside it. Likewise, this cultural 
baggage also relates to the way in which GPN actors position themselves within wider 
institutional and regulatory networks (Hess, 2004; MacKinnon, 2012). 
Network embeddedness, on the other hand, describes the network of actors with which 
an agent is related, regardless of their country of origin or local anchoring in particular 
places (Henderson et al., 2002; Hess, 2004). The ‘architecture’, durability and stability of 
these formal and informal relations determine the agents’ individual network 
embeddedness and the structure and evolution of the GPN as a whole. The former 
relates to the social and economic interrelationships between different actors, whereas 
the structural aspect of network embeddedness considers not only the agents involved 
in the productive process, but also the broader institutional networks, including non–
business agents like governmental and non – governmental actors (Henderson et al., 
2002; MacKinnon, 2012; Yeung, 1998). Summarizing, ‘network embeddedness relates 
to the topological space of networks, in which distance and proximity are a function of 
the relations between actors without being confined to particular regions’ (Hess, 2004, 
p. 181). 
Finally, territorial embeddedness considers the extent to which a GPN actor is ‘anchored’ 
in particular territories. Economic actors become embedded in the sense that they 
absorb and are constrained by the socio–economic dynamics that already exist in those 
places. Thus, territorial embeddedness comes from the construction of substantial 
socio–economic linkages between the foreign and local actors, like in the Marshallian 
sense (Hess, 2004). These linkages may be related to the historical ties between firms 
and particular locations, but they can be weakened by the constant need to find new and 
cheaper locations to invest and stay competitive, which reflects the tensions between 
spatial fixity and mobility that are endemic to capitalism (Harvey, 1982; MacKinnon, 
2012). 
Moreover, the location of lead firms in particular places might generate a new local 
network of economic and social relations, involving existing firms as well as attracting 
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new ones. Territorial embeddedness, then, becomes a key element in regional economic 
growth and in capturing global opportunities. What is more, the nature of these locations 
also influences how the agents behave and perform inside the GPN, along with the 
changing power relationships in the network. The environmental factors derived from a 
firm’s location may affect its competence, which determines the strength of its influence 
over the dynamic bargaining process between them and other actors of the network (Coe 
et al., 2008b). 
Similarly, national and local government policies may explicitly or implicitly aim to embed 
particular parts of the GPN in particular cities or regions, in order to support the formation 
of new nodes and clusters in the host regions . However, the positive effects of 
embeddedness in a particular place cannot be taken for granted over time. For example, 
once a lead firm cuts its ties within a region3, a process of disembedding takes place 
(Pike et al., 2000, pp. 60-61). This potentially undermines the previous base for economic 
growth and value capture, which can be the case if the agglomeration takes form as an 
economic enclave (Henderson et al., 2002). 
Hence, territorial embeddedness can be linked to a space in which objects and actors 
are clustered together and boundaries can be drawn. Consequently, the mode of 
territorial embeddedness or the degree of a GPN firm’s commitment to a particular 
location is an important factor for value creation, enhancement and capture, which is 
crucial for sustainable regional development (Henderson et al., 2002; Hess, 2004). 
 
2.2.2.3 Power 
 
Additionally, regional development does not take place on a level playing field. Power 
imbalances and the increasing ‘footloose’ nature of MNEs and hypermobility of FDI 
present limits to the bargaining position of national/local institutions. This is a critical 
issue for sustainable regional development and prosperity, since the sources of power 
and the ways it is exercised and distributed within the GPNs are decisive in determining 
the potential for value enhancement and, most importantly, value capture (Coe et al., 
2004; Henderson et al., 2002). 
                                               
3 Like disinvestment or plant closure. 
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If power asymmetries pervade the production network, local actors may not be able to 
capture much of the value created in the region, seriously hindering their regional 
development perspectives (Amin & Thrift, 1994; Coe et al., 2004). When MNEs 
concentrate power, regional assets can be transferred out of the region through 
repatriation of profits and, eventually, the relocation of the productive networks in other 
regions. This situation has historically created unsustainable agglomerations in the form 
of economic enclaves. Conversely, regions with considerable or strategic regional assets 
may be successful in creating value in team–based projects that require face–to–face 
interaction in spatially proximate clusters that can promote the apparition of 
agglomeration economies, economic diversification and sustainable growth (Coe et al., 
2004). 
While the concept of power in social thought is a complex one (see Clegg, 2002; Lukes, 
2005), the GPN literature follows Allen (2003), who defines power not as a capacity or a 
repertoire of resources possessed by actors, but rather as relational effects of social 
interaction. To Allen 
‘Power as an outcome cannot and should not be ‘read off’ from a resource base, 
regardless of its size or scope . . . It is, as suggested, a relational effect, not a property 
of someone or some ‘thing’. Power . . . is often disguised as resources and in that sense 
we need to disentangle the two; we need to distinguish clearly between the exercise of 
power and the resource capabilities mobilized to sustain that exercise’ (2003, p. 5). 
However, this distinction between the exercise of power and resources and capabilities 
has not been empirically addressed in the GPN literature, leaving the use and 
operationalization of the concept of power in a theoretical ‘black box’. Furthermore, the 
actors’ capacity to exercise power will be limited by the bargaining power of each actor, 
highlighting the relevance of the bargaining process and its dynamics within the GPN 
(Henderson et al., 2002; MacKinnon, 2012). The central relevance of the bargaining 
process in the distribution and exertion of power repeatedly has been highlighted in the 
GPN literature, but has not been theoretically or empirically linked to it in a deeper way. 
According to the GPN literature, there can be three main forms of power: corporate, 
institutional and collective power. Corporate power refers to the lead firm’s capacity to 
influence decisions and resource allocations, decisively and consistently in its own 
interests, through the control over key resources, like information, knowledge, skills and 
brands within a GPN (MacKinnon, 2012). Lead firms in these networks concentrate an 
immense corporate control of resources through their ability for collecting and processing 
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information globally. Such information asymmetry can play a large role in strengthening 
their bargaining position when they interact with regional institutions (Dicken, 2011). 
However, the utilization of a network approach implies a complete rejection of a ‘zero 
sum conception of power’, in that lead firms rarely, if ever, concentrate all the corporate 
power (Henderson et al., 2002). The GPN framework assumes power to be 
asymmetrically distributed in production networks, meaning that the specific 
configurations and asymmetries of power within GPNs are largely complex, contingent 
and variable over time. For example, the power relationships between firms their 
suppliers are rarely as simple as the conventional wisdom tends to suggest whereby the 
large automatically dominate and exploit the small. As Coe et al posit (2008b, p. 276) 
‘size does not always matter’. 
Small firms can also have sufficient autonomy to develop and exercise their own 
strategies, which can be achieved in combination with others. A successful 
agglomeration of small firms can take the form of a SMEs cluster, presenting most of the 
positive externalities of an industrial district and benefit from the GPNs’ global markets 
and connections (Henderson et al., 2002). However, agglomerations of SMEs are not 
produced out of thin air, they require strong regional institutions and clearly defined 
policies in order to create the conditions for the apparition of clusters. Institutional power, 
thus, plays a crucial role in this. 
Institutional power refers to the exercise of power by: (a) the national and local state; (b) 
international inter – state agencies (European Union, NAFTA); (c) the ‘Bretton Woods’ 
institutions and the World Trade Organisation; (d) the various UN agencies; and (e) the 
major international credit rating agencies which exercise a unique form of private 
institutional power. The capacity to exercise power to influence the most important 
decisions of lead companies and other agents integrated into the GPN is ‘inevitably 
asymmetric’ and varies both ‘within and between’ these five categories (Henderson et 
al., 2002). In this way, some strong national states (especially in East Asia) have 
successfully influenced private companies in order to achieve industrialization and 
development. On the contrary, countries where neoliberal policies and legislation favour 
the FDI attraction while weakening the unions, civil society and state’s bargaining 
position, have not been able to fully benefit from presence of MNEs.  
The power of interstate agencies has been considered as potentially strong for some 
cases like the EU, but it seems almost insignificant in other contexts like countries of the 
Global South. The power of the Bretton Woods institutions is still significant in countries 
needing financial aid, but it seems to have weakened in countries free of debts and with 
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greater degree of autonomy. The UN agencies have little to no direct power compared 
to the rest, since its influence is only moral and advisory. The credit rating agencies, 
however, can still hold an extensive power, both directly for many lead companies and 
indirectly via their credit risk assessments of national governments, but little is known 
about the way they exercise that power (Henderson et al., 2002). 
Likewise, the more the region is articulated in a GPN, the more it will have to benefit from 
the economies of scale and scope in these networks. However, it is also more prone to 
be affected by external crises, control and dependence (Coe et al., 2004). The role that 
national and local institutions play in this balance is crucial for harnessing the best of the 
GPN while protecting the national and regional economies from its global dangers, and 
their bargaining power will greatly influence the possibilities for regional development. 
Likewise, value capture can be strongly enhanced by the non–firm institutions and their 
accumulation and exertion of power.  
The last form of power is collective power, which is associated with the actions of 
collective agents who seek to influence companies at particular locations in GPNs, their 
respective governments and, occasionally, international agencies. This includes the 
local, national or international constitution of the various collective actors participating in 
the GPN, such as the firms (trade and labour unions, employers’ associations), 
consumers and civil society organizations (NGOs involved with human and 
environmental issues, neighbour councils, consumer associations and political parties) 
and academia (Henderson et al., 2002).  
In most circumstances where these organizations are engaged in, they attempt to 
balance the exercise of power of the other actors, either directly on particular firms or 
groups of firms within given networks or indirectly on national governments or 
international agencies. The exertion of this collective power by the different collectives 
aims to influence and shape the institutional and regional environment in their favour. 
Such situation is especially strong on economically weak nations or regions, where they 
compete to attract and retain investment by offering the best conditions for FDI 
(Henderson et al., 2002; MacKinnon, 2012). 
Furthermore, even though labour, consumers and civil society are often (though not 
always) relatively powerless compared with the MNEs that dominate GPNs, they have 
learned to organize to be effective. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have become 
increasingly important in the global systems during the last decade by evolving from local 
to international organizations, and linking themselves to global organizations sharing 
similar objectives. CSOs’ influence varies widely, but there are some industries where 
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they are extremely prominent and have significant influence over corporate behaviour, 
such as the natural resources, energy, clothing and textile industries (Coe et al., 2008b).  
The collective power that some CSOs have displayed is such that some authors claim 
that ‘they are the originators, advocates and judges of global values and norms’ (Beck, 
2005, p. 238), a position they achieved ‘by sparking public outrage and generating global 
public indignation over spectacular norm violations’ (Coe et al., 2008b, p. 288). These 
constant pressures and embarrassment carried out by some CSOs have been so strong, 
that some consider them the main reasons for the current trend towards explicit 
corporate social responsibility policies (CSR) among MNEs. CSRs has been widely used 
lately as a way to alleviate these allegations and recover the MNEs’ social licence to 
operate, especially when the MNEs presence is associated with serious negative 
externalities like pollution, corruption and violations of human rights (Coe et al., 2008b; 
Dicken, 2011; Gereffi et al., 2001). Nonetheless, the relevance of CSOs over the 
changing bargaining processes and their relation with the other actors involved in the 
production network has not been expanded by the GPN literature.  
 
2.2.3 How the different actors interact 
 
A further explanation about how these categories affect the interactions of the GPN 
actors is needed in order to understand the way institutions and governance structures 
affect the dynamic bargaining process and hence the possibilities for strategic coupling 
and regional development.  
GPNs can be considered as contested fields, where the production is organized between 
actors that belong to quite different industries and social contexts (Levy, 2008). This 
intrinsic diversity means that there is usually a confrontation between the various 
particular agendas and objectives, one that will be resolved though the dynamic bargain 
whose outcomes depend upon the relative power configuration of each actor in specific 
situations.  
Moreover, power relationships between GPN actors are not structurally determined or 
unidirectional (Coe et al., 2008b). Each of the most important set of actors in the global 
economy is involved in both cooperation/collaboration and in conflict/competition 
relations at the same time (Dicken, 2011). This paradoxical behaviour highlights the 
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relevance of not assuming that the relationships between the GPN actors are always of 
one kind.  
For example, the relationships between MNEs and national/regional states are not 
always based on conflict or competition. They can cooperate if they are part of a joint 
development project, where they may try to promote the apparition of positive 
externalities that would benefit both firms and regions. Likewise, relationships between 
different labour unions may not be always cooperative, even between unions that belong 
to the same firm. Internal power struggles or rivalries may prevent comradeship to take 
place. All these different (and sometimes unexpected) interactions are related with the 
diversity of actors and networks, all of which are imbued within an ever–changing mixture 
of both cooperative and competitive relationships (Coe et al., 2008b). 
It is also important noticing that regions do not automatically benefit from being ‘plugged’ 
into GPNs. Regional benefits can be hindered for several reasons: local actors may be 
creating value that does not maximize the region’s economic potential, the enhancement 
of value might not be happening inside the region (or at all), and the local actors may not 
be able to capture much of the value created within the region. For example, a region 
may have an advantage on some regional assets, like in the quantity and quality of 
mineral ores they possess. However, the value created might not be enhanced inside 
the region by the MNEs. Mining corporations may be focused only on exporting raw 
minerals without promoting other value-adding processes, like refineries or advanced 
engineering services. Moreover, much of the value created in the exploitation of this 
abundant natural resource may be transferred out of the region through the repatriation 
of profits and eventually the relocation of production networks to other regions (Coe et 
al., 2004). 
Accordingly, regional assets can become an advantage for regional development only if 
they fit the strategic needs of global production networks, a process that the GPN 
framework calls ‘strategic coupling’. This coupling takes place as an outcome of a 
dynamic bargaining process between the agents involved in the production network, 
where each actor exerts all their bargaining power based on the strategic resources they 
hold. Furthermore, the process of ‘fitting’ regional assets with strategic needs of global 
production networks requires the presence of appropriate institutional structures that 
simultaneously promote regional advantages and enhance the region’s articulation into 
GPNs (Coe et al., 2004, p. 474).  
Similarly, regional institutions have an essential role in shaping the regional development 
possibilities of a globally embedded region. They can balance the power asymmetries 
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obstructing the benefits from such networks, while also providing the ‘glue’ that ties 
global capital and unleashes regional potential. By regional institutions this research 
includes local specific institutions, such as the national, regional and local government, 
and other civil organizations and extra–local institutions that influence activities within 
the region without necessarily having a physical presence (like the national tax authority). 
Hence, regional institutions play a major role in creating, enhancing and capturing, which 
are the base for regional development (Coe et al., 2004). 
However, GPNs are characterized by profound power asymmetries that usually favour 
MNEs. The global scope of MNEs provide them with several pivotal advantages over 
regional institutions that make their position stronger: they can collect and process big 
quantities of information globally; produce and have access to the newest technology; 
have a detailed knowledge of the market and; most notably, concentrate big amounts of 
capital, allowing them to invest in projects and infrastructure. Thus, regional development 
will have a strong non–local component, as the exercise of power in particular places 
may be originated at some other distant location.  
The GPN framework posits that regional institutions and civil society will try to counteract 
the region’s dependency from external forces by exerting all their bargaining power. The 
bargaining position of these regional institutions can be particularly strong when their 
region–specific assets are highly complementary to the strategic needs of MNEs, in 
which case they can become considerable powerful in relation to the MNEs present in 
the production network. An example of this is when regions offer notably cheaper factors 
of productions, strategic resources that cannot be found somewhere else – like minerals 
or specific know-how, highly cooperative trade relations and favourable labour and tax 
legislations.  
Moreover, value capture can be enhanced in the region if MNEs reinvest or retain 
earnings in the local subsidiaries instead of exporting their earnings to their 
headquarters. This scenario is plausible when such subsidiaries play a critical function 
in the GPN and it can be stimulated through the availability of venture capital formation 
or favourable support from national banking institutions. In both scenarios, regional 
actors directly and indirectly involved in the GPN – workforce, suppliers, SMEs –are likely 
to benefit from the enhancement and retention of value through skill upgrading, 
technological innovation and new venture formation.  
Despite all of the above, value is unlikely to be retained in the region unless certain basic 
structures are already in place. These include a critical mass of know–how, skills and 
finance in rapidly evolving growth markets, a socio-cultural and institutional infrastructure 
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capable of designing and funding a common industrial agenda, and entrepreneurial 
traditions encouraging growth through vertical disintegration of the division of labour 
(Amin & Thrift, 1992, p. 585). The role of the State is critical in providing these basic 
structures, which can assure a significant retention of value in the host region. 
Consequently, the State is the main institution in charge of bargaining with MNEs to get 
the best of their presence, through its policies and regional resources management. 
Furthermore, the continuous bargains taking place in the GPN will be significantly 
influenced by the governance structures of the regional institutions and MNEs, all of 
which determine the possibilities for sustainable regional development.  
 
2.3 THE BARGAINING PROCESS, THE STATE AND THE STRATEGIC COUPLING 
 
2.3.1 Weaknesses and gaps in the GPN approach  
 
Despite the literature supporting the benefits for regions and states of being plugged into 
a GPN, there are several critical voices questioning the universality of these claims. Such 
authors raise questions about the shortcomings, dangers and weaknesses related to the 
‘dark side’ of the GPNs, especially for the host regions in developing countries (Coe et 
al., 2008b; MacKinnon, 2012; Yeung & Coe, 2015). Some of the most relevant 
drawbacks are: the lack of depth in the study of power and the increasing power 
asymmetries; decoupling and regional downgrading processes; the neglect of the 
extractive industries; and the inadequate theory development and empirical work by the 
GPN 1.0 regarding to the conceptual categories of power, value and embeddedness; all 
of which have important implications for regional development possibilities.  
Arguably, there is a lack of depth in studying the concept of power, the bargaining power 
and power asymmetries in the GPN literature. Power is crucial in determining the 
regional development and, unless we assume perfect market competition, socio–
economic relations are usually characterized by stark asymmetries in its distribution. The 
GPN approach, however, has tended to underplay the tensions that arise from the 
differential powers of key agents in particular the often unequal nature of the 
relationships between key agents like the local residents, regional institutions and MNEs 
(Dawley, 2011). 
Furthermore, most of the GPN literature stresses the central role of power and the 
bargaining process in achieving a strategic coupling, but there are scant efforts to 
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‘unpack’ these concepts, to operationalize them or to apply them in an empirical analysis. 
The definition of power used in the GPN approach has been considered too simplistic, 
and the link between power and the bargaining process has not been deepened or 
studied (Yeung & Coe, 2015). The rational link among these two concepts is the concept 
of ‘bargaining power’, but it has been used only in a superficial way, even though the 
‘obsolescing bargain’ literature deeply advanced its definition and applications. 
This is particularly worrying, since power distribution and accumulation has been one of 
the main concerns of earlier political economy approaches to regional development. This 
literature recognized and warned about the dire implications that power concentration in 
MNEs’ hands can have for the host region, especially in terms of forging external 
technological, cultural and capital dependency (Cardoso & Faletto, 2007; Harvey, 1982; 
Massey, 1984; Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). Historically, when MNEs concentrate power 
– or bargaining power specifically –, they have not had any incentive to achieve a 
strategic coupling with the host region, since their primary goal is related to profit 
maximisation.  
Likewise, power asymmetries between MNEs and regional institutions reflect the spatial 
mobility of the former over the regional specific assets of the later (Phelps, 2008). Hence, 
MNEs have the power to make regions compete with each other in order to offer the best 
conditions, in terms of financial, legal and institutional support. Such a situation has been 
widely fostered by neoliberal policies promoted by international institutions (IMF, WB, 
WTO), which have spread deregulation, trade liberalisation and privatisation. These 
policies aimed to reduce the barriers to movement of capital over space while privileging 
the demands of MNEs over those of other interests groups such as labour and SMEs 
(Harvey, 2010; MacKinnon, 2012; Peck et al., 2010). This, in turn, has caused weaker 
and more dependant local institutions that are unable to bargain in fair conditions with 
MNEs. 
This concentration of power by the MNEs is usually complemented with the political 
power to mould national and subnational regulatory environments to their needs. In some 
cases, this can result in ‘corporate capture of public goods’ whereby MNEs are able to 
re-orientate regional institutional capacities to serve their interests at the expense of 
other actors such as indigenous firms and workers (Phelps, 2000, 2008). Thus, the study 
of power asymmetries is fundamental for understanding the possibilities for regional 
development. Power concentration in the hands of MNEs will reinforce regional 
dependency on foreign forces and actors, leading to an unsustainable development and 
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a vicious cycle that reinforces itself, which can ultimately take the spatial form of an 
economic enclave (Figure 1 and 2).  
Additionally, there is a denial of decoupling, recoupling and downgrading processes in 
the GPN literature, which has also paid little attention to the historical evolution and 
transformation of production networks and regional assets over time. Strategic coupling 
can be viewed in evolutionary terms, suggesting that regional institutions’ capacities to 
bargain with MNEs will reflect the legacy of previous strategies and forms of investments. 
Processes of decoupling, downgrading and corporate abandonment have attracted little 
attention (MacKinnon, 2012). Coe and Hess (2011) identify ruptures between GPNs and 
regions related to disinvestment, in addition to intra – regional ruptures such as political 
exclusion, the severing of local economic ties and displacement and eviction. Such forms 
of decoupling also need to become a more central focus of GPN research. 
Another flaw is the neglect of the extractive industry, since as Coe (2008b) and Bridge 
(2008) state, the GPN literature tends to ignore extractive industries almost entirely. They 
explain that the production is unequivocally grounded in the environment, as all forms of 
GPN demands on the natural resources through its needs inputs for the production 
process (resources) and the outcomes that emits to the natural environment, in the form 
of pollution or waste. This has caused several problems that are not being addressed by 
the current GPN research, like the overuse of non–renewable and renewable resources, 
the destruction of ecosystems, and the sustainability of the growth and development for 
the host regions. This point is especially interesting considering that the bargaining 
power of regions is particularly high when their region-specific assets are complementary 
to the strategic needs of the MNEs. Thence, extractive regions should have a 
considerable amount of bargaining power, which is not the average scenario. Moreover, 
the extractive industry is the basic pillar for several developing countries, as well as their 
developed counterparts that use these resources as inputs, so further research is 
compulsory to fill in this theoretical gap. 
From all these criticism, this research focuses on developing a conceptual and empirical 
contribution regarding to the bargaining power of the MNEs and the State within an 
extractive GPN, which can ultimately determine the development possibilities of the host 
region and country. In this sense, understanding the bargaining processes and the role 
of the state in reaching a strategic coupling becomes vital. 
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2.3.2 The bargaining process 
 
The dynamic bargaining processes happening at the different scales of the GPN have 
direct implications for value capture and the regional development possibilities. Such 
outcomes are determined by the exertion of bargaining power among the agents 
involved. Nonetheless, power is unevenly distributed among the actors participating in 
the GPN, so the conditions framing the initial bargains do not take place in a fair playfield 
(Coe et al., 2004). The outcomes of these bargains will reflect the adjustment of each 
actor’s needs and assets, or the degree in which there is a ‘strategic coupling’ and 
regional development possibilities.  
As in all bargaining situations, the relative power of actors within a network depends, 
largely, on the extent to which each possesses assets sought by the other party and the 
extent to which access to such assets can be controlled. The scarcer the asset, the 
greater the bargaining power it conveys and vice versa (Coe et al., 2008b, p. 276). 
Hence, the weakest actors in a GPN will be those who hold easily replaceable assets.  
However, this is not a static situation. Actors can upgrade their assets and competencies 
by forming associative relationships and becoming more competitive, while also reaping 
power from their position within the other GPNs to which they belong. Contrarily, actors 
can also lose bargaining power when there are significant changes in the status quo or 
initial conditions. Power asymmetries related to the bargain process are dynamic and 
sensitive to the changes in local and trans – local socioeconomic and political conditions. 
Such changes can provoke drastic adjustments in the power balance, which are usually 
followed by new bargains. Here, the bargains will take place in some or all of the multiple 
scales where the GPN’s actors are distributed, depending on the spatial scope of the 
changes. The actors involved in the new negotiations will exert all their bargaining power, 
determining the potential for regional value creation, enhancement and, more 
importantly, value capture.  
An example of these shifting conditions is the implementation of neoliberal or FDI friendly 
policies in an industry. This provokes a shift in the power balance towards the MNEs, 
which in turn will demand a new bargain with the regional institutions in order to establish 
new and more beneficial conditions to their strategic interests. Similarly, regions holding 
strategic valuable and scarce resources may wait until considerable sunk costs are made 
by a MNE to renegotiate the conditions, taking advantage of the spatial fixation of the 
investment. Moreover, the way in which these bargains take place and the outcomes 
they produce are also shaped by the governance structures of the agents involved. 
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These structures relate to the way in which firms, states and other actors organize 
themselves and decide how to use their strategic assets as sources of bargaining power. 
 
2.3.3 The state and regional development 
 
Governance structures of firms and regional institutions are another decisive variable 
influencing the way in which the actors exert their bargaining power. Certainly, each 
region/nation has a specific socio economic context, which, in turn, presents distinct 
governance structures (Coe et al., 2004). The diversity on such structures also implies 
that similar developmental policies may have different impacts on regional assets, 
meaning that there is not a unique ‘holy policy’ that can assure strategic coupling and 
regional development for all regions and cases. 
Hence, national/regional states play a central role in obtaining the best out of the 
bargaining processes, since they usually hold the most powerful bargaining position to 
get the best conditions for regional development. Under certain circumstances, national 
and regional states can exert a considerable influence that can ensure positive national 
and local benefits. However, to achieve this, the national/regional state not only has to 
have the theoretical capacity to control the access to assets within its territory but also 
the power actually to determine such access. In other words, ‘strong’ states can be highly 
effective in the power struggle over investments (Coe et al., 2008b, p. 282).  
Still, some argue that states’ position have weakened in relation to MNEs, especially 
when they are highly embedded in GPNs (see Petkova, 2006). When national/regional 
institutions are weakly developed or completely missing, MNEs find little or no resistance 
to their exercise of power and can impose their will over the rest of the actors, capturing 
value, public goods and the regional institutions for their own benefit (Phelps, 2008). This 
situation has been deepened by the increasing adoption of neoliberal market policies of 
concessions and incentives granted to MNEs by some developing nations, like the ones 
included in the IMF’s ‘structural adjustment programmes’, causing great difficulties for 
achieving regional development.  
However, the regional integration agreements – such as the European Union – have 
allowed states to retrieve a measure of their bargaining power. As Bartlett and Seleny 
(1998) emphasize, this was only possible since the EU acted as a unified ‘strong state’. 
As they explain, without the EU post–communist countries in Eastern Europe would have 
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been relatively powerless (Coe et al., 2008b), highlighting, again, the relevance of a 
strong local, national or supranational state that is able to represent regional’s interests 
when bargaining with MNEs. 
Henceforth, the likelihood of value capture for the host region is greatly enhanced when 
regional institutions are able to exert considerable power in the bargains with MNEs and 
other agents of the GPN. The bargaining power of each actor varies according to 
territorially specific, and dynamic, socio–economic configurations, as well as their 
strategic assets and the particular governance structures of the institutions and firms. 
Therefore, knowledge about these territorially specific power configurations is essential 
for regional institutions to take appropriate measures for transforming a region’s assets 
and to maximize their bargaining power and impact (Coe et al., 2004). The strength of 
regional and national states is, therefore, crucial in promoting a strategic coupling 
between the regional and corporate interests, a necessary condition for sustainable 
regional development. 
 
2.3.4 Strategic coupling 
  
In the GPN’ approach, regional development is a consequence of the strategic coupling 
between the interests and assets of the MNEs and regional institutions involved in the 
production network (Coe et al., 2008b; Coe et al., 2004; MacKinnon, 2012). Such a 
process is one of the main contributions of this literature and, consequently, widely 
studied. Strategic coupling is defined as ‘the dynamic processes through which actors in 
cities and or regions coordinate, mediate, and arbitrage strategic interests between local 
actors and their counterparts in the global economy’ (Yeung, 2009, p. 332). These multi–
scalar processes involve material flows in transactional terms and non–material flows 
like information, intelligence, and practices (Yeung, 2009). 
Furthermore, Yeung (2009) explains that this coupling mechanism has some very 
singular attributes since it is strategic, meaning that the process does not happen without 
the active intervention and intentional action on the part of the participants. Hence, the 
actors will make their best efforts exerting all their bargaining power to get the better 
conditions for their strategic needs. The process is also time–space contingent as the 
coupling process is subject to change. A typical strategic coupling resembles more a 
form of temporary coalition among the different actors and institutions rather than long 
term commitments or alliances. Additionally, the coupling process goes beyond territorial 
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boundaries and geographical scales, as actors from multiple spatial scales (international 
institutions, multinationals, states, regions, and localities) converge and their practices 
radiate out to diverse geographical places – some global and some highly local.  
Essentially, the strategic coupling concept is about explaining the dynamic relational 
processes and mechanisms that occur when the key actors of the GPN reach a mutually 
beneficial agreement. The strength that each actor has in order to achieve their strategic 
needs will depend on their bargaining power and assets, and its outcome will have multi-
scalar consequences for everyone involved directly and indirectly in the production 
network, as well for the spaces where they are located.  
Additionally, Yeung (2009) recognizes three processes and mechanisms that facilitate 
the strategic coupling. The first relates to the emergence of transnational communities, 
formed by the transnational elite professionals and businessmen that are constantly 
traveling around the world. This spatial mobility and face to face interaction allows them 
to construct informal webs for sharing knowledge and technology based on a shared 
social identity and/or nationalistic feelings. Transnational communities and social capital 
have been proved as crucial in regional development (Phelps & Wood, 2006; Rodríguez 
Pose & Storper, 2006) since they provide a significant mechanism for international 
diffusion of knowledge and the creation and upgrading of local capabilities, especially in 
developing countries (Saxenian, 2002). They also help to coordinate the efforts between 
MNEs and suppliers through different languages and business cultures, which facilitates 
the communication and strategic coupling inside the GPN. 
The second mechanism is the change experienced in the industrial organization. The 
increasing social division of labour creates opportunities for adopting organizational and 
technological innovations in some regions and countries, and plug themselves into 
broader GPNs. Many industries are passing through a process of vertical disintegration 
where individual MNEs are shortening their value chain activities, just to reintegrate 
those processes in cheaper/more profitable geographical dispersed locations. Such 
process of vertical disintegration/reintegration provide a strategic coupling platform for 
local and regional firms in the regions and countries where the productions stages have 
been relocated. However, these changes in industrial organization depend greatly on 
technological changes and how regions and firms can adapt their capabilities to them. 
The last mechanism relates to the initiatives of states and institutions. The two previous 
mechanisms greatly depend on the fierce efforts that some state institutions to achieve 
strategic coupling. One of the most important morals regarding the success of some 
Asian countries – like Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea – is that there is little doubting 
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the decisive role their states and governments have played in paving the way to become 
the major exporters of information and technology worldwide. State institutions have also 
become increasingly important in the last decades, by promoting the enhancement of 
human resources and physical infrastructure through strong industrial policies, all of 
which established suitable conditions for regional growth and development. 
If the strategic coupling process is a success, there will be possibilities for the 
diversification of the local production, through the birth of new local suppliers of the GPN 
and specialized firms that may become part of new GPNs. Such a fertile environment is 
ideal for the appearance of SMEs clusters, which are usually associated with sustainable 
growth and regional development. Knowledge spillovers and capital reinvestment in the 
host region are critical variables for this to happen, since the capture of the value 
produced in the region should lead to a virtuous cycle of self–sustained growth regional 
development.  
Still, the process of ‘fitting’ regional assets with the strategic needs of the MNEs requires 
the presence of appropriate institutional structures that simultaneously promote regional 
advantages and enhance the region’s articulation into the GPN, since failing in producing 
a strategic coupling can leave to unsustainable forms of agglomeration, namely, 
economic enclaves (Coe et al., 2004). 
Again, it is imperative for regional institutions to ensure that strategic coupling occurs 
with the needs of MNEs in GPNs and to guarantee that the creation, enhancement and 
capture of value takes place inside the region. The strategic coupling is an outcome of 
the bargaining process between MNEs and local institutions; hence, if local institutions’ 
bargaining position is strong, they will be able to ensure a successful strategic coupling 
between local and MNEs’ interests, so the region will be able to benefit from this 
relationship. This means that local institutions, and especially regional states, are critical 
actors in promoting sustained economic and social development in the locations 
incorporated into GPNs (Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2002; MacKinnon, 2012).  
2.3.5 Three challenges of the GPN 1.0 
 
As figure 2 summarizes, the previous discussion expands the concepts and dynamics 
comprised within the GPN 1.0 approach. Here, regions and corporations hold strategic 
assets, used in the bargains aimed to achieve their strategic objectives. The outcomes 
of these bargains are determined by the bargaining power each actor accumulates and 
exerts. Hence, if regional institutions exert a greater bargaining power in relation to 
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MNEs, there will be possibilities for synergies, positive externalities and, ultimately, a 
strategic coupling between local and trans–local interests. Such coupling means that a 
significant amount of value will be created, enhanced and captured locally, leading to a 
diversification of the local productive fabric. Furthermore, MNEs will be more embedded 
in the local economy, which can stimulate the apparition of an economic cluster, fostering 
the chances for sustainable regional development. 
Conversely, if MNEs hold more bargaining power than regional institutions, they will try 
to get the best conditions for exploiting the regional assets, looking for favourable 
legislation, concessions and capture of public goods and regional institutions, making 
the strategic coupling impossible. Moreover, the region will probably become dependent 
on external forces and will develop a specialization in the production of low value added 
activities. Value enhancement activities will probably take place outside the region, and 
most of the value may be capture and exported by the MNEs, who will have minimal 
embeddedness in the region. This can generate a vicious cycle and the illusion of growth, 
unsustainable in the long run, taking the spatial form of an economic enclave and grim 
chances for regional development.  
However, the discussion so far leaves three main issues weakly developed. Firstly, the 
extractive industries have been almost absent in the analysis, despite being the base of 
most of the current final and intermediate goods. Secondly, issues related to the 
bargaining processes between the actors involved within a GPN, and how these 
determine the strategic coupling between the actor’s particular interests, are seriously 
underdeveloped. Thirdly, the concept of power, which ultimately explains value capture 
and the potential sustainable development possibilities for the host region and country, 
has not been conceptually unpacked or empirically analysed.  
These three underdeveloped aspects of the GPN approach are closely related. Indeed 
a focus on the extractive industry can enhance the GPN 1.0 approach and reach a better 
understanding of the concept of power, and how it relates with the bargains taking place 
within the GPN and the possibilities of reaching a strategic coupling among the actors. 
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Figure 2: GPN approach summary. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
2.4 INCORPORATING THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY IN THE GPN APPROACH 
 
2.4.1 The extractive industry 
 
In a very real sense, the extractive industries represent the ‘beginning of the beginning’; 
the initial stage in the basic production circuit and in the web of global production 
networks that make up the global economy (Dicken, 2011, p. 243). However, despite its 
relevance, there is comparatively little coverage of the extractive industry in the GPN 
literature. Moreover, it is problematic to apply the conclusions of GPN analysis for the 
manufacturing to the extractive sector; extractive industries – especially mining – have 
so rarely been associated with sustainable development. This industry is represented by 
the finiteness and location specificity of its resources; and the stark bargaining power 
asymmetries within the production network, causing very unequal distributions of 
benefits and costs among the actors involved in the exploitation of the resource (Bridge, 
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2008; Davis, 1995; Gunder-Frank, 1969; Humphreys et al., 2007; Prebisch, 1950; Ross, 
2001).  
The basis of the extractive industries lies in the concept of natural resource, defined as 
‘the materials created and stored in nature through complex biophysical processes over 
vast periods of time’ (Dicken, 2011, p. 244). However, this view of resources as ‘natural 
things’ whose origin belongs to the world of physical science, obscures the way all 
resources are, intrinsically, cultural evaluations about utility and value (Bridge, 2009). 
Thus, an element or material found in nature is only a ‘resource’ if it is defined as such 
by potential users; meaning that is both a socio – cultural and a political construction; 
and that its relevance depends on political variables, which is why natural resources 
have always been a source of socio–political struggle (Dicken, 2011). 
Most of the resources4 that are the base of the extractive industries are non–renewable 
and their quantities fixed, at least under the technological conditions available when they 
are assessed (see Figure 3). Another key characteristic is their locational specificity, 
since ‘they are where they are’ (Dicken, 2011, p. 244). This means that they must be, at 
least initially, exploited where they are located, although later stages of the extractive 
commodity chain can be located somewhere else. In either case, their use involves large 
investments in exploration, extraction, processing, transport infrastructures and human 
capital formation (UNCTAD, 2007).  
Moreover, the extractive industry is characterized for being overwhelmingly producer – 
driven; the colossal size of its firms; and the strong mix of private enterprises (MNEs) 
and state – owned enterprises (SOEs). This mix of finite quantities, fixed locations, 
territorial embeddedness, scale of production and FDI presence is what shapes the 
development possibilities for extractive regions (Dicken, 2011). However, natural 
resource endowments do not mean automatic development gains for a country or region. 
As the Resource Curse literature highlights, cases in which countries rich in natural 
resources have developed are few, which is closely related to the dependency of the 
host region with the extractive sector. This takes shape in the conflictual relation between 
the host state/society and the extractive MNEs/international actors over the distribution 
                                               
4 There is a distinction is between a resource and a reserve. The latter includes all geologically identified 
deposits that can be economically recovered. All other deposits are labelled resources, either because they 
have not yet been discovered or because their exploitation is not currently feasibly (Turner, 1994, pp. 222-
224). 
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of benefits; and in the economy’s sensitivity to price shifts, which will also affect the power 
distribution among participants.  
 
Figure 3: Classification of mining industries. 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2007: Box III. 1.1. 
 
2.4.2 The extractive GPN 
 
The extractive GPN has some very particular features, which are vital for the 
development possibilities of the host region. The extraction of mineral resources is 
mostly dominated by large–scale, capital–intensive investments, although small–scale 
mining can be important in some countries and for some specific minerals. Furthermore, 
some projects are technologically complex, and investments are made under high levels 
of uncertainty that usually take a long time to materialize (UNCTAD, 2007). Therefore, 
the investments required in this industry are especially costly and risky. Likewise, most 
of the extractive reserves are located in developing countries where the host states 
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generally do not have the capital, expertise and technology to exploit them. This has 
been one of the main causes for applying neoliberal policies and incentives in order to 
attract FDI into these locations.  
The basic GPN of the extractive industry has been historically organized in a vertical 
production system, comprising a linear sequence of stages: exploration, development, 
extraction, processing, distribution and final consumption (Figure 4). Each of these 
stages has an environmental output, usually forgotten by the economic analysis (Bridge, 
2008). These negative effects take shape in pollution or other negative externalities, 
which are often reduced by the promotion of corporate social responsibility policies by 
the extractive firms (Frynas, 2005; Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012). However, despite its 
apparent simplicity, this is a highly complex and contested process where all the actors 
involved exert their bargaining power to achieve their strategic needs, which is why a 
network approach is necessary to better comprehend this industry. 
 
Figure 4: Extractive GPN. 
 
Source: Dicken, 2011: Figure 8.2. 
 
Moreover, each stage poses huge technological challenges due to the finiteness and 
locational specificity of the resources. This means that technological solutions have to 
be continuously implemented in every stage, which are highly expensive and produced 
in the more developed parts of the world. Among these technological challenges, three 
are the most important: finding new sources of supply, extracting the highest benefits 
from these sources, and getting them to the market. New ores are difficult to find and 
usually difficult and expensive to exploit, since the most easily accessible ones have 
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been already exploited. Purity will be determinant in the economic viability of the 
exploitation, since the lower the degree of purity, the greater the cost involved in 
extraction and processing. Finally, the need to get the product to the market stresses the 
importance of investing in expensive transport infrastructures which are often entirely 
lacking (Dicken, 2011).  
Furthermore, the long distances between the ores and the final markets generate the 
need for a massive scale of transportation infrastructure. Thus, this industry has always 
faced the problem of increasing the scale of production and being able to transport the 
product to its final consumers. These investments are also slow to materialize; extremely 
costly; and once they have been finished they turn into high sunk costs, since the facilities 
and infrastructure built are not easily transferred to alternative uses (Dicken, 2011). 
These sunk costs can be extremely high in the exploration, development, extraction, 
processing and distribution stages, meaning that the investment will be spatially fixed 
after it has been materialized, causing a shift in power towards the local state as the 
obsolescing bargaining models predict (Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). Likewise, the 
capital intensity of this industry is extremely high compared to its labour requirements, 
since it employs fewer workers relative to their size and production in comparison to 
other industries (UNCTAD, 2007).  
Recently, the organization in the production in extractive industries has drastically 
changed, due to the incorporation of MNEs and the technological changes brought by 
the globalization of production. This means that the industry has gone from organizing 
itself in a vertical way, where the production process was linear or chain like, to a situation 
in which the extractive industry is mostly horizontally integrated. Such change was 
caused by the outsourcing of processes that are not vital for the production, and the 
subcontracting of labour force for lower wages and worse working conditions. This has 
several implications for the agents involved in the industry, especially in terms of 
bargaining power. Bigger firms are integrating with each other, increasing their economic 
leverage and influence; while the smaller ones lose relative bargaining power due to their 
size and inability to create bigger conglomerates of firms which would allow them to 
bargain collectively with the MNEs.  
Finally, the state is a vital actor through all the stages of the extractive GPN, since the 
resources are geographically embedded in a territory that is controlled and administrated 
by it. The relationship between the state and the rest of the actors of the chain has been 
deeply studied, but also somehow neglected by the current mainstream extractive 
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literature, which mostly focuses into the purely abstract economical flows. Hence, the 
role of the state is developed next. 
 
2.5 EXTRACTION, GOVERNANCE AND THE STATE 
 
Several authors consider the state as a crucial actor in determining the development 
outcomes for an extractive region plugged into a global production network (Auty, 1994; 
Bridge, 2008; Dicken, 2011). There are two important reasons for this: firstly, the unique 
territorial embeddedness of resources, which are ultimately controlled, regulated and 
sometimes exploited by the national state in which they are located (Dicken, 2011); and 
secondly, the external forces that can be too powerful for local institutions and actors to 
handle. This requires a high participation of the state, since it is the only actor strong 
enough to bargain with MNEs and the international institutions supporting them. Hence, 
the state’s strength will determine the outcomes for the agents involved in the bargains 
that set the terms and conditions for the exploitation (Auty, 1994; Dicken, 2011; Moran, 
1974).  
In real life scenarios the role of the state is dynamic, as well as its influence over growth 
and development, but is useful to keep in mind the consequences of strong and weak 
states for the production network. Furthermore, the relative strength of the state in the 
extractive industry is closely related to its promotion of appropriate macro–economic and 
sectoral policies reinforcing its bargaining position (Auty, 1994). Thus, the strength of the 
state plays a key role in determining the development outcomes for the host regions. 
However, these outcomes will also depend on the motivation behind the state’s exertion 
of power, as is explained next. 
 
2.5.1 Strong states in extractive spaces 
 
Natural resources can be a considerable source of bargaining power. Therefore, the 
strength of resource rich states depends on the scarcity of the resource worldwide; the 
quality and quantity of the ores found in the country/region; the characteristics of the 
labour market; and the political stability, all of which can make the exploitation highly 
desirable for MNEs. Since taxes and royalty payments associated to primary extraction 
can generate important revenues for national and regional governments, the 
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regional/national states frequently try to promote the attraction of FDI and the 
establishment of new extractive centres.  
Moreover, the extractive industry usually provides direct and indirect jobs and the 
apparition of economic linkages with the rest of the economy. The more important is this 
industry in the production of a region/country, the more the state will want to control the 
conditions of exploitation. Hence, a powerful state can exert its influence in two ways: a 
‘strong developmental state’ related with the promotion of regional development and 
benefit redistribution; and a ‘strong state dominated by selfish interests’, involving the 
enrichment of the political/dominant class and MNEs at the expense of the environment 
and population’s wellbeing. 
In the first case, a strong developmental state uses its power to achieve the best 
conditions for luring FDI intro the region, while also protecting the environment and 
promoting the creation of safe and decent jobs for the local labour. It also stimulates the 
generation of economic linkages with SMEs and technological spillovers from MNEs, in 
order to create a more competitive and vibrant environment. This should help to diversify 
the productive fabric and stimulate the exports of goods and services value added, 
leading to an improvement in the national and regional development possibilities. 
Likewise, a developmental state promotes stronger relationships between the MNEs and 
local groups, meaning higher standards to get a social licence to operate (Bridge, 
2004a). Additionally, the extractive MNEs usually depend on the actions, strength and 
legitimacy of state power to realize their investments. Such actions include infrastructure 
development, the allocation of title to land and resources, and the 
establishment/enforcement of the procedures by which other parties can participate in 
decisions over land use (Bridge, 2004a). All this relates with the state’s ability to provide 
a safe environment for resource extraction for all the agents involved, by using its power 
to, for example, allocate land destined for exploitation and the terms, conditions and 
compensations expected from the MNEs.  
In the second case, a strong state dominated by selfish interests promotes policies and 
actions that favour the political/economic elites in charge of such decisions without 
considering region and its inhabitants wellbeing. Here, corruption and influence peddling 
are the norm. The state aims to create a mutually and supportive relationship between 
the MNEs and the nation’s political elite, where the firm is politically and physically 
protected from the population, as long as they provide benefits to their protectors (Bridge, 
2004a). This scenario often promotes violence used against objectors and the working 
and exploitation conditions are exceptionally harsh for the local population. A particularly 
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well-documented case is what the literature calls ‘rentier states’, which mostly refers to 
non–democratic developing countries, specialized in oil production (Ross, 2001; 
Sandbakken, 2006).  
Another variation is when the state is ‘captured’ by MNEs. Here, the initial bargain is 
dominated by the MNEs, which manage to get the best possible conditions for exploiting 
the resources. The state can be potentially strong, but does not use its bargaining 
position in order to avoid scaring the FDI. The outcomes of such bargains usually involve 
the implementation of neoliberal policies and laws liberalizing the labour market, the 
access to natural resources, providing tax concessions and facilitating the capture of 
public goods (Phelps, 2008), where the state only acts as a referee in what it considers 
‘issues among privates’ that will be solved by the market. Moreover, a state not willing to 
exert its bargaining power state could, in the long run, lead to enclave formations. This 
situation can be reversed once the state realizes that it can exert its power on new rounds 
of negotiations, after the investment has been done and the costs are sunk (Vernon, 
1971).  
 
2.5.2 Weak states in extractive spaces 
 
The recent globalization process and neoliberal policies adopted in resource rich 
developing countries have, in some cases, weakened their states and regional 
institutions to such degree that some of them seem to be completely absent (Bridge, 
2004a). One of the main implications of this is the hyper–specialization in the primary 
sector is a process named ‘primarization’ (Muradian & Martinez-Alier, 2001), which may, 
in the long run, lead to further increases in the already large gaps between developed 
and underdeveloped regions of the world. This since it could cause a decay of the 
manufacturing industry; unequal distribution of benefits; and violence, all of which worsen 
the dependency and development chances of the host regions and countries. 
The growth and nourishment of the manufacturing industry has been historically 
considered as vital to achieve autonomy and development by the developing extractive 
regions and their states. However, the ‘primarization’ caused by a weak state, could 
hinder all this. As Benavente et al. (1997) illustrate, the globalization process not only 
has expanded the extractive production and processing industry, but it also has induced 
a decay of manufacturing industries in Latin America. Likewise, Noorbakhsh and Paloni 
(1999) shows that structural adjustment programs applied in most African countries have 
preceded declining or insignificant rates of growth in their manufacturing industry.  
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Moreover, weak states can also cause an unequal distribution of profits. After the 1980’s 
most of the developing states lacked financial capital and were under strong international 
pressure to adopt neoliberal policies for getting funds, causing a reversal in the 
nationalization processes that took place in the 1970s. Hence, today, the extractive 
MNEs can function as economic enclaves, importing the bulk of their inputs and 
repatriating most of their profits to their headquarters without creating significant 
backward or forward linkages with the local economy that could allow the generation of 
a competitive local industry capable to export or compete globally (Muradian & Martinez-
Alier, 2001; Phelps et al., 2015). Additionally, these companies have vertically integrated 
networks of production that include extraction, processing, and international distribution, 
so intrafirm trade is very common, allowing ‘transfer pricing’; the artificial reduction of the 
MNE’s taxes in the host country to increase their profits, which reinforces the exportation 
of profits to the headquarters (Muradian & Martinez-Alier, 2001). Consequently, the profit 
distribution has not improved but, on the contrary, it has become more concentrated in 
the hands of mining MNEs.  
Finally, weak states can lead to violence. There are some cases in which the state can 
be completely absent which can be caused by a shift in the state’s ideology. For example, 
some nations under the neoliberal influence perceive any state intervention as a potential 
destabilizing force scaring away FDI. The weak governance of these states may create 
deep civil unrest, especially among people suffering the worst consequences of the 
extractive industry: pollution, bad working conditions, increasing cost of life, among 
others. This tension is usually suffocated with violence, where the state deploys the 
police or even the army in order to pacify manifestations (Canel et al., 2010; Zalik, 2004). 
Historically, extractive countries have witnessed several massacres of workers, due to 
states that were unable to distribute the benefits of the extractive industry or to achieve 
new and more fair agreements with the MNEs. 
 
2.5.3 Extractive States and GPNs 
 
The role of the state has been widely studied in the literature. However, the spatial 
manifestations and dynamics involved in the bargains within GPNs have not been 
developed in the same manner. The economic geography sub-discipline provides a way 
to acknowledge this through the recent development of the chain and network 
approaches. Such literature has incorporated questions of governance, political relations 
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and how these structure the actions/inactions of the state on issues of resource 
development and environmental protection (Bridge, 2004a). 
The GPN stands out among the approaches, since it studies more complex structures 
and relations between states, MNEs and other actors, considering vertical, but also 
horizontal relationships within production. Moreover, it frames its analysis considering 
the role of space, by delivering a ‘sense of the relational way in which production is 
organized via inter – firm networks that massively exceed the boundaries of the nation – 
state and a mode of analysis, which is time and space sensitive’ (Bridge, 2008; Coe et 
al., 2008b). Hence, to further develop the GPN literature and its analysis of the extractive 
industries, issues of how state and MNEs’ bargaining power shape the production 
network are crucial. Still, the application of this approach to the extractive industry would 
be futile without addressing the particular features of this industry. In this sense, Bridge 
(2008) provides the pillars for the construction of an extractive GPN, focused on the 
development possibilities that this industry may (or may not) facilitate in developing 
regions, as shown next.  
 
2.6 A FIRST ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE AN EXTRACTIVE GPN 
 
Oil and copper are two of the most important minerals in the extractive industry. Oil has 
been deeply studied due to its geo–political relevance and its various strategic uses. In 
this sense, Bridge (2008) provides a first attempt to construct an extractive GPN based 
on the oil industry where he addresses the complex relationships between the various 
firm and non–firm actors involved, and the implications of these for sustainable 
development. Likewise, copper has been considered one of the most important metals, 
since it provides almost one fifth of the world metallic mineral production due to its uses 
as an electric conductor; building material; and base for several other goods (UNCTAD, 
2007).  
This research takes Bridge’s (2008) attempt to depict an extractive GPN as a blueprint, 
adapting it for the copper GPN and incorporating issues of bargaining power and the 
changing relationship between states and firms for the copper industry in the Chilean 
case - the most important copper producer worldwide. Bridge’s (2008) work was 
pioneering in addressing the concerns about the extractive industry outlined above, 
expanding the findings of the resource curse thesis into the construction of an extractive 
GPN. He applies the GPN’s analytical tools to the oil industry as an alternative 
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perspective for understanding the ‘limited opportunities’ that transnational extractive 
industries provide for regional sustainable development, while also incorporating the 
intricate network of relationships of actors and spaces that the nationally-focused 
theories did not allow (see Figure 5).  
Bridge (2008) firstly notices the ‘landed’ nature of assets in the extractive network, which 
differentiates it from the other industries. Landed has a double meaning here: it relates 
to the materiality and territoriality of the resource. Hence, the materiality of the resource 
refers to the processes related to its exploitation, such as production, transportation and 
processing (see Figure 5). Since natural resources are only partially socially produced, 
extractive sectors rely on natural production to a degree not found in other industries. 
Therefore, the dependency on natural production limits the spatial flexibility of the 
network. This means that ownership over the resources is strategic for value creation 
and capture, and that their distribution will be determined by the bargaining power of 
each actor of the GPN, creating a relation of mutual dependency among resources 
holders and seekers. Furthermore, the unknown nature of the upstream exploration 
stage means that this industry heavily depends on resource quality, technology and 
capital available rather than labour intensity. 
On the other hand, the territoriality of the resource relates to how they are embedded in 
the proprietorial, institutional and cultural – political structures of the nation–state, which 
is greater than for other sectors; and how, therefore, this industry is closely related with 
capture and distribution of resource rents. Regarding the former, mineral resources 
belong to the state, which leases or licences their exploitation after a series of bargains 
with the mining MNEs. Consequently, the state has a strong bargaining position, and 
changes in the policies related to resource ownership and access can produce 
considerable shifts in the configuration of the network.  
Additionally, extractive resources are also embedded in a national cultural system, where 
they are bound to notions of sovereignty and national identity. As history shows, political 
struggles have taken place all over the world when natural resources have been 
‘privatized’, since it has been considered as an attack to the ‘national character’ of such 
wealth (Perreault, 2006). These struggles are directly related to the distribution of 
resource rents, highlighting the relevance the bargaining processes have in extractive 
GPNs. The exertion of the bargaining power by state and extractive MNEs will determine 
the value capture and development chances for the region.  
Hence, there are two defining tensions in the extractive GPNs influencing its 
organizational structure and geographies: the tension between resource–holding states 
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and resource–seeking firms; and the distribution of value between producers, both state-
owned and private, and consumers, where this distribution is determined by the 
bargaining power of the different actors and significantly affected by changes in price. 
Both of these tensions are transversal to most of the mining related industries and are 
the focus of this research (Figure 5).  
Moreover, in an extractive GPN, a significant portion of value can be captured at the very 
beginning of the chain via the assigning of rights to exploit the resources. This 
assignment will be heavily influenced by the bargaining power of the MNEs, which will 
do anything possible to reach maximum control over low–cost/high-quality resources; 
capture public goods that would facilitate the extraction; and to diminish the ability of 
resource–holding states in the (re)negotiation of ground rents and other conditions 
(Bridge, 2008; Dicken, 2011; Phelps, 2008).  
Likewise, the regional development opportunities for oil regions depends on three 
structural imperatives of the extractive production network, which are closely related to 
issues of value, power and embeddedness: the resource imperative, the ecological 
imperative and the technological imperative. Since the oil industry shares several 
characteristics with the other extractive industries, it is useful to consider how the 
imperatives that Bridge (2008) proposed can be used in understanding the development 
possibilities of such regions. 
Figure 5: A global production network for oil. 
 
Source: Bridge, 2008.  
2.6.1 Resource imperative 
 
Extractive MNEs have to address the imperative of replacing their reserves, so they do 
everything in their power to gain stable control over the best ores. In the particular case 
of mining, the differential rent of the resources will be a matter of dispute among the state 
and mining MNEs. This logic of rent capture has two consequences in shaping the 
extractive production chain: firms will compete for access and controlling reserves, and 
rent capture will be simultaneously an issue of rent allocation between producing firms 
and resource – holders (Bridge, 2008; Dicken, 2011). Since extractive resources and 
minerals are usually property of the state, the extractive MNEs have to bargain the terms 
and conditions of the exploitation. Firms will try to capture the differential rent via property 
rights, established in the initial bargain with the host country/region. Such bargains take 
place several times during the lifetime of an extractive project, becoming a great source 
of the tensions between MNEs and states. The GPN approach highlights the relevance 
of these negotiations, and the power that the actors exert in order to determine its 
outcomes. 
Thus, the GPN approach allows the incorporation the tension between the actors 
involved in the extractive GPN and the implications of rent distribution or value capture - 
which are subject to a dynamic bargain among the actors of the extractive production 
network. The latter has been largely studied by the resource curse literature, but the 
GPN approach provides ‘a relational perspective on Vernon’s model of the ‘obsolescing 
bargain’ between firms and states’ (Bridge, 2008; Vernon, 1971). However, despite the 
explicit link between these two bodies of literature, the theoretical bridge has not been 
built yet. This research provides a first step in making the connections between the GPN 
and bargaining models, as well as providing an empirical analysis about how bargaining 
power influences strategic coupling and regional development in mining regions. 
 
2.6.2 Ecological imperative 
 
The ecological imperative relates with the environmental impacts the extractive industry 
has over the host region, like the negative effects on landscapes and quality of life of the 
region’s inhabitants. It also refers to how the radically polluting nature of some extractive 
GPNs (especially mining) affects the distribution of value. The leftovers and by-products 
generated by the extractive industry generate extra costs for the host region, in terms of 
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the damage to the environment and the expenses they have to incur in order to mitigate 
these negative effects, all of which diminishes the real value that regions are capturing 
when allowing the extractive production (Bury, 2004; Cademartori, 2008).  
The extractive MNES have tried to reduce the social outrage of the negative impacts of 
resource exploitation by incorporating less contaminating technologies, but mostly when 
they are either cost efficient or because the local regulation and/or social pressures 
oblige them. Extractive MNEs have also applied corporate social responsibility policies 
(CSR) in the host regions, to get a ‘social licence to operate’. These policies have been 
widely used in the recent years, especially in the cities and regions that are most exposed 
to the negative externalities of the extractive industry.  
CSR initiatives in the mining and other extractive industry sectors have been mostly 
articulated around issues related with the environment, social and community 
development, employment and labour, and human rights (Carroll, 1999). However, these 
policies have been heavily questioned in the last decade since they are perceived as not 
solving the most fundamental problems arising from the extractive operations, such as 
the negative impacts on the environment and society (Frynas, 2005; Hilson, 2012). 
Hence , there is a rich literature explaining that CSR might actually increase negative 
effects of the extractive production for the host region such as: interfering in local and 
regional governance (Frynas, 2005); increasing inequality, fragmentation and social – 
economic insecurity (Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012); increasing the firm’s detachment from 
the host region (Gardner et al., 2012); obstructing the chances of overcoming the 
resource curse symptoms (Ackah Baidoo, 2012); stimulating the generation of enclaves 
(Ackah Baidoo, 2012); and influencing the ‘shrinking’ of the state and the loss of 
legitimacy in the mining operations (Campbell, 2012).  
These negative effects are directly related with the questionable motives for the 
implementation of polices in the first place (Slack, 2012). Additionally, CSR policies tend 
to reproduce the shortfalls of the agendas imposed by external actors in the past such 
as a lack of concern about the socio–economic development of the host region when 
compared with securing the best conditions for resource exploitation (Campbell, 2012). 
Hence, there is a real danger on focusing on CSR policies, since this may divert attention 
from broader political, economic and social solutions to those problems (Frynas, 2005).  
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2.6.3 Technological imperative 
 
Since the extractive industry produces relatively changeable commodities in which 
product competition is based primarily on price, extractive producers face a 
‘technological imperative’ to reduce costs along the productive chain. This means the 
aggressive pursuit of economies of scale in production, refining and transportation, which 
has led to the scaling up of production and the infrastructure needed for it. Moreover, the 
upstream stages of the extractive chain, where the exploration to find new ores takes 
places, face the additional challenge of being unable to achieve conventional economies 
of scale, since employing the same exploration technology over larger areas, for 
example, does not reduce costs of exploration in terms of mineral discovered per unit 
area (Bridge, 2008). The technological imperative then draws attention to where value is 
captured in the upstream end of the production network. 
Furthermore, the GPN perspective indicates how the technological imperative in the 
extractive industry can constrain opportunities for turning the particular strategic coupling 
among its actors into regional advantages (Bridge, 2008). In many resource rich 
economies, natural resource endowments provide the primary ‘regional asset’ which 
should stimulate regional development (Coe et al., 2008b). If regional institutions have 
enough bargaining power to achieve their strategic objectives, there may be some 
possibilities for strategic coupling, and in some industries, like mining, this may increase 
the chance for the apparition of clusters. This is a key argument for the GPN approach, 
since regional development depends on the coupling mechanism’s ability to facilitate 
processes of value creation, enhancement and capture (Coe et al., 2004). However, in 
an extractive GPN the strategic coupling may be constrained for three reasons. 
Firstly, the scaling up of production, refining and transportation raises the capital intensity 
of production, and entrenches the position of existing actors by increasing barriers to 
entry. This tends to weaken the opportunities for developing strong backward and 
forward linkages between extractive investments and the host economy (Bridge, 2008). 
The few backward linkages with local firms are established to get basic 
support/maintenance services or for outsourcing low skilled parts of the production chain, 
leaving the activities with more added value outside the host region’s. The resource 
curse literature already established that when MNEs concentrate power, there is a high 
possibility of external control and dependency, which can lead to the formation of mining 
enclaves with dire consequences for local development (Cardoso & Faletto, 2007) (Auty, 
1980; Cademartori, 2008; Phelps et al., 2015; Ross, 2001).  
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Secondly, some phases of the extractive production network are technologically 
complex, creating an entry barrier where local firms are unable to penetrate and benefit 
from the knowledge spillovers produced. Likewise, the upstream part of the GPN 
requires considerable investment, know–how and technology, creating further entry 
barriers. MNEs usually possess access to the huge amounts of technological knowledge 
and financial capital needed to start a new project, which strengthens their bargaining 
position before the investment is done (Moran, 1974). Hence, the upstream part of the 
production chain is dominated by MNEs that benefit from their strong position to capture 
value (Bridge, 2008). However, state owned and local firms may be able to gather the 
technology and capital necessary to participate in this part of the chain, but only under 
particular conditions related to the support given by the state and the particular 
characteristics of such firms. 
Finally, the imbalance of power between different actors in the chain is highly significant. 
In most extractive regions, MNEs hold a considerable amount of bargaining power in 
comparison to the local governments and social movements. This is particularly true in 
the period before making the investments in the host region, since MNEs have control 
over the investments, technology and knowledge. Consequently, the initial conditions 
are usually very favourable to FDI, a situation deepened by the intervention of 
international trade organisations (IMF, WB, and WTO) which have imposed neoliberal 
policies in these countries, weakening the state position (Bury, 2005; Ramamurti, 2001). 
Hence, the uneven distribution of bargaining power can become a considerable obstacle 
for the strategic coupling process between MNEs and local institutions. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In sum, GPN literature allows the analysis of the mining MNEs’ impact on local 
development through the analysis of power relationships; value creation and capture; 
and embeddedness. A GPN approach focuses on the inter–firm relations between the 
agents involved in the extractive production network, incorporating the diversity of 
organizational forms and governance structures of its participants. It also draws attention 
over issues of relations of dependency and dominance across the network and the ways 
in which these shift over time and space (Bridge, 2008, p. 414). The GPN allows a further 
enrichment of the extractive literature since it widens the analysis of structural relations 
of dependency by considering issues of value capture and territorial embeddedness, 
62 
 
which will vary for each extractive industry according to the materiality and territoriality 
of the resource. 
The spatial fixity of the natural resources also means that the state plays a pervasive 
role in the extractive industry. The reason lies in the uniqueness of resources and the 
control of access to them presented by the national state in which they are located 
(Dicken, 2011). However, some countries have been under the neoliberal paradigm long 
enough to consider any state intervention as a threat to their socio–economic structure. 
In these places, the state may choose not to exert all (or any) of its strength in the bargain 
with extractive MNEs. Since the extant literature has not addressed this issue, this 
research hopes to re–evaluate the state–firm relationship under these circumstances as 
one of its main contributions. 
Furthermore, value and embeddedness - crucial for regional development - are 
determined by the power exerted in the continuous bargains among the actors within the 
network. However, the unpacking of the power concept and the incorporation of 
bargaining models have received little or no attention in the GPN framework despite 
being explicitly considered as some of its main concerns (Bridge, 2008; Coe et al., 
2008b; Henderson et al., 2002). The adaptation of the GPN approach to the extractive 
industry requires the consideration of bargaining power issues, since these have 
historically determined the outcomes for regional development as the obsolescing 
bargain and dependency theories stressed (Cardoso & Faletto, 2007; Moran, 1974; 
Vernon, 1971).  
Hence, there is a need to develop and deepen the analysis of bargaining and power 
within the GPN 1.0 approach. In this sense, this research aims to theoretically unpack 
the concept of power, specifically bargaining power, and incorporate it into the GPN 
approach. To do this, the GPN approach is adapted to the mining industry following 
Bridge’s blueprint and considering and updating the bargaining model literature (Moran, 
1974; Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1971). It is to the development of an operational 
definition of bargaining power and the incorporation of the bargaining models into the 
GPN 1.0 literature that this thesis now turns. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POWER IN EXTRACTIVE GPNS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Power is a complex and contested concept for the social sciences in general5 (Clegg, 
2002; Haugaard, 2002; Lukes, 2005) and hence for the GPN approach, since it 
determines the value and embeddedness of, and development outcomes arising from, 
relations among the actors of these networks.  
The GPN approach has incorporated Allen’s definition of power in its theoretical 
framework (Coe et al., 2004), which considers that ‘…power is a relational effect (…) it 
is an outcome of social interaction not something designed to put a blunt stop to it’ (Allen, 
2003, pp. 4, italic added). However, the GPN literature has not fully developed the power 
concept, treating it as a black box that somehow pervades almost every aspect of the 
GPN while, simultaneously, determining the chances of strategic coupling and 
sustainable development. Furthermore, the GPN approach continuingly recognizes that 
a very specific kind of power plays a crucial role in determining the strategic coupling 
possibilities, namely, bargaining power (Coe et al., 2008b; Coe et al., 2004; MacKinnon, 
2012). Yet again, no deeper theoretical efforts have been made in order to adapt 
bargaining models to the GPN approach.  
Since this research aims to contribute to unpacking the concept of power in the GPN 
literature, focusing on bargaining power, this chapter starts with a brief summary of the 
main debates regarding power in the social sciences. This provides the base for the 
proposed definition of bargaining power of this research, as well as its operationalization 
for the analysis.  
 
 
                                               
5 Haugaard (2002) notes how power is, in part, a reflection of the nature of power as a concept. Power is 
what the philosopher Wittgenstein terms, a ‘family resemblance’ concept - when we use the concept in 
different contexts, its meaning changes sufficiently so that there is no single definition of power. 
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3.2 THE THREE DIMENSIONAL POWER DEBATE 
 
The definition of power has evolved from being completely focused on the agency of the 
participants to also considering the structural variables, non–decisions, perceptions and 
circuits of power. A basic and mostly transversal definition of power can be found in The 
Dictionary of Human Geography, which states that ‘a minimal definition of power [refers] 
to the ability of one agent to affect the actions or attitudes of another’ (Gregory et al., 
2009, p. 575). This idea of relations and effects is the one thing that most of the power 
definitions share, and is why the GPN approach considers power as a series of relational 
effects among the actors involved (Allen, 2003).  
 
3.2.1 Dahl’s agency based concept of power 
 
The community power debate was initiated with Robert Dahl with his seminal work Who 
Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (1961). In his continuous works 
(Dahl, 1957, 1958, 1961, 1968), Dahl showed a deep concern about achieving 
methodological precision in the measurement of power. In this sense, he proposed an 
initial formal definition of power by following a methodology in which, rather than 
measuring what power was thought to be, power was to be measured through 
responses. Hence, responses were taken as an indicant of power, which stood as the 
cause of the measured reaction (Clegg, 2002; Dahl, 1958). 
Dahl’s work highlights the relational and contested nature of power, by arguing that 
power can be observed when an actor ‘A’ made an open attempt to force an actor ‘B’ to 
do something that s/he had would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957). If A succeeded, s/he 
had power in this particular area (Clegg, 2002). However, Dahl (1963) concluded that B 
could also exercise power over A in another issue area (Gregory et al., 2009). Hence, 
for Dahl power was conceived as ‘intentional’ and ‘active’. It was ‘measured’ by studying 
its exercise, this is, by ascertaining the frequency of who wins and who loses regarding 
to a particular issue, or who prevails in a decision–making situation. Such situations are 
positions of conflict between interests, where interests are conceived as preferences, 
revealed in the political arena by political actors taking policy stands (Lukes, 2005).  
Thus, power was something which a concrete actor – individual or organization – had to 
be seen to be exercising. Power is exercised to have those subjects to it to go along with 
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the individual preferences of the powerful. Dahl also notes that A’s power over B will 
have what he terms a source, domain or base, conceptualized in terms of resources 
open to exploitation by A in relation to B, which are expressed through means or 
instruments of power (Clegg, 2002). Hence, resources are defined in terms of the 
distribution of cash, popularity and control over jobs, and control over information 
sources (Dahl, 1968, p. 409). 
The above implies that power has a very specific meaning in this literature: it is about 
prevailing in decision–making situations and is not to be equated with power resources 
(Haugaard, 2002, p. 6). This is vital, since for Dahl resources may or may not be 
mobilized in decision making. Here, resources are potential power and have different 
‘scopes’, where scope means the specific situations that can be affected by this potential 
power. Thus, potential power based on resources or reputations should not be 
considered as actual power (Haugaard, 2002). However, the consideration of resources 
in defining power helps to qualify the definition Dahl made in 1957. By linking power to 
resources he is claiming that potential power will be intrinsically unequally distributed, 
and that there will be an inherent bargaining process among the actors involved, since 
resources are unevenly spread out in the world, previous to any specific political or 
economic relation among actors (Clegg, 2002).  
This approach concludes that since different actors and different interest groups prevail 
in different issues, power will be widely dispersed than narrowly concentrated in 
communities (Clegg, 2002; Haugaard, 2002; Lukes, 2005). Furthermore, this approach 
has a strong focus on behaviour in the decision making capabilities of the actors involved 
in a power struggle, or their ‘agency’. In this sense, agency is not limited to individuals, 
but may assume a collective form (Clegg, 2002), which is fundamental in the study of 
GPNs.  
Still, Dahl’s approach has been strongly criticised based on the lack of any criteria for 
deciding whether or not an exercise of power was in fact intended (Clegg, 2002). A 
variety of other criticisms (Lukes, 2005) led to the apparition of a new body of literature, 
which tried to fill the gaps left by the pluralist framework, what Bachrach and Baratz 
named the ‘Two Faces of Power Approach’. 
 
3.2.2 Bachrach and Baratz’s two faces of power  
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This approach was firstly proposed by Bachrach and Baratz (1970; 1962). Their central 
critique claims that the Dahl’s model ‘unduly emphasises the importance of initiating, 
deciding and vetoing and, as a result, takes no account of the fact that power may be, 
and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision–making to relatively ‘safe’ 
issues’ (Bachrach, 1970, p. 6).  
However, they accept several claims of Dahl’s approach: they agree that it is wrong to 
equate actual power to power resources or reputation of power; scope and intensity of 
power have to be considered in the analysis; conflict can be observable and, most 
importantly; power has to be analysed at a behavioural level. Agency in power is crucial, 
since it involves agents making things happen that would not otherwise have happened 
(Haugaard, 2002). 
Bachrach and Baratz identified ‘two faces of power’: the one depicted by Dahl’s model, 
in which agency is the main component; and their proposed ‘structural face’ of power 
(Clegg, 2002). This second element expands the one dimensional approach which, 
according to them, does not take into account the ‘institutional bias’. By this, they mean 
that not only A exercises power over B in overt decision–making instances (like Dahl 
proposes) but A may equally well exercise power over B by limiting the scope of the 
political process to issues which are relatively inoffensive to A. The most obvious 
instance of this is the process of agenda setting whereby an issue of importance to B is 
deliberately left off the agenda by A (Haugaard, 2002).  
Thus, they argue that power is not only manifested in observable decision making on 
certain issues, but also in limiting the scope of the decision–making process related to 
such issues (Clegg, 2002). In their words: ‘the central point to be made is the same: to 
the extent that a person or group – consciously or unconsciously creates or reinforces 
barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power’ (Bachrach 
& Bachrach, 1962, p. 949). This unobservable element was called ‘non–decision making’ 
and introduces the notion of ‘potential issues’, which non–decision making prevents from 
taking place (Clegg, 2002; Lorenzini, 2006; Lukes, 2005). Hence, the power they called 
non–decision making is the decision to not to make a decision about key issues that 
challenge the resources of power, or authority, of those who currently dominate the 
process (Haugaard, 2002; Lukes, 2005). Accordingly, an empirical analysis would then 
have to incorporate the examination of both: the decision and non–decision making 
processes. 
Along these lines, Bachrach and Baratz’s definition of power is two dimensional, since it 
retained a focus on decision–making but it also considered non–decision making and 
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the existence of an actual conflict of interests a form of it. In their words, a decision is a 
‘choice among alternative modes of action’ (Bachrach, 1970, p. 44). Thus, non–decision 
making is ‘a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits 
and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept 
covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision–making arena; or, failing 
all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision–implementing stage of the policy 
process’ (Bachrach, 1970, p. 44). Such view of power relations allows the consideration 
of the control over the political agenda, as well as the way in which potential issues can 
be kept out of the political process.  
Despite the advances of this approach, it has also been criticised. Among these, Lukes 
(2005) claimed that power is not only reflected in concrete decisions. Individuals or 
groups can limit decision–making to relatively non – controversial issues by influencing 
community values and political procedures and rituals. This critique took form in which 
is now considered Luke’s model, or the Three Dimensions of Power. 
 
3.2.3 Luke’s three dimensions of Power 
 
Lukes (2005) critiques previous conceptions of power for their inadequacies in 
addressing the impact of structural conditions in the exertion of power. He proposes the 
notion of dimensions instead of ‘faces’ in the analysis of power, and a ‘third dimension 
of power’ that opens up any evident dualism between agency by incorporating the 
structural elements, or what he calls ‘false consciousnesses’ or ideology, that influence 
the actor’s decisions and non–decisions (Clegg, 2002).  
Lukes (2005) considers that the two faces view is inadequate for a comprehensive study 
of power for three reasons. Firstly, Bachrach and Baratz model still assumed that non–
decision making is a form of decision making, even though their model was built as a 
critique of the limited behavioural focus of the Dahl’s view. This commitment to 
behaviourism, that is, to the study of overt actual behaviour, where concrete decisions 
are made in situations of conflict, neglects the influence that structure exerts over 
individual action (Haugaard, 2002). He posits that the bias of the system is not 
necessarily reducible to individual’s actions or non–actions but by the socially structured 
and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions all of which are 
inherited from the past (Haugaard, 2002; Lukes, 2005). However, this raises several 
difficulties regarding of how to distinguish power exertion from structural constraints. 
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Secondly, the two faces of power approach wrongly assumes that actual observable 
conflict is necessary for power. This is highly debatable for Lukes since two of the modes 
of power, manipulation and authority, may not involve such conflict; and it is highly 
unsatisfactory to suppose that power is only exercised in situations of such conflict. He 
explains that ‘A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want 
to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his 
very wants’. In this respect, Lukes argued that power is at work also when securing 
consent and thus preventing conflict from arising (2005, p. 7). 
Thirdly, the two faces view insists that non–decision making power only exists where 
there are disputes or controversy among the actors involved, which are denied in the 
political process in the form of issues. Hence, it is assumed that if some of the actors feel 
no grievances, then they have no interests that are harmed by the use of power. This is 
refuted by Lukes, since grievance is a social perception that depends on the very specific 
socio-economic context and culture. Moreover, he claims that the supreme exertion of 
power is precisely to shape people’s perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a 
way they accept their role in the existing order of things.  
Considering all of these, Lukes claims that it is important to consider what he calls ‘the 
third dimension of power’, which is the power to prevent the formation of grievances by 
shaping perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way as to ensure the 
acceptance of a certain role in the existing order (Lorenzini, 2006, p. 92). Thus, this three 
dimensional view allows the consideration of several ways in which potential issues are 
kept out of politics, whether through individuals’ decisions or through the operation of 
social forces and institutional practices. 
Furthermore, Lukes (2005) introduces two important linked concepts for his analysis: the 
‘latent conflict’ and the ‘false consciousness’ of some of the actors involved. A latent 
conflict is a contradiction between the interests of A (those exercising power), and the 
real interests of B, which are excluded from this process. The conflict is latent, because 
those subject to power either do not express or remain unaware of their ‘real interests’, 
what Lukes calls false consciousness or ideology. This means that the interests of B are 
very difficult to trace, since those concerned cannot express them or are unable to 
recognize them (Lorenzini, 2006). Hence, Lukes redefines power by considering these 
two concepts in terms of interests, by stating that ‘…A exercises power over B when A 
affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests’ (Haugaard, 2002, p. 38).  
There are other later contributions to this debates, such as the made by Clegg (2002) 
where he renames some of the previous concepts, while also developing others. He 
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calls, Dahl’s definition of power, ‘episodic power’ and differentiates between ‘power over’ 
and ‘power to’. The former is the archetypal view of power, where one side subjects the 
other to its will due to the asymmetrical distribution of resources; whereas the latter is 
the ability to do something on one’s own based on each actors’ resources and 
established in mutual action due to the symmetrically distribution of the resources. This 
research proposes an operational bargaining power definition based on these 
dimensions while also considering the role that strategic resources, particular constraints 
and scope play in the bargains as detailed next.  
  
3.3 STRATEGIC RESOURCES, CONSTRAINTS AND SCOPE IN BARGAINING 
POWER  
 
A central element for the proposed definition of bargaining power, is the role of strategic 
resources in the bargains. The previously developed idea that power is socially created 
by the actors implies that they must foster and expand their strategic resources, since 
those resources may become the actor’s base of potential power (Barnes, 1988; Clegg, 
2002; Haugaard, 2002; Parsons, 1963). These strategic resources are unevenly 
distributed, relatively scarce, highly desired and unavailable from other sources in the 
quantity or quality required to the demanding actor’s needs, but the accumulation of 
some of them by one or more actors does not exclude the others from developing their 
own6.  
However, it is vital to emphasize that power is not to be equated should with a strategic 
resource. As Giddens (1979) concludes, ‘resources are the media through which power 
is exercised’ (Giddens, 1979, p. 91), meaning that power can be exerted only because 
resources have certain meaning attached to them which, in turn, is generated by the 
structure. Moreover, Giddens explains that when a social agent acts, it draws upon 
certain resources to bring about certain situations which would not otherwise have 
occurred.  
Allen, whose definition of power is associated with the GPN literature, further develops 
this point when he claims that power 
                                               
6Hence, bargaining power is understood as a non – zero sum game (Haugaard, 2002; Parsons, 1963).  
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 ‘As an outcome cannot and should not be ‘read off’ from a resource base, regardless of 
its size or scope. Power in this sense is no more to be found ‘in’ the wood of musical 
instruments. It is, as suggested, a relational effect, not a property of someone or some 
‘thing’’ (Allen, 2003, p. 5).  
He posits that power is usually disguised as resources and, because of that, we have to 
separate them: there has to be a clear distinction between the exercise of power and the 
resource capabilities mobilized to sustain that exercise. This idea is the base for the 
proposed bargaining power definition of this work. The distribution of strategic resources 
implies that the actors have to negotiate with the others holding the resources they need 
to reach their strategic objectives. In this sense, power is exerted in social interactions 
called bargains, where the bargaining agents can affect the actions, attitudes and 
perceptions of the rest through several scales (Gregory et al., 2009).  
Moreover, power is exerted in a context where each actor also faces several particular 
constraints (Mann, 1986; Ramamurti, 2001). Here, constraints are understood as the 
elements that impede, limit or restrict the actors in fully using their strategic resources to 
strengthen their bargaining position. The key point is that each actor must hold some of 
the strategic resources desired by the other actors in order to establish a bargain; and 
that some strategic resources can become a power resource or potential power, 
strengthening the bargaining position of the agent holding it. The extent to which a 
strategic resource will enhance the bargaining position of an actor is determined by the 
constraints they face.  
Moreover, even if some actors have a stronger initial bargaining position in a particular 
GPN due to the strategic resources they hold, the strength of their position will probably 
change over the successive bargains if they foster and develop their strategic resources 
while overcoming their constraints. Consequently, each actor’s bargaining position is not 
fixed, but dynamic, since it depends on how it manages its resources and constraints 
over successive bargains.  
A final essential element is the scope or spatiality of power. When defining power, Allen 
(2003) argues that it is inherently spatial and, conversely, spatiality is imbued with power. 
He explains that the exercise of power in particular places may originate far away from 
those places, yet it remains part of power’s active presence. Therefore, power relations 
in a place are affected by what happens somewhere else and by the network of 
connections of which is part. In his words, ‘any placement of power involves the 
distanciated actions of those physically absent as much as it does present and in close 
physical proximity’ (Allen, 2003, p. 181). However, what puts people and power in place 
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is the mixture of styles and modes peculiar to a particular location, something particularly 
relevant for the GPN approach.  
Subsequently, the research assumes that both, the bargaining process and the exertion 
of bargaining power, are intrinsically spatial. Thus, geography and location of the actors 
influence the exertion and strength of bargaining power. This means that each actor’s 
bargaining power has a spatial scope of influence, which depends on its position in the 
GPN, its strategic resources, constraints and will to use its resources in order to reach 
its strategic objectives. Hence, the actors hold several bargains in different nodes, where 
their strategic objectives adapt according to the hierarchy of the node where the bargain 
takes place within the GPN. In this way, actors located in one or more spaces of a multi 
– scalar plane, that can be divided in at least three different levels: regional/local, national 
and international. All these levels are connected, having a strong influence in determining 
each actor’s strategic resources and constraints.  
The most important bargains take place in those nodes that can be placed in the upper 
reaches of global hierarchies, like financial centres or capital cities, where most of the 
MNEs’ and NGOs’ headquarters, international institutions and the state apparatus are 
located. In this line, bargains taking place in the most strategic nodes will have greater 
latitude in their influence over the rest of the less strategic nodes. However, the influence 
goes both ways, since bargains happening in the production nodes can also affect the 
long-term strategic decisions of the extractive MNEs if they manage to substantially 
change the rules, constraints or behaviour of the industry. Still, the higher the hierarchy 
of the node, the higher the probability that the outcomes of the bargain will have 
consequences in the rest of the levels. 
The actors involved in the successive bargains are represented by diverse groups with 
various strategic objectives, which do not always represent the best interests for all the 
actors located in the other levels of the network. This emphasizes the relevance of 
considering the actors that bargain at different spatial scales; the relevance of sharing 
similar strategic objectives among actors located in several nodes at the same time; and 
how the different strategic objectives influence these negotiations. For these reasons, 
this definition incorporates the multi–scalarity of the bargains, by acknowledging the 
actors located in the regional, national and international nodes of the Chilean copper 
mining GPN. Hence, the incorporation of space in the proposed definition implies the 
existence of multiple levels in which bargaining power is exerted by actors located in at 
least one of those levels. 
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Certainly, the strategic resources, particular constraints and scope of influence are 
crucial for the proposed definition of bargaining power within an extractive GPN, and 
form the foundation of it. A more detailed explanation the role of bargains in defining 
bargaining power is developed in the next sections, where the bargaining models are 
explained. 
 
3.4 FROM THE OBSOLESCENCE MODELS TO THE TWO – TIER BARGAINING 
MODEL AND BACK TO THE GPN 
 
3.4.1 Bargaining as strategic coupling 
 
Power asymmetries in the bargaining process between the MNE and the local institutions 
in the mining GPN are decisive for reaching a strategic coupling and, thus, the 
development possibilities of the mining regions. The result of this dynamic bargaining will 
also have a spatial manifestation in the form of a mining cluster or enclave. In the former, 
the region will be capable of diversifying itself, developing new industries and better 
chances of achieving sustainable development, whereas in the latter it will become an 
unsustainable, dependent, mono–structure and exporter.  
The bargaining models were initially known as ‘obsolescing bargaining models’ (OBMs), 
and have been widely used in the past for studying mining industry impacts in developing 
countries (Bergsten et al., 1978; Fagre & Wells, 1982; Kobrin, 1987; Lecraw, 1984; 
Moran, 1974, 1985; Vernon, 1971). These models were criticized and dismissed for 
being simplistic and for inadequately addressing the strategies of governments and firms 
(Jenkins, 1986; Vachani, 1995). However, they have been recently rediscovered as an 
important theoretical tool for studying the complex global relations of the production 
(Eden & Molot, 2002; Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Nebus & Rufin, 2010; Ramamurti, 2001; 
Vachani, 1995). From these works, this research takes Ramamurti’s ‘two tier’ bargaining 
model as a starting point, since it provides a way to incorporate different actors from 
different geographical scales and their impacts on bargaining processes. 
As previously mentioned, strategic coupling is achieved when regional agents and MNEs 
mobilize their specific resources to bargain, in a process where the bargaining power 
determines its outcomes. Hence, the bargaining position of an agent within the GPN is 
especially high when their resources are complementary to the strategic needs of the 
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contrary agent. However, this situation can change through the successive bargains 
taking place through time, which can happen when one or some of the initial conditions 
change. Bridge summarizes this relationship between the GPN and bargaining literature 
as follows: 
‘The architecture of the GPN approach (...) opens a space for addressing how the 
structure and pattern of the global oil production network affects the ability of resource–
holding states to (re)negotiate ground rent. In essence a GPN approach, provides a 
relational perspective on Vernon’s model of the ‘obsolescing bargain’ between firms and 
states’ (Bridge, 2008, pp. 406, italic added). 
Nonetheless, despite the explicit recognition of the relevance of the bargaining process 
in achieving strategic coupling, the theoretical connection between the GPN and 
bargaining literature has not been built yet within the economic geography or extractive 
literatures. This section tries to provide a first integration of those two bodies of literature, 
in order to develop an operational definition of bargaining power that can help to 
understand the socio-economic and spatial outcomes for the host region embedded in 
an extractive GPN. To do this, the bargaining model is updated and integrated into the 
GPN approach by considering the characteristics of the obsolescing bargaining (Moran, 
1974; Vernon, 1971); and two tier bargaining models (Ramamurti, 2001) – thereby 
incorporating new global actors and relationships. 
 
3.4.2 The original bargaining model and derivatives 
 
During the 70’s and 80’s, the OBM was the main approach to study the relations between 
the host country/region government and the MNEs. This model was initially proposed by 
Raymond Vernon in his book Sovereignty at Bay (1971) and expanded by several 
authors (Bergsten et al., 1978; Fagre & Wells, 1982; Kobrin, 1987; Lecraw, 1984; Moran, 
1974, 1985). These works explore the changing nature of the bargaining between MNEs 
and resource rich developing countries, which are ultimately determined by their 
objectives, resources and limitations.  
The model treats the interactions between MNEs and host countries/regions as a 
bilateral monopoly (Kobrin, 1987). It assumed that there was an inherent conflict between 
the objectives of the MNEs and the host country, leading to a bargaining process where 
both parties try to get the best conditions for achieving their goals. Such bargaining is a 
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positive sum game such that both parties voluntarily bargain and achieve absolute gains 
(Eden & Molot, 2002, pp. 361, italic added). However, the relative gains depend on the 
relative bargaining power: the greater one agent’s relative bargaining power, the greater 
that agent’s relative share of the gains (Eden et al., 2004). This bargaining power is, in 
turn, based on each agent’s resources; the constraints they face and their capacity to 
exert coercion over the other agents (Brewer, 1992; Eden & Molot, 2002; Kobrin, 1987; 
Vachani, 1995; Vernon, 1971, 1977).  
The OBM also assumes that initially, the MNEs are able to exert a stronger bargaining 
power for several reasons. First, MNEs are able to invest in several locations and are 
highly mobile before considerable sunk costs materialize. Second, MNEs have capital, 
resources and capabilities (such as technological expertise, access to foreign markets, 
and specific know–how of the industry) for extracting raw materials that the host 
countries usually do not possess. Thus, host countries/regions are compelled to offer 
attractive incentives to lure FDI (Eden & Molot, 2002; Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). 
Likewise, MNEs will use their bargaining power at this stage in order to get the most 
beneficial conditions for their exploitation, namely, tax exemptions and favourable 
legislation. 
When MNEs decide to invest ‘this event is generally celebrated by the signing of some 
sort of contract between the investor and the [host] government…[this] bargain is quite 
formal in character, and includes a series of commitments on the part of both parties’ 
(1971, p. 54). Among these commitments, the foreign investors usually accept to carry 
on the exploration and exploitation of the ores, to pay taxes, to abide the law, to provide 
the infrastructure needed for the production in case is missing, to provide their labour 
force with the skills and conditions needed for their work and to promote economic 
linkages with local suppliers. The state, on the other hand, generally agrees to a series 
of self–denying commitments, such as not taxing MNEs, not preventing the importation 
of supplies or interfering with the remitting of profits abroad, and so on.  
However, the bargains between MNEs and host countries/regions are expected to 
obsolesce over time. The longer the MNEs is in the host country/region, the more likely 
it is that the host region will perceive that it is not getting enough from the exploitation of 
the resource, especially if the investment turns out to be highly profitable and there are 
large remittances to the foreign parent (Eden & Molot, 2002). In the words of Vernon: 
‘…almost from the moment that the signatures have dried on the document, powerful 
forces go to work that quickly render the agreements obsolete in the eyes of the 
government’ Vernon (1971, p. 47).  
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The literature recognises several of these powerful forces, like the fact that once the 
investment is realised the large sunk costs provoke a shift in the bargaining power 
towards local institutions, which will be able to renegotiate the terms of the agreements 
to stimulate growth and development. Additionally, technological and knowledge 
spillovers, and economic growth in the host region can encourage the appearance of 
local suppliers and a better understanding of the industry, making the region less 
dependent of the MNEs. Hence, when the host region realizes that it holds enough 
bargaining power to change the original conditions, it will start a renegotiation process 
with the MNEs, in which it will impose stricter rules and fewer incentives. All of this aims 
to harvest better benefits and chances to achieve sustainable development. The region 
will also use this change to become less dependent of the MNEs by diversifying its local 
productive fabric and re–investing in private or state owned firms that can eventually 
substitute the MNEs. 
Figure 6 summarises the main components in the bargaining process between the MNEs 
and host countries identified in the obsolescence bargaining literature. Both possess a 
set of power sources or strategic resources which provide them with their bargaining 
strengths. Additionally, their exercise of power is limited by specific constraints. Thus, 
according to Kobrin (1987) and Dicken (2011) the relative bargaining power of both 
actors is a function of two related elements: the relative demand for the resources that 
are hold or controlled by each actor; and the constraints that affect the exertion of 
bargaining power to reach each actor’s strategic objective. These elements are crucial 
for the latter definition of bargaining power proposed.  
Furthermore, host countries usually have to deal with greater constraints compared to 
the MNEs as is seen in Figure 6. This can be related to the higher mobility and flexibility 
of the later in the early stages and in some industries. However, despite their 
manoeuvrability, MNEs’ behaviour still depends heavily on the nation–state behaviour, 
since they are the ones controlling the laws, political environment and natural resources. 
In sum, the main idea behind this model is that ‘the scarcer the resource being sought 
(whether by a MNE or a host country), the greater the relative bargaining power of the 
controller of access to that resource and vice versa’ (Dicken, 2011, p. 233). 
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Figure 6: Main components of the bargaining relationship between MNEs and host 
countries. 
 
Source: Based on material in Kobrin, 1987; Ramamurti, 2001 and Dicken, 2011. 
The OBM was later applied to other industries like manufacturing (Moran, 1985). More 
recently, several updates and revisions have also been made to the original bargaining 
model. Vachanti (1995) distinguished between static and dynamic bargaining outcomes. 
Moon and Lado (2000) expanded the bargaining model by recognizing that firm–specific 
resources are the base for the firm’s bargaining power and rent generation. Eden & Appel 
Molot (2002) incorporated the possibility of states bargaining with latecomer firms in a 
process of sequential entry by rival MNEs. Nebus and Rufin (2010) acknowledged the 
different types of actors that participate in bargaining processes within production 
networks. 
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3.4.3 The Two Tier Bargaining Model 
 
This research takes Ramamurti’s (2001) extension of the original OBM as a base to 
incorporate the bargaining models into the GPN approach. This is because his proposal 
considers most of the previously mentioned contributions, while also incorporating the 
role of international institutions and their impacts on the bargaining outcomes, which 
have come to the fore in processes of globalisation. Ramamurti’s model (2001) posits 
that the shift towards more ‘friendly’ host countries to FDI cannot be explained within the 
framework of traditional bargaining models like Vernon’s (1971), since MNE–host 
country relations can no longer be viewed as a dyadic, two party negotiation, but rather 
as a dynamic, two tier multi–party bargaining process. Such change has been caused 
by the liberalization of FDI through bilateral negotiations carried out by industrialized 
countries, under the agendas of multilateral institutions. Industrialized countries have 
also, and most importantly, reduced or stopped official capital flows (like aid and 
multilateral lending) to developing countries, meaning that, by the time he developed his 
model, such countries were perceived as more dependent on private capital flows. 
Hence, by addressing the relevance of international actors in the bargaining process, 
Ramamurti (2001) postulates a new two tier bargaining model (see Figure 7). Tier 1 
bargaining occurs between host developing countries and home (industrialized) 
countries, taking place bilaterally or through multinational institutions (IMF, WTO). The 
bilateral bargaining between host and home governments are guided by variables like 
the magnitude of bilateral trade between countries, which side enjoys the bilateral trade 
surplus, how much aid the developing country is receiving, historical and cultural ties 
between the two countries, geopolitics, etc. Bargaining with multilateral institutions, on 
the other hand, is shaped by the borrowing country’s balance of payments, its 
relationship with industrialized countries, its size, and its dependence on bilateral or 
multilateral aid, among other variables.  
Additionally, tier 2 bargaining takes place between individual MNEs and host 
governments, which was the main focus of the original OBM. Such bargains are driven 
by micro variables, like the uniqueness of a MNE’s technology or the scarcity and 
demand for natural resources hold by a country. 
In this two tier bargaining model, industrialized countries use tier 1 bargaining to weaken 
host governments in tier 2 bargaining processes while, at the same time, improving their 
own position (Figure 7). Thanks to this, MNEs are now able to profit and protect their 
technological and intangible assets due to the high competition between developing 
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countries for FDI, caused by the decline of official capital flows. Moreover, Ramamurti 
(2001) claims that the ability of host countries to make MNEs compete against each other 
has weakened in the last decades.  
Likewise, bilateral investment treaties, structural adjustment loans and multilateral deals 
imposed FDI liberalisation in developing countries, constrain the host countries’ ability to 
limit foreign ownership, establish performance requirements, require domestic dispute 
settlement and regulate financial transactions. MNEs have been especially successful at 
doing this in countries with huge debts and weak states that have had to adopt structural 
adjustment programs, and in sectors with huge entry barriers due to the high costs of the 
investment (Ramamurti, 2001).  
Thus, Ramamurti’s approach basically postulates that, through tier 1 bargaining, home 
governments of MNEs have systematically weakened the ability of host developing 
countries to extract concessions from individual MNEs in tier 2 bargains. Consequently, 
given the same sources of bargaining power as in the past, MNEs ought to enjoy higher 
bargaining power today than before, while the opposite must to be true for host countries. 
However, since Ramamurti’s work (2001), this model has not been further developed, 
and even though most of his conclusions are related with the mining industry and its 
GPNs, he does not explain how this approach explicitly applies to them. In this sense, 
the next section incorporates some of the previously developed arguments of the 
bargaining models into the GPN of an extractive industry, by operationalizing how 
bargaining power is defined, and what elements should be taken into account while 
analysing the exertion of such power within a GPN. 
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Figure 7: The two tier bargaining model. 
 
Source: Based on Ramamurti, 2001. 
 
3.5 BARGAINING POWER AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE BARGAINING MODELS 
IN AN EXTRACTIVE GPN 
 
Even though the GPN literature recognizes the crucial relevance of the bargaining power 
and process between the agents that participate in a GPN for regional development, it 
has not fully unpacked this concept, or incorporated bargaining models as part of its 
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analysis. Furthermore, the bargaining models themselves work with the notion of 
bargaining power, but they have linked it to the resources and the exertion of power 
instead of providing explicit definition of it. Thus, since power is the base for the 
achievement of strategic couplings, this section proposes an operational definition of the 
concept, which will be later used in the integration of the bargaining models into the GPN 
approach. 
 
3.5.1 A proposed operational definition of bargaining power 
 
As one of its main contributions, this research proposes an operational definition of 
bargaining power. Such effort enables the analysis of how the different agents, especially 
host states and MNEs within GPNs, decide to use their strategic resources while facing 
their constraints, in order to achieve their strategic objectives. The way in which they 
decide to use those strategic resources, as well as the relative asymmetry in their 
bargaining positions, determines their chances of reaching a strategic coupling that is 
mutually beneficial. Hence, the cumulative outcomes of the successive bargains will 
determine, in the long run, the possibilities for reaching a sustainable development in the 
host region and country.  
Here, the actors of the GPN are understood in the broad sense, meaning the sum of 
individual organisations or institutions. For the Chilean copper mining GPN these 
aggregated actors are: the copper mining MNEs, which comprise all the mining 
multinational enterprises operating directly or indirectly in Chile; the State, as the sum of 
all its institutions; and the civil society, when talking of all the citizens, NGOs and other 
civic organizations in a particular geographical area. 
Moreover, this research considers that bargaining power is exerted in social interactions 
called bargains. These interactions are positive sum games, since bargaining power is 
assumed to be socially created by the agents based on their development of strategic 
resources, which can be a source of potential bargaining power. The quantity, quality 
and demand of those resources will determine if there is a bargain as well as each actor’s 
bargaining position, but bargaining power cannot be equalled as the amount of strategic 
resources each actor hold. Bargaining power is not something that can be possessed or 
accumulated in a material way, since it is considered as a relational effect. Ergo, it could 
be said that holding and developing strategic resources is a mandatory but not sufficient 
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condition to, firstly, foster bargains between agents; and secondly, exert bargaining 
power. 
Consequently, bargaining power is exerted when an actor deliberately uses one or more 
of its strategic resources in the successive bargains taking place within a particular GPN, 
in order to reach its strategic objectives, while also facing each actor’s particular 
constraints. Both, the strategic resources and constraint of each actor, are continually 
changing due to the dynamic nature of both the bargaining processes and the GPNs; 
meaning that each actor’s bargaining position will probably change over the successive 
bargains.  
Furthermore, in order to use the bargaining power within a GPN approach, this research 
follows Allen’s (2003) suggestion and it explicitly incorporates the influence of space over 
the bargaining process, by acknowledging that both the bargaining process and the 
bargaining power are intrinsically spatial. Hence, geography and location of the actors 
determine the scope of influence of each actor. Regarding the former, each bargain takes 
place in nodes at different points within a hierarchy, where the most important decisions 
are negotiated in those nodes highest within the hierarchy. Consequently, the higher 
within the hierarchy that a bargain takes place, the greater the scope of the outcomes. 
This is, in a certain way, an innovation over the current discussion, since it incorporates 
the bargaining models in the GPN approach, while also elaborating the relevance of 
space or geography in bargaining processes. Additionally, this research proposes that 
some actors can be operating in multiple spatial levels at the same time, namely the 
international, national and regional/local levels. This research mostly focuses on the first 
three, but recognises that a richer analysis would be made by also incorporating the 
processes taking place in the local level.  
This definition of bargaining power rests in three different dimensions. Bargaining Power 
is then understood as the dynamic influence of one actor (A) of the GPN over others (B), 
when A actively utilizes its strategic resources and means to: firstly, make B do 
something it would not otherwise do in order to achieve its own strategic objectives; 
secondly, limit the scope of B’s decisions in the short term by preventing the discussion 
of issues that are dangerous to A’s strategic objectives; and thirdly, in the long term, 
when A is able to change B’s perceptions of what are its real interests. 
Hence, the dimensions proposed for understanding the exertion of bargaining power 
mirror the ones proposed in the power debate, and are vital for the comprehension of 
the bargaining outcomes in the short, and long terms, highlighting time as another 
relevant variable in the power analysis. Thus, bargaining power can be exerted as: 
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episodic bargaining power and non–decisional bargaining power in the short term; and 
as a creation of a false consciousness or change in the agents’ perception as a result of 
the successful and continuous exertion of bargaining power from an actor over several 
bargains through time.  
The first kind of bargaining power, episodic bargaining power, takes its name from the 
analysis of Clegg (2002) and Dahl (1961) where bargaining power is considered 
intentional and active. It can be observed when A succeeds in its open attempt to force 
B to do something that he/she would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1968), through A’s 
utilization of its strategic resources and means in the degree A’s constraint allow it, and 
in order to reach its strategic objectives. This kind of bargaining power is extremely useful 
for unpacking the power relations between the agents, since it entails a focus on the 
actual process where bargaining power is exerted. Hence, episodic bargaining power is 
about decision–making situations, and cannot be equated to the strategic resources or 
reputation hold by the agents, since such resources can or cannot be mobilized during 
the bargain7.  
A second kind of bargaining power proposed is the non–decisional bargaining power, 
taking its name from what Bachrach and Bachrach (1962) proposed in their work. Here, 
bargaining power is exercised by limiting the scope of decisions made in the bargaining 
process, when issues are deliberately left out of the agenda by one of the actors. In this 
case, A exercises power over B when A limits the scope of the political process to issues 
which are relatively inoffensive to A.  
The third kind of bargaining power proposed is ideological bargaining power, which is 
more of an outcome of the continuous exertion of the previous two in successive 
bargains over a long period of time and, when established, it is present in the background 
of every negotiation where it slowly changes the ideology of the less powerful agents. 
Hence, ideological bargaining power refers to how continually strong bargaining 
positions in terms of episodic and non–decisional bargaining power can shape the 
perceptions of the less powerful actors in the long term, in order to ensure the acceptance 
of their role in the existing array of things. In this way, long term bargaining power 
asymmetries can cause a latent conflict between A and B by giving them a false 
consciousness or ideology. Consequently, A will try to reach its strategic objectives by 
                                               
7 For example, a firm can use its wealth to finance political campaigns while looking to influence the 
legislation related to FDI; or to buy new computers. In the first case, the firm is using its resources to affect 
the conditions of the bargain whereas in the latter case the firm is not using its resources as a source of 
power. 
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affect B in a manner contrary to B’s interests; by making B unaware of its real interests 
(Lukes, 2005). 
It is important to notice that bargaining power can be exerted in all or some of these three 
dimensions in a progressive way. This means that it is necessary to exert bargaining 
power in one level, to be able to do it in the next one; which is located in a deeper socio–
economic structure. The more levels are under the influence of the bargaining power of 
an agent, the larger and more pervasive will be its influence over the other agents, and 
the stronger the chances of having the upper hand in following bargains. This research 
mostly focuses on the episodic bargaining power, since focusing on the bargaining 
process is the first step to shed light on how power is exerted within an extractive GPN. 
However, the proposed definition incorporates the three dimensions, in the hope that 
future works will allow their full understanding. 
In addition, table 1 shows how bargaining power is intrinsically spatial, having a 
geographical scope of influence in which the bargains held in the nodes with a higher 
hierarchy will most likely impact the less strategic ones, and sometimes, vice versa.  
Furthermore, bargaining power is exerted in successive bargains; and heavily depends 
on each actor’s capacity to develop its strategic objectives while also facing some 
particular constraints. Hence, the strategic resources and constraints are the key to 
understand how bargaining power is exerted as well as the cumulative outcomes of the 
bargains. Bargains will only take place when actors possess strategic resources that 
others need, and their bargaining power potential will be determined by how intensively 
the others demand such resources, as well as each actor’s particular constraints.  
Finally, as seen in table 1, bargaining power can be defined in terms of the three 
dimensions it operates, starting from the ones that can be most easily observed in each 
bargain, namely the episodic bargaining power; to the non – decisional bargaining power 
that involves a deeper level of manipulation; and finally the ideological bargaining power 
which relates to how an actor can modify the other actor’s perception of reality in order 
to create a false consciousness.  
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Table 2: Summary of types of bargaining power and their scope  
 
Type of bargaining power exerted in terms of its dimension 
 
Actors actively and intentionally use their strategic resources, while 
facing their constraints, in the successive bargains in order to reach 
their strategic objectives by: 
Spatial scale where 
the bargaining power 
is exerted 
Episodic bargaining 
power 
Non - decisional 
bargaining power 
Ideological bargaining 
power 
Regional 
Making other actors 
do something they 
would not have 
done otherwise.  
Leaving out the 
bargain issues that 
are dangerous for 
the achievement of 
their objectives.  
Changing the 
perceptions of the 
other agents so they 
believe their strategic 
objectives are the 
same as the ones of 
the agent exerting this 
kind of power over 
them. 
National 
International 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
This research mostly focuses on the study of the episodic bargaining power between the 
state and mining MNEs located within the Chilean copper mining GPN in the 
international, national and regional levels. It does this, by establishing the host state and 
mining MNEs’ strategic resources and constraints, and how they use them in the 
bargains that take place. However, the research also tries to briefly shed some empirical 
light over some aspects of the non–decisional bargaining power exerted in the Chilean 
case. It does not fully analyse either that type or the ideological bargaining power, since 
the aim of the research is to focus on the actual bargaining process between the state 
and mining MNEs taking place at different scales, and to present empirical evidence on 
how the most basic form of power can be analysed for extractive GPNs. Despite this 
limitation, the analysis of the bargains helps to determine the spatial outcomes for the 
host regions and nations within a GPN, something that has not been done so far. The 
next section details what sort of spatial outcomes could be expected as a result of 
bargaining processes.  
 
85 
 
3.6 SPATIAL OUTCOMES OF BARGAINING PROCESSES 
 
This section explores the spatial outcomes of the bargain, in terms of two different 
outcomes: clusters and enclaves. The former implies sustainable growth and 
development; and the later unsustainable growth and dependence. Thus, this section 
explains the characteristics of these agglomerations, as well as their relevance for 
achieving a strategic coupling and regional development in an extractive GPN. 
 
3.6.1 Historical description of the extractive enclaves and clusters 
 
3.6.1.1 The enclave and GPNs  
 
From the beginning of the 20th century until the 70s, there was a strong academic 
perspective that questioned the benefits of the FDI over local development, giving birth 
to the concept of the traditional mining enclave. This was defined as an economic activity, 
geographically localized with limited forward and backward linkages with the local 
productive system, and whose property is mainly foreign (Cardoso & Faletto, 2007; 
Girvan, 1970; Weisskoff & Wolff, 1977).  
The extractive regions of underdeveloped countries have been historically characterized 
by presenting economic enclave structures, marked by the geographical localization of 
the MNEs in the place of exploitation, the weak productive linkages with the productive 
local structure of the host region, the property of the foreign capital investment and the 
exploitation of low value assets (Cademartori, 2008; Gupta & Gupta, 1998; Phelps, 
2008). Such geographical and productive isolation added to the income exports to the 
foreign countries were supposed to present a vicious circle for the local development, in 
which the enclave structure reinforced itself (Auty, 1980; Cardoso & Faletto, 2007; 
Conning & Robinson, 2009; Emerson, 1982; Girvan, 1970; Gupta & Gupta, 1998; 
Weisskoff & Wolff, 1977). 
The enclave structure was kept from evolving into a more beneficial one, due to the 
excessive bargaining power that MNEs exerted during that period. This power was such 
that the MNEs established a social and spatial organization called Company Town or 
Industrial City, in which they controlled all the aspects of their workers’ lives – housing, 
fun, money, transportation, and common areas – (Kerr & Siegel, 1954; Phelps et al., 
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2015). The traditional enclaves were geographically isolated; had extremely limited 
relationships with the national economy; scant forward and backward productive 
linkages; and extremely focused on exporting products to foreign markets, while the 
profits were captured by the headquarters of the MNEs. This meant leaving in the host 
region just the necessary currency to maintain the productive process and to pay the 
government taxes, which hampered the generation of a virtuous circle to promote the 
local development (Cademartori, 2008; Cardoso & Faletto, 2007; Hirschman, 1958; 
Weisskoff & Wolff, 1977). 
However, during the 70s, the concept of enclave was progressively crossed out because 
its definition abandoned the principal geographical and economical characterization, by 
including all kinds of signs of unbalanced growth, leading to a loss of precision, predictive 
capability and credibility as an analytic category (Hojman, 1983). Additionally, the 
emergence of the neoliberal model established by dictatorships in developing countries 
also played a big role the abandonment of theories linked to the dependency theory. This 
left a gap which was later filled by the more optimistic view, proposed by the cluster 
policies. 
Thus, the benefits of this kind of GPN were extremely unbalanced towards the MNEs 
interests, creating an illusion of growth and development that was not sustainable in 
these regions due to the inexistence of a strategic coupling, the capture of value by the 
MNEs and the lack of strong economic linkages. As an extreme example of this 
unsustainable growth we have the case of Chile, which enjoyed a high growth rate thanks 
to the nitrate industry and its mining enclaves, until it all ended when the MNEs left the 
country (decoupling), leaving it sunken in the worst economic crisis of its history (Meller, 
2007). 
 
3.6.1.2 Clusters and GPNs 
 
In a trend that started during the 1990s, the importance of the FDI has been reassessed 
as the engine of regional growth, leading to the proposition of creating clusters based on 
large mining in Latin America, mainly fostered by international organisms such as CEPAL 
(Ramos, 1998). The change in the way in which the local impact of the mining MNEs is 
perceived, leads to question whether there has really been an evolution from the mining 
enclave to the mining cluster, where large mining companies promote local development 
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and, also, in which way the mining MNEs contribute to local development (Phelps et al., 
2015).     
The cluster trend has its origin in Becattini’s (1990) work, which is based on the idea of 
industrial districts proposed by Marshall in 1890. This implies assuming the existence of 
positive externalities due to the agglomeration of firms in a geographical area. Recently, 
international organisations (CEPAL in 1998) as well as governmental organisations 
(CORFO in 2001 and the Chilean Government in 2008 in the case of Chile) have boosted 
the application of cluster strategies in mining regions in order to promote their economic 
development (Buitelaar, 2001; Lagos & Lagos, 2010; Ramos, 1998).They assume that 
there is a strategic coupling between the interests of the MNEs in the mining global 
production network and the regional institutions, which should lead to the regional 
development (MacKinnon, 2012). 
An ideal type of cluster that could be applicable to the mining regions is Markusen’s 
(1996) Hub and Spoke Industrial District, in which there is a few large firms (hubs) that 
are linked with a lot of local small and medium firms (spokes). This type of agglomeration 
faces some constraints in the case of the mining activity:  
1. The mining sector is in the mature stage of his product life cycle, which probably implies 
the lack of agglomeration economies (Potter & Potter, 2011). This should act as a 
centrifugal force, contrary to the agglomeration. 
2. The localization logic of the MNEs is determined by the ‘location’ in the OLI paradigm 
(Dunning, 1993), principally because the mining deposits are fixed in the space. 
Furthermore, the market power of mining MNEs causes that they locate in a type of 
region whose organization is closer to an ‘Industrial Complex’ (Gordon & McCann, 2000) 
than to other type of cluster. This implies that the relations between MNEs and the rest 
of the firms are formal, since MNEs are not willing to provoke outflows of knowledge 
spillovers. MNEs essentially try to maximize the inflows of knowledge for their own good, 
unless they have clear incentives to create technological spillovers (McCann & Mudambi, 
2004, 2005) 
Furthermore, several authors have stated that the presence of the MNEs in regions 
generate limited benefits to the host region development, because of: the confiscation of 
public assets and the internalization of the positive externalities of the MNEs; significant 
power asymmetries; and the generation of economic enclaves (Conning & Robinson, 
2009; Phelps, 2008; Phelps et al., 2015). In this line, Phelps et al (2015) critique the 
tendency in the economic geography literature to assume that agglomerations formed 
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as a result of the extractive industry take the form of a cluster, when they can clearly 
show several characteristics of an economic enclave. Thus, they propose that within the 
expanding GCC/GVC/GPN literature, ‘local and national industry development produces 
outcomes that are intermediate—those that represent neither the highs of industry 
[clusters] nor the lows of enclaves’ (Phelps et al., 2015, p. 141). Hence, bargaining 
process will, more likely, have one of these intermediate spatial effects, which are multi–
scalar and have different impacts on the possibilities for sustainable development of the 
host regions, as detailed next. 
 
3.6.2 The intermediate spaces: multi–scalar enclaves and clusters  
 
In order to establish whether the spatial effects that the bargaining process can be 
sustainable in the long run for the host region/country, it is crucial to provide updated 
definitions of what is understood as a cluster and an enclave. In this sense, Phelps et al 
(2015) propose a removed definition for the economic enclave concept, where  
‘[It] can be defined as a physically, administratively, or legally bounded territory 
whose geography or morphology is intimately related to the following economic 
characteristics: dependence on one or a few large firms; high specialization in 
one activity; and weak integration into the local economy, which is used primarily 
to access some local factors of production. As a result, the economic enclave is 
not able to generate localization economies related to specialization. In the short 
and medium term, enclaves can grow rapidly to contribute export earnings and 
have a positive net local economic impact, mainly based on internal economies 
of scale. This characteristic remains the main basis for enclave – led growth 
strategies. In the long term, however, a characteristic of enclaves is the lack of 
sustainability’ (Phelps et al., 2015, p. 120).  
 
This definition implies that an economic enclave is a form of strategic decoupling, 
between the MNEs and the host region of a particular extractive GPN (MacKinnon, 
2012), which is the complete opposite scenario of what might be expected from a cluster 
form of agglomeration. Such decoupling entails that: value will be mostly captured by the 
MNEs; value enhancement within the host region/country is not a priority for MNEs; and 
that the degree of embeddedness of the mining MNEs is mostly determined by their sunk 
costs and spatial immobility of the natural resources. All of these can be caused by 
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bargaining power asymmetries within the extractive GPN, where MNEs are able to 
impose their will over the other agents. This is mostly likely to happen when host states 
are weakened by the international institutions or agreements, or when they choose to 
not exert all their bargaining power to maintain the ‘FDI friendly’ posture. 
On the other hand, the cluster concept shares several elements with the enclave, like its 
territorial embeddedness, but it can be considered as the other side of the same 
analytical coin. Hence, based on the definition of an enclave proposed by Phelps et al. 
(2015), this research defines a cluster as:  
a physically, administratively, or legally bounded territory whose geography or 
morphology is intimately related to the following economic characteristics: 
dependence on few large firms or on several small and medium enterprises; high 
specialization in one activity in the short run that leads to high diversification of 
the productive fabric in the medium – long run; and a strong integration into the 
local economy, which is used as a source of skilled labour, supplies and know – 
how. Thus, an economic cluster can generate agglomeration economies related 
to diversification. In the medium – long term, clusters can contribute to economic 
growth and the creation of a skilled labour pool and competitive SMEs that are 
able to provide products and services worldwide. Thus, one of the main 
characteristics of a cluster is its sustainability through the achieving of a strategic 
coupling among the actors involved. 
Nowadays, however, the bargaining process is unlikely to produce pure enclaves or 
clusters in the extractive industry. In the particular case of mining, the recent apparition 
of mining camps allow the generation of diverse spatial effects on different scales of the 
GPN as Phelps et al (2015) report. Even though the mining industry has been associated 
with mining company towns (Cardoso & Faletto, 2007) and national enclaves (Singer, 
1950), the new tendency toward mining being carried out in camps produce two 
additional scenarios in which the camp is somewhat integrated with agglomerations in 
the national and local level. Thus, some of the characteristics of an enclave have ‘sprung 
their bounds’, allowing the co–existence of mining enclaves and clusters in different 
scales.  
Phelps et al acknowledge this new scenario, and propose that a new the emergence of 
the mining camps is associated with development outcomes that are intermediate, 
meaning, ‘the mining camps as an enclave coexisting with measure of industry 
agglomeration elsewhere in subnational and national urban systems’ (Phelps et al., 
2015, p. 135). Henceforth, according to their classification, the bargaining process in a 
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mining GPN can produce: the traditional mining company town; a mining camp with 
agglomeration economies present in secondary city; a mining camp with agglomeration 
economies present in capital city; and the nation as an enclave (see Figure 8). 
a) The mining company town: it refers to the traditional mining town which was explained 
in the previous section, which is tightly spatially delimited and where all the productive 
factors and linkages are localized in places close to the ore. The very few economic 
linkages of this agglomeration with the host region and country, and the terrible working 
conditions for its labour force made it completely unsustainable. Yet, this form of enclave 
can still be found operating in some underdeveloped countries (FIG 8.A).  
 
b) The mining camp and agglomeration economies in secondary cities: it can be analogous 
to an oil platform, where the production is tightly delimited. Here, the labour force is 
brought to the extraction site for working long shifts and then be transported to their 
respective home cities. For Phelps et al, even though the mining camp is completely 
isolated from the rest of the region, some of the economic relations that take place on 
them may promote the apparition of clusters in a secondary city, through the 
development of mining service industries. However, the degree in which secondary cities 
can turn into competitive agglomerations is still unclear (FIG 8.B). 
 
c) The mining camp and agglomeration economies in capital cities: if agglomeration 
economies form, they will most likely create a cluster in a delimited part of the capital 
city. This since the capital is usually the main intermediary location of the global supply 
chain of mining production, and firms can benefit from its strong urbanization economies. 
Here, the country can benefit from the presence of mining MNEs because tax revenues 
and external economy effects concentrated in the capital city. However, the secondary 
cities of mining regions still show many characteristics of an enclave. This is the most 
likely scenario for small national economies, with a highly concentrated population in the 
capital and with a strongly centralized national government such as Chile (FIG 8.C).  
 
d) The national economy as an enclave: most of the enclave literature understands them in 
these terms (Singer, 1950; Weisskoff & Wolff, 1977). Here, mining camps exists as one 
of many dispersed fragments of production chains of international reach. However, the 
mining camp fails to produce any of the external economies typical of an industry 
agglomeration in every scale: mining camp itself, secondary in the mining region and 
capital city. Moreover, the MNEs capture most of the value, and little to none further 
value added. Likewise, there are significant imports of all factors of production at the 
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local and the national scale. Notably, there are significant leakages rather than linkages 
in the form of imports of technology and the international recruitment of labour (FIG 8.D). 
 
Figure 8: Three types of enclave: the company mining town (a), intermediation 
based on the mining camp (b and c), and the nation as an enclave (d). 
 
Source: Phelps et al, 2015. 
In sum, the economic enclaves were used widely in the study of undeveloped mining 
regions with a strong presence of MNEs until the 70s, when this model was abandoned 
due to its lack of conceptual severity and scarce explanatory capacity, caused by an over 
– use (Hojman, 1983). Furthermore, the economic geography literature has assumed 
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that the agglomerations formed as results of the dynamic bargains in the extractive GPNs 
are one of the several types of clusters, implying beneficial outcomes for the host 
region/country. However, there are several cases in which such clusters categories 
present characteristics that are typical of an enclave. Thus, in the last decades, this 
concept has been recovered in the academic literature, due to the unsatisfied 
expectations generated by many projects of FDI in the mining field, and the little impact 
that the cluster policies have achieved in many regions (Conning & Robinson, 2009; 
Gupta & Gupta, 1998; Phelps et al., 2015). 
Henceforth, the appreciation of the enclave is crucial for understanding regional 
development outcomes. It is doubtful that the presence of large MNEs in mining regions 
can cause enough agglomeration economies to produce a multi–scalar cluster involving 
the secondary mining and capital cities due to the considerable bargaining power 
asymmetries in this industry, but there can be situations in which enclaves can co–exists 
with some forms of clusters. Such agglomerations will be determined by the successive 
bargains between MNEs and local institutions and actors, as well as the strategic 
coupling/decoupling that will take place as a result of them. The next section proposes 
the way in which this work will measure such processes and outcomes. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This section provides a theoretical way in order to achieve one of this research 
objectives, the incorporation of power in the extractive GPNs approach. It does this by 
introducing the main elements of the power literature, while also establishing the Three 
Dimensional Power Debate as the theoretical grounds for the proposed definition of 
bargaining power. Hence, there is a brief description of the three approaches: episodic, 
non–decisional and ideological power, while also highlighting the relevance of the 
strategic resources, particular constraints and scope later used for developing a 
bargaining power operational definition. 
Moreover, the chapter also develops the main obsolescence models, and how these 
predict that resource rich nations will be able to exert more bargaining power after the 
initial investments are done by the mining MNEs. The section explains both the traditional 
bargaining models, and the most updated ones that consider two tiers of negotiations: a 
first tier taking place within the country’s limits between the mining MNEs and states, and 
a second one happening in the international level between the host countries and 
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international institutions and home countries of the extractive MNEs. These models 
provide the idea that power is exerted by each actor in the successive bargains taking 
place in different geographical nodes of an extractive GPN.  
Then the chapter makes two theoretical contributions of this research, by; firstly, 
incorporating the bargaining models into the GPN approach in order to empirically and 
theoretically unpack the concept of power; and secondly, providing three operational 
definitions of bargaining mirroring the three faces of the power debate: episodic, non – 
decisional and ideological bargaining power. This kind of power cannot be possessed or 
accumulated, but it strongly depends on the strategic resources and constraints that 
each actor holds and faces.  
The outcomes of the successive bargains taking place in a particular GPN will also have 
very specific spatial outcomes, which can ultimately take the form of extractive enclaves, 
meaning unsustainable development, or clusters, implying a strategic coupling between 
the actors and better chances of sustainable development for the host region and nation. 
The methodology this research uses to analyse the bargains and their outcomes 
between the mining MNEs and the State are detailed next. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE METHODS AND DATA UTILIZED 
 
The initial four research questions proposed in Chapter 1 were aimed at contributing to 
the discussion about how the mining industry affects uneven regional and national 
development, in the context of contemporary globalisation. In this sense this section 
describes how each question is addressed in this research, by explicating the methods 
and data considered for such goal. 
Question one was answered by using the work of Bridge (2008) as the base to 
conceptually and empirically incorporate elements from the mining industry into the GPN 
1.0 approach. This is done by focusing on bargaining between the agents, through the 
inclusion of bargaining models into the GPN framework. Question 2 was addressed by 
providing three operational definitions of bargaining power, using the concepts 
developed within the power debate. These definitions highlight the idea that the potential 
bargaining of each actor depends on the strategic resources it holds, and its exertion of 
the constraints it faces. Value capture will then be determined as an outcome of the 
successive bargains taking place within a GPN, as well as the bargaining power exertion 
between the main actors. Questions three and four are empirical in nature and require a 
deeper discussion of the methods used and so are the subject of the present chapter.  
In order to tackle the implications of the bargaining power between all the agents involved 
in the mining GPN and the role the state plays in these negotiations, this research utilizes 
a case study analysis of the Chilean copper mining GPN. A Case study analysis provides 
the required design for achieving an in depth understanding about how these processes 
interact and influence each other, allowing the construction of a theoretical framework 
that considers the pivotal role of power over value and embeddedness of MNEs in the 
host region, as well as the implications for local and national development as a result of 
these relations.  
For this purpose, the relevant nodes of this GPN are considered, namely: London (UK), 
where most of the headquarters are located and corporate decisions are made; 
Santiago, capital city of Chile and host of the national headquarters of the mining MNEs; 
and the Antofagasta Region, where the most important mines and ores are located. 
Primary and secondary data were gathered through these different scales. The former 
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comprises 50 interviews made in the three nodes between 2012 and 2016 to mining 
experts, CEOs, politicians, academics, and civil society representatives, while the latter 
comes from public databases, reports, newspapers, and firms’ public information. 
Combined, these data permit a description and comprehension of the underlying 
processes in the bargains between the agents mining MNEs and the Chilean State as 
the base contributions of this thesis: an updated theory of mining GPNs that incorporates 
bargaining models and bargaining power, the unpacking of the power concept, and the 
re-evaluation of the state–firm relationship.  
To achieve these objectives, the research uses the three bargaining power definitions 
previously established, in order to determine the strategic resources and constraints of 
each actor and the scope and relevance of such resources or constraints. These 
resources and constraints determine the bargaining position of each actor, which is 
extremely important to understanding how the bargaining processes take place. 
Additionally, the research analyses how the mining MNEs and Chilean State use (or not) 
their strategic resources while facing their constraints in order to reach their strategic 
objectives, in the continuous bargains taking place in every node of the Chilean copper 
GPN. In short, the research provides a picture of the winners and losers from bargaining 
along the mining GPN in three different ways.  
Firstly, and most importantly, the research assesses issues caused by a highly 
unbalanced bargaining power distribution between the different actors. By using the 
operational definition of bargaining power proposed, this research discusses the 
evolution of its sources, distribution and exertion among the agents involved, focusing 
on state and the mining MNEs. Additionally, it also inquires the role of international 
institutions in this process, as the Two Tier Bargaining model suggests (Ramamurti, 
2001). The consequences of this distribution determine the value capture and degree of 
territorial embeddedness of a mining MNE in the host region. Collective institutions are 
considered but not in depth, since they are not the focus of this work. 
Secondly, the research evaluates how much value is captured by MNEs and the central 
region in the Chilean copper mining GPN. Value capture and distribution has been 
considered vital for the development possibilities of the host region, and can be captured 
by mining MNEs at the very beginning of the chain (Bridge, 2008). Conversely, Coe et al 
explain (2004) that value can be captured locally if the MNE re–invests in its subsidiaries, 
suppliers or local labour force. For these reasons this work analyses the relationship 
between MNEs, local firms and state, and the policies that both, state and MNEs, have 
implemented in order to maximize their value capture. 
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Thirdly, there is an assessment of the economic linkages between the mining industry 
and the local productive fabric. Economic linkages have been the traditional measure of 
the degree of territorial embeddedness of MNEs in the host region, due to their relevance 
for the diversification of its economy. However, in the mining sector, the increasing 
barriers to entry in the industry, might affect the kind of participation that local SMEs 
have. Local SMEs usually do not possess the capital required for overcoming these 
barriers, so their participation in the mining GPN may consist mostly as providers of basic 
services. This can cause weaker economic linkages between MNEs and local firms and 
a less diversified economy. This work analyses the economic linkages between MNEs 
and the local SMEs, in terms of their strength, localization and the power struggles 
between suppliers and mining MNES.  
The analysis of such categories can provide a strong evaluation of the chances that the 
Chilean mining GPN has to achieve a strategic coupling and, therefore, a sustainable 
form of agglomeration, namely, a mining cluster. On the other hand, if the chances of a 
strategic coupling are low, the Chilean mining GPN could be closer to an unsustainable 
form of agglomeration, in other words, one of the mining enclave formations proposed 
by Phelps et al (2015). A more detailed argument about why the case study analysis was 
chosen as the main method to respond the research questions is described next.  
 
4.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY: A CASE STUDY DESIGN  
 
This research utilizes the case study analysis in order to give a response to its research 
questions. Such a method allows the understanding of a real life phenomenon in depth, 
while also considering important conditions that may be highly pertinent for 
comprehending the phenomenon of study (Yin, 2009, p. 18). It is an approach suited to 
addressing the complexity of relationships in the mining GPNs and the power struggles 
within them.  
Case studies have been widely used ‘for examining contemporary events [where] 
relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated’ (Yin, 2009, p. 11). They rely on primary and 
secondary data and interviews with people involved in the events, all of which are used 
in this research. This analysis provides findings ‘generalizable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations or universes’ (Yin, 2009, p. 15) which is one of the ultimate 
objectives of this work.  
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A case study has been defined by Yin (2009) in two parts: A case study is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real–life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident. Moreover, the case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive 
situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points; and as 
one result, relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion; and as another result, it benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.  
The main strength of this method relies on its capacity to address real life phenomenon 
with fuzzy boundaries - a well-known characteristic of the GPN framework – yet also is 
compatible with theory building; in this case of the underlying processes between the 
bargaining power and its role in influencing value capture and local embeddedness.  
  
4.2.1 Single or multiple case studies? 
 
A common concern about the use of case study design in research is related with the 
choice between a single or multiple case study design, which is related with the external 
validity or generalizability of this approach. Bryman (2012, p. 67) exemplifies this 
worriment by asking ‘how can a single case possibly be representative so that it might 
yield findings that can be applied more generally to other cases?’. The response to this 
question usually involves a preference towards a multiple case study design, since the 
evidence gathered from multiple cases is frequently considered more convincing and, 
therefore, the overall study can be regarded as being more robust (Herriott & Firestone, 
1983; Yin, 2009). 
However, the main aim of case study research is to engage in a process of what has 
been called ‘analytic generalization’ by Yin (2009) and ‘theoretical generalization’ by J.C. 
Mitchel (1983), where researchers use extant theory as a guide to evaluating the 
empirical results of the case study. In this process, the investigator tries to ‘generalize a 
particular set of results to some broader theory’ (Bryman, 2012; Mitchell, 1983; Yin, 
2009) meaning that the main strength of case study is not to expand the findings to a 
wider universe, but to contribute to theory development through the theoretical linkages 
observed in the features of the case study. 
Moreover, Yin (2009) argues that it is vital to consider what kind of case study research 
(single or multiple cases) fits better with the research objectives, as both are useful in 
different situations. He explains that the rationale for single case designs cannot usually 
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be satisfied by multiple cases, since some of the cases used by the researchers are, by 
definition, more likely to involve only single cases. In this sense he identifies five 
situations where single cases are the best way to contribute to theory development8. 
Since one of the main goals of this research is to update, test and develop theories 
regarding the mining GPN and its impact on the host regions, a case study approach is 
used. Furthermore, this research focuses on a single case study, namely the Chilean 
mining GPN. The Chilean case study has been considered as the most important copper 
producer worldwide and an example of development by international organisations, 
meaning that the theories related to FDI, growth and cluster generation have been widely 
accepted as true. Additionally, the Chilean case has also been historically depicted as 
an example of mining enclave formation and resource curse, and has implemented some 
of the most extreme neoliberal policies in Latin America, all of which make it a good 
critical single case study with which to appraise opposing theoretical views and the 
evolving nature of the bargains between MNEs and states.  
Moreover, the Chilean case can be considered as representative of developing countries 
whose growth and development depends heavily on natural resources, especially 
mining. In addition, several longitudinal analyses have taken place before (Cademartori, 
2008; Kobrin, 1980; Moran, 1974), where the power relationships within the Chilean 
mining GPN and its outcomes have been studied over several periods of time. All of this 
implies that the use of a single case study is appropriate for the aims of this research. 
However, there is still one decision to be made regarding to the number of units that will 
be part of the case study design, as explained next. 
 
4.2.2 Holistic and embedded case studies. 
 
Sometimes the same single case study involves more than one unit of analysis. This 
happens when within a single case, a subunit(s) are part of the analysis, in which case 
the design would be called an embedded case study design. Conversely, if the case 
                                               
8 The critical case - chosen to test-out the hypotheses of a well–developed theory; the extreme case, whose 
analysis may provide invaluable theoretical insights, the revelatory case, used to observe previously 
inaccessible to social inquiry phenomenon; the typical case, which exemplifies an everyday practice or 
situation; and the longitudinal case, consisting in studying the same single case at two or more points in 
time. 
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study is focused only on the global nature of the case and not on its subunits, a holistic 
design is being used (Yin, 2009). 
The holistic design is helpful when there are no subunits in the case, or when ‘the 
relevant theory underlying the case study is itself of a holistic nature’ (Yin, 2009, p. 50). 
However, while using this approach, the researcher could overlook the examination of a 
specific phenomenon, since the holistic approach focus on an extreme abstract level 
may result in a lack of clear measurements or data. Another weakness of this approach 
is that the research design might not be appropriate for the initial research questions 
anymore when there is a shift in the entire nature of the case study (Yin, 2009). 
On the other hand, the embedded design allows the analysis of subunits within the case, 
allowing a more complex examination. The subunits can often add significant 
opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case. 
However, as Yin (2009, p. 52) warns ‘if too much attention is given to these subunits, 
and if the larger, holistic aspects of the case begin to be ignored, the case study itself 
will have shifted its orientation and changed its nature’. This highlights the fact that an 
embedded case study should always return to the larger unit of analysis in order to 
provide a satisfactory answer to the original research question, and that is why this 
research design is appropriate for the study of the Chilean copper GPN. 
A single case study design is relevant for the analysis of the Chilean case, since it shows 
features from the critical, representative and longitudinal types, which are mostly used in 
this kind of research. Moreover, due to the characteristics of the Chilean mining GPN, it 
is vital to examine its main nodes located in multiple scales: London (global), Santiago 
(national) and Antofagasta (regional). Hence, an embedded case study design is used, 
since it addresses the complexity of this GPN and the agents involved in it.  
 
4.2.3 Units of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis of this study are the main nodes of Chilean mining GPN, which 
comprises London (UK), Santiago (Capital city of Chile) and the Antofagasta region in 
Chile (where most of the mineral are exploited). These places where chosen due to the 
following criteria: 
The first node, London (UK), is where most of the mining MNEs that are based in Chile 
have their headquarters. Additionally, this is where the London Metal Exchange (LME) 
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is based, which is the most important centre for the trade of industrial metal worldwide. 
Together with this, the International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) and several 
mining NGOs are there. Thus, London is the central node where all the main decisions 
are made regarding to mineral prices (at LME), corporate behaviour and practices to 
achieve sustainable development in host regions (mediated by the ICMM) and global 
resistance and coordination to mining externalities (exerted by mining NGOs). 
The second node, Santiago (capitol city of Chile), is where all the mining MNEs operating 
in Chile have their local headquarters. They concentrate there because the central 
government, its ministries and the most important institutions related to mining are 
located in the Chilean capital city due to its highly centralized political structure. 
Furthermore, it has the best transport links and access to the Region of Valparaiso, 
where the National Congress is located. Almost every single relevant legislative and 
investment decision regarding the Chilean mining industry is taken here. 
The third node, the Antofagasta Region (Chile), is the place which holds most of the 
Chilean mineral ores, the highest concentration of mining projects and the ports where 
the minerals are shipped worldwide. It concentrates the world’s largest deposits of 
copper, lithium and molybdenum. The whole region has a historically strong dependency 
on mining and most of its cities are engaged directly or indirectly with this industry. 
Additionally, this region has to deal with the mining industry’s externalities leading to a 
strong presence of social movements, CSR policies and state involvement in mediating 
these conflicts between civil society, local SMEs and mining MNEs.  
These three nodes are the most relevant ones in the copper mining GPN, and are where 
the primary data was collected through the multi–method strategy detailed next. The 
analysis was carried out for each node, while also considering the larger scope of the 
bargaining taking place in each location. The research used the primary information 
gathered from the interviews to experts in order to determine the strategic resources of 
both the mining MNEs and Chilean State, as well as the constraints they face, and also 
to understand how these actors use/or do not use these resources in the successive 
bargains taking place in each node. Secondary data was gathered as background 
information in order to better understand the reliability of the perceptions gathered in the 
interviews, and to visualize the trends in the bargaining processes, as well as the 
outcomes of such bargains for achieving strategic coupling and increasing the 
sustainable development possibilities of the host region and country. All of these 
elements are further developed in the next sections of this chapter. 
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4.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.3.1 The need for a multi–method strategy 
 
Since the early 1990’s there has been a discussion about what are the best research 
methods when dealing with MNEs, elites and power imbalances in the international 
business, economic geography and, consequently, GPN research. This debate is part of 
a broader one, related to what can be accepted as a scientific method within social 
sciences, in which some social scientists focus on the statistical methods as the ultimate 
way to secure the validity and reliability of research findings, where others defend the 
view that qualitative methods are required to make empirical sense of the reality 
observed in a statistical analysis (Layder, 1993; Yeung, 1995).  
Nowadays, the international business and economic geography research acknowledges 
the relevance of qualitative methods in their investigations - since it is now recognized 
that is almost impossible to achieve perfect replicability in any research dealing with the 
social world in open systems. Despite this shortcoming, qualitative methods are both 
valid, in the sense they help to make sense of the opinions and information collected; 
and reliable, meaning that some of them, such as the personal interviews, can be 
repeated by other researchers (Yeung, 1995). 
Moreover, there is an overall consensus about the strength of using a multi–method 
strategy that comprises both intensive and extensive methods (Sayer, 1992). The former 
refers to the methods that allow a constant process of abstraction in which theories are 
produced, and whose primary source of data comes from qualitative research methods, 
especially from personal interviews. Extensive methods provide the background 
information to offer an exhaustive picture on the particular historical and geographical 
attributes of a particular phenomenon, using all sorts of secondary data sources (Sayer, 
1992; Yeung, 1995). Since this research aims to make a theoretical contribution to the 
GPN and bargaining literature; to analyse the bargaining power exertion within the 
Chilean copper mining GPN; and to evaluate the role of the State in the bargains taking 
place with the mining MNEs, it addresses such issues by adopting both intensive and 
extensive methods. This allows a broader and richer understanding of the processes and 
outcomes involved in the study. 
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4.3.2 Qualitative and quantitative methods used 
 
Regarding to the intensive/qualitative methods, this research uses the personal interview 
for two main reasons. Firstly, as one of the main contributors to the GPN approach, 
Yeung (1995), explains, it is a much better technique compared to more common ones 
used for researching international business, such as postal surveys and telephone 
interviews. He argues that this method is especially relevant when the research is 
conducted in an urban context; when the objective is to deeply understand the processes 
and mechanisms of international business; and when flexibility is needed to both collect 
and analyse data, which is especially critical for researches focusing on firms operating 
simultaneously in several geographical locations. Since this research aims to understand 
the bargaining processes taking place in several nodes spread over different 
geographies, all these reasons seem to fit the research’s needs. 
Secondly, personal interviews are a well–established way to study elites or issues related 
to power asymmetries in economic geography, political science and international 
business research (Cormode & Hughes, 1999; Morris, 2009; Rice, 2010; Welch et al., 
2002). This research does not define a copper mining elite, but it focuses on collecting 
impressions from what it considers informants who are either experts on the industry or 
have the capacity to shape and influence the bargains taking place within the copper 
mining GPN. Thus, the interviewees of this research have one or more of the following 
characteristics: occupy a CEO or high management position in a mining MNE or state 
owned mining firm; have a deep empirical or theoretical knowledge about the Chilean 
copper mining industry; have considerable experience in the copper mining industry; are 
currently (or have been) representatives of a group that has been affected or has 
bargained with the mining industry; are (or have been) part of a State led programme 
related to mining, or from a particular State institution directly or indirectly related to the 
mining industry.  
Furthermore, since this research takes into account issues related to power in the 
interviews, it follows all the ethical implications of working with personal interviews 
depicted in the literature (Smith & Smith, 2006) and in the UCL’s Research Ethics 
committee, in order to ensure the interviewees and researcher’s safety. Hence, the 
interviewees were notified in advance about the aims and objectives of the research, 
permissions were asked to record the interviews, the recorded interviews were 
anonymized before the transcription, there was a preoccupation in keeping the 
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anonymity of the interviewees in the analysis and they were offered the chance of having 
access to the finished thesis if they wanted to.  
Moreover, in terms of extensive/quantitative methods, this research uses secondary data 
gathered from official and private sources in order to provide a framework in which the 
bargains take place. This data is used to validate what the interviewees described as the 
main strategic resources, constraints that the Chilean State and mining MNEs hold and 
face, as well as the outcomes of the bargains hold between them. There are several 
quantitative analyses made in the research, such as an historical analysis of the mining 
GPNs developed by Chile and their consequences, the depiction of how some of the 
strategic resources and constraints have evolved in recent times, and what are the 
effects in some socio–economic indexes of the bargains celebrated in each node. The 
primary and secondary data used for both, the qualitative and quantitative analysis are 
detailed next. 
 
4.4 SOURCES OF INFORMATION UTILIZED 
 
4.4.1 Primary data: qualitative personal semi–structured interviews 
 
In order to have a representation of all the important nodes of the Chilean mining GPN, 
50 semi – structured interviews were in London (UK), Santiago (Chile) and Antofagasta 
(Chile) between May of 2013 and June of 2016 by the researcher and, in some cases, 
with the first supervisor of this thesis. The participants were selected trying to have 
representatives from all the agents involved in the mining GPN, such as CEOs and 
representatives from most of the most important mining MNEs’ worldwide and 
CODELCO, politicians and policy makers involved with the Chilean mining industry, 
international mining NGOs, mining unions, SMEs and MNEs that supply this industry, 
representatives of industrial associations, experts, academics and mining journalists.  
From these, seven were conducted in London, twenty four in Santiago and nineteen in 
the Antofagasta Region. Two interviewees declined to be recorded, and forty eight of 
them agreed. Two interviewees were interviewed twice, due to their deep knowledge of 
aspects of the industry. All of the interviewees that accepted to be recorded also agreed 
for quotations to be used in the research. These interviews were conducted in Spanish 
and English, lasted from 30 to 60 minutes and have been transcribed by the author. All 
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of the interviews followed the UCL’s ethical guidelines regarding to the collection and 
study of data related with human participants and, therefore, this research has the UCL 
ethical approval. 
The discussion held in the interviews aimed mostly at issues regarding to their 
perceptions about: the main strategic resources and constraints of the mining MNEs and 
Chilean State; the nature of the relationship between the mining MNEs and Chilean State 
in each particular node; the strategic objectives and constraints of these actors, the 
bargaining process between these two agents; the perceived outcomes and implications 
of this process for reaching a strategic coupling between each actor’s strategic 
objectives; the perceived scope of influence of the main actors; the chances of reaching 
sustainable development in the host region and country; and some specific questions 
related to the interviewee’s position in the copper mining GPN (see appendices A, B and 
C for a copy of the interview sheet used in the fieldwork, the interview schedule and an 
example of one interview transcription).  
In terms of the challenges and characteristics of the interview process, there were no 
problems in getting in touch with some of the main representatives of international 
organizations related to the mining industry in the London node. The interviews that took 
place in Santiago were aimed to relevant politicians, policy makers, CEOs of mining 
MNEs and from CODELCO, State institutions directly and indirectly related to the mining 
industry and experts. In this node, the main researcher had to use the elasticity of his 
positionality (Rice, 2010), meaning sometimes presenting himself as a PhD student from 
the Bartlett School of Planning, UCL, and at others as a PhD student, but also the son 
of a former Manager of CODELCO, since most of the CEOs working in the mining MNEs 
present in Chile also worked in CODELCO. This allowed access to several CEOs and 
managers in the national and regional headquarters, which in turn facilitated the contact 
of important politicians, policy makers and other experts related with the mining industry.  
The interviews made in the Antofagasta Region took place mostly in the city of 
Antofagasta, and one in the city of Tocopilla. These were aimed to local experts, 
academics, SMEs suppliers, policy makers, local representatives, politicians and mining 
MNEs local CEOs and managers. In this node some of the interviewees asked the 
researcher to stop recording, since they were scared about possible retaliation from the 
mining MNEs to their businesses if their opinions were made public. In one case, after 
stopping the recording, one interviewee panicked and started to cry. All these opinions 
were not transcribed or recorded or mentioned in the research or analysis in order to 
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keep the interviewees’ safety, but they were useful in understanding the relationships 
between the SMEs suppliers and the mining MNEs at the local and national levels.  
 
Table 3: Summary of the interviews realized in the three nodes during the 
fieldworks. 
Location 
Total number of 
interviews Number of interviews by category 
London 7 International mining NGO volunteer (2) 
    Director of mining NGO (1) 
    Director of state owned mining MNE (1) 
    CEO international mining association (1) 
    Chilean politician and mining expert (1) 
    Representative of the LME (1) 
Santiago 24 Private mining experts (2) 
    Academics (5) 
    CEO of a mining supplier MNE (3) 
    CEO of a mining MNE (5) 
    CEO of a state-owned mining MNE (2) 
    CEO of the Chilean Central Bank (1) 
    CEO of the Mining Council (1) 
  
  
Directors and experts from state institutions 
related to mining (5) 
Antofagast
a 
19 
Private mining experts (4) 
    Academics (3) 
    CEO of mining MNE's subsidiary (2) 
    CEO of local SME supplier of mining MNEs (2) 
    CEO of a regional industrial association (1) 
  
  
Director of MNE's institution in charge of CSR 
policies (1) 
    Politicians and former politicians (4) 
    Representative of miners’ labour unions (2) 
TOTAL 50   
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
4.4.2 Secondary data  
 
Several secondary data sources are used in this research; most of the data comes from 
firms, NGOs, official statistics, research institutions and reports/compendiums related 
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with the mining industry. Among these, it is worth highlighting that there are two datasets 
that were provided by MNEs that have never been released to public, which contain 
information about their suppliers in Chile. One of these was provided by a supplier of the 
mining industry and the other from one of the most important copper mining MNE in the 
world. These datasets provide invaluable information about their relations with their 
suppliers, like where they are located, their origins and the amount of the transactions. 
Since this information is extremely delicate, valuable and strategic, the firms asked to be 
kept in anonymity.  
Other relevant secondary data sources are the reports from international institutions, like 
the OECD, ECLAC, World Bank, ICMM, MNEs, London Metal Exchange, NGOs and 
United States Geological Survey (USGS). This information is related to economic 
indexes, trends of the mining industry in the world and issues related to the industry.  
Equally important are the datasets collected from Chilean sources, like the Mining 
Ministry, COCHILCO (Chilean Copper Corporation), INE (National Institute of Statistics), 
Chilean Central Bank, Fundación Chile and several academic reports and news from 
local and national newspapers. Most of this data is related with longitudinal economic 
indexes, the evolution of the mining industry, the Chilean mining productive fabric and 
the relevance of mining in the socio-economic structure as a whole. The use of 
longitudinal data allows the study of the evolution of the case study. Most of these data 
sets are available for free in the World Wide Web.  
Finally, three previous versions of the survey to SMEs in the Antofagasta Region were 
used. They were taken between 2006 and 2009, providing a vital source of longitudinal 
data for the representation of the linkages between mining MNEs and local SMEs. These 
datasets are relevant, since several firms have been surveyed in the three periods and 
the modules and questions have not changed dramatically (apart from the module about 
bargaining power incorporated in this version), allowing to describe their evolution. 
 
4.5 STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis is divided two parts, one historical assessment of the previous mining GPNs 
developed in Chile until 1973, and the analysis of the current copper mining GPN. Firstly, 
there is an historical analysis of the power struggles between the agents involved in the 
Chilean mining industry. This, in order to build up a picture of basic quantitative measure 
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of impact, as well as qualitative data on how these have been historically shaped by MNE 
structure and strategy and host national and regional government policy. This provides 
a valuable overview of national policies in the mining industry and the perspectives of 
MNEs and leading international advisors. The historical analysis is divided in three parts: 
A description of the ‘nitrate golden era’ (1810–1879), the ‘copper era’ (1920–1971) and 
a brief introduction to the present copper GPN (1973-present). These periods are 
condensed in one chapter that introduces the case study of the Chilean copper GPN in 
order to depict how the evolution of the bargaining power sources and exertion by the 
different agents involved have influenced the current power struggle and outcomes over 
local development, with a focus on tier 1 and tier 2 negotiations.  
Secondly, the analysis focuses on the current copper mining GPN, developed from the 
early 1990s onwards. This is the main original empirical contribution of this research, 
comprising three chapters in total. It starts with a chapter focused on the strategic 
resources and constraints of the Chilean State, followed by other developing the strategic 
resources of the mining MNEs and their constraints. Then, there is a final chapter 
describing the bargaining process taking place in each node of the Chilean copper 
mining GPN. This part also focuses on the kind of bargaining power exerted by each 
actor and the scope of the outcomes of the bargaining processes. Finally, the analysis 
establishes what actor is capturing value, where this value is being captured, the degree 
of the territorial embeddedness of the mining MNEs with the local productive fabric, the 
implications of all of this for reaching local and national sustainable development through 
the mining industry, and the kind of agglomeration that is being produced in the host 
region.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CHILEAN MINING GPNS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Even from before its origins as a nation–state, the Chilean economy has been historically 
based and dependant on the exploitation of natural resources by foreign capital. Because 
of this extreme dependency, and the crucial role of Chilean minerals in the international 
mining industry, this research focuses on the Chilean case study as a way to provide a 
better comprehension of the exertion of bargaining power within extractive GPNs. 
This chapter explains Chile’s participation in the mining GPN in terms of three periods, 
in which the bargaining power has shifted abruptly between the actors involved: the 
nitrate company town era (1810–1879), the copper era (1920–1971) and the current 
neoliberal age (1970’s-today). The history of the Chilean mining GPN case study is 
presented with a focus on the bargaining process between MNEs and the State, and its 
socio–economic and spatial outcomes. This frames the later discussion about the current 
bargaining process within the Chilean mining GPN and its implications for achieving a 
strategic coupling and regional development.  
 
5.2 THE CHILEAN CASE 
 
Chile, a recent (and only South American) member of the OECD, has a deep history of 
mineral dependency, from long before it was colonized by the Spanish (Mamalakis & 
Reynolds, 1965; Salazar, 2003). Such dependency has been the source of several 
economic bonanzas and crises; where the relationship between the actors involved in 
the Chilean mining GPN has been quite turbulent. Still, the Chilean productive fabric has 
been constructed around the extractive industry, especially mining. What started with the 
Spanish ‘conquistadores’ (conquerors) search for gold in the sixteenth century, evolved 
into the development of mining towns and camps around nitrates, copper and other 
metals. This section introduces the Chilean case and its relevance in the global mining 
GPNs, which is developed in the later sections. 
Chile is located in South America, and borders Peru to the North, Bolivia to the North–
East, Argentina to the East and the Pacific Ocean to the West. Its population is 
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18.006.407 inhabitants (INE, 2014); and its capital city is Santiago, which concentrates 
more than 40% of the national population9, most of the MNEs’ local headquarters and 
Chilean political power. The country is organized in fifteen regions, which are the 
country’s first level of administrative division. Its economic and political stability has been 
used as an example of economic success for OECD and Latin American countries, since 
it has recently experienced some of the highest growth in the Latin American region. In 
2011, Chile more than doubled its GDP from 1988, reaching the region’s highest GDP 
per capita with USD 17.312 and outrunning the OECD average rate. When compared 
with other emerging economies, the Chilean growth trajectory seems to follow the 
impressive Korean example but at lower rates (OECD, 2013a).  
Chile’s principal economic activity is mining, mostly exploited in the northern part of the 
country. This industry is crucial for the Chilean economy because it represents: around 
13% of the total national production10; around a third of the national tax collection (Meller, 
2013); an average of more than 55% of the national exports during the last twenty – five 
years (Figure 10); and an average of 37% of the total FDI materialized in Chile during 
the last forty years (COCHILCO, 2013). Chilean mining is vital not only for the Chilean 
economy but also for global markets, since it is, firstly, the world’s biggest producer of 
copper (31% of the global production), iodine (64.4%) and lithium (36%); and secondly, 
holds the world’s biggest reserves of copper (30% worldwide), iodine (24%), and lithium 
(55%), as well as considerable reserves of silver (15%) and molybdenum (16%) (USGS, 
2015). Most of the reserves and production are located in the Antofagasta Region (see 
Figure 11).  
                                               
9 Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE), Population Projections for 2015. 
10 Source: Banco Central de Chile (Central Bank) statistics about production by sector, 2015. 
110 
 
Figure 9: Map of Chile, the Antofagasta Region and its mining towns. 
 
Source: Phelps et al., 2015. 
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Figure 10: Participation of the mining exports in the total Chilean national exports 
(%). 
 
Source: Own elaboration by using data from the Chilean Central Bank.  
The mining industry has had a deep impact both on the Chilean economic history, and 
on its social evolution. Mining was exploited since the pre–Columbian period but has 
intensified after Chile’s independence (Mamalakis & Reynolds, 1965). Mining has 
allowed Chile to take part on the international trade by luring foreigner investors into the 
country, who quickly controlled the production of nitrates, gold, silver, copper and other 
metals, crucial for the development of industrialized nations. This early dependency 
around the mining sector and FDI was created, fostered and consolidated by the local 
political elite, interested in promoting national growth without regard for the social costs 
- a constant in Chilean history.  
In particular, FDI and MNEs have played a crucial role in Chile’s socio–economic 
development, where the power relationship between the State and the MNEs has passed 
through several phases. Each of these phases has had different outcomes: a strong 
liberal period during the nitrate era and the beginning of the copper era; followed by a 
nationalization period during the 1960’s–70’s; and the abrupt end of this period during 
the dictatorship of Pinochet. The latter famously adopted some of the most extreme 
neoliberal policies known to date (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007). These phases have 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
112 
 
changed the way in which bargains took place, and how bargaining power has been 
exerted by the agents within the Chilean mining GPN. 
Furthermore, today Chile has been largely considered as an example of economic 
development based on mining production by international organizations during the last 
twenty years, and its ‘model’ has been exported to other extractive nations. This, despite 
the fact that enclave policies were applied in Chile during the nitrate era; and nowadays 
cluster policies have been implemented at a regional and national scale. Both sets of 
policies assumed positive local and national development possibilities but had 
completely opposite outcomes for development.  
Finally, most of the production and extraction takes place in the Atacama Desert, the 
driest of the world, with the extraction and production processes taking place under 
extreme circumstances. Specifically, more than half of the production takes place in the 
Antofagasta region (see Figure 11), making it one of the most important mining regions 
worldwide. Thus, this research focuses on the Antofagasta Region as the main node of 
mining production of the Chilean mining GPN due to its national and international 
strategic relevance. A brief depiction of this region’s characteristics is developed next, 
which helps to frame the later description of the historical evolution of the Chilean mining 
GPN, its agents, power struggles and outcomes. 
 
Figure 11: Regional mining production share in the national mining production 
(average between 2008 - 2013). 
 
Source: Own elaboration by using data from the Chilean Central Bank.  
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5.3 THE ANTOFAGASTA REGION  
 
The Antofagasta Region is located in the northern part of Chile, in the middle of the 
Atacama Desert (see figure 9). It covers 126.049,1 square meters and has a population 
of 622.640 inhabitants, representing 3.4% of the total Chilean population (18.000.000)11. 
Two cities stand out in the regional city system (Figure 9): Antofagasta, the regional 
capital, with a population of around 350.000 inhabitants (roughly 56% of the regional 
population), centre of the regional economic activity and main port of mineral exit; and 
Calama, a city with 138.000 inhabitants (22% of the regional population), located two 
hundred kilometres away from Antofagasta and right next to the Chuquicamata mine. 
This is the biggest open pit mine of the world and is owned by CODELCO, the biggest 
copper state-owned firm worldwide.  
Mining has historically been the region’s main productive activity, with a strong presence 
of mining MNEs. The Antofagasta region has the biggest deposits of copper, iodine and 
lithium worldwide, as well as considerable reserves of silver and molybdenum (USGS, 
2015). Thus, this region is extremely important for international markets, especially 
considering that Chile is the biggest copper producer worldwide with a third of the total 
production and 35.3% of the world exports (COCHILCO, 2013; USGS, 2015). The 
importance of the mining industry for the region is such, that nowadays it represents 57% 
of Antofagasta’s regional product, which comprises 48% of the total national mining 
production (Banco Central de Chile). Furthermore, 96% of the regional exports are 
minerals12, copper being the most important - representing around 30% of the total 
national exports (COCHILCO, 2013).  
The Antofagasta region is at least seven times more specialized in mining than the rest 
of the country, a clear sign of its dependency to the industry. Moreover, the region has 
historically received most of the FDI taking place in Chile, only surpassed by the 
Metropolitan Region (capital of the country). Consequently, the region has accumulated 
an average of 14% of the total FDI materialized in Chile in the last 40 years, 91% of 
which goes to the region’s mining sector13.  
                                               
11 According to INE, 2014: Proyecciones de Población (Population Proyection) Database. 
12 According to data from the Servicio Nacional de Aduanas (National Customs Service). 
13 According to data from Comite Inversiones Extranjeras: Materialized Investment by Chilean Region and 
Sector Between 1974 – 2012. 
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Interestingly, during the last decade, the Antofagasta Region has been considered by 
several international institutions as an example of a ‘winning region’, due to its growth 
and perceived development based on the mining industry exploitation (CEPAL, 2009; 
OCDE, 2009; OECD, 2013a). These institutions have been impressed by the region’s 
average growth rate of 6%, and its GDP per capita of USD 48.000, which is about 2.8 
times higher than the national average and even above the OECD average of USD 
35.021 (OECD, 2013a). 
However, most of the stunning macroeconomic results are driven by the mining 
industry’s sizeable production, and usually tend to disguise critical issues like the stark 
fluctuations in the regional growth rate (Figure 12) and the actual living conditions of the 
region, which are not as good as they ought to be according to these indicators. For 
example, the average household income per capita is considerably lower than the 
income per capita, at almost USD 9.000 (OECD, 2013a).  
 
Figure 12: Growth rate of the Antofagasta Region (1986-215). 
 
Source: Own elaboration by using data from the Chilean Central Bank. 
 
Furthermore, there are also other burning socio–economic issues, such as the higher 
cost of living in Antofagasta compared to other Chilean cities and regions; the effects the 
mining industry has had in terms of pollution and depletion of natural resources; the 
social impact of the FDI laws for the working class, citizens and indigenous population; 
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the impact over the health and quality of life of the population; and the economic 
sustainability in terms of what will be left after the mining bonanza is gone. 
Additionally, the region faces three severe concerns regarding to its competitive position: 
the decrease in the copper quality ores due to their prolonged exploitation; and the 
insufficient amount of water and energy available for mining and social consumption. 
Since mining is intensive in the use of these two resources, and because it takes places 
in the driest desert of the world, water and energy supply14 have become an urgent 
problem. The consequential increasing prices of water and energy have not only raised 
the already high regional cost of living, but also caused a loss of competitiveness of the 
Antofagasta Region and Chile compared to cheaper competitors, such as Peru or 
Zambia. These complications have been the source of several frictions between the 
social agents, the state and the mining MNEs.  
Historically, the frictions between the agents of the mining GPN have been always 
present, shaping several state led policies regarding to the mining industry in the 
Antofagasta Region: from the early promotion of economic enclaves in the form of 
company towns during the nitrate era (1800s); passing through the nationalisation of the 
mining ores during the sixties and seventies; to the current period, where extreme 
neoliberal policies were imposed by the dictatorship. All these periods have had a 
particular bargaining power configuration among the actors, where bargaining power has 
shifted, sometimes abruptly, and some others very slowly, among them. The 
understanding of these historical dynamics in the complex relationship between the 
State, the mining MNEs and the civil society, can allow us to understand what is (and 
has been) the role of bargaining power over the development possibilities. Consequently, 
the main characteristics and dynamics of these three periods are detailed next.  
 
5.4 THE NITRATE ERA AND THE RISE OF THE COMPANY TOWNS AND MINING 
ENCLAVES (1810s – 1879) 
 
5.4.1 The dawn of the Chilean golden nitrate GPN 
 
                                               
14 According to the INE (2011), the mining industry has used a relatively steady 34% of the total national 
electric production since 1997.  
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The history of the development of the Chilean nitrate GPN has been considered by some 
as the ‘history of the delivery of the main natural wealth to foreign capitals’ (Vitale, 2011) 
and a ‘lost opportunity’ (Meller, 2007). There is a wide belief that this situation ended up 
benefitting mostly the foreign investors, while also creating economic enclaves that were 
completely unsustainable after the bonanza was over (Cademartori, 2002). The Chilean 
nitrate story begins when, after independence from the Spanish Empire in 1810, the 
newly born Chilean State was too poor and weak to exploit its extractive resources and 
lead the economic development of the nation. Henceforth, the State opened the gates to 
FDI by implementing laissez faire policies, starting a period termed ‘outward 
development’ (Cariola & Sunkel, 1982; Salazar, 2003; Salazar & Pinto, 2002).  
This stage was characterized by a high growth rate led by the exportations of natural 
resources. During 1860 – 1870 Chile was the main world copper producer, supplying 
between 40% and 50% of the world’s total consumption (Salazar & Pinto, 2002), which 
helped to swiftly insert the country in the ongoing capitalist globalisation process. Such 
strategy paid off, as between the years 1830 – 1870 Chile achieved a period of prosperity 
never seen before. Since 1830, around 60% of the national tax incomes came from 
custom revenues, which allowed the stabilization of the internal political situation and the 
construction of basic infrastructure, like the train and telegraphic lines, ports, roads, 
schools and other basic urban services (Salazar & Pinto, 2002).  
However, such dependency on international trade was a double-edged sword for the 
Chilean interests. National growth was extremely subordinated to international trade 
forces and fluctuations, since 80% of the Chilean exports were concentrated in the main 
four capitalist economies of the period - the United Kingdom, the United States, France 
and Germany -leaving the country exposed to external shocks. Due to this fragility, it was 
not surprising that Chile was one of the most affected countries after the economic crisis 
of 1870. Once the crisis hit the international markets, the country went from being the 
most important copper producer in the world, to contribute with only 5% – 10% during 
the 1890s (Salazar & Pinto, 2002; Vitale, 2011). 
This economic catastrophe led the Chilean State to desperately look for new ores to 
exploit. Hence, this has been considered as one of the main causes of The Pacific War 
(or Nitrates War) that gave birth to the Golden Nitrate Era. So, in 1879, Chile won against 
the alliance between the Peruvian and Bolivian armies, gaining the control of the mining 
ores located in the current regions of Arica y Parinacota and Antofagasta, which were, 
and still are, extremely rich in mining resources such as nitrates and copper (Salazar & 
Pinto, 2002; Vitale, 2011). This promoted a new and stronger dependency on the nitrate, 
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especially saltpetre, known as ‘the white gold’ due to its relevance for the economic 
growth and national wealth. 
5.4.2 The nitrate bonanza and downfall (1880s – early 1930s) 
 
The Nitrate Gold Era started immediately after the end of the Guerra del Pacífico in 1883, 
when the Chilean State sold most of the nitrate ores to British foreign investors instead 
of nationalizing them. By the end of the war, the British investors owned 70% of the 
nitrate ores (Meller, 2007), laying the foundations of the close relationship between the 
Chilean State and MNEs. Led by the British entrepreneurs, Chile promptly recovered its 
relevance in the world mining industry as the biggest producer of nitrates worldwide. The 
rich and high quality mineral deposits, the high international demand for nitrates and the 
easy access from the ores to the sea through the ports of Iquique and Antofagasta15, 
allowed the transition from a broken country to a relevant world player (Meller, 2007; 
Vitale, 2011). 
Hence, the period between the 1880s and the beginning of the 1930s is called ‘The 
Golden Nitrate Age’; due to an economic bonanza similar to the ‘gold rush’ in California. 
During this time, Chile witnessed a considerable increase in the national exports16 led by 
the nitrate industry17, and a major increase in the growth rate and incomes of the state. 
The rising Chilean nitrate GPN comprised London as the centre of the mining MNEs 
headquarters; Santiago, as a strategic node where the foreign investors and politicians 
bargained new projects and further liberal legislation; and the newly acquired northern 
regions of Chile, where the extraction and production of nitrates took place in traditional 
company towns called ‘salitreras’ (Kerr & Siegel, 1954).  
Some of the main characteristics of these company towns were their location next to the 
ores, and the replacement of the State by the company in several of its duties. The latter 
meant that public goods and services – such as housing, police, water, energy, public 
spaces, money and all forms of entertainment – were supplied and controlled by the 
company at a big expense, making the need for fiscal transfers from central governments 
                                               
15 These secondary cities also acted as commercial nodes and intermediaries in the export of commodities 
(Phelps et al., 2015). 
16 Between 1890 and 1915 the national exports grew 325%. From this increase, half of the total national 
exports came from the nitrate industry in 1890, which reached a top of 70% before World War I (Mamalakis, 
1971; Meller, 2007). 
17 Nitrate exports increased from US$ 6.3 million in 1880 to US$ 70 million in 1928 with a peak of US$ 96 
million right before World War I (Meller, 2007). 
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unnecessary (Phelps et al., 2015). Some of these company towns generated so much 
wealth, that they were known for bringing the best European shows to perform in their 
theatres.  
However, these salitreras offered little joy for their workers and the local economies 
surrounding them. They were usually lured from distant places under the promise of 
well–paid jobs and a better life, only to find extremely harsh conditions in the company 
towns, such as: their location in the middle of the desert; wages paid in local currencies 
in the form of tokens, that could only be redeemed at local shops and other amenities 
(Phelps et al., 2015); and working conditions considered today as proto–slavery due to 
the inexistence of any kind of insurances, safety equipment or resting days (Salazar, 
2003).  
This was possible due to the tight relationship between the State and MNEs, where the 
former was mostly focused on providing the best conditions for the latter. This situation 
led to an increasing social unrest that ended up with the first general strike in Latin - 
American in 1890, where thousands of workers marched from the ‘salitreras’ to the port 
cities. Such mobilizations ended abruptly when the British MNEs convinced the Chilean 
government to take action, leading to the massacre of thousands of workers and their 
families by the army in several opportunities (Vitale, 2011). Sadly, this would not be the 
only time when MNEs managed to use the army in order to re–establish production in 
their mines. 
In terms of the economic benefits for the host regions, the Chilean mining towns have 
been considered a prime example of economic enclaves, meaning that the production 
was tightly spatially delimited and isolated from rest of the productive fabric 
(Cademartori, 2002; Phelps et al., 2015). Thus, the company towns, or ‘salitreras’, were 
characterized by their weak economic linkages with the rest of the host regions; almost 
non–existent technological spillovers due to the tight vertical integration of the industry; 
the considerable exportation of rents to their headquarters, which reached about 6% of 
the Chilean GDP (Mamalakis, 1971); and the importation of most of the capital and 
technology necessary for the operation, which were not available in the country (Meller, 
2007; Pinto, 1959). 
However, the apparent indolence from the State regarding to the negative effects of the 
nitrate industry did not mean that its bargaining power was decreasing; on the contrary, 
thanks to the big push that it got from the mining taxes and export rights and the quantity 
and quality of its ores, the State was finally able to gain a significant role in the Chilean 
economy. In relative terms, the participation of the State in the national GDP increased 
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from 6% in 1880, to 14 % 1920 (Meller, 2007). Moreover, from the total incomes 
generated by the nitrate industry between 1880 and 1924, around a third part went to 
the State in form of taxes18 (Salazar & Pinto, 2002). This meant that the State was finally 
able to invest in basic infrastructure vital to the later development of the mining industry. 
The end of the nitrate bonanza started with the development of synthetic nitrate during 
World War I, which led to an abrupt end to the exploitation of nitrates when the 
Depression of 1929 hit the world. During this period, the price of nitrates fell resoundingly 
and, by 1932, the GDP per capita had fallen to 60% of its 1928 levels (Cademartori, 
2002). As a result, Chile had to face a disastrous economic crisis that led to the closure 
and abandonment of most of the mining towns, today completely abandoned as ghost 
towns (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Nitrate Company Town named ‘Oficina Chacabuco’. It operated from 
1922 to 1940. 
 
Source: Original picture, taken during fieldwork in 2013. 
 
                                               
18 Which reached a peak in the decade of 1910 where 60% of the total national income came from the 
payments made by the nitrate industry (Salazar & Pinto, 2002). 
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5.4.3 The lost opportunity of the Chilean nitrate GPN  
 
Some of the main consequences of the Chilean nitrate GPN period were: the 
considerable value captured by the MNEs in the form of their high export of rents and 
utilities; and the transformation of Chile in a highly vulnerable and dependent industrial 
mono–structure and exporter country. Even though most the value was created and 
enhanced in the mining regions, the State’s liberal doctrine let the British nitrate firms 
operate with complete freedom, which materialized in the creation of mining economic 
enclaves. Here, the company towns were never truly embedded with the rest of the 
territory, in the sense that they did not promote economic, social or technological 
linkages with the rest of the local productive fabric.  
By guarding the foreign interests instead of the national ones, the Chilean State allowed 
MNEs to fully exert their bargaining power, not only within the company towns and host 
regions, but also in the rest of the country, by using their economic influence in order to 
crush strikes and promote further liberal legislation that served their purposes. Even 
though the State grew more powerful thanks to the increase in its income and the quality 
of the Chilean resources, it chose to protect the economic growth and FDI by siding with 
the MNEs. Thus, most of the bargains that occurred benefited the MNEs interests 
resulting in the impossibility of a fruitful strategic coupling between the national and 
foreign interests. 
Consequently, the Nitrate Era period has been called as a ‘lost opportunity’, leaving the 
impression that after the downfall of the nitrate industry ‘nothing was left in the country’ 
(Meller, 2007; Salazar, 2003). It has been argued that the mining enclave policies were 
promoted to benefit only the few traditional groups allied with the foreign exporters, which 
hindered a broader process of vigorous domestic industrialisation (Cademartori, 2002; 
Moran, 1974). Nevertheless, this period also left some important basic infrastructure, 
crucial for when Chile found a new opportunity in the copper industry. This time, however, 
the Chilean State was better prepared to avoid repeating the same mistakes. 
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5.5 THE FOUNDATION OF THE COPPER GPN ERA (early 1930s – 1973) 
 
5.5.1 The rise of the red metal 
 
The severity of the nitrate crisis Chile obliged the country to re–consider its productive 
matrix and development strategies, leading to its rediscovery of the copper industry 
where it had historically been a major player. Luckily, since the early 1900’s, the global 
copper demand had greatly increased due to the rise of electric power and the expansion 
of the construction sector in the world economies. Additionally, new technological 
advances made by the US in the mining technology made the big scale exploitation of 
low grade of copper ores (1% – 2%) profitable.  
Consequently, the Chilean copper ores were attractive again, but the bankrupted Chilean 
State and entrepreneurs were not able to take over the copper industry. Hence, the state 
promoted a new wave of foreign investments, mostly from the United States, which 
financed several mining projects, such as the biggest open pit mine of the world, 
Chuquicamata (1911); and the biggest underground mine worldwide, El Teniente (1914); 
both of which still hold their titles. By 1924 these mines were contributing with 80% of 
the total copper production in Chile. However, the State was not willing to repeat the 
disastrous experience caused by the unsustainable nitrate enclaves, increasingly 
augmenting its participation and control over the copper industry (Meller, 2007; Salazar 
& Pinto, 2002). This was the beginning of Big Copper Mining in Chile, which until 1970 
added more than half of the total Chilean copper exports (see Table 2) (Meller, 2007). 
 
5.5.2 The bargains between the Chilean State and the American MNEs 
 
During the new copper era, the Chilean State showed a commitment in chasing its 
strategic objectives, namely, sustainable socio–economic development. To do this, it 
started a process of changing some of the initial – extremely favourable – conditions 
offered to the mining MNEs which, of course, caused a conflict with them and their home 
countries. Such clashes took place over several bargains, in a process that Moran (1974) 
described in detail while he developed his bargaining model by analysing the Chilean 
case.  
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According to Moran (1974, 1985) and Meller (2007), during the nitrate era, the mining 
MNEs had exerted an almost absolute bargaining power to achieve their strategic 
objectives, mostly due to the State’s complicity. However, after the nitrate debacle, the 
State decided to take a more strategic approach in the bargain, by using its strategic 
resources and the advantage of the immense sunk cost related to the mining industry to 
its favour. Thus, as Moran (1974) and Vernon (1971) posit, the bargaining process can 
be separated in two periods: one before the investment, and one after the investment. 
First, before the investment, the mining MNEs hold a considerable amount of bargaining 
power, since they concentrate the technological, financial and human capitals needed 
for the exploitation of the ores. They also have a deep knowledge of the industry, 
managerial and technical skills and established linkages with international suppliers and 
buyers. The high risk involved in the mining investments allowed the MNEs to make the 
countries compete and to exert considerable bargaining power, in order to secure 
generous rewards in case the project proved successful (Moran, 1985; Vernon, 1971).  
Conversely, the Chilean State also held valuable strategic resources, such as the 
quantity and quality of its copper ores; the infrastructure needed for transport and mineral 
production left from the nitrate era; the easy access from the mines to the ports; the 
stable weather, labour force and capacity to provide fiscal incentives and favourable 
legislation. However, as shown in Figure 14, before every major investment commitment, 
the American MNEs were able to exert more bargaining power, securing higher returns 
from their copper investment. This bargaining power asymmetry was possible since the 
MNEs were still able to use their strategic resources, such as their monopoly over the 
capital, technological and network strategic assets, as a strong leverage for getting 
attractive conditions, while also pushing for further incentives and concessions. At the 
same time, the State had to sacrifice its participation in the copper returns, as is shown 
in the vertical fall that happens every time it had to negotiate a new investment (Figure 
14) (Moran, 1974, 1985; Ramamurti, 2001). 
Second, once the investment was materialized and proved to be profitable, the firms 
were unable to use the uncertainty and risk as an effective leverage in the bargaining 
process. Hence, after the costs were sunk, the power shifted from the MNEs to the 
Chilean State. Once the projects proved to be successful, the uncertainty and risk 
dissipated, creating what Moran (1985) calls a ‘hostage effect’ where the company was 
not able to (credibly) threaten to leave due to the large sunk costs involved. 
Simultaneously, Chile began to developing skills and expertise appropriate to the 
industry, which allowed to slowly increasing the critical mass of national human capital 
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that finally took over the American MNEs jobs19. This helped increasing the country’s 
technical, managerial and bargaining skills, vital for later rounds of negotiations and 
improving its share in the returns of the copper industry (Figure 14) (Moran, 1974, 1985). 
Later, once a new large lump of investments was negotiated (as shown in the dotted line 
of Figure 14), there was a new shift in the bargaining power towards the MNEs, since 
the State faced the situation of convincing FDI to materialize. This explains the brief fall 
in the Chilean capture of returns, which depicted its relative loss in bargaining power. 
Despite this, the bargaining State was still in a better initial bargaining position than in 
the previous period. Again, after the investment was successfully realized, the bargaining 
power shifted towards the State since, as Moran (1974, p. 165) puts it, ‘as Chile… 
chipped away at ignorance and mystery, the esoteric value of the foreigner’s services 
declined’. This implied that the fluctuations in the bargaining power became increasingly 
shorter; and progressively better for the country.  
Thus, the more Chile advanced in its learning curve and the less risky the investments 
were, the more the country was able to exert its bargaining power to force renegotiations, 
adjustments or surtaxes, as a consequence of the shift in the balance of bargaining 
power (Moran, 1974). The more Chile was approximating to the end of this curve, the 
more the country had better skills and experience to operate the industry directly, which 
also diminished the cost of nationalism and the idea of expropriating and nationalizing 
the industry. This increasing bargaining power, added to the increasing socio–political 
outcry for moving away from ‘dependencia’, generated a climate in which a transversal 
set of voices raised claiming for higher taxes and the nationalization of the copper 
industry.  
 
                                               
19 During the decade of 1960s, the El Teniente mine (property of Kennecott) had only 10 
foreigners in a plant of 10.000 workers. 
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Figure 14:Relative distribution of returns of the copper industry. 
 
Source: Based on Moran (1974). 
 
Moreover, there was a growing concern during the 1950s about the American firms not 
investing enough to expand the production according to the national interests, which 
helped to create an increasing suspicion about the benefits of uncontrolled FDI. Despite 
having a considerable higher profitability compared to other countries20, Chile started 
losing participation in the world production of copper, which dropped from 21% (1945 – 
1949) to 15% (1950 – 1959) (Meller, 2007). This was in line with the view that ‘copper 
was too important for the Chilean development to leave it in foreign hands’ (Meller, 2007, 
p. 34), something shared by most of the population and political elite. Furthermore, the 
American government intervened in several occasions in the Chilean copper industry in 
                                               
20 During the 1950’s the return rates of the copper MNEs were at least 19% per year in Chile compared to 
less than 10% elsewhere (Meller, 2007). 
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an unfavourable way to Chile, raising the country’s discontent with the foreign investors 
(Mamalakis & Reynolds, 1965; Meller, 2007; Moran, 1974; Pinto, 1959).  
All of these events led to a progressive distancing from liberal economic policy models 
and increasing discomfort with the American MNEs, which were seen as an obstacle to 
realizing the full economic potential of the copper industry; or even blamed as ‘the cause 
of the country’s underdevelopment’ (Moran, 1974, p. 25). Thus, in order to reduce the 
external dependency and vulnerability of the economy and to take control over the 
‘engine’ of the Chilean economy; the State starkly increased its participation in the 
national economy. 
Since the copper industry was the main pillar of the Chilean economy, the State 
prioritized the revision of the initial conditions given to the American MNEs, leading to 
several bargains between them (see Figure 14). Due to the characteristics of the mining 
industry, new production or extractive investment comes in large discrete lumps, which 
forces the State and mining MNEs to have several bargains each time a new investment 
is planned. In each of these bargains, the bargaining power shifted according to the stage 
and level of uncertainty of the investment and the improvements of the Chilean learning 
curve regarding to the industry.  
One way in which the State responded to these political pressures was by exerting its 
bargaining power to increase its share of value capture, through the increase of taxes to 
the MNEs. During the Big Depression, the copper companies were paying no more than 
20% of taxes. However, during the Second World War, the country raised the taxes 
above 50%. By 1952, the total tax burden was above 65% (see Table 2). Furthermore, 
as Table 3 shows, the copper taxes contributed to more than one quarter of the total 
State tax revenues during the 1950s, and around 20% until the nationalization of 1971 
(Mamalakis & Reynolds, 1965). Despite this considerable increase, the American MNEs 
were enjoying a period of economic success, and ‘they did not begin to think seriously 
of abandoning or even cutting back on their Chilean operations’ (Moran, 1974, p. 24; 
Salazar & Pinto, 2002). 
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Table 4: Retained percentage of the gross profits in the Chilean big copper mining 
production (median of the annual percentage). 
Before 1925 1925-40 1941-51 1952-60 1961-70 1971 
Around 11% 38% 58% 61% 66% nationalization 
 
Sources: Meller (2007) using data from (Mamalakis and Reynolds (1965); Pinto (1959)). 
 
Table 5: Relative participation of the big copper mining (BCM) in the Chilean 
economy between 1925 – 1970 (Annual average for each period). 
 
Share of total 
taxes 
Share of national 
exports 
Total BCM exports in 
MM US$ 
1925-29 4.5% 27.4% 127.9 
1930-34 1.8% 25.3% 57.5 
1935-39 4.8% 29.3% 66.8 
1940-44 12.2% 39.6% 121.4 
1945-49 16.2% 50.5% 265 
1950-54 26.5% 50.2% 382.7 
1955-59 26.3% 59.8% 439.2 
1960-64 15.2% 56.2% 505.7 
1965-70 19.9% 56.6% 936.9 
 
Sources: Meller (2007) using data from (Mamalakis and Reynolds (1965); Pinto (1959)). 
 
Finally, the continuous conflicts with the American MNEs created the ideal scenario in 
which the dream of ‘recovering control of the natural wealth’ and ‘restoring sovereignty 
over national development’ was finally within reach. By 1966, the president Eduardo Frei 
Montalva began the nationalization of the copper industry, with a partial expropriation of 
51% of the copper mines, called ‘Chilenization’ (Salazar & Pinto, 2002). Thus, he proudly 
announced claimed that ‘this is the greatest battle that Chile has even won… A Second 
Independence!’ (Moran, 1974, p. 153).  
Later, the socialist government of Salvador Allende finished the nationalization process 
in 1970, by expropriating all the copper mines while refusing to pay compensations to 
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the American MNEs. This and the threat of a socialist elected country in the context of 
the Cold War, caused the intervention of the American government, funding political 
groups to destabilize the Allende’s government. This fostered the conditions leading to 
the coup of 1973, which saw neoliberal policies installed after the ‘Chicago Boys21’ took 
control of the economy (Meller, 2007; Moran, 1974; Salazar, 2003; Salazar & Pinto, 
2002). During this whole period, the copper industry maintained the enclave logic present 
in the Salitre era, in which the big American copper mines at the beginning, and the newly 
created State owned mine during the 1960–70s, created company towns like 
Chuquicamata.  
 
5.6 THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE DURING THE COPPER AND NITRATE 
AGES 
 
The main lesson from the nitrate and copper periods is related to the changing role that 
the State had in the bargaining with the MNEs. As discussed, the outcomes of such 
bargains have been crucial in determining the development possibilities of the host 
regions and country. What is more, even though Chile has displayed several periods of 
fast growth, it was not able to materialize such economic wealth into a more sustainable 
and diversified socio–economic fabric. Mining enclaves, or company towns, were the 
main spatial outcomes during these periods, in which most of the value was capture by 
the extractive MNEs. These spatial agglomerations materialized the participation of the 
State in the extractive production, and the way it exerted its bargaining power within the 
Chilean mining GPN.  
In order to understand the role of the State in the Chilean society, it is compulsory to 
mention its evolution through history. Before the nitrate era, Chile was mainly an 
agricultural country, in which the political and economic power rested on an agricultural 
oligarchy. During the nitrate boom, a new oligarchy based on the production and 
exportation of mining resources, manufacturing and financial institutions was born, which 
was still very close to the agricultural oligarchy. Even though this new oligarchy was the 
most powerful one among the Chilean elites, it was unable to exploit the mineral ores, 
mostly due to their lack of experience, financial capital and the insufficient technology 
                                               
21 They were a group of liberal Chilean economists that studied in the University of Chicago, under the 
tutelage of Milton Friedman. They became the most hard-core defenders and promoters of the complete 
liberalization and privatization of the country’s assets.  
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and human capital available in the country at that moment. Henceforth, the best choice 
for the State was to lure FDI into exploiting the mineral wealth of Chile, by liberalizing the 
economy (Meller, 2007).  
So, during the nitrate golden era and until the Big Depression, ‘the possibility of earning 
foreign revenues from unknown mineral deposits was considered a windfall, and 
primitive forms of tax collection – frequently royalty payments – were the reward collected 
by governments ill – equipped to judge adequately how far they could push against the 
companies’ (Moran, 1974, p. 164). The role of the State during this period was mostly as 
an intermediary between the foreign investors and the Chilean society, while using its 
bargaining power to capture a share of the mineral exports that allowed it to grow in 
scope and strength. Moreover, some internal political and business groups helped the 
mining MNEs to exert their bargaining power in order to get the best conditions for their 
production, in order to benefit themselves from the foreign presence (Meller, 2007). 
Furthermore, after the Great Depression of 1929, the State started to gradually develop 
a new ‘middle class’ by transforming itself into the main job provider. It was the alliance 
between this new middle class and the workers that started the political pressure over 
the State in order to make it take a more dominant position in the socio–economic 
development that finally led to the nationalization. Hence, during 1940 and 1970 the 
State played different roles in the productive process, while also transforming itself in the 
most important socio–economic actor. Thus, during this period, the State was able to 
fully exert its bargaining power in order to get to maximise its capture of value within the 
extractive GPN. This also allowed the State to promote several social reforms, like a new 
constitution and legislation that improved the working conditions of the Chilean 
population, improved the distribution of incomes, enhanced the diversification of the 
productive fabric and reduced the dependency on foreign capitals (Meller, 2007; Salazar 
& Pinto, 2002).  
Finally, the nitrate and copper eras share several characteristics, such as the extreme 
dependency on FDI and mineral extraction and the proliferation of mining towns. 
However, they also have stark differences in terms of the role of the state and how it 
exerted its bargaining power after each investment. As Moran (1974) argues, once the 
Chilean State started to move upwards in the learning curve regarding after it gained 
experience in the mining industry, it started to slowly trying to improve the conditions of 
the deal after the investments were made. All of this concluded in the State fully exerting 
its bargaining power in the nationalisation process of the early 1970s. All of this is 
summarized in Table 4, which depicts the main characteristics of these two periods in 
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terms of the GPN framework. This period in which the State was a major player in the 
Chilean economy, and a powerful agent within the Chilean mining GPN had an abrupt 
ending, with the coup of 1973 and the posterior neoliberal age. 
 
5.7 THE VIOLENT ORIGINS OF THE NEOLIBERAL COPPER GPN (1973 – to date) 
 
The coup of 1973 was the beginning of a deep transformation in the Chilean socio-
economic structure. The horrors in human rights violations, political persecution and 
violence that the Pinochet’s regime spread over the country provided the perfect state of 
shock and fear (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007) necessary for the extreme transformation 
suffered by the Chilean economy. This meant the shift from a situation in which the State 
was able to fully exert its bargaining power regarding to MNEs, to a one in which the 
State slowly – at the beginning – and then rapidly (during the 1980’s) declined to 
participate in the economy. During this last period, the dictatorship applied extreme 
neoliberal policies, aimed to privatize, de-nationalize and bring fresh FDI to the country.  
However, this was not an instant and smooth transition towards the neoliberal model. 
During the first two years, the dictatorship was cautious in its economic policies, since 
the country still was quite unstable and its political power was not yet fully established. 
Only in 1975, and after failing to limit high inflation rates and stabilize the economy, the 
dictatorship allowed the Chicago Boys22 to take full control over Chilean economic 
policies (Salazar & Pinto, 2002). This meant a stark shift from a situation in which the 
State controlled and heavily intervened the economy, to a situation in which the whole 
economy was suddenly completely liberalized (Meller, 2007).  
Thus, the neoliberal era was born, which essentially proposed a simple change: to 
completely denationalise the economy allowing the market forces to allocate and 
distribute the Chilean wealth. However, despite the wave of privatizations, the military 
government never thought about getting rid of the state owned CODELCO, due to its 
massive relevance for the Chilean economy and the army coffers23. The economic 
retreat of the State was fast, and by 1980 the public sector was already sold or returned 
                                               
22 Their core policies were famously condensed in a document called The Brick, due to their toughness and 
length. 
23 Thanks to the ‘restricted law on copper’, 10% of the incomes generated by CODELCO’s sales go directly 
to the Chilean army as a secondary source of income. 
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387 firms. Furthermore, the deregulatory policy implied the creation of a financial market 
and the openness to international trade, ending the protectionist policies put in place 
after the Big Depression (Salazar & Pinto, 2002).  
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 Table 6: Summary of the Nitrate and Copper Age. 
  Nitrate Age (1980 - 1929)  Copper Age (1929 - 1973) 
Bargaining power 
Mining MNEs are able to fully exert their bargaining power before and after 
making the investments in order to get the best conditions for them. They also 
replaced the State in several of its duties within the company towns. The State 
does not exert its bargaining power due to its lack of experience, financial and 
human capital and dependence on mining. 
A more experienced State is able to exert its bargaining power every time a 
new wave of investments was made. By the end of the period, it is able to 
considerable improve the working conditions within the mining industry, as well 
as its economic linkages and relevance for the national budget. It fully exerts 
its power by nationalizing the copper industry. 
Value 
Mostly created, enhanced and captured by British MNEs in the form of 
exportation of profits. Some value was captured by the State in the form of 
basic taxes and custom duties. 
Mostly created, enhanced and captured by the mining firms (American MNEs 
and State owned mining firms). A higher share of value is retained in the 
country due to higher taxes, the exportation of refined minerals and the 
nationalization of the industry.  
Embeddedness 
Mining towns almost completely isolated from the host socio - economic fabric. 
Economic linkages are few and weak; most of the technology, human capital 
and spare parts are imported. 
State owned firms develop stronger socio - economic linkages with the rest of 
the productive fabric. Sense of national pride regarding to the ‘recovery’ or the 
copper industry.  
Strategic coupling 
Strategic coupling was unable to be reached due to the overwhelming 
bargaining power exerted by the British MNEs. 
The State was able to reach several of its strategic objectives, but only some 
of the American MNEs (the ones that receive some compensation) were able 
to do the same due to the nationalization process. 
Spatial outcome 
Economic mining enclaves in the form of company towns completely run by 
the MNEs.  
Economic mining enclaves in the form of company towns. Some of them were 
run by American MNEs and others by the State owned firms.  
 
Source: own elaboration.
132 
 
These policies were crystalized in the constitution of 1980, which made the newly 
adopted neoliberal system extremely difficult to modify in the later years. This led to the 
high concentration of economic influence in private groups (by 1979 the bigger 10 groups 
controlled 135 of the 250 private firms); an increasing gap in the income inequality (there 
were massive layoffs in the State apparatus due to its shrinking as well as the lower 
wages allowed by the liberalization of the labour market); and a speculative environment 
at a big social expense.  
The enormous social cost was reflected in the stark increase in the unemployment rate, 
which in 1983 reached 28.9 % of the total labour force; the decrease in the participation 
of the industrial sectors in the economy due to the lift of the tariff protections24; a high 
decrease in the real wages which dropped 40% between 1970 and 1975 (Foxley, 1982); 
and an increase in the inequality25; all of which led to a critical augment in the poverty 
level of the Chilean citizens. Furthermore, despite the spread belief that the abuses 
committed during this period were necessary to generate growth and development, the 
average growth rate between 1973 and 1990 was only 3.7%, which is not significantly 
different than the yearly average of 3.86% between 1940–1973, or the 2.29% between 
1880–1930 (Meller, 2007; Salazar & Pinto, 2002).  
These poor economic achievements caused several protests which destabilized the 
dictatorship, leading to the plebiscite of 1988, in which (against all predictions) the 
Chilean people voted for returning to democracy. This finally happened in 1990, but not 
before the Chicago Boys approved the last laws to finish and secure the neoliberalisation 
process, turning the country into a place in which everything, from the educational to the 
pension system, was privatized.  
Later, during the 1990s, Chile witnessed a massive inflow of FDI that materialized in new 
mining projects, such as La Escondida (owned by BHP Billiton), the biggest copper mine 
in the world. Even though the new democratic government belonged to a coalition of left 
parties, the neoliberal policies were deepened and the State continued to retreat, setting 
the ideal conditions for the new mining MNEs to fully exert their bargaining power. This 
is the period that will be analysed in this research, since it extends to the current days. 
                                               
24 The metal-mechanic and textile industries had a fall of 44% and 31% over their participation in the national 
GDP (Muñoz, 1995). 
25 Between 1969 and 1978, the two quintiles with lower incomes reduced their participation in the overall 
consumption from 19.8% to 14.5% while the quintile with higher incomes increased from 43.2% to 51% 
(Foxley, 1982, p. 69). 
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Figure 15: Summary of the main historical events in the evolution of the Chilean Mining GPNs. 
 
Source: Own elaboration.
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5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This section depicts the relevance of the Chilean case to the world mining industry, while 
also providing the historical context in which the mining GPN has developed in the 
country. Hence, Chile has always been a relevant actor in the global mining GPN, firstly 
as the biggest producer of nitrates, and later, as the main producer of copper. 
Interestingly, the relationship between the mining MNEs and the Chilean State has 
changed as the mining GPN itself has developed in the country. During the nitrate era, 
the British multinationals exploited the nitrates by developing what has been considered 
an extreme form of mining enclaves, building company towns next to the mining ores 
that were completely under the MNE’s administration. In these enclaves, the firms 
substituted the State and most of its basic functions, while also exporting most of the 
rents to their home countries. However, thanks to the major incomes produced by the 
nitrate industry, the Chilean State was able to become a relevant socio–economic actor 
for the first time, and also enjoy a considerable bargaining position once the investments 
were made in the country. This was not used in order to foster sustainable development 
though, and despite some efforts in developing some basic infrastructure, the whole 
period finished in a major economic crisis.  
The previous situation was fiercely avoided by the governments that nationalized the 
newly developed copper industry, which were desperate to avoid committing the 
mistakes leading to the nitrate downfall. In this period, the State not only develops a 
better bargaining position due to the quality and quantity of its copper resources, but it 
also fully exerts its bargaining position while facing the mining MNEs. This led to a strong 
break in the relationships between the Chilean State and mining MNEs, which according 
to some historians may have caused the US intervention in the coup happened in 1973. 
The chapter finishes its historic representation of the Chilean mining GPNs by 
addressing the bloody origins of the current copper mining GPN. A deeper understanding 
of this copper mining GPN in terms of how the actors have related and bargained with 
each other, as well as the regional and national consequences of such bargains is 
developed in the following chapters by detailing the power resources and constraints that 
both, the Chilean State and the mining MNEs, possess. Some of these resources and 
constraints and the way bargaining power is exerted are similar to the ones depicted in 
the historic incarnations of mining GPNs, while some others are recent and have 
changed the way in which the bargains take place. Hence, the next chapter starts this 
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analysis with the actor in charge of promoting sustainable development, the Chilean 
State. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CHILEAN STATE: ITS STRATEGIC POWER RESOURCES AND 
CONSTRAINTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The following sections take the proposed bargaining power definition and apply it to the 
analysis of the main actors in the Chilean copper GPN: The Chilean State and the mining 
firms (national and MNEs). The aim is to provide an empirical analysis of how bargaining 
power works, by focusing on its sources, constraints and how these promote or restrain 
each actor’s exertion of it. Such analysis is crucial to understand how bargaining power 
influences value, embeddedness and, ultimately, the spatial agglomeration and 
development possibilities for the Chilean copper mining GPN. The analysis considers 
three nodes: The Antofagasta region, where the production takes place; Santiago, capital 
city of Chile; and London, where most of the most important decisions are made 
regarding to the copper industry.  
Each actor of the Chilean mining copper GPN holds different strategic resources which 
can be used as a source of bargaining power in order to achieve their strategic 
objectives. Similarly, each actor also faces a particular set of constraints that will impede 
them for achieving such objectives. The following two chapter focuses on describing: the 
strategic resources they hold; how they are distributed; how actors face and overcome 
their constraints, and; the way they exert their resources in the bargaining process.  
This analysis is done starting with the sources of power and the constraints of the Chilean 
State, followed by the mining firms. Later, the use of these resources in the successive 
bargains is developed, as well as the implications of this process in terms of value and 
embeddedness for the host region and nation. The civil actors are incorporated in the 
analysis of the other two agents, but not greatly developed, since the focus of this 
research is on the bargaining between the State and the mining MNEs. The period 
analysed is from 1990 (the year Chile returned to democracy) until the present day.  
This first chapter focuses on the strategic resources and constraints of the Chilean State, 
which determine its later capacity to bargain with the mining MNEs. The selection of the 
strategic resources took into account what mining experts and current literature consider 
as the most valuable when the country and host region bargain with the mining industry, 
which can be grouped in: the quantity and quality of copper deposits found in the country; 
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its extremely FDI-friendly legal and taxation regimes; its political and economic stability; 
the high prices of copper due to the commodity ‘super cycle’26; and the international 
perception of Chile as a ‘land of opportunities’ for FDI and new projects.  
Likewise, Chile faces several constraints on fully exerting its bargaining power. These 
come from external as well as internal sources, and could present serious limits on 
achieving the country´s strategic objectives, which are the focus of the second part. The 
various constraints identified were grouped in three broad categories: competitiveness 
concerns; issues related with the structure and functioning of the State; and political 
affairs, and their analysis provides the last piece for addressing the potential power and 
its scope that the State can exert while negotiating with the mining MNEs.  
 
6.2 THE STRATEGIC RESOURCES OF THE CHILEAN STATE 
 
6.2.1 The quantity and quality of the Chilean copper deposits 
 
Chile’s deposits and quality of copper have been considered ‘World Class’ (World Bank, 
2006, p. 117). It is the largest copper producer in the world. Its share in world production 
was 30% in 201427 with a mining production of 5.7 million of metric tons (MT). As Meller 
(2007) notes, such production is much greater compared to the production of other 
relevant copper producers, namely China, Peru and the United States (see Figure 15). 
The stark increase in the production of copper relates to FDI attraction policies 
implemented during the Pinochet dictatorship, in the form of several laws and 
concessions that turned the country into a fiscal paradise.  
As a result, the accumulated FDI that Chile received between 1990 and 2005 was almost 
eleven times the accumulated FDI that the country received between 1974 and 1989, a 
tendency that has continued in the last decade thanks to the high prices of the resource 
super cycle28. Most of this FDI was materialized in the mining industry, which explains 
                                               
26 A ‘commodity super cycle’ is a period where the prices of one or more commodities greatly increase for a 
decade or more, to then slowly return to the pre cycle prices. A comprehensive study about the reasons 
causing them is found in Erten and Ocampo (2013). 
27 According to the USGS data consulted in 2015. 
28 According to data from Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIE) (Foreign Investments Committee) 
available in http://www.ciechile.gob.cl/es/inversion-en-chile/estadisticas/ 
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the abrupt increase in the national copper production that went from 1590 thousand TM 
in 1990 to 5800 thousand MT in 2014 (Figure 15).  
Figure 16: Main producers of copper, 1990 - 2014 (thousands of TM). 
 
Source: Own elaboration according to data from USGS (2015); USGS (1994). 
 
Furthermore, Chile has the largest reserves of copper in the world. As show in Figure 
17, in 2014 the country concentrated 30% of the global reserves, nearly tripling the 
reserves hold by second and third places, occupied by Australia (13%) and Peru (10%) 
respectively (Meller, 2013). These reserves are exploited by several private and State 
owned projects and firms, from which two are vital for the worldwide copper market. The 
first is the state owned CODELCO29, the biggest copper producer firm of the world. Only 
in 2014 it produced 1,622 thousand of MT of copper, representing 29% of the national 
and 9% of global production. The second is the private mine ‘Escondida’ (owned mostly 
by BHP Billiton), the biggest copper producing mine worldwide. In 2014 it contributed 
1165 thousands of MT of copper or 20% of the Chilean and 6% of world production.  
                                               
29 CODELCO is comprised by eight operations: Andina, Chuquicamata, El Teniente, Gabriela Mistral, 
Ministro Hales, Radomiro Tomic, Salvador and Ventanas. 
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Table 7: Production of copper in thousands of metric tons (MT) and percentage of 
the Chilean participation in the world production (1950 - 2014). 
Year 
Chilean production (in 
thousands of MT) 
Participation in the world 
production 
1950 363 15% 
1960 532 13% 
1970 692 11% 
1980 1,068 14% 
1990 1,588 18% 
2000 4,602 35% 
2010 5,419 34% 
2014 5,747 31% 
 
Source: Own elaboration according to data from COCHILCO (historical statistics). 
 
The quantity and quality of the Chilean copper resources were also widely recognized 
by most the interviewees as one of the major strengths of the country. As one of the main 
Chilean mining entrepreneurs and representative of the Mining Industry stated ‘…when 
God created the world, He put his mining finger on the Second [Antofagasta] Region of 
Chile’ (INT8). 
Such resources were considered as highly strategic by all CEOS interviewed from the 
mining MNEs, who admitted that they would not be able to find similar deposits in other 
countries. They all agree that these deposits were very important when the firms decided 
where to invest, and for how long. Similarly, both the Chilean State, through its public 
servants and politicians; and civil society, represented by civil representatives and NGOs 
recognize that Chilean copper deposits are extremely important when bargaining with 
the foreign agents with a view to achieving sustainable development, something that 
mirrors what Moran (1974) found in his study. 
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Figure 17: Share of world copper reserves in 2014. 
 
Source: Own elaboration according to data from USGS (2015). 
 
6.2.2 Legal and taxation regimes favourable to FDI 
 
Chile is also known for its extremely FDI-friendly legal and taxation regimes. It is 
considered a ‘tax heaven’ for mining investments worldwide – a strong selling point for 
bringing new FDI into the country. The FDI friendly attitude started with the dictatorship 
in 1973, mostly due to the strong influence of the ‘Chicago Boys’, and it has been 
deepened during the democratic governments that came after the return to democracy 
in 1990.  
Thus, the previous nationalization of the copper industry during the previous democratic 
governments, during Eduardo Frei Montalva and Salvador Allende’s periods, was 
deconstructed through a series of laws approved during the Dictatorship and expanded 
by subsequent democratic governments (Acuña, n.d.; Alcayaga, 2005). Nowadays, Chile 
is being sold internationally as a very attractive destination in terms of legal security and 
stability for FDI, since its legal framework comprises both constitutional and legal 
provisions. Such laws are detailed next: 
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6.2.2.1 Laws approved during the dictatorship period (1973 – 1989) 
 
Initially the ‘Junta Militar’ 30 established in their new national Constitution of 1980 that the 
State ‘is the absolute and indefeasible owner of all mineral wealth, including all mines’ 
(Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES), 2012, p. 60), due to its strategic relevance 
for the economy of the country. However, the Junta later approved several laws that 
opened the country to FDI, while also providing irresistible tax incentives for new 
projects. The most important were the ‘Ley de Renta’ (Income Tax law); the ‘Decreto Ley 
600’ (DL. 600); and other laws liberalizing the mining industry, each of which contributed 
to make the country attractive for FDI in the following ways (Íbañez, 2003):  
The ley de Renta (income tax law), established in 1974, decrees that the taxable income 
for the firms will be the ‘operational taxable income’, which is the result between the 
gross income minus the cost related with the production and sales. This law allows the 
consideration of several items as part of the production costs, which diminishes the 
taxable income. Among the most important, there are: the accelerated depreciation of 
assets, meaning that the production expenditures related to this concept increases in the 
short term; the payments for financial services, allowing the firms to deduct the financial 
cost of a loan obtained; the transfer prices, where the mining MNEs sell their products to 
their subsidiaries at a higher price than the market price, increasing their production 
costs; and the contributions or donations for cultural and educative ends, mostly 
materialized through CSR, that also allows a reduction in tax. 
The DL. 600, established in 1974, is the main legal regulatory framework for regulating 
the FDI. It is a ‘law contract’ between the Chilean State and the firms that secures the 
tax invariability of paying a unique tax for all the investments that entered the country 
embracing this law. This tax cannot be modified unilaterally, and it lasts from a minimum 
of ten years for up to twenty years for investments over 50 million dollars. This legal 
contract is above the national sovereignty, meaning that is not controlled or influenced 
by the State in any form, since an autonomous organism (the Comité de Inversiones 
Extranjeras CIES / Foreign Investment Committee) is the one in charge of signing it on 
behalf of the State. 
                                               
30 The Military Junta was a form of government adopted between 1973 and 1978 during the Chilean 
dictatorship. It was comprised by the Commanders of the army, air force, navy and the General Director of 
the police. 
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Thus, the CIES approves new investments only based on their compliance with the 
Chilean legislation, without considering any other variables. The logic behind this is to 
limit the discretion of the State in the approval of new investments. Consequently, as the 
Foreign Investor Guide published by the CIES (2012) establishes, the main principles 
behind the DL.600, which are the: economic freedom; non–discrimination and; non–
discretionality of procedures and legal security. 
Finally, the Ley Organica Constitucional de Concesiones Mineras (Constitutional 
Organic Law on Mining Concessions) and the Código de Minería (Mining Code), 
approved in 1982 and 1983 respectively, are the specific laws regulating the mining 
industry in Chile. These laws establish a stark break related to the previous Chilean 
mining legislation, mostly regarding the role of the State in controlling and granting 
mining concessions. Both establish that the public authority is unable to decide whether 
to authorize or not a mining concession a priori. They also create conditions in which the 
mining concessions given to the firms last indefinitely. Moreover, they also provide a 
really strict set of retributions from the State to the MNEs in case of expropriations, and 
discourage public investment in the mining sector. These laws effectively privatized the 
mining industry in Chile (Alcayaga, 2005; Íbañez, 2003). 
  
6.2.2.2 Laws approved during the Democratic period (1990 – to date) 
 
After the return to democracy, FDI-friendly laws and policies were deepened by the new 
governments of La Concertación as a way to consolidate the neoliberal ideology 
prevailing in Chile. Two are particularly important: the law 18.985, and the failed attempt 
at introducing royalty payments (Alcayaga, 2005; Íbañez, 2003). The law 18.985, 
approved in 1990, establishes that the sale of mining belongings is exempted from 
income tax and it changed the mining taxation from a presumed rent regime to an 
effective rent system· This is vital, since the taxes based on the presumed rent were 
related to the sales of mineral, independently of the profits or losses of the mining firms. 
Conversely, the taxes collected from an effective rent are calculated and paid only if the 
firm has profits. Furthermore, only the big mining firms that produce at least 36.000 tons 
of copper per year can use this form of taxation. 
This law also creates the ‘costo de pertenencia’ (ownership cost). This allows the mining 
MNEs to include as a cost the depreciation of their natural reserves, which can be 
subtracted from the taxable income, instead of paying that cost to the Chilean State. 
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Hence, not only the mining MNEs do not have to pay royalties for exploiting the natural 
resources in Chile, but the mining concessions are conceded for free by the Chilean 
State to the foreign investments. 
Later in 2005, the law 20.026 was approved, which is wrongfully known as the Mining 
Royalty law. A royalty can be considered as the rent MNEs pay for exploiting, using and 
profiting from the natural resources and land owned by the State. There were two 
attempts to create a royalty in Chile, one in 2004 that tried to establish a real royalty, but 
did not succeed; and a second one in 2005, that is not a real royalty, but a specific tax 
for the mining industry. The latter was approved as the law 20.026, and is only applicable 
for the investments made after 2010, since the previous investments were made under 
the DL.600 that provides them with tax invariability. However, this new law also provides 
tax invariability for 12 years for the firms that accepted it (until 2017) and it actually 
contributed to lower the taxes paid by the mining MNEs, so most of them decided to 
embrace it.  
A New Royalty law, or law 20.469, was also approved in 2010, as a way to support the 
reconstruction of the zones affected by the earthquake of 2010. It is also a specific tax 
for the mining industry; and it considers an extension of the invariability period of six 
years and a rate that varies between 5% and 14% for the new mining projects and for 
those that already have signed a contract with the State as of 2018. This new taxation 
system was voluntary, but 94% of the mining companies adopted it due to the incentive 
of tax invariability until 2023 (six years more compared to the previous royalty law) 
(Minería Chilena, 2013).  
All these laws have established Chile as one of the most attractive countries for investing. 
The Fraser Institute annually ranks states, provinces and countries according to their 
investment attractiveness by asking to the mining company officials. In this rank, Chile 
has been among the top 13 most attractive countries to invest in the world since 2005, 
and the most attractive one in Latin America since 2010. Furthermore, according to the 
World Bank (2006, p. 195), it is one of the countries with the lowest total effective tax 
rate, as Table 5 shows. Thus, the tax legislation caused by the extreme neoliberalisation 
of the Chilean society (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007) has played a vital role in luring FDI 
into the country, and it has been recognized by most of the interviewees as one of the 
country’s strongest resources.  
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Table 8: Foreign Investor Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Total Effective Tax Rate 
for a Model Copper Mine in Selected Countries and States (2003). 
Country Foreign investor IRR (%) Total effective tax rate (%) 
Lowest taxing quartile 
  
Sweden 15.7 28.6 
Chile 15.0 36.6 
Argentina 13.9 40.0 
Papua New Guinea 13.8 42.7 
Zimbabwe 13.5 39.8 
Philippines 13.5 45.3 
Highest taxing quartile 
  
Indonesia (non-COW 2002) 11.2 52.2 
Poland 11.0 49.6 
Ontario, Canada 10.1 63.8 
Uzbekistan 9.3 62.9 
Côte d’Ivoire 8.9 62.4 
Burkina Faso 3.3 83.9 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2006) which used data from Otto (2002). 
 
6.2.3 Political, economic and tax stability 
 
When asked about the main strategic resource that makes Chile stand out from the rest 
of mining countries, there is a strong agreement among the interviewees pointing to its 
‘political, economic and tax stability’. Stability is a vital strategic resource for mining 
MNEs, due to the long term nature of their investments. Mining MNEs seek to establish 
‘long term relationships’ in countries that provide ‘economic, tax and legal stability’ (INT 
23) or what they call ‘clear rules of the game’ (INT 38). This has also been a major 
argument favouring investing in Chile, in a world market filled with several mining 
competitor countries, such as Peru or South Africa, and has been widely promoted by 
the national agencies in charge of bring FDI into the country (INT 23). 
The genesis of Chilean stability is in the XIX century, where ‘the institutions replaced the 
decisions of the citizens, who were considered immature and ignorant, for an institutional 
base that was able to preserve the republic and common good from the wisdom of the 
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oligarchy’ (Mayol, 2012, p. 79). Such change happened by a process where politics as 
an exercise of social power was supplanted by a naturalization of the institutions, ‘which 
should be allowed to work’ (Mayol, 2012). This was deepened during the dictatorship, 
through its exertion of extreme violence and terror over the population, and it continued 
after the return to democracy. In the later period, the country adopted what has been 
called the ‘politics of the consensus’ as a way to avoid political dissent during the fragile 
first days of the democracy, since a return to a military government was still a real 
possibility (Meller, 2007; Moulian, 2002). 
The politics of consensus assumes an ‘imaginary harmony’, in which the dissent 
regarding the characteristics of the economic, political and tax model imposed by the 
dictatorship has largely disappeared (Moulian, 2002). Such consensus has been 
expanded through the continuous advance of the neoliberal model, and it has cemented 
the obsession with stability and support to FDI that the country has, becoming what has 
been called ‘a market ideology’ (Lukes, 2005). As an academic put it, ‘Chile has sold 
internationally its macroeconomic stability. That was what the dictatorship sold and that 
is what [the country] keeps selling nowadays’ (INT 38). This is perfectly summarized in 
a report from the CIES to promote Chile as a ‘Land of Opportunities’, where they claim 
that: 
‘Chile is a safe and reliable place in which to do business. This is borne out by risk rating 
agencies which have maintained or increased their ratings for Chile, highlighting its 
political stability, low level of public debt, the health of its financial system and the solidity 
of its macroeconomic system at a time of external crisis’ (Comité de Inversiones 
Extranjeras (CIES), 2013, p. 19) 
Furthermore, the Chilean economy has shown a stable growth rate of around 5% on 
average during the last two decades, while also expanding enough to pass from a debtor 
to a creditor country in international terms – with Chile now one of the 38 countries 
members of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) from the IMF, contributing with 
1,360 SDR millions to this fund31.  
Thus, Chile has been considered an example of a stable country, where the rules of the 
game are pretty much static, or modified only after reaching agreements between the 
State and mining MNEs. Investors have repeatedly cited this as a major reason for 
                                               
31 The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF to supplement its member countries official 
reserves. Its value is based on a basket of four key international currencies, and SDRs can be exchanged 
for freely usable currencies. 
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considering investing in the country (Hiep Dang, Director of McAfee Labs, Quoted in 
Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES), 2013, p. 8) (Jon Segovia, Partner and 
Director of Solarpack, quoted in Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES), 2013, p. 38). 
 
Table 9: Ranking of the top ten copper producing countries, according to new 
investments encouraged by their political stability (2014). 
Response 1 2 3 4 5 
Canada 55% 32% 10% 2% 1% 
Australia 48% 37% 9% 5% 1% 
United States 43% 34% 20% 3% 0% 
Chile 37% 42% 18% 4% 0% 
Zambia 24% 38% 29% 5% 5% 
Peru 17% 41% 29% 14% 0% 
Russia 14% 14% 7% 43% 21% 
Mexico 14% 48% 31% 7% 0% 
China 11% 32% 26% 21% 11% 
Congo 0% 10% 19% 55% 16% 
1: Encourages investment 2: Not a deterrent to investment 
3: Mild deterrent to investment 4: Strong deterrent to investment 
5: Would not pursue investment due to this factor 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Fraser Institute Survey of Mining 
Companies 2014. 
 
This is reflected in Chile being considered as the third most stable country in Latin 
America; and the fourth among the main producers of copper after Canada, Australia 
and the United States, by the Fraser Institute Survey for 201432 (See Table 6). In this 
survey, 37% of the sample agreed that its political stability encourages investment. 
Additionally, the same survey locates Chile as the second most secure33 country in Latin 
                                               
32 The survey was circulated electronically to over 4,200 individuals between August 26 and November 15, 
2014. Survey responses were tallied to rank provinces, states, and countries according to the extent that 
public policy factors encourage or discourage investment. A total of 485 responses were received for the 
survey, providing sufficient data to evaluate 122 jurisdictions.(Fraser Institute, 2014). 
33 This includes physical security due to the threat of attack by terrorists, criminals, guerrilla groups, etc. 
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America, where half of the sample considers that they would invest there because of this 
reason. 
 
6.2.4 High copper prices  
 
Another pivotal variable in Chile’s strategic position is the extremely high copper prices 
caused by the commodity super cycle started in the early 2000s.This brought fresh FDI 
into the country, materialized in expanding previous mining projects and new 
prospections of new ones. To illustrate this, in 2001 only 23% of FDI made in Chile was 
materialized in the mining industry, while in 2011 it reached a maximum of 61%34. 
The world commodity price rise started in the early 2003, and it was not significantly 
affected by the global decline caused by the 2008 crisis. Even more, commodity prices 
showed signs of recovering quicker than the global economic output level. One of the 
main factors pushing the commodity boom was the increasing use of commodities 
worldwide from the beginning of the 2000s; as well as the inability of the commodity 
producers to match the growing demand due to supply constraints proper of the industry.  
This expanding demand for commodities was exceptionally strong in China, since its 
rapid economic growth increased its need for resources, to expand its infrastructure and 
to satisfy its internal demand of consumables (Canuto, 2014). By 2013, China absorbed 
around 42% of the world mining minerals; including oil, copper, aluminium and iron, 
among others; and 55% of the global steel (Lagos, 2013). Furthermore, China´s copper 
demand also experienced a continuous increase, going from importing 11.4% of the 
world copper production in the year 2000, to 39.8% in 201335. Thus, China has played 
an extremely important role in the increase in the commodity prices so far. 
 
6.2.4.1 The Copper Super cycle  
 
Copper price rises commenced in 2003 giving birth to the copper super cycle that lasted 
until 2013 – as shown in Figure 18 by the period between the two dotted vertical lines. 
                                               
34 According to data from COCHILCO and the Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES). 
35 According to data from COCHILCO. 
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This expansion was so pronounced, that the copper price went from an average of 0.73 
US$/lb between January of 1999 and January 2003; to a maximum of almost 4.5 US$/lb 
in February of 2011, meaning an increase of more than 500%. Even though the prices 
were affected by the crisis of 2008, they quickly recovered and even surpassed their 
previous levels. Consequently, these extremely high copper prices generated extremely 
high profits. In the words of an interviewee from the Chilean Central Bank: 
‘the profits are so big due to the copper prices … that they [the mining firms] were willing 
to double the wage of a worker from another industry, in order to convince him to do the 
same job but in the mining industry… so if you are willing to do that is because you have 
margin to do it’ (INT12).  
This period’s outstanding profits meant that several mining companies passed ‘from 
being the poor relative of the [global] economic family, to be the richest’ (INT3), allowing 
several of them to be part of the influential group of the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
100 Index (FTSE). In 2012, right before the end of the copper super cycle, the Chilean 
firm Antofagasta Minerals managed to have the most profitable stock among the copper 
mining MNEs.  
Finally, according to Lagos (2013), there is enough evidence to think that the demand of 
copper will keep increasing in the following years, due in part to the increasing demand 
of the BRIC countries, but the current slowing down of the Chinese economy casts 
serious doubts about this. However, and despite China´s deceleration, the copper prices 
are still above 2 US$/lb, more than double the prices at the end of the 1990s. Moreover, 
the increasing demand for metals from the other BRIC countries, together with the 
cyclicality of the extractive industry, will probably cause a recovery in the metal prices, 
making the copper industry still very attractive to invest.  
149 
 
Figure 18: Nominal Monthly Copper Price between January 1999 and October 2015 
(U$ Dollar/lb). 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from COCHILCO. 
 
6.2.5 The brand of Chile as a ‘land of opportunities’ 
 
One of the most important assets held by the Chilean State is the brand of Chile as a 
‘Land of Opportunities’ (Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES), 2013). This has been 
widely promoted around the globe to cause a good impression among foreign investors 
and international institutions. It also received the previous names of ‘The Latin American 
Jaguar’, an ‘example of development’ and a ‘leader in Latin America’. All of these have 
tried to establish the idea of Chile as a model among its peers, in a marketing campaign 
that also looked to establish an internal ideal of Chile as an envied country, perfect for a 
society obsessed with nationalistic feelings, the idea of being competitive and individual 
success (Moulian, 2002). 
Among the main characteristics used to promote the Chile brand by the CIES (Comité 
de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES), 2013) – and recognized by most of the interviewees 
– are: its socio – economic stability; its friendly and trustful business atmosphere; its 
insertion into the world economy; and its competitiveness. For the specific mining 
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industry, the latter refers to the Chilean weather, infrastructure, human capital, strategic 
location for headquarters and mining culture. Some of these characteristics (like its 
stability) have already been previously addressed, so this section focuses on the good 
business climate in Chile, its international integration, and its competitiveness in the 
mining sector.  
 
6.2.5.1 The Chilean business climate  
 
One of the main accomplishments of embracing the neoliberal ideology, was the 
construction of a consensus regarding the market as the ultimate provider of growth and 
development. Such ideology was initially established by the dictatorship, through the 
reversal of the nationalizations; the privatization of public assets; the opening up of 
natural resources to private and unregulated exploitation; the privatization of social 
security and; the facilitation of foreign direct investment and free trade (Harvey, 2005), 
starting a process that lasts until today, where the idea of free market and the dismantling 
of the State was imposed through what has been called a ‘shock therapy’ of terror and 
violence (Klein, 2007). 
The neoliberal policies achieved their aims, establishing the perception that ‘the really 
important thing about the Chilean business is that free markets did work their way in 
bringing about a free society’ (Milton Friedman interview quoted in Klein, 2007, p. 117). 
This led Chilean society to completely embrace the free markets as a way of achieving 
personal wealth and, ultimately, freedom. Such ideology fostered the obsession in 
generating the best climate for making business as the best way to accomplish growth 
and development. Even though this ‘Chilean Model’ has been challenged in the last 
years (Mayol, 2012; Mayol & Ahumada, 2015; Moulian, 2002), it still holds a very deep 
grasp on the country´s culture and economic policies. 
Hence, Chile’s major strengths as a foreign investment destination are its longstanding 
and well-functioning market economy; open foreign investment regime; strong fiscal 
position; sophisticated capital markets and the world’s most extensive network of free–
trade agreements (FTAs) (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014). All of this is reinforced by 
the legislative structure which – in addition to its tax exemptions and protection for FDI – 
ensures labour flexibility and special access to strategic resources, giving it wide 
international recognition. The country holds 13th position in the Business Environment 
Ranking of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in 2014, leading the Latin American 
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Countries on a par with developed economies in North America, Europe and Asia 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014); and the 41st position in the World Bank Ease of 
Doing Business Ranking of 2015, which considers 189 economies (World Bank, 2014). 
  
6.2.5.2 Chile as a globally connected strategic location for headquarters 
 
Chile has turned into a strategic location for MNEs to establish their Latin American 
headquarters, due to its geographic location, its numerous trade agreements and the 
costs of installing new offices, all of which are attractive for the expansion of their mining 
production networks (Coe et al., 2004). Its location allows privileged access to the Pacific 
Ocean through the west and to the Atlantic through the South, as well as several of the 
most relevant markets in Latin America such as Argentina and Brazil. 
Additionally, the country is extremely connected with global markets. Chile has signed 
the largest number of FTAs in the world: fifteen FTAs involving 21 countries; six 
Agreements of Economic Complementation involving 10 countries, three Association 
Agreements involving 32 countries and one Agreement of Partial Scope with India, all of 
which sums 25 trade agreements with 68 countries. This means that the country has 
expanded its domestic market of around 17.6 million inhabitants to one of more than 
4,000 million potential consumers around the world, that represent more than 80% of the 
global GDP (Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES), 2013). 
The most important commerce zones in terms of their participation in the Chilean 
external commerce are: Asia, with almost 41% of; North America, with 20%; and South 
America, with around 18% (see Figure 19). The commercial interchange between Chile 
and the Latin American countries (comprising the ones in South and Centre America) 
represents almost 20% of the Chilean external commerce, meaning that the trade 
agreements between the country and the rest of Latin America is secondary in relevance 
after Asia.  
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Figure 19: Distribution of the Chilean external commerce by geographic zone 2014 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from DIRECON (General Direction of International 
Economic Relationships). 
  
Furthermore, according to the UBS investment bank (2015), Santiago is one of the 
world’s 18 least expensive cities for the installation of foreign companies. In its 2015 
Price and Earnings Report, the Chilean capital was in the 54th position out of 71 cities in 
the ranking where first place indicates the most expensive city (Zurich) and New York is 
the basis of comparison36. Additionally, Santiago has been also considered to have one 
of the lowest office rental costs of Latin America and praised due to its strong and stable 
open financial market (Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES), 2013). 
 
6.2.5.3 Chilean mining competitiveness 
 
Chile is also well known in the world mining industry for some particular characteristics 
that make it stand out as an outstanding place for mining investments (Phelps et al., 
                                               
36 The report considers the cost of a basket of 122 goods and services according to European consumption 
habits and including three rent categories (UBS, 2015). 
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2015). Among these, the CEOs of the mining firms, politicians and experts interviewed 
agreed that the most important are: its weather, infrastructure, human capital and mining 
culture. In the words a CEO of one of the most important mining MNEs, ‘the attractive 
thing [about Chile] is that it is a country of low risk, with a qualified working class, with a 
good environment, and easy access, [together with] the climate conditions!’ (INT 32). 
The Chilean weather in the mining regions is especially privileged. Since most of the 
mining production is located in the Atacama Desert, the operations do not have to deal 
with rain, or extremely cold/hot climates that can stop the exploitation of minerals. In this 
region, the average temperature in the day varies from 25 to 35 degrees Celsius, and in 
the night from five to minus one degree. Since it is considered the driest desert of the 
world, ‘it usually does not rain at all, which is exceptional for the operations. In other 
countries, such as Brazil, there are rainy periods where you have to interrupt the 
operations periodically, here that almost never happens’ (INT 32). This has been 
considered as a ‘very important advantage’, since this weather helps to create ‘the (…) 
environment to make mining happen’ (INT 9).  
Moreover, the good and proper infrastructure key in the development of a mining project 
largely already exists. As recognized by several CEOs, ‘[Chile] has ports, good 
highways, which in other environments require more investment and that many times 
make not possible to development projects’ (INT 32). In the mining regions ‘the biggest 
distance from a mine to the closest port is 200 kilometres, with paved roads and cities 
like Antofagasta and Calama, with hospitals, churches, parks, (…) so it has a 
tremendous infrastructure’ (INT 8). This has been achieved through a constant 
investment in connectivity, thanks to the State’s effort and the private sector participation 
in the Public Works Concessions Program. Created in 1991, such initiative has allowed 
the modernization of the country´s highways, bridges, and other road infrastructures 
(Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIES), 2013).  
Likewise, the country’s ports are considered as some of the most important for sea 
connections in the South Pacific (USI, 2014). As another source of connectivity, the 
telecommunications in terms of mobile telephony and internet have also expanded 
greatly during the last decades. All of this is reflected in the ranking regarding to the 
Networked Readiness Index, where the country holds the 54th place out of 143 countries 
in terms of best infrastructure, and the 37th position in terms of the individual, business 
and government usage of information and communication technologies (World 
Economic Forum & INSEAD, 2015). 
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Lastly, another strategic resource held by Chile is the quality of its human capital working 
in the mining industry, generated thanks to its long mining tradition. According to several 
CEOs, politicians and experts, the country ‘…has a critical mass of professionals that 
neither Argentina nor Peru has in this moment’ (INT 9). As one of the CEOs of the most 
important mining firms worldwide explains ‘you will not find 100.000 grown men 
dedicated to mining anywhere else in Latin America, I mean, Chile has them if we 
consider technicians, professionals and from other areas like construction’ (INT 9). 
In fact, several of the CEOs that now work for the mining MNEs started their careers 
working in CODELCO, which they universally consider as the best school for learning 
the intricacies of the mining industry. Moreover, the country has several academic 
institutions that have trained professionals focused in the mining industry, such as Mining 
Engineering, Geology, and others; as well as mining institutes (such as the CIMM, 
Fundación Chile and TEC) and postgraduate degrees, which have been specifically 
designed and created with the mining firms to provide the best educational skills for the 
industry.  
Another important element is the internationally recognized quality of the Chilean working 
force. The Global Talent Index of 2015 considered Chile one of the ‘biggest gainers’ in 
terms of fostering an environment that encourages talent. This index seeks to assess 
the talent trends at international level through a benchmarking index of talent 
environments in 60 countries, and Chile moved from the 31st hold in 2011, to the 26th 
position in 2015, being one of the best performers of Latin America (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2015). Similarly, is common for Chilean professionals that have worked 
in the mining industry to initiate their own business as mining suppliers, due to their deep 
knowledge of the industry´s needs and market niches.  
Together with all these strategic resources, the Chilean State also faces several 
particular constraints that hinder its bargaining position. Thus, the potential bargaining 
capacity of the State will be determined by the strategic resources developed in this 
section, but it will be hindered by the will of the governments negotiating with the mining 
MNEs and the constraints the country faces. Such constraints are considered next. 
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6.3 THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE CHILEAN STATE 
  
6.3.1 Competitive concerns 
 
As previously developed, Chile holds several competitive strengths. However, it is also 
facing a worrying scenario regarding the quantity, quality, price and dependence of some 
of the resources that the mining industry needs to produce, meaning a relative loss in 
the relevance of some of its strategic power resources as Moran (1974) predicted. This 
is a shift from its previous position, in which the country had lower total production costs 
in the copper industry than the world average. As Figure 20 shows, since the start of the 
copper super cycle in 2003 and until the beginning of the ‘sub-prime’ mortgage crisis in 
2008, the country was 11.5% more competitive than the rest of the world average, 
whereas from 2009 until 2012 it has been 5.7% less competitive than the world average 
(Consejo Minero, 2014a). Consequently, the Chilean mining position is currently facing 
a considerable loss of comparative competiveness. 
This loss of competitiveness has been attributed to an increase in the total production 
costs of copper which, according to the experts interviewed (Consejo Minero, 2013, 
2014a), in turn, stems from a number of factors: the decrease in the copper ore grade, 
the water and energy supply; the quantity of human capital; the dependency of FDI and 
technology imports; the falling prices of copper; the future likelihood of a possible 
substitute for copper; and new countries competing for leadership in the copper industry. 
Each one of them is explained next. 
 
6.3.1.1 Decrease in the quality of the copper ore grade 
 
During the last decades, and fostered by the increased exploitation of the copper super 
cycle, the Chilean copper ore grade has decreased considerably. Its quality went from 
1.29 in 2000 (COCHILCO, 2009) to 0.71 in 2014 (COCHILCO, 2014), meaning a 
decrease of 44% in 14 years. A further decline can be avoided by investing in mining 
exploration, which is what has happened lately. In 2012, the mining industry investment 
in exploration reached an historical peak of US$ 1.305 million, representing 5% of the 
world total investments in this area that year (Consejo Minero, 2013). However, the 
tendency is to a further deterioration in the quality of the copper ore grades.  
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Figure 20: Total Costs (C3 = Cash costs+ Depreciation+ Interests+ Indirect costs) 
of the copper mining in Chile and the world 2003 - 2012 (US$/lb). 
Source: Consejo Minero (2014a) with data from COCHILCO. 
 
6.3.1.2 Energy supply issues 
 
The cost of energy is remarkably important for the mining industry since it is a strategic 
resource for the functioning of the mines. Its variations can have a stark effect on the 
viability of a project, since the expenditure on energy usually represents 20% of a mining 
firm operational costs (Consejo Minero, 2014b). In Chile, the mining industry is the most 
energy–intensive one, absorbing around one third of the total energy consumption, with 
an increasing demand that grew from 47% between 2003 to 2013 (Figure 21). However, 
the Chilean position is weak in terms of its energy prices compared to other mining 
nations. As several studies show, the energy prices are the highest of Latin America, 
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other copper producers like Australia and Canada (Comisión Permanente de Recursos 
Naturales, 2012; Consejo Minero, 2014b; CSIRO, 2014; Korinek, 2013).  
Thus, there is an excess of demand of electric energy by the Chilean mining sector that 
is not being satisfied, and which is likely to worsen due to the future opening of new 
mines and projects. This challenging situation has been exacerbated by an increasingly 
more active and organized civil society due to their cultural appraisal of the negative 
externalities associated to energy production (Bebbington, 2009; Bridge, 2009), which 
has questioned the availability, costs and means of supplying electricity, as well as its 
economic and environmental sustainability (Consejo Minero, 2014b). These new political 
movements have managed to stop several new power plants, and have pushed for 
stronger environmental legislation and the consideration of renewable energies, leading 
to a situation where the mining firms are contemplating building their own energy 
capacity rather than relying on public infrastructure (CSIRO, 2014).  
 
Figure 21: Energy consumption by the Chilean copper mining industry and its 
participation over the national consumption between 2003 – 2012 (GWH). 
 
Source: Consejo Minero (2014b) with data from COCHILCO, CDEC – SING and CDEC 
– SIC. 
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6.3.1.3 Water supply insufficiency 
 
Most of Chile´s copper mines operate in the Atacama Desert, located well above sea 
level in an arid environment. This means that to make water available and ready for use 
in the production process, it must be desalinated and pumped into the mountains, a 
process that is both expensive and energy–intensive (CSIRO, 2014). Since the 2000’s 
and fostered by the copper super cycle, the increases in mining production and the fall 
of mining ore grades have resulted in mining companies processing larger quantities of 
material. Thus, in 2007 the mining industry used around two thirds of the total water 
received in the Antofagasta and almost a more than one third of the total amount of water 
used in the mining regions of Arica and Parinacota; Antofagasta; and Atacama (Badal, 
2014). This led to projections that suggest an increase if the demand for water resources 
from 350 Mm3 in 2012 to 500 Mm3 in 2020 – an enormous challenge due to the 
extremely dry conditions of the environment (CSIRO, 2014).  
Recently, the country has not been able to fully satisfy this demand, causing diverse 
tensions in the copper industry (Consejo Minero, 2014b). Thus, several mining firms 
have developed alternatives, such as the desalination of sea water. However, pumping 
the water from the coast to the mine sites mines requires increased energy consumption. 
The cost of removing salt from seawater in Chile is around US$ 5 per cubic metre, which 
in the US costs only $2.3 and 2.8 in Mexico (Jamasmie, 2013). Even though some firms 
have already established desalination plants, others are still evaluating the idea. This 
increasing trend has led to a substitution of 10% of the continental water resources by 
desalted water (COCHILCO, 2013; Consejo Minero, 2013). Still, it could be argued that 
Chile’s water troubles may be caused by the energy challenges it faces. If new energy 
sources are developed and energy costs decline, desalination will become a more cost-
efficient option (CSIRO, 2014). 
Other aspects of the water supply constraint are the fierce competition for water use 
among the various sectors of Chile’s economy, especially mining versus agriculture 
(Budds, 2004; CSIRO, 2014); and the strengthening of civil society and indigenous 
movements. Similar to the energy issue, civil society organisations have resisted and 
even stopped projects related to the concession or trade of water rights in the Atacama 
Desert located in indigenous territories, or involving pollution and/or depletion of water 
sources in protected natural areas (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington & Williams, 
2008; Larraín et al., 2010). Moreover, the energy and water issues have only arisen 
recently, but they have become a main concern for the Chilean copper industry. As a 
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CEO of a mining MNE explains ‘you can have a tremendous resource, you can have a 
tremendous ore, but you start slowing down because you don’t have energy, you don’t 
have water, issues that twenty, thirty years ago were not a problem, we were not 
concerned about them at all!’ (INT22).  
 
6.3.1.4 Scarcity of advanced human capital 
 
Chile’s mining history and culture has produced highly skilled professionals for the 
national and international mining industry. However, the supply of skilled workers of the 
country is not enough for the demand of the industry anymore, meaning the existence of 
a ‘thin labour market’ that hinders the chances of reaching a strategic coupling (Coe et 
al., 2004). This raises challenges related with the relevance of this factor in the rise of 
the labour costs, and the increased turnover rate due to the ‘stealing’ of workers (CSIRO, 
2014; Innovum Fundación Chile, 2014; OECD, 2013b).  
Moreover, the gap between the supply and demand of human capital is expected to keep 
increasing, reaching its maximum once most of the projects planned for the medium term 
are finally functional (OECD, 2013b). As Figure 22 shows, the gap in the supply of 
workers is projected to increase more than five times for the period 2014–2023, mostly 
in the areas of maintenance and fixed plant and mobile equipment operators (CSIRO, 
2014; Innovum Fundación Chile, 2014). However, these estimations should be 
considered with care, since they are based on projected investments, greatly affected by 
the fall of copper prices and the end of the super cycle. 
Still, the constrained growth in supply has been an ongoing issue where both the Chilean 
educational system and the characteristics of the industry have played an important role. 
Mining is not a popular career track for Chilean students or a priority area of development 
for the national educational system, despite the fact that the Chilean mining industry pays 
the highest salaries in Latin America. This is related to the distance and extreme 
conditions of the work sites, the poor image of the sector, and the low relevance of 
mining-related disciplines in the national educational system (Consejo Minero, 2014b; 
OECD, 2013b). Recently, however, the mining MNEs have shown some initiative by 
creating the Council on Mining Skills, which coordinates and adjusts the needs of the 
industry with the programs being provided in the Chilean educational institutions, having 
a moderate success (CSIRO, 2014).  
160 
 
Furthermore, several experts also warn about a huge lack of advanced ‘innovative 
professionals’, able to create new technological solutions and firms; and to facilitate 
knowledge spillovers between the big mining firms and the rest of the productive fabric 
in the mining regions. This concern is exemplified in the words of an expert academic:  
‘It seems that the innovation in the mining industry is relatively few […] and is realized 
by the mining MNEs, so in that sense I believe that the big mining industry has not 
generated a critical mass of innovative professionals, or knowledge spill overs’ (INT 38).  
Thus, Chile not only faces a matter of quantity for working at the mines, but also the lack 
of human capital for helping to develop a self–sustainable productive fabric around the 
main big mining industry that could stand the eventual departure of the mining MNEs.  
  
Figure 22: Projection of the aggregated supply and demand of workers for the big 
Chilean mining industry (in thousands of people). 
 
Source: Innovum Fundación Chile (2014). 
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for the copper; the rise of other copper competitors; the historical technological 
dependency; and the current fall in the copper prices.  
The potential for a possible substitute for copper has been an issue that, although is not 
considered as a real threat yet, brings back painful memories related to the end of the 
nitrate era due to the invention of synthetic nitrates. The most important potential 
substitute is the graphene, which shows even better properties than copper37 (CSIRO, 
2014). However, graphene is still produced only at a laboratory level, meaning that the 
costs are still extremely high. Some estimations claim that the cost of obtaining one 
kilogram of graphene is close to US$50.000 (Consejo Minero, 2014b). Moreover, copper 
not only has several applications not only as a conductor of electricity but also has anti–
microbial properties and is resistant to corrosion and is highly recyclable, making it 
difficult to fully substitute.  
Yet, this does not mean that the chance of repeating the economic debacle caused by 
the fall of nitrates is not a possibility in the medium/long term. As the report made by 
CSIRO (2014) explains, if it becomes feasible to produce graphene or another copper 
substitute at a competitive cost, it could be a relevant factor causing the ‘collapse of the 
Chilean copper industry’.  
The rise of new competitors in the copper industry has also been considered an issue 
which could threaten Chilean dominance worldwide. As shown in Figure 15, Chile is by 
far the main producer of copper worldwide. However, there are several other countries; 
such as China, Peru, Congo and Australia; that have greatly increased their participation 
in the world production. By focusing in the development of their copper mining industry, 
these countries increased their participation in the production of copper from a 14% 
share in 1990 to 27% in 2014 (Figure 15).  
The strongest competitor is Peru, since is the second copper producer in Latin America, 
and the third worldwide. It has almost 10% of the total copper reserves and it is the only 
South American country that confirmed and met all the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) requirements. It became a signatory to this agreement 
partly to overcome its main weakness - political instability. The increase in Chilean 
production costs related to energy and water issues and decreases in the quality of its 
ores, have made Peru more attractive as a destination for mining FDI were it not for the 
                                               
37 Copper has been considered the best electric conductor, but studies have shown that graphene would 
have a 60% higher electric conductivity (Consejo Minero, 2014b).  
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country’s inability to create stronger political stability and to offer safe and attractive 
conditions for FDI. 
 
Table 10: USPTO patents in the copper mining industry 1976 – 2006. 
                
Total number of actors in the mining industry 501 100% 
Total number of firms and suppliers with patents 46 9% 
Total number of patents    1519 100% 
Number of patents assigned to Chilean companies   4 0,26% 
Number of patents assigned to foreign firms with operations in Chile 1515 99,74% 
 
Source: Based on Bas and Kunc (2009). 
 
Table 11: Regional distribution of the patent requests of the copper mining 
industry, 2000 – 2009. 
Region Total Total without mining firms 
Metropolitana 75.8% 68.8% 
Antofagasta 10.7% 14.1% 
Valparaíso 5.2% 7.4% 
Biobío 2.1% 3.0% 
Iquique 2.1% 3.0% 
Tarapacá 1.9% 1.3% 
O´Higgins 0.9% 1.0% 
Coquimbo 0.7% 0.7% 
Araucanía 0.2% 0.3% 
Maule 0.2% 0.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Fuente: Atienza, Lufin, Soto, Cortes, et al. (2015), Atienza, Lufin, Soto, and Cortés 
(2015). 
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The historical technological dependency of the country on overseas economies has also 
been a recurrent concern, where the experts interviewed agreed that the Chilean position 
does not seem to have changed much from its earlier technological dependency. As a 
CEO of a mining MNE in charge of the supply chain explained ‘normally all the 
technology comes from abroad, I mean, everything that is machinery and related to the 
operation plants, everything that has to be with the technology for producing copper is 
absolutely imported, here we do not make trucks, we do not make any of that, everything 
comes from abroad’ (INT 21).  
This lack of technologically-intensive industries connected to mining at national and local 
levels has been analysed in two studies. The first, made by Bas and Kunc (2009), 
showed that at a national level, 99.74% of the mining patents assigned by the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1976 and 2006 were granted to 
mining MNEs; and only a trivial 0.26 % to the Chilean firms (Table 7). The second, done 
by Atienza, Lufin, Soto, Cortes, and Falabella (2015) finds that, for the period 2000–
2009, 41.3% of the 1,090 requested patents belonged to Chilean firms, individuals or 
institutions. Interestingly, as Table 8 shows, these patent requests are substantially 
concentrated in the Metropolitan Region. This contrasts with the situation of the 
Antofagasta Region which, despite being the second region in terms of numbers of 
patents, has a much lower share of all patent activity than one might expect given its 
share of mining output. Consequently, firms and individuals with technological capacity 
are not locating in the mining regions (Atienza, Lufin, Soto, Cortes, et al., 2015). 
More recently, the fall in the copper prices caused by the end of the commodity super 
cycle, has been one of the main causes for a substantial halt in investments related to 
the mining industry. As Figure 18 shows, the copper prices have gone through a 
continuous decrease since February of 2011, where they peaked at 4.47 US$/lb; 
dropping to 2.36 US$/lb in October of 2015, almost half of its previous maximum. During 
the same period, the number of new investments in the mining industry declined 57%; 
while the proportion of the paralyzed investments increased from representing less than 
1% of the total investment in 2009, to 63.6% in 2015 (Figure 23). Likewise, the energy 
sector, closely related to mining, suffered a halt in investments equivalent to a third of 
the total paralyzed in 2015, a sum that reaches 97% of the total if the mining sector is 
also considered (Figure 24).  
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Figure 23: Investment projects in the Chilean mining industry in millions of US$. 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from SOFOFA (2014).  
 
Figure 24: Total unrealized investment in September 2015 in millions of US$. 
 
Source: SOFOFA (2015). 
 
 
104
134
167
148
124
61
71
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
n
e
w
 i
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
 o
f 
U
S
$
Active mining investment Paralyzed mining investment
Number of projects
6.1%
17.2%
22%
36%
46%
63.6%
0.03%
Mining,
US$ 59,867
65%
Energy
US$ 29,291
32%
Others 
US$ 2,786
3%
Total: US$ 91,943 millions
(%) 
165 
 
6.3.2 The structure, size and operation of the Chilean State 
 
A second major constraint identified, relates with the size, characteristics and the way in 
which the Chilean State operates. This is a decisive issue, since these factors determine 
the way in which the State can exert its bargaining power. Moreover, the State is the only 
agent sizeable enough to have a strong bargaining position while facing the mining 
MNEs, and the way in which is organized and operates affects the possibilities of 
reaching a strategic coupling (Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). This section develops these 
issues, focusing on the structure, internal organization, relative size, role of CODELCO 
and political issues that may constrain the Chilean State. 
 
6.3.2.1 Structure and organization 
 
The country is organized in fifteen regions, which are subdivided in provinces 
(provincias) and boroughs (comunas). Today, the country has 54 provinces and 346 
boroughs. In terms of its administration and government, the Republic of Chile is a single, 
democratic and presidential State, conformed by several autonomous institutions. The 
executive power resides in the President of the Republic, who is Head of the State and 
of the Government simultaneously. The President names the Ministers of the State, 
which are his/her direct collaborators in governing and administering the State. There 
are twenty two Ministries, each of which has regional Ministerial Secretaries and Sub-
Secretaries (SEREMIS) (Figure 25). 
At a regional scale, each region has its own Regional Government, which depends 
directly on the central one located in Santiago. The main authority is the Intendente, 
which is named by the President and is his/her representative over the regional territory. 
The regional administration belongs to the Regional Governments formed by the 
Intendente and a Regional Council. Additionally, each province is in charge of a 
Governor, which is also appointed by the President. Locally, the administration belongs 
to the Municipalities, which are formed by a Major and the Municipal Council. The local 
Majors and Councilmen are democratically elected, being the only ones that are not 
chosen by the President. 
Regarding the mining industry, the sector depends on the Ministry of Mining. As Figure 
25 shows, the Ministry has one Sub–Secretary located in Santiago and Regional 
Ministerial Secretaries spread all over the country. The Mining Regional Ministerial 
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Secretaries are located in most regions, and they are led by a Regional Ministerial 
Secretary (SEREMI). These organizations help the Intendente of each region to 
coordinate, elaborate and execute the mining policies, plans, budgets and projects that 
the Regional Government considers appropriate.  
The Ministry of Mining is also in charge of three state owned mining firms and two mining 
institutions (Figure 25). Among the former, the Ministry supervises the National Mining 
Firm (ENAMI); the National Oil Firm (ENAP); and the National Corporation of the Chilean 
Copper (CODELCO).The Ministry also oversees two important mining institutions, 
namely the National Service of Geology and Mining (SERNAGEOMIN) which objective 
is to advice the Ministry of Mining and to contribute to develop mining and geological 
policies; and the National Commission of Copper (COCHILCO), a specialized technical 
institution which also advices the Ministry of Mining.  
 
Figure 25: Organization of the Chilean State and the Ministry of Mining.  
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
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6.3.2.2 Centralism and bureaucracy 
 
The Chilean State’s organization has been considered extremely centralized and 
bureaucratic from its outset, creating issues relating to the who and where of decision-
making, influence concentration and a high degree of ‘bureaucratic inertia’ (Pollitt, 2000). 
The President and all the Ministers are located in Santiago, the capital city, holding a 
substantial capacity to make decisions that affect every scale and dimension of the 
Chilean society. Furthermore, the regional, provincial and comunal centrally allocated 
authorities play only a representative role of the central power in the regions, being 
absolutely unable to make any sort of relevant decision. Some democratically elected 
Mayors do their best to improve their local socio–economic conditions but they lack the 
power and means to provide sustainable solutions. All this fractures the local, regional 
and national political arenas, leaving most of the bargaining taking place in Santiago. 
The bureaucracy of the Chilean State has also become a main issue. Most of the 
interviewees considered the Chilean State slow and inefficient, where technocrats and 
bureaucrats have taken an undue relevance in taking decisions that were previously 
considered a matter of political concern (Silva, 1991). This has affected the governance 
of the regions and country, and the functioning of the mining industry. A very experienced 
politician, both as a State employee and as a democratically elected representative, 
explained the process of getting social projects approved:  
‘… you take a lot of time to formulate a project, and to get it approved and technically 
accepted you have to wait at least five years, and when you have it accepted it is already 
obsolete. Hence, the decisions are not being made in a political–strategic way, but we 
[the Chilean State] are so bureaucratized that the bureaucrats are the ones making them, 
technicians that are behind a desk doing a mathematical calculus’ (INT 33). 
The politician also adds that ‘…the decisions are not being made with a political strategy, 
with a long term vision, but they are being made with an investment criterion, if [the 
project] is profitable or not’ (INT33). 
Moreover, the big mining industry, represented through the Mining Council, also shares 
these concerns. In his presentation, the executive president of the Mining Council 
(Villamarino, 2015) points out that a mining project usually requires more than 500 
permissions, which are usually delayed due to the high State bureaucracy. In this sense, 
the public institutions in charge of approving them do not possess enough public servants 
to do the job in a reasonable amount of time. Furthermore, the different public institutions 
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have different criteria for approving projects, which also change continuously through 
time; and is common that several public institutions have to provide different permits for 
issues that are pretty similar (Villamarino, 2015). Lately, there have been some attempts 
by the mining industry to solve these issues, but so far the main opinion is that they still 
persevere and slow down several vital processes for the normal operation of the industry. 
 
6.3.2.3 The relative size of the Chilean State 
 
The relative size of the State has also turned into a constraint, especially after the 
neoliberal policies that slashed its level of public expenditure and total tax income, aimed 
to the withdrawal of the state from economic life (Harvey & Harvey, 2007; Silva, 1991). 
Regarding to the former, OCDE data reports that from 1990 to 2014 Chile spent an 
average of 10% of its GDP on public expenses – one of the lowest expenditures among 
those countries included in the study. During the same period, Chile had an average total 
tax revenue of 19% over its total GDP. This figure put Chile as the second lowest in 
terms of tax revenues collected. Hence, the OCDE data shows the Chilean State’s 
modest presence in the Chilean economy. All this hugely impacts the size and 
capabilities of the State institutions, since funding is crucial for their basic operation. 
Hence, the lack of economic presence has led to develop State institutions with a 
minuscule size and lacking attributions. In the mining industry, the State’s core 
institutions are awfully funded and unable to make important decisions in an autonomous 
way. For example, the SERNAGEOMIN, in charge of supervising the safety of the mines, 
does not have the capacity to fulfil this essential role due to budget constraints and limited 
attributions in case infringements are found. This caused the world famous incident of 
the thirty three Chilean miners, trapped 700 meters underground for sixty nine days in 
2010. When the accident happened, the SERNAGEOMIN only had 18 people 
supervising the safety in the mines in all the country (Rodrigo Alvarez, National Director 
of SERNAGEOMIN in an interview for ADN Hoy, 2015). 
Moreover, the Mining Ministry is the least well-funded of all the strategic Ministries. As 
Figure 26 shows, the planned budget for the Ministry in 2016 only contemplates 46,271 
thousand million pesos. This is less than 10% of what the Ministry of Agriculture may 
receive, a sector that only represents less than 3% of the national production. Even when 
the aggregated planned expenditure in all the ministries related to the mining industry is 
considered; namely, the Ministry or Energy, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of 
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Mining; the amount only reaches half of the planned spend on the agricultural sector. 
Thus, the ministries related to the mining industry are not able to play a relevant role in 
reaching the strategic objectives of the country, or in solving the burning issues that Chile 
is facing in terms of its mining competitiveness.  
According to some local entrepreneurs and representatives, the reason for this lack of 
support to the mining industry is rooted in a traditional anti–mining bias from the centre 
of the country: ‘…sometimes you hear some people with an anti – mining bias, where it 
would be almost desirable for Chile to forget its minerals, to not exploit its minerals’ 
(INT14). In this line, an academic from Antofagasta posits that the central political power 
located in the capital is still ‘in the hands of the landowner aristocracy’ or ‘the wine 
surnames’ (INT 15), historically associated with the agricultural sector. This political elite 
‘[is] still in charge of the country’ (INT 15) and associate mining with the traditional image 
of the miner covered in dust and with a shovel - an image they associate, in turn, with 
poverty and underdevelopment and, thus, try to avoid. Hence, the State is not prioritizing 
a strengthening of its bargaining position vis a vis the mining industry. 
170 
 
Figure 26: Projection of the Chilean State Budget planned for 2016 (Millions of 
Chilean Pesos). 
 
Source: National Budget Direction (Dirección de Presupuestos, 2015). 
 
6.3.2.4 Underutilized role of CODELCO. 
 
Since its creation in the early 1970s, CODELCO has become the most important State 
owned firmed in Chile, and the biggest copper producing firm of the world. From 1971, 
the firm has generated more than US$ 115.4 thousand million (in 2014 prices), 60% of 
which happened between 2004 and 2014 due to the copper super cycle. During this 
period, CODELCO’s exports represented 18% of the total Chilean exports, and it 
contributed to the Treasury with 12% of the incomes of the Central Government 
(CODELCO, 2015; Rodrígues et al., 2015). Thus, the firm has been considered the 
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master girder38 or the nation’s wage39, but also a source of proud and international 
recognition. However, the firm faces several issues regarding the ageing of its operations 
and lack of financial support for capitalizing new projects, hindering its potential as an 
engine of a sustainable mining industry. 
CODELCO’s financial issues are the most serious. Nowadays, CODELCO is still the 
biggest copper producer worldwide, but it has to keep reinvesting in finding new ores 
and expanding the existing project’s lifespan in order to keep the title. Lately, 
CODELCO’s capacity to do these has been troublesome, facing several problems in 
obtaining the capital it needs to keep itself competitive. CODELCO ‘…has to appeal to 
its owners, which is the state, in order to get capitalized, and the state has millions of 
needs, it is not in its mind to capitalize CODELCO’ (INT28). This has brought serious 
capitalization problems to the firm, as one CEO from CODELCO disclosed: 
‘[In 2012 CODELCO] asked for a budget of 4,000 million dollars for 2013… but they [The 
State] gave it 1,000! (…) So this makes it difficult to sustain the levels of production that 
we have today (…) there has to be investment, we have to generate projects (…) what 
is happening is that CODELCO hast to go out to the world banking system to get into 
debt, to ask for loans, but that is never enough for what CODELCO requires, meaning 
that you have to postpone some investments and projects (…) so we start losing the 
competitive position we have in the market’ (INT22).  
These issues, added to the recent fall in the copper prices, have strongly impacted the 
Chilean economy. According to the newspaper La Tercera, what the Treasury received 
from CODELCO in 2015 was 40,3% less than what the State was expecting and 49% 
less compared to what received in 2014 (Agurto, 2015). Hence, there has been a lost 
opportunity in strengthening CODELCO’s position, both as the main contributor State 
revenues, and as an enhancer of national/local competitiveness. This opinion is shared 
by two experts, who explain that ‘it is curious that a country as liberal as Chile does not 
allow its biggest firm to follow the same market rules (…) and there you realize that there 
is no planning, because the State sees CODELCO as an income source, but not as a 
source of competitiveness’ (INT28 – 29). However, CODELCO and BHP Billiton have 
implemented a programme called Worldwide Class Suppliers, which involves the 
                                               
38 As depicted by President Eduardo Frei in his speech after the ‘Chilenization’of the copper industry in 1970. 
39 As depicted by President Salvador Allende in his speech after the nationalization of the copper industry in 
1971. 
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capacitation and support of some selected mining suppliers to make them able to 
compete internationally, but the results have not been very auspicious.  
Thus, there are many critical voices regarding to what has been the role of CODELCO 
compared to what it could potentially achieve. As an academic explained: 
 ‘CODELCO should be an engine of (…) knowledge, it should be an engine promoting 
the local cluster, but it is not, (…) one could think ‘well it is a public firm, and because of 
that it could be used as an incubator of national innovative businesses’ but is it 
happening? No, what is really happening is that CODELCO is behaving similarly to any 
multinational firm’ (INT38). 
When comparing CODELCO’s behaviour to a MNE, the academic is remarking the idea 
that the mining industry has been widely considered as ‘too oriented to the costs and too 
little oriented to the value’ (INT24). This means that, when making decisions about 
suppliers and cooperation agreements, all the mining firms usually focus on prices as 
the decisive variable. Consequently, the firm is missing its opportunity of becoming the 
main breeder of the new ideas for the mining industry, which could improve the 
sustainability of the productive fabric, and strengthen the State position when bargaining 
with MNE. The latter is crucial, since if some mining technology were produced within 
the country, the State would not depend on the MNE´s capacity to bring it, lowering their 
bargaining power. 
 
6.3.2.5 Political issues constraining the Chilean State 
 
The last major hazard to the bargaining power of the Chilean State is associated with 
political issues, some of which are structural, while others have emerged gradually after 
the return to democracy in 1990. The Chilean State has been unable to cope with these, 
since it has kept a strong commitment to the neoliberal principles of ‘not interfering with 
the markets’, since neoliberalism has become an hegemonic discourse where it has 
become incorporated into the way Chileans interpret, live and understand the world 
(Harvey & Harvey, 2007; Lukes, 2005). This commitment has been interpreted as leaving 
market forces work to find the solutions for most of the political and economic troubles, 
considering such issues as ‘problems between privates’ (INT26, p.4; INT30, p.6). Thus, 
the Chilean State plays a ‘subsidiary role’, letting the markets work, and intervening only 
in cases of extreme difficulties (Mayol, 2012). 
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Moreover, the Chilean State is an extremely centralized one, meaning that most of the 
relevant decisions are taken in the Central Region. This leaves local governments and 
institutions powerless and unable to have fair negotiations with the big mining industry, 
or with the central state itself, something that has been noticed even by international 
institutions (OECD, 2009; PNUD, 2015). Furthermore, the fact that the successive 
governments have not been able to share a common development policy has also 
become an important concern, leaving the country aimless in terms of a long term 
development strategy.  
All of these have awakened the long dormant civil society, which has challenged the 
neoliberal model and its consequences, demanding structural changes and long term 
sustainable solutions. This social movement has been transversal, multiscale and 
tenacious, and has been able to change the status quo in the relationship between the 
State and the mining MNEs.  
 
6.3.3 Constraints related to policies 
 
Since its origins, Chile has centralized its economic and political resources in the Central 
Region. The causes for this have been quite diverse, such as the geomorphic 
characteristic of the territory; the early difficulties to establish a sovereign State; the 
annexation of sizable territories caused by wars; the judicial and administrative heritage 
left by the Spanish empire based on the French Centralism; and the historical allocation 
of the economic and political elites in the capital of the country (Boisier, 1992; Tagle, 
2014). All of this has generated a discourse and perception in which the county is divided 
in two symbolic spaces: ‘Santiago’ and ‘the regions’. This opposition is built over an axis 
of political–economic domination, in the ‘centre–periphery’ kind of fashion. In this way, 
Santiago is considered the centre of the economic, politic, administrative and cultural life, 
the source of ‘civilization’. The regions, on the other hand, have been historically 
perceived as the exact opposite. The further the region from the capital, the less 
‘civilized’. All of this has been materialized in the widely spread phrase among the 
Chileans, ‘Santiago is Chile’, which perfectly summarizes this situation (Miguel, 2010).  
This centralism is not only spatial, but also institutional. As mentioned before, Chile has 
historically had an administrate concentration in the hands of the President of the 
Republic who delegates to his/her Ministers, Intendents and other representatives, in 
what has been considered a ‘presidential Caesarism’ (Boisier, 1992). This extreme 
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centralization has led to a dissociation between the regional representatives of the 
Central Government (Intendente, Governor, SEREMIS), and the democratically elected 
ones. The latter see their capacity to represent their voters seriously reduced, since, as 
a well-experienced politician explained, ‘the big decisions, the strategic ones, they are 
not been taken here [in the Regions], they are been made in the Central Government’ 
(INT33). Even though they could have local support from their communities, the locally 
elected representatives simply do not have the capacity to bargain with the big mining 
industry. In the words of a representative from one mining city:  
‘even though we have the local power, we lack the tools and resources, I mean, we are 
here barely doing our job, we govern our communes with [the resources that] we have 
(…) which are very poor (…) the State looks to the other side; we have a governor and 
intendente, but they are like the Colony, like the governors from that period who were 
there to represent [the Spanish Crown], but nothing else, so they do not have any real 
power. So, we [the municipality] have to take care of everything without any resources 
or tools’ (INT34). 
Nowadays, this centralization seems to obey the need of the central government to 
control every aspect of the socio–political and economic life in the country. For the mining 
regions and cities in particular, there is a consensus that the Central State, specifically 
the Treasury, is not willing to allow local bargains and agreements between the regional 
elected representatives and the big mining industry. The reason lies on the crucial 
relevance of the mining industry, and the need of the central government to concentrate 
all the benefits from the industry in the capital, so it can decide how and where relocate 
them. Consequently, the local and regional institutions are left in a defenceless position. 
As summarised by a mining expert: ‘the local [and regional] governments do not weigh 
a shit’ (INT13). Unable to exert any considerable economic, political or cultural influence, 
the regions seem doomed to accept the mining MNE’s will. However, a strong ‘regionalist 
movement’ has risen, comprising politicians, civil society and other actors, which has 
continuously grown in strength. 
Additionally, the Chilean State shows a stark discontinuity in its economic policies, 
caused by the successive governments from different coalitions and the absence of a 
long term development strategy. Chile has two main political coalitions: the Alianza por 
Chile, comprising right wing parties traditionally associated with the wealthier and 
supportive to the dictatorship part of society; and the Nueva Mayoría (formerly known as 
the Concertación), formed by the self–declared ‘centre and left wing’ parties. Despite the 
artificial difference between coalitions, both of them have deepened the neoliberal model 
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and share similar economic ideologies in their praxis. Moreover, after every presidential 
election, the winning coalition reset the socio–economic policies and programmes 
applied by the previous government, making impossible to plan and carry out long term 
policies. As a former person in charge of mining industrial policies explained:  
‘sadly, here [in Chile] we make policies according to who is in power so, (…) if there is a 
change in the [the coalition] governing, everything that was made is deleted, it is erased 
quickly, and new programmes are created, new projects, so unfortunately there is no 
continuity … and sometimes you start lifting powerful, big things, but sadly you are 
stopped half way through’ (INT20). 
This discontinuity is associated to a far–reaching issue, which is the total absence of a 
national or local development strategy. Until the 1970s, the Chilean State had an 
extremely active role in implementing its development policies, aimed to the 
improvement of the extractive sectors as well as the industrial ones. Moreover, the 
neoliberal structural reforms of the 1970s and 1980s completely modified such approach. 
In these reforms, the aim was to take the State out of the economy. 
After the return to the democracy and until the mid-2000s, there was a continuous 
national discussion about the development model that Chile should follow, and the role 
the State should play in making it happen. Several were considered, such as the 
‘European welfare States’, the ‘development based on mining clusters’ and the 
‘American’ models. However, this discussion has completely disappeared from the 
current politic agenda. Some attempts to build a local and national development strategy 
were outlined, such as the ‘Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo’ (Regional Development 
Strategy) for the Antofagasta Region in 2000 (Gobierno de Chile, 2000), and the ‘Mining 
Cluster Policy’, and a ‘National Competitiveness Strategy’ in 2007, proposing building 
several clusters based on the extractive industries and services, but all of them have 
been abandoned by the State or erratically revived and forgotten in the same way Pollitt 
(2000) proposed . There has been a recent attempt in 2014 to create a development 
strategy for the mining industry, but it has not been implemented yet and shows important 
shortcomings like ignoring the sub–national dimensions and the power asymmetries 
within the industry (Comisión de Minería y Desarrollo de Chile, 2014). 
This lack of continuity in development policies and absence of development strategies is 
considered a decisive weaknesses of the Chilean State, leading to a situation in which 
the country ‘(…) [only] make[s] the policies according to who is in power’ (INT 20). This 
lack of a long term vision of what the country wants to become, has created a widely 
spread perception that the Chilean State ‘improvises’ in each scale, since there is no 
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shared and internalised ultimate objective for the country and its regions. Moreover, 
efforts to build a development strategy are continuously erased or reset after a new 
coalition gets the presidency. An example of this is the mining cluster policy, which has 
been proposed and resurrected several times, but ‘[as soon as] a new government 
arrived, there was a change, we started from scratch, [the new government] revised all 
the policies and said ‘no, [the development strategy] is not related with the cluster, is 
related with other things’’ (INT31).  
Hence, this lack of a development strategy weakens the bargaining position of the State 
in every level in relation to the mining MNEs; something that contrasts with the pre–
dictatorship State in which ‘it had a long term vision where the things were not in terms 
of this or the next government but in terms of how are we [the Chileans] are going to 
keep moving forward by having a short, medium and long term planning’ (INT26). This 
situation also makes it impossible for the state to define its strategic objectives and try to 
achieve a strategic coupling with the mining MNEs. Furthermore, the absence of a 
development strategy worries the mining MNEs too, leading some of them to propose 
development strategies and policies for the region and country such as the ‘World Class 
Suppliers Programme’ and the ‘CREO Antofagasta’, in which they ‘invite’ the State to 
contribute.  
Finally, there is the issue of the emergence of civil society organisations during the last 
decade. Even though the civic unrest and mobilization greatly helped to destabilize the 
dictatorial government which led to the return to democracy, this movement lost most of 
its verve due to the promises of a fairer and less violent country. During the 1990’s and 
early 2000’s, while the country opened its economic frontiers and deepened the 
privatization of the State, Chile gave the appearance of growth and progress, with little 
social unrest. However, the structural contradictions of the Chilean neoliberal model led 
to an increasing sense of dispossession and betray. In 2005 and 2006 this growing 
unrest was spearheaded by the university and secondary students, the beginning of what 
became a transversal social movement that questioned the roots of the neoliberal model. 
This movement reached its peak in 2011, where it was supported by civil movements 
representing every aspect of the Chilean society, such as unions, elderly people, 
environmentalists, indigenous associations and many others.  
This outrage known worldwide as the Chilean Student Revolution managed to set a 
transcendental critique focused on the deepening of the neoliberalism which created 
abysmal inequalities, despite the apparent economic growth – a characteristic that 
shared with the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movements – all under the banner of ‘No 
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al Lucro’ (No to the profit logic). Even though that banner could sound confusing for 
people not familiar with recent Chilean history, it represents the resentment felt that every 
aspect of society should be ruled by market forces. The market in Chile had proven to 
be largely imperfect, as shown by the several scandals related to oligopolistic and 
monopolistic behaviour from the big firms, further increasing the social unrest (Mayol, 
2012; Mayol & Ahumada, 2015). 
Hence, this new empowered civil society managed to put several issues that were 
previously ignored in the political arena, such as environmental and indigenous 
concerns. The former has led to an increasing pressure from the civil society that has 
stopped massive mining and electric projects and investments such as the thermoelectric 
Castilla and the mining projects Andina and Pascualama.This pressure has also taken 
form of new and stricter regulation of several previously unregulated spaces, allowing 
the formerly powerless civil society to use legal mechanism for defending their interests. 
The new regulation has enabled civil society ‘recourse to justice, which stops [the 
projects] and obliges them [the firms] to do more studies (…) something that five, six, ten 
years ago was not like that, it did not happen, but today it does. [The firms] have to be 
more careful because [the legal environment] is a little bit more restrictive, more 
demanding for them’ (INT 28-29). 
Furthermore, there is an increasing tension related to the signature of the 169 
Convention from the International Labour Organization by the Chilean State. This 
convention is a legally binding international instrument, which deals specifically with the 
rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, and based over the pillars of non–discrimination, 
consultation and participation. In this sense, the Convention requires that indigenous and 
tribal peoples are consulted on issues that affect them, engaging in a free, prior and 
informed participation in policy and development processes that affect them (ICMM, 
2016).  
These requirements have caused several legal battles between the mining firms and 
indigenous population, and have increasingly become a tool used by the civil society to 
achieve their objectives. Furthermore, this trend has also brought a new breed of 
‘specialized lawyers, groups of lawyers dedicated to environmental issues, as well as to 
[deal with] the relationship [between the communities and] the firms’ (INT 28-29). Such 
process has considerably raised the number ‘litigations’, between civil society and firms, 
something that has created a new and more stressful situation for the mining companies 
as well more empowered communities.  
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Conversely, the mining MNEs complain that starting new projects is ‘not as easy as 
before (…) because before to start they have to carry expensive studies, which are also 
time consuming, while also facing more norms, laws and restrictions’ (INT 28-29). Most 
of the CEOS from mining MNEs and firms interviewed mentioned this as a considerable 
weakness for the Chilean country, while also stating they do their best to avoid litigation 
due to all the problems involved with it, such as bad press and the delaying or stopping 
of projects. Their strategy is to apply CSR policies and negotiate directly with the affected 
communities, since they are always ‘open to dialogue’ (INT37). When this is not enough, 
they hire the best law firms and use their political links, since they have access to ‘the 
whole police apparatus of the Chilean State’ (INT26), to tip the balance in their favour. 
  
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter started focusing on the strategic resources currently held by Chile and that 
can contribute to its bargaining position when negotiating with the mining MNEs. Among 
these, there are: the quantity and quality of copper deposits found in the country; its legal 
and taxation regimes favourable to FDI; its political and economic stability; the high 
prices of copper due to the commodity super cycle; and the international perception of 
Chile as a land of opportunities for FDI. As expected, most of them are related with what 
the traditional bargaining models propose as strategic resources for the host countries, 
such as: access to the domestic markets, control over natural resources, availability of 
appropriate labour, suitable infrastructure and political climate and government 
incentives (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). Since some of the 
strategic resources held by the Chilean State are only found there in the quantities and 
quality that are attractive for the mining MNEs, they really differentiate the country over 
its peers and competitors, meaning that they can provide great potential power. Hence, 
the Chilean State holds enough resources to bargain the conditions for reaching 
sustainable development regionally and nationally.  
However, these strategic resources hold by the Chilean State are offset by the 
considerable constraints it faces, which restrain its exertion of its bargaining power. The 
national State faces several internal issues that are affecting the country’s 
competitiveness such as the decreasing in the copper grades and the scarcity of water, 
energy and human capital, all of which have risen the costs of production. This, together 
with the recent fall in the copper prices, have put the mining firms in a challenging position 
regarding to their access to such crucial resources and their costs projections.  
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Moreover, the extremely centralised structure of the Chilean State; the national and 
regional relative size compared to the mining MNEs; and the way it operates, heavily 
restrain the capacity of regional governments. This centralised national government 
leaves little to no space for regional governments to bargain with the mining MNEs, being 
unable to draw the best out of the mining industry. Plus, the relative size compared to 
the mining MNEs can be considered quite modest and continuously shrinking, mostly to 
the continuous privatizations and neoliberal policies imposed and still deepened. This 
means that most of the times the Chilean institutions (national and regional) are 
underfunded and understaffed. Consequently, they do not have the capacity to fulfil their 
functions, which truly hinders the State’s bargaining capacity at every scale.  
There are several political issues that have changed the political stability of the Chilean 
country. The extremely high level of political and economic centralization not only 
impedes fast and participative decision making in the regions, but it also concentrates 
the economic and political resources in the capital city of Santiago. Additionally, and 
more worryingly, the Chilean State completely lacks a medium/long term development 
strategy in all its levels, mostly caused by the fast retreat of the State from the economic 
arena, the mono–dependency on the copper industry and the continuous reboot of 
policies when new governments reach power.  
Lastly, the recent political outburst witnessed by the Chilean society has led to a situation 
of political upheaval, where civil society has managed to press the State for a bigger and 
stronger participation in the socio–economic issues. These movements have criticized 
and questioned the roots of the neoliberal model, while also putting concerns on the 
political agenda that were previously neglected such as environmental, indigenous and 
distributive issues. This has led to more regulation of the mining industry and the 
empowerment of social movements, something seen by mining MNEs as a threat to 
political stability.  
The next chapter makes a similar analysis of the strategic resources and constraints that 
MNE have. All of this to finally understand how the State and firms use these resources 
and face their constraints when bargaining with each other. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MINING MNES: THEIR STRATEGIC POWER RESOURCES AND CONSTRAINTS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter continues the analysis of the sources of power and the constraint of the 
second actor studied in this work, the mining MNEs. However, before doing that, it firstly 
depicts how the Chilean copper mining industry is organized and structured, which will 
facilitate the later analysis of the mining MNE’s strategic resources. The chapter then 
proceeds to establish which strategic assets are held by the mining MNEs, how they 
differ from the ones found in the traditional bargaining literature, and how they can be 
used as power resources in bargains struck with the other agents of the Chilean mining 
GPN. Such resources have been divided into two groups: strategic resources internal to 
the firm; and the resources that are related to the connections and linkages of the firms 
with the other actors. Subsequently, the constraints faced by mining MNEs are shown, 
which can be grouped in two broad categories: the lack of mobility of mining MNEs and 
the recent relevance of public image in order to get the social licence to operate. 
Interestingly, these constraints differ from the previously established in the bargaining 
literature, due to the specific characteristics of the Chilean mining GPN, which opens 
new empirical and theoretical challenges for the mining MNEs in reaching their strategic 
objectives. 
 
7.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MINING MNES IN THE CHILEAN GPN 
 
The Chilean mining sector is comprised by several copper producer firms, led by the 
State owned CODELCO, the main copper producer of the world. Nowadays, CODELCO 
is divided in six mining divisions40, located all over the country (see Table 9) and has 
shares in firms related with mining exploration in Chile and overseas. The rest of the 
main copper producers in Chile belong to private capitals, which are subsidiaries of the 
most important mining MNEs worldwide. At a national level, the main copper producer 
mines are Minera Escondida, Minera Los Pelambres S.A. and Anglo American Sur, 
owned by BHP Billiton, Antofagasta PLC (a Chilean MNE) and Anglo American 
                                               
40 In the mining jargon, divisions, mines and projects mean the same, and will be used indistinctively in this 
work. 
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respectively; all of which are crucial copper producers in the world copper scenario (see 
table 9).  
Moreover, the most important private firms in the Chilean big mining industry are grouped 
in the GMP1041: the ten largest private copper companies that had subscribed to the DL. 
600 in 2001, where they accounted for 90% of private sector mining production and the 
bulk of mining taxation from this sector, a position that still holds today (COCHILCO, 
2013). The mines comprising the GMP10 are Escondida, Collahuasi, Los Pelambres, 
Anglo American Norte, Anglo American Sur, Candelaria, El Abra, Zaldivar, Cerro 
Colorado, and Quebrada Blanca. Their ownership structure is quite diversified, with the 
participation of the main mining MNEs like: BHP Billiton, Freeport McMoran, Barrick 
Gold, Teck, Rio Tinto, Glencore Xstrata, Anglo American, Suitomo Metal Mining, 
Mitsubishi Materials and Antofagasta PLC (See table 9). The latter is the only Chilean 
mining MNE of the group, and it has become a main player despite its relatively short 
life. All these companies trade their copper production at the London Metal Exchange, 
the world centre for the trading of industrial metals, and share similar internal, external 
and contextual strategic resources. 
                                               
41 GMP10 comes from Gran Mineria Privada – 10 (Great Private Mining – 10). 
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Table 12: Property Structure of the Main Mining Copper firms in Chile, their location and production for 2012. 
By Firm Owners Region of production Production in kMT year 2012 
Codelco Chile Chilean State   1646.5 
Division Radomiro Tomic Chilean State Antofagasta  427.8 
Division el Teniente Chilean State O'Higgins  417.2 
Division Chuquicamata Chilean State Antofagasta  355.9 
Division Andina Chilean State Valparaiso  249.9 
Division Gaby Chilean State Antofagasta 133 
Division Salvador Chilean State Atacama 62.7 
Other Producers     3425.3 
Minera Escondida Ltda. BHP Billiton (57,5%); Rio Tinto (30%); JECO Corp (10%); JECO 2 Ltd. (2,5%). Antofagasta 1075.9 
Minera Los Pelambres S.A. Antofagasta PLC (60%); Nippon LP Resources (25%); MM LP (15%). Coquimbo 417.7 
Anglo American Sur S.A. Anglo American (50,1%); JV Codelco-Mitsui (29,5%); Mitsubishi Corp. (20,4%). Valparaiso 416.6 
S.C.M. Doña Inés de Collahuasi Xstrata Copper (44%); Anglo American (44%); JCR (12%). Tarapaca 282.1 
Minera Esperanza Antofagasta PLC (70%); Marubeni Corp. (30%). Antofagasta 173.2 
Cía. Minera Spence BHP Billiton (100%). Antofagasta 166.7 
S.C.M. El Abra Freeport McMoRan (51%); Codelco Chile (49%). Antofagasta 153.7 
Cía. Minera Zaldívar Barrick Gold (100%). Antofagasta 131.1 
S.C.M. Candelaria Freeport McMoRan (80%); Sumitomo (20%). Atacama 122.8 
Minera El Tesoro Antofagasta PLC (70%); Marubeni Corp. (30%). Antofagasta 105 
Carmen de Andacollo Teck (90%); Enami (10%). Coquimbo 79.8 
Cía. Minera Xstrata Lomas Bayas Ltda. Xstrata Copper (100%). Antofagasta 73.3 
Cía. Minera Cerro Colorado BHP Billiton (100%). Tarapaca 73.1 
Quebrada Blanca Teck (76,5%); Grupo Hurtado Vicuña (13,5%); Enami (10%). Tarapaca 62.4 
Empresa Minera Mantos Blancos S.A. Anglo American (100%). Antofagasta 54.2 
Minera Michilla S.A. Antofagasta PLC (74,18%); Inversiones Costa Verde (15,3%) Otros (10,52%). Antofagasta 37.7 
Source: Own elaboration using data from COCHILCO and Consejo Minero.
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7.3 THE STRATEGIC RESOURCES OF THE MINING MNES 
 
7.3.1 Strategic resources internal to mining MNES 
 
Traditionally the most relevant strategic resources for the mining MNEs’ bargaining 
capabilities have been related to their internal structure and assets. According to the 
interviewees, such resources can be grouped in the internal structure and organization 
of the firms; and the quantity, quality and scope of the strategic assets hold by them, 
something already noticed by the bargaining literature (Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). In 
terms of structure, the mining MNEs have adopted a global presence as the selected 
way to organize themselves, in order to get the most of their productive processes 
(Dicken, 2011). This international and multi–level organization, has allowed them to 
benefit from a higher adaptability to market changes, and the chance of influencing all 
the main nodes where pivotal decisions are made. Furthermore, their internal strategic 
resources allow them to access to several critical supplies in quantities, and under 
conditions that are usually not available for developing local and national States.  
 
7.3.1.1 Internal structure and organization 
 
The mining MNEs present a geographically scattered structure, being able to influence 
several levels of the copper mining GPN, sometimes even simultaneously, in the same 
way Bridge (2008) depicted for oil. As Figure 27 depicts, the mining MNEs are organized 
in a main headquarter, a regional division or mineral group, and their subsidiaries. The 
main headquarter is located in the central decisional node or home country and is in 
charge of the most relevant and sensitive decisions, having the broader international 
scope of influence. The regional division or mineral group has the second biggest sphere 
of influence, and is responsible of all the subsidiaries of a broad region, such as a 
continent or group of countries; or producing a certain mineral, like the copper group, 
iron group, etc. Finally, the subsidiaries are located in the host countries and regions, 
and they produce and export minerals. The subsidiaries are divided in a national 
headquarter, located in the capital city of the host country and in charge of the total 
national production and investments; and the divisions, mines or projects, located next 
to the ores where the minerals are exploited and exported.  
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In the Chilean case, the mining MNEs located their headquarters in their home countries, 
such as England, Australia and Canada. All of them have representatives in London, the 
most important node in this industry, since it is where almost 80% of all the non–ferrous 
metal futures businesses are transacted42. Moreover, Santiago hosts several copper 
divisions’ headquarters from decisive players, such as BHP and Anglo American, which 
control all their subsidiaries producing copper worldwide from the Chilean capital. 
Likewise, Santiago is also where all the copper mining MNEs have their national 
headquarters, due to its political relevance both nationally and internationally. Finally, the 
copper mines are located mostly in the Antofagasta region, where the ores are located 
and exploited.  
This division of functions in the different levels of the mining MNEs is strongly related 
with the degree of autonomy each subunit has. Said autonomy decreases the closer the 
subunit is to the production site, a fact that is unlikely to be challenged (Phelps & Fuller, 
2000). Likewise, the internal structure of the copper mining MNEs is centralized in main 
nodes and higher levels of direction, especially in relation to investments or long term 
decisions. Regarding to this, the CEOs of the mining MNEs interviewed agreed that 
every decision requires a different type of approval, related to its complexity, criticality, 
risk, amounts involved and scope.  
Thus, ‘[the local subsidiaries] have autonomy to make decisions until a certain amount 
of investment (…) and when they overcome a certain limit, they need more sophisticated 
levels of approval’ (INT 39). This also applies to the multiple negotiations and bargains. 
The more important they are for the industry and mining MNEs, the higher the level of 
approval needed. Hence, in the Chilean mining GPN, the most sensitive decisions and 
negotiations take place in nodes like London, or the MNE’s home countries, whereas for 
the Chilean mining production, ‘the negotiations (…) take place in Santiago’ (INT 33), as 
a politician explained.  
Hence, this multi–scalar influence is summarized in the words of the representative of a 
London based international NGO related to mining: ‘[mining MNEs] have offices here in 
London, they have offices in several parts of the world and they operate in different 
environments. That impacts over the power asymmetries, since they have access to all 
the levels, from the local government to the national government, the regional 
government and the British government’ (INT 2). This is a crucial advantage over the 
                                               
42 These transactions take place in the London Metal Exchange (LME). 
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other agents of the GPN, such as the state and civil society, since their international 
scope is far more limited.  
 
Figure 27: Organization and scope of a typical big copper mining firm in the 
Chilean mining GPN. 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
 
Another strategic resource is the mining MNE’s flexibility and adaptability to the market 
changes, especially in comparison to the State owned CODELCO. Mining MNEs usually 
have a more horizontal structure, with a more flexible labour force; fewer levels of control 
and bureaucracy; and a detailed planning based on cost saving; allowing them to quickly 
change and adapt to the dynamism of the globalised copper industry. As a CEO from a 
mining MNE explained ‘[our firm] is not a firm that has an inertia that means that in order 
to turn a little it has to pass through twenty thousand bureaucracies. The decision making 
process [in our firm] is fast, we act quickly when facing shifts in the market’ (INT 27).  
This dynamism relates to the horizontal structure and characteristics of the MNE’s labour 
force. Mining MNEs usually have less workers than State owned firms, and their workers 
are hired to make different jobs in order to quickly adapt to the needs of the firm. In the 
words of a mining MNE’s CEO who worked in private firms and CODELCO ‘in the 
American firm where I worked, there were five secretaries for (…) all the CEOs of the 
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company (…) Here [at his current job], which is a Vice – presidency, we have only one 
secretary. In CODELCO there was one for every floor, which decreased its productivity’ 
(INT 10). Additionally, a mining expert explained that mining MNEs hire workers, not 
specialists. By this he means that ‘[in the mining MNEs] today you will work here, 
tomorrow (…) you could work somewhere else. So that is the big difference [with 
CODELCO], they are modern firms that can be handled with few people’ (INT 13). 
Likewise, the outsourcing of the labour force has also helped making the firms more 
flexible by effectively diminished the union’s participation and coordination among 
workers.  
Furthermore, the adaptability of the mining MNEs is also improved by their detailed 
planning of their activities, based on a continuous improvement strategy to lower their 
production costs. Since ‘[in the mining industry] there is no thorough knowledge of the 
long and medium terms’ (INT 10), most of the mining MNEs plan only for a brief period, 
usually four months. This responds to their need of adjusting themselves not only to the 
typical fluctuations related to the production of copper, but also the fluctuations of 
financial exchange markets. According to several CEOs of mining MNEs, the firms are 
always looking to adapt as quickly as possible to these shifts, so when they face a 
problem they ‘do not complicate themselves (…) they just want to solve the issue, (…) 
[they focus in] the solution and then quickly keep moving forward’ (INT 10). 
Moreover, since the copper prices are decided in the financial markets, the mining MNEs 
are continuously trying to increase their productivity as a way to boost their profits. 
Hence, they focus on cost savings, incorporating new technologies, and constantly 
upgrading their internal processes. Likewise, the multi–scalar scope of the mining MNEs 
allows them to harvest several other strategic resources, such as access to international 
capital, information, markets, technology and labour force. These assets are vital for the 
bargaining process within the GPN as noticed by the bargaining literature, and have 
historically provided the mining MNEs of advantages that are difficult to reproduce by the 
other actors involved.  
 
7.3.1.2 Strategic assets 
 
Traditionally, the bargaining literature has listed several bargaining power resources hold 
by the mining MNEs as detailed in Chapter 3 (Moran, 1974; Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 
1971). Among these, access to financial and physical capital by the mining MNEs have 
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been decisive when bargaining with host countries and regions, since their enormous 
reserves and access to these assets allow them to undertake the massive investments 
required to start a mining project (Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). Furthermore, it is still 
argued that the host State and regions do not usually have enough access to financial 
or physical capital to start their own mining endeavour. Hence, they have lured FDI 
through several incentives, creating a ruthless competition among resource rich States 
in order to get fresh FDI.  
Today, the financial capital held by the mining MNEs operating in Chile is still a major 
strategic resource. These firms are relevant global players, being listed in the most 
important world rankings, such as the FTSE 100 and Forbes. Regarding the FTSE100, 
five mining MNEs located in Chile are listed by the London Metal Exchange (2016): Anglo 
American, Antofagasta PLC, BHP Billiton, Glencore and Rio Tinto. Likewise, several of 
them are also ranked in the top 200 Forbes World’s biggest Public Companies of 2015, 
such as BHP Billiton in the 50th position; Rio Tinto in the 105th; and Glencore holding the 
110th (FORBES, 2015). All this illustrates the great profitability of the industry and the 
considerable amount of capital that the firms have available. 
The FDI flow has been considerable since the 90’s43, but it has increased markedly since 
the beginning of the copper super cycle in 2003. As Figure 28 illustrates, the mining 
MNEs’ presence over the total investments made in the big copper mining industry has 
grown extremely rapidly in just one decade. Likewise, the investment made by the mining 
MNE went from 816 million US$ in 2003 to 9,372 million US$ in 2013. During the same 
period, the private copper investment grew extremely fast, 31% on average, reaching 
the enormous growth rate of 79% and 77% in 2009 and 2012 respectively (Figure 28). 
This FDI expansion happened despite difficulties faced by the industry at the time, such 
as the economic crisis of 2008 and the end of the commodities super cycle.  
More interestingly, MNEs’ investment went from being directly proportional to what 
CODELCO was spending in 2003, to double in 2013, while also keeping a more stable 
growth rate in their investments (Figure 28). Likewise, the mining MNEs’ continuous 
investment have also increased their production capabilities, allowing the private mine 
Escondida – owned by BHP Billiton – to produce almost three times what Chuquicamata 
– owned by CODELCO – was producing in 2012 (Table 9). Thus, CODELCO has been 
overtaken both as the main mining investor in Chile and as owning the main copper mine. 
                                               
43 According to Bridge (2004b), Chile accumulated 17.6% of the total mining investment worldwide between 
1990 and 2001. 
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The increasing FDI entering the country could be explained by the extremely high utilities 
present during the copper super cycle (Figure 29). Between 2002, just before the super 
cycle and 2010, just before the end of it, the utilities before taxes for the GMP10 firms 
increased over twenty six times. This created the impression of the copper industry as a 
‘cash cow’ whose benefits ‘should be milked as soon as possible’. The president of a 
regional workers’ union explained that ‘the rate of which [the mining MNEs] earn their 
utilities is so high that (…) today [the investment that a mining MNE] pretended to recover 
in ten or twenty years [is being recovered] in less than half that time’ (INT 36). Mining 
investments are usually planned to create returns over ten to twenty years. Recovering 
the total investment in half that time implies exceedingly high profitability. 
Moreover, even though all of the GMP10 firms obtained ‘gigantic rents’ (INT 12) during 
this period, some of them reaped even bigger benefits. The most astonishing case was 
Escondida, whose utilities before taxes went from 776 million US$ in 1999 to 5,635 
million US$ in 2010. Such extraordinary profitability caused a feeling of endless bonanza, 
leading the mining MNEs to keep developing new or upgrading old projects in the 
country.  
 
Figure 28: Total Investment of the big copper mining firms in Chile and growth rate 
of such investments (Millions of US$). 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from Consejo Minero (2014b). 
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Figure 29: Utilities of the GMP - 10 before taxes (Millions of US$). 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from CIPER (2015). 
 
Another traditionally recognized strategic resource for the mining MNEs is their access 
to external markets and information (Moran, 1974). This is granted by their global 
presence, allowing them to gather relevant information about markets and trends. 
However, in countries like Chile where there is a strong State owned mining firm 
(CODELCO), this access is not monopolised by the mining MNEs, since CODELCO 
trades its copper production worldwide in the same industrial metal exchange centres. 
There, all the copper firms trade their production, while also gathering and sharing 
strategic information about the industry’s trends and projections. 
More recently there has been a steady increase of mining MNEs’ participation in the total 
national copper exportation and, by extension, the world’s markets, going from 58% in 
1995 to 73% in 2014 (Figure 30). Hence, the mining MNEs’ massive size and increasing 
relevance in the national and international copper production allow them to gather 
information from more markets and customers than CODELCO. Furthermore, the mining 
MNEs usually also produce other minerals, hence, they belong to several mining GPNs 
simultaneously; meaning they have a broader knowledge of the mining industry in 
general, in terms of markets, trends, challenged and projections.  
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Figure 30: Participation in the total copper export by exporter (1994 - 2014). 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from COCHILCO (2014). 
 
A final internal strategic resource is the mining MNEs’ access to new technologies 
(Moran, 1974). The competitive issues within the Chilean mining industry, such as the 
lowering the ore grades and the insufficient energy and water supplies, have led the 
copper mining firms to push for new technologies in order to make the lower grade ores 
profitable. An example is found in Escondida, which ‘has managed to build the first 
desalination plant in Chile and has currently approved a project (…) to supply water to 
all the future projects related to Minera Escondida. Thus, it has marked the tendency 
respect to what the copper industry is doing’ (INT32).  
However, in the Chilean copper mining GPN, technology is not developed by national 
firms, but it ‘usually comes from outside (…) everything that is related to the copper 
production is technology absolutely imported’ (INT 12). This has created an extremely 
high dependence on MNEs producing or importing these technologies. Thus, the Chilean 
productive fabric is currently unable to create relevant technological advances in a 
constant way, and it mostly focuses in adapting imported technology.  
Nonetheless, this technological gap between the overseas and Chile’s productive is 
being dealt with by the mining MNEs. The foundation in 2010 of a programme for creating 
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‘World Class Suppliers’ aimed to produce tailored technological solutions for the firms’ 
specific problems in Chile, is a strong attempt to level the field promoting the apparition 
of firms that could become local technological suppliers. Still, the results of the 
programme are far from expected (Valdes, 2016) and the copper industry keeps 
importing technology, deepening the technological dependency of the country. 
 
7.3.2 Strategic resources related to the firm’s networks 
 
Mining MNEs are also rich in their connections with several key actors in the copper 
mining GPN. The nature of some of these relations is close, where both parties benefit; 
whereas others are established over more vertical ties, based on the others need of the 
mining MNEs as a consumer, employer or benefactor. These linkages and relations have 
been nurtured through several years and they constitute an extremely handy resource 
when influencing actors in the GPN. In this line, the bargaining literature has traditionally 
considered the international, national and local political and entrepreneurial class; their 
working force; their suppliers and the civil society of the host country and region as the 
most relevant ties between the mining MNEs and international institutions (Fagre & 
Wells, 1982; Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). 
Furthermore, these relations can spread over different decisional nodes and are usually 
complex, deep and hard to follow. They can be seen as extremely sensitive, especially 
regarding to the links between MNEs and the political class; or highly polemical, like the 
relations between the firms and the labour force or civil society. Moreover, some 
additions to the bargaining literature are added by considering new forms of network 
resources, like the mining associations, CSR policies and the firm’s image as creator of 
employment. 
  
7.3.2.1 Linkages with the political elites  
 
As depicted in Chapter 5, copper mining MNEs operating in Chile have always shared a 
strong bond with the local political and entrepreneurial elites (Salazar & Pinto, 2002). 
Such relations play a key role in the decision-making processes taking place at every 
node, by setting a more favourable ideological, legislative and cultural environment 
towards FDI and the development of the private mining industry (Moran, 1974). As a 
representative from a mining related NGO explained: 
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‘In Chile, the political and multinational sectors are very close, they usually move in the 
same circles (…) and this is another mechanism they [the mining MNEs] use for making 
political pressure, because most of the times those elites share a common interest, they 
have a similar vision of development, of neoliberalism’ [INT2]. 
The scope and depth of these ties are extremely difficult to map. Yet, is possible to 
examine how mining MNEs interact with the political and entrepreneurial classes in 
different locations by looking at: first, how they relate and use international institutions 
and their home countries’ governments; second, how they group themselves in 
international, national and local associations; and third, how they directly or indirectly 
influence the political class through lobby firms.  
In terms of the relationships between the mining MNEs and international institutions, the 
recent developments in the bargaining literature (Doh & Ramamurti, 2003; Nebus & 
Rufin, 2010; Ramamurti, 2001) consider the international institutions and bilateral 
investment treaties as pivotal players in the tier 1 of the bargaining, meaning the macro 
or supra – national level in the two tier model. Thus, international institutions, such as 
the World Bank and IMF, have ‘determined the agenda of developing countries’ (INT38) 
by giving the resource rich countries loans in times of crisis, with the condition of applying 
strict structural adjustment plans to liberalise their economies, creating a vicious cycle of 
dependency and a loss of national sovereignty in most cases. 
However, as an academic expert on mining explained, 
‘This period [where the international institutions were extremely influential] has finished. 
The famous crisis of the Washington consensus happened and brought several critiques 
to these plans (…) Today these international agencies have fallen into some disrepute, 
nobody believes in them too much, so even though they still have certain influence, it is 
a lot less than in the past’ (INT38). 
Recently, some resource-rich developing countries, like Chile, passed from being 
debtors to being lenders (as seen in Chapter 6), meaning that Chile has ‘graduated from 
the dependency of the IMF and other multilateral organisms’ (INT5), since ‘the country 
does not need their resources’ (INT12). These opinions summarize something 
unexpected according to the two tier bargaining literature: international institutions and 
multilateral organisms do not have the same influence they had in other periods. 
However, ‘the situation is different for countries that do need rescue or financial aid (…) 
in such countries, the discussion about this issue must be really different’ (INT12).  
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Furthermore, mining MNEs still rely on their influence over their home countries as a 
strategic resource (Moran, 1974; Phelps & Fuller, 2000). As a representative of an 
international mining related NGO explained, ‘The British based companies can rely on 
UK government diplomatic power (…) so, the UK government will exert its authority other 
national governments in order to get those national governments to adopt policies that 
are friendly towards British multinationals’ (INT42). In this interview, he provided several 
examples about the British government actively interfering to persuade the local 
government ‘to allow mines to go ahead’ (INT42). In Chile there is a consensus about 
mining MNEs establishing their links with strategic political actors at the main decisional 
nodes of the Chilean copper mining GPN by supporting political campaigns, grouping 
themselves in trade associations and using lobby. 
Regarding to the support of political campaigns, the Chilean law 19.885 allows firms to 
donate money with political objectives to politicians running for office, while also 
preventing disclosure of the exact amount. However, it is highly likely that politicians 
know who is contributing to their causes, since nothing stops the firms letting them know 
if they want to. Moreover, firms donating under this law can receive a reduction of 1% in 
their net taxable income corresponding to the year of the donation. Hence, just between 
2005 and 2013, more than 60 million US$ were spent on supporting candidates to the 
parliament from the two most important political coalitions in Chile, The Alianza and the 
Nueva Mayoría (Urquieta, 2014).  
There are two major copper producers contributing to the Chilean politicians’ aspirations: 
Barrick and Antofagasta Minerals (owned by Antofagasta PLC) (Matamala, 2015). 
According to the Departamento de Estudios Económicos y Tributarios de la Subdireción 
de Estudios del Servicio de Impuestos Internos (2015), Barrick only donated in 2006 and 
2013, while Antofagasta Minerals contributed in five periods. Consequently, Antofagasta 
Minerals – which belongs to the Luksic group, one of the most influential in Chile and 
Latin America – has been the main donator to political campaigns in Chile. Thus, the 
historical relationship between the political and multinational elites identified by Moran 
(1974) is still highly influential (Salazar & Pinto, 2002). 
The mining MNEs have also established indirect relations and exerted influence over the 
political elite, through their participation in several mining associations in all the levels of 
the GPN (as seen in Figure 27). Such associations present themselves as promoters of 
sustainable development through mining for the host region and country, allowing their 
members to enjoy a position of status not only within the industry, but also in the political 
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context they develop. This is a new strategic resource to be considered by the bargaining 
literature.  
Moreover, the mining associations can also become a platform for lobbying since they 
organise or attend to activities with the most relevant political actors, allowing the mining 
MNEs to build and strengthen strategic relationships with key agents. Dinners, seminars, 
and meetings have proven extremely helpful spaces for discussing issues that are or will 
affect the industry, such as new legislations, tax exemptions and other conditions in 
every level of the GPN.  
At the international level, the most important mining association, is the International 
Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM). This is a London based organization whose main 
goals are to ‘highlight its members as leaders of the industry and to elevate the standards 
of the industry as a whole’ (ICMM, 2016). Its global relevance, as one of its CEOs 
explained, comes from the fact that ‘it gathers twenty two of the biggest mining and metal 
producers of the world and thirty four national and regional commodities organizations’ 
(INT4). All the big mining firms of the Chilean copper mining GPN are members.  
The ICMM is setting international standards for the mining firms – which are mandatory 
for its members – to get the social licence to operate, essential in this industry. Moreover, 
the ICMM actively aims to create collaboration links with all the actors involved in the 
metal mining GPNs, meaning home and host states, stakeholders in every level and, 
more recently, indigenous population. However, this relation is usually quite 
asymmetrical, due to the size and multi–level access to all sorts of resources that the 
Council Members have, compared to the other smaller and more dispersed stakeholders, 
in the same way as the CSR critiques predicted (Frynas, 2005; Hilson, 2012). The 
preoccupation with sustainability issues has given the ICMM’s members a high status, 
especially in the main decisional nodes of the mining GPNs. 
At the national level, the big copper mining firms are also affiliated to the Consejo Minero 
(Mining Council), located in Santiago. Its members produce 96% of the national copper 
and around a third of the world total, which is why despite having a very small staff44, is 
considered an extremely relevant actor in the copper mining GPN. The Council’s main 
goal, according to one of its CEOs, is to ‘promote good public policies for the mining 
industry (…) and to make the quality of the mining industry known (…) by permanently 
working with the authorities, government and members of the Parliament’ (INT 40). In 
                                               
44 According to their webpage www.consejominero.cl the whole organisation is comprised of four people in 
their executive committee, seven in their executive team and three administrative staff. 
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the Mining Council, firms are members through their mining projects, meaning some 
firms hold several memberships. Each member has a vote, hence, the mining MNEs 
have a bigger presence and authority over the Council’s decisions. 
The Mining Council explicitly does not interfere with issues related to the business 
dynamics between their members, but they do represent their members’ position when 
their interests may be affected. For example, when new legislation related to the mining 
industry is being discussed, the Council has meetings with high representatives from the 
government in order to present the Council member’s views backed with their own 
studies. The Mining Council has a strong presence in the Chilean copper mining GPN, 
and it has a friendly and close relationship with the political elite. The Council is also part 
of the ICMM, and organizes annual events in the form of dinners or seminars where 
important politicians and actors of the Chilean copper mining GPN are invited to assist 
and present, which have become crucial spaces for lobbying.  
At the local level, all the big copper mining firms belong to the Asociación de Industriales 
de Antofagasta (Industrial Association of Antofagasta or AIA), a regional association that 
groups big mining firms and other big and SMEs companies operating in the Antofagasta 
Region. The AIA is explicitly focused on achieving sustainable development for the 
region, through their promotion of mining cluster policies aimed to diversify the productive 
fabric. This focus has sometimes caused tensions between their associates, especially 
between the local suppliers of the mining industry and the big mining firms.  
The AIA represents its associates on the local public and political arena, and is an 
important player in the copper mining GPN. It organises the biannual International 
Exhibition of the Mining Industry (EXPONOR), which takes place in Antofagasta. The 
EXPONOR has become one of the most important mining exhibition worldwide, since it 
gathers crucial actors from the copper mining GPN: CEOs of the mining MNEs; 
international and local SMEs suppliers; and national/international politicians and 
entrepreneurial elite. Thus, EXPONOR is a decisive space to influence positions relating 
to the sustainability of mining in the Region of Antofagasta and the country.  
Furthermore, mining MNEs rely on lobbying, which can be done individually, through 
lobby firms or through some of the mining associations. At the international scale, 
lobbying activity is a quite regulated, transparent and common practice. However, 
lobbying has just recently been regulated in Chile45, and there is still a major perception 
                                               
45 With the promulgation of the law N.20.730 in 2014. 
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that the lobbying process is ‘not transparent’ (INT28) and not ‘as regulated as we would 
like’ (INT12). This feeling is based on the several legal vacuums in the legislation, like 
the deregulation of meetings that take place outside the country and the fact that the law 
only affects the people receiving the influence and not to the ones exerting it.  
Mining MNEs operating in Chile have lobbied through specialized firms, by themselves, 
and also by using the Mining Council. As an academic and politician explained, there is 
a wide perception that the Mining Council ‘keeps a permanent practice of lobbying with 
the political leaders. They organize dinners for them, meetings … they are always 
influencing them’ (INT43). The Council is very open about this, as a CEO of the Mining 
Council claimed ‘The Mining Council (…) goes and let the government know our position 
about a certain normative. Additionally, during the presidential campaigns, we also try to 
have a more proactive attitude by saying ‘these are the ideas that we have for a future 
government’’ (INT40). Likewise, an expert who was in charge of a local development 
agency further exemplified this situation, claiming that ‘if you start putting problems to 
the [mining] industry… they have a club, don’t they? The Mining Council, and the club 
gathers and (…) sends its lobbyist’ (INT16b). 
On the contrary, the AIA has also played a role in lobbying defending the copper 
industry’s interest, but with a strong local focus. This sometimes differ with the big mining 
MNE’s interests, since the AIA is especially concerned about the sustainability of the 
industry for the host region and country through the support of local SMEs. The AIA has 
historically raised points related to the decentralization of Chile, the acknowledging of 
Antofagasta as the ‘Mining Capital of the World’ (INT14) and in creating a mining cluster 
to diversify the local productive fabric. This approach diverges from that of the Mining 
Council and some mining MNEs, which have framed the sustainability of host regions 
and countries within the CSR policies that the industry should have.  
 
7.3.2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
During the last decades, mining MNEs have actively promoted Corporate Social 
Responsibility policies (CSR) as a way to actively engage with their host regions and 
nations, turning them into a new strategic resource. This trend started in the early 1990’s, 
where CSR changes its focus from exclusively maximizing the profits of the shareholders 
(Friedman, 1970) to including all the stakeholders of the firm, increasing the welfare of 
the society in general (Meller, 2013). Thus, mining MNEs are implementing CSR policies 
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to improve the mining industry’s image and, consequently, getting the social licence to 
operate. This has become a world standard for mining companies, since today ‘there are 
several investors demanding them [the mining MNEs] to do something about them [CSR 
policies], and not only to do them, but to show them and to communicate them properly’ 
(mining expert, INT3). 
Moreover, CSR policies have proven to be a crucial resource since, as the former CEO 
of a local industrial association and entrepreneur explained: 
‘The strength that [the CSR] has is that the community will be more friendly towards the 
mining firm, since the mining firms (…) are taking a natural resource and polluting (…) 
meaning that the firm is interested in being friendly with the city, because who is going 
to expel them tomorrow and say ‘Yankee go home?’ the people (…) so [the mining 
MNEs] have to find a way to keep the people happy. [The building of] stadiums, beaches 
(…) is a way to keep a friendly relationship’ (INT 8). 
The CEO of a mining MNE in charge of its CSR policies further developed this by stating 
that ‘we [the mining MNEs] basically have (…) to generate relationships of trust and 
mutual benefit; specially to make the communities close to our operations (…) seeing 
the insertion of our projects in their communities in a positive way’ (INT 17). To do this, 
they work together with the ‘civil organizations and local governments (…) trying to 
benefit the maximum number of people within those communities and having a special 
care about not replacing the role of the State’ (INT17). Hence, the leverage that CSR 
policies can provide reaches both the civil society and the host governments located 
where they implement them. 
The originator of this trend in Chile was BHP Billiton through Minera Escondida, which 
currently allocates 1% of its pre–tax profits to long–term community development plans 
‘that seek to improve quality of life and provide the necessary resources’ (BHP Billiton, 
2015). Only in 2014, BHP Billiton invested US$33 million in ‘social development projects’ 
while its Foundation implemented initiatives for another US$3 million (BHP Billiton, 
2015). Moreover, BHP has also actively promoted initiatives such as the World Class 
Suppliers Programme and the Creo Antofagasta. The former is a joint project with 
CODELCO and the support of some State institutions, aimed to create suppliers 
intensive in knowledge. The latter is a public–private initiative aimed to generate a plan 
for the sustainable development of the Antofagasta city. Likewise, Escondida has also 
funded several other initiatives such as the new stadium (Figure 31), football playfields, 
artificial beaches, research buildings, hospitals, as well as many other social projects 
through its Fundación Escondida.  
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Correspondingly, every mining MNE operating in Chile has developed CSR policies. 
Anglo American, for example, focuses on educational and entrepreneurial issues, like 
the Delta Programme, which works with talented children learning advanced topics at 
the local universities. As an academic involved in the Delta Project indicated, it ‘is not 
cheap [1000 US$ dollars per student], and the firms were fighting for it, but Anglo 
American took it and never let it go, because it gives them a great public image’ [INT31]. 
Another widely marketed CSR initiative is the Calama Plus Programme, a public–private 
collaboration led by CODELCO joined by FreePort McMoran and Glencore. This initiative 
involves an investment of US$1.000 million and aims transforming Calama, a mining city 
perceived as ‘weak, precarious, with a smell and vision of a mining camp and a weak 
infrastructure’ [INT 14], into a sustainable city (Meller, 2013).  
These are just some examples of the magnitude that CSR policies have reached in the 
Chilean copper mining GPN. In a survey taken in 2004 of ten big mining firms, all of them 
declared that they sought to identify and analyse the expectations and demands of 
groups affected by their business and make studies of the environmental impacts of their 
products. They also established that they aim to keep transparent and non–abusive 
relations with their employees, suppliers, clients and other actors, and 90% claimed that 
they include the social action in the general process of strategic planning of the firm 
(COCHILCO, 2005).  
This commitment to CSR policies has been well received by host states, concerned 
shareholders and part of the civil society. For instance, in the 2014 Ranking of Chile’s 
Most Respected Companies (Gfk Adimark, 2014), Minera Escondida was located in the 
8th place and it has been consistently in the top ten during the previous nine years. It was 
also awarded for third year in a row with a Big Tick by UK – based business in the 
Community, an organization that seeks to draw attention to best corporate practices 
internationally (BHP Billiton, 2015). Likewise, Antofagasta Minerals, Anglo American, 
and several other mining MNEs have also been awarded for their CSR, highlighting the 
overall positive perception that the mining MNEs have managed to cultivate among the 
civil society and the host state in every level.  
Consequently, the mining MNEs have gained reputation through their CSR, since part of 
civil society now believes that ‘it is in [the mining MNEs’] DNA to compromise with the 
environment where they produce’ (Former CEO of an industrial association and 
entrepreneur based in Antofagasta, INT8). Hence, CSR has facilitated obtaining the 
social licence to operate, turning into a new strategic resource to be considered by the 
bargaining literature.  
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Figure 31: Regional Stadium of Antofagasta.  
 
Source: Original picture, taken during fieldwork in 2016. 
 
7.3.2.3 Image as creators of employment and higher wages 
 
Nowadays, there is a strong perception in Chile about the mining MNEs being both 
crucial job creators and paying wages far higher than the national average. People 
outside the mining industry see with astonishment the high production bonuses that 
miners receive, and the local and national States are thankful every time there is a new 
project waiting to start producing. This impression has been continuously fed by the 
mining MNEs and has become another new relevant resource to be considered in the 
bargaining literature.  
Regarding the first and most important argument, the MNEs have spread the idea that 
the Chilean mining industry has provided a considerable amount of employment in the 
country. As Figure 32 shows, when the direct and indirect employments created by the 
mining industry are considered, the participation of the industry reaches an average of 
8% of the total employment from 2004 to 2015. The participation of the mining industry 
peaked in 2012 – 2013 reaching a 12% of the national average, starting a descent just 
after the super cycle ended. The copper mining industry, in particular, provides most of 
the employment of the Chilean mining industry. According to COCHILCO (2014), the 
copper industry has provided an average of 78% of the total employment in the mining 
sector between 2004 and 2013, a trend that is most likely to continue.  
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However, most of the impact of the mining industry in national employment comes from 
the indirect and not from the direct employment generated. According to COCHILCO 
(2014), the direct employment produced by the mining industry only reaches an average 
of 1% for the same period, but this is not what the mining MNEs report. Figure 32 is built 
and presented by the Mining Council in their reports (2014a, 2016) using data from INE 
and COCHILCO, but it was not possible to obtain the data or reports they used to build 
the indirect employment index, or to find what they understand as that concept. 
Moreover, there has been a strong trend to increase the number of subcontracted 
employees in the industry. According to data from SERNAGEOMIN, the mining industry 
has increased the number of subcontracted workers from 12% of the total workforce in 
1990 to almost 70% in 2014, raising several questions regarding the quality and 
conditions of the subcontracted employees and the overall impact of the mining industry 
on employment. 
The second argument relates to the mining wages paid by the mining MNEs, compared 
to the other sectors. According to data from the INE, the Chilean mining industry has the 
highest salaries in the country, an increasing trend since 2004. This is exemplified in 
Figure 33, which shows the taxable income of the mining industry labour force in 2015. 
During that year, the mining industry doubled the national average and was 25% higher 
than the incomes of the financial intermediation sector, the second best paid industry of 
the country. Additionally, the mining industry pays production bonuses yearly, which 
have reached amounts over twenty million Chilean pesos per worker at the end of the 
super cycle (Vera, 2013). This is almost 30 times the country’s taxable income average 
in 2015, and 80 times the current legal minimum wage of 250,000 Chilean pesos (around 
250 British Pounds and 380 USD).  
All of the above has caused a perception across civil society, politicians and policy 
makers that the mining MNEs greatly contribute to the employment and incomes of the 
Chilean labour force. This has led to a distorted perception of reality, where the relevance 
of the mining MNEs to labour is exaggerated. As an interviewee from the Mining Ministry 
established ‘for each job created in the mining industry, six new indirect employments 
are formed’ [INT5] when in reality only an average of 2.7 indirect jobs are created for 
each new direct one (Consejo Minero, 2014a). Hence, mining MNEs have been able to 
create the impression that they are crucial for the labour market, when mining is not a 
labour intensive industry. Mining MNEs have used this impression as leverage when they 
bargain, by widely using the phrase ‘we [the mining MNEs] create so many jobs and if 
we leave, there would be a lot of unemployment since there would be so much people 
jobless’ [Major of a city in the Antofagasta Region, INT34].  
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Figure 32: Direct and indirect employment generated by the mining industry and 
participation in the country total 2004 - 2015 (thousands of workers). 
 
Source: Consejo Minero (2014a, 2016) based on data from INE and COCHILCO. 
 
Figure 33: Monthly taxable income by economic sector in 2015 (thousands of 
Chilean pesos). 
 
 
Source: Consejo Minero (2016) using data from the SAFP. 
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7.3.2.4 The monopsonistic position  
 
Finally, mining MNEs operating in the Chilean copper mining GPN also enjoy a 
monopsonistic position while dealing local suppliers. Even though this is not entirely 
related to the mining MNEs’ bargaining position with the host local and national states, it 
is crucial for determining the host economies’ possibilities of creating, enhancing and 
capturing value through the diversification of the productive fabric, which is the base of 
local sustainable development. This is another strategic resource that has not been 
considered yet, which could be interesting to add into the bargaining literature. 
The ten most important private firms in the Chilean big mining industry (GMP10) 
represent most of the private total mining production. This means that, besides from 
CODELCO, the big copper mining industry is concentrated in a small number of firms. 
These mining firms are, in turn, controlled by even fewer mining MNEs, such as BHP 
Billiton, Freeport McMoran, Barrick Gold, Teck, Rio Tinto, Glencore Xstrata, Anglo 
American, Suitomo Metal Mining, Mitsubishi Materials and Antofagasta PLC. This 
implies that the local suppliers located in the host region and country are in a greatly 
disadvantaged position when bargaining with the mining MNEs. 
The mining suppliers are many, small, geographically concentrated and extremely 
economically dependent on the few mining firms. According to Fundación Chile (2014), 
the Chilean mining industry had 5,998 suppliers registered in the REGIC46 database in 
2012, most of which were micro or small suppliers (66%) that have less than 50 workers. 
A considerable amount of these provide services of support and equipment provision 
(64%) and are mostly located in the Metropolitan Region, where 62% have established 
their headquarters. The Antofagasta Region is the second one with most headquarters, 
but only 12% of the suppliers have chosen to locate there. 
Moreover, the suppliers are highly dependent on the mining MNE’s demand. 37% of the 
suppliers declared that they sell more than 60% of their production to the mining industry, 
which grows to 63% when considering the suppliers that sell more than 41% to the mining 
industry. All this has given the mining MNEs a considerable amount of bargaining power 
over their suppliers, as the CEO in charge of a mining MNE’s provision explained ‘when 
there is more competition regarding to what you want to buy, obviously you will have 
more power to influence the supplier’ [INT21].  
                                               
46 Database of mining suppliers. 
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Additionally, the monopsonistic market structure of the mining industry has led to 
situations in which the mining MNEs can fully establish the conditions of the contracts 
and trades, due to the extreme dependency of the SMEs to their hierarchical relationship 
with the mining MNEs (Phelps, 1996). As a mining expert explained, the mining MNEs 
usually tell their suppliers ‘if you like them [the conditions the MNEs offer] good, if you 
don’t, you know where the door is (…) which resembles the feudal times a lot’ [INT16a]. 
Likewise, the mining MNEs have also used this in the bargains the host local and national 
states, by highlighting their relevance in the creation and later subsistence of the SMEs 
suppliers. This is a considerable power resource in the bargains, since the SMEs are the 
ones that provide most of the national employment, 65% of the total, which turns into 
80% for the case of the most vulnerable population (Avanza Chile, 2015). Henceforth, 
mining MNEs have effectively turned the monopsonistic market structure of the Chilean 
mining industry as an important bargaining tool with the host States and, more 
importantly, the local suppliers. 
Summarizing, this section described the internal and external strategic resources they 
hold when bargaining in each node. However, just as with the Chilean State, the potential 
bargaining power will be hindered by the constraints of the mining MNEs. The next 
section finishes the analysis of the mining MNEs by analysing these constraints, and 
how they differ from what the traditional bargaining literature predicted. 
 
7.4 THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE MINING MNES 
 
Despite its recent developments, the literature about bargaining between MNEs and the 
State identifies only two elements constraining the bargaining position of the MNEs: the 
degree of competition and concentration in the industry, and the extent to which the host 
country government is an important customer or distributor (as seen in Figure 6, Chapter 
3). For the specific case of the mining industry, Moran (1974) considers an additional, 
but pivotal constraint: the sunk costs MNEs incur due to the nature of the production.  
In the Chilean mining GPN, however, the first two constraints do not apply. Even though 
the copper industry has fewer producers compared to other industries, the firms do not 
compete among themselves in the regular sense, since all their production is trade in the 
stock exchanges of London, New York and Shanghai, the same places where the prices 
are set. Since they cannot control the demand for copper or the prices, their only 
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objective is to decrease the production costs, which is why they have formed alliances 
between them by way of the previously mentioned industrial associations.  
The sunk costs identified by Moran (1974), on the other hand, have become just a part 
of a broader constraint, namely, the lack of mobility of mining MNEs. Moreover, the 
interviews with experts and secondary data analysed suggest an additional constraint 
that could constrain the MNE’s from fully exerting their bargaining power: the relevance 
that public image has taken the last years to get their social licence to operate. This 
section explores these constraints that MNEs face when using their strategic resources 
as bargaining power while negotiating with the Chilean State. 
 
7.4.1 The limits to being footloose 
 
One of the main arguments in the traditional bargaining model of the mining industry, 
states that ‘with the investment sunk and successful, the host country [was] in position 
to bring pressure for renegotiation’ since ‘in the perception of the foreign companies, the 
host country (now strong) can begin to cheat them (now weak)’ (Moran, 1974). By this, 
Moran was referring to a decisive element decreasing the footloose capacity of the 
mining MNEs: their sunk costs in the form of investment already made and the firms’ 
stock of capital goods. This research tries to enrich this perception, by finding several 
others elements that decrease the MNEs’ capacity to leave the host region such as: the 
profits generated by the industry; the medium term plans represented by the investments 
projected; and the exit barriers the host country has. All of these can shape constraints 
on the MNE’s exertion of power in successive bargains with the State.  
According to most of the interviewees, the first and most crucial variable influencing the 
firm’s decision of staying in the host region and country is the profit they get from 
participating in a particular GPN. An expert of the Chilean Ministry of Mining illustrated 
this by stating that ‘[Among] the elements that the mining firms evaluate when deciding 
to invest or start, suspend or a project or finish a mine, the most important factor [is] the 
price [of the commodity], I mean, whoever tells you anything else is wrong’ (INT5). In this 
sense, the Chilean copper mining GPN has generated outstanding profits during the time 
of the commodity super cycle (Figure 29, Chapter 7). Consequently, even though the 
copper prices have decreased since 2013, the industry is still generating considerable 
profits, meaning the mining MNE’s will not leave.  
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Furthermore, as depicted in Chapter 6, the country also has several other characteristics 
that allow the maximization of profits for the mining MNEs. As an expert from COCHILCO 
explained:  
‘Chile is the only country that makes things so convenient for extracting rents … it gives 
its rents away! (…) in the natural resources industry it is really difficult to value the rents 
extracted … think that they [the mining MNEs] get the returns for their capital and the 
returns for rents, so it is almost impossible for them to leave’ [INT28-29].  
All of this makes the experts conclude that mining MNEs’ project the image that they are 
footloose ‘as a bluff (…) they use this to do something very typical of the industry, which 
is to lower the costs’ [INT15] and ‘to put pressure, it is part of the lobby they do’ [INT 28-
29]. Similarly, when the CEOs of the mining MNEs were asked about the footloose 
capacity of their firms, they recognised that it is highly unlikely they abandon the Chile 
since: 
‘when the firm decides to develop a mining project it is because there is a long term 
relationship, and Chile is an attractive economy [where] several big firms have installed 
their operations and investments; and all the big mining firms have operations in Chile, 
so they see it as an attractive country, making it very difficult for them to leave’ 
[Superintendent of Investments of a mining MNE, INT 32].  
Hence, once the investment is made, it is difficult for the mining MNEs to abandon the 
hosting spaces due to the scale and type of the projects. Copper mining is a capital 
intensive industry, which requires lumpy investments for starting new projects or 
upgrading established ones (Moran, 1974). Accordingly, investments are planned for 
long periods – ten to twenty or even thirty years – meaning that the firms will only leave 
the host region if the exploitation and production stops being profitable and as long as 
they are able to do it.  
Likewise, the mining MNEs have greatly invested in Chile, specifically in the Antofagasta 
Region, which concentrates around 37% of the total FDI materialized in the country. The 
investment realised by the mining MNEs in Chile has significantly increased since 2003 
from 816 to 8,214 million US$, an increase of 907% in only eleven years (Chapter 7, 
Figure 28).  
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Table 13: Accumulated FDI between 1990 - 2010 in millions of US$. 
Sector/Year 1990/2000 2001/2010 Total 1990-2010 Total 1990-2010 % 
Agriculture and 
fishing 980 355 1,336 1.4% 
Mining 19,287 11,909 31,196 32.0% 
Industry 7,045 3,486 10,531 10.8% 
Electricity, gas and 
water 11,332 8,429 19,762 20.3% 
Construction 1,234 641 1,876 1.9% 
Commerce 1,324 4,066 5,391 5.5% 
Transport and 
communications 4,011 7,062 11,073 11.4% 
Services 12,362 3,814 16,176 16.6% 
Total 57,575 39,762 97,341 100.0% 
Source: Meller (2013) using data from the CIE. 
 
Figure 34: Composition of the stock of capital between 1996 - 2012 in percentages. 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Central Bank. 
 
Moreover, Meller (2013) shows that the mining industry has concentrated most of the 
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52.3% of the total accumulated FDI during that period, depicting the relevance the mining 
industry in alluring FDI. Most of this investment has been allocated in new projects, 
upgrading old ones and building the infrastructure needed for supplying the energy and 
water the industry needs to operate. Thus, a relevant part of the investments made by 
the mining MNE’s have turned into fixed capital. 
Likewise, the capital stock that the mining industry has in Chile is another way to 
understand the mining MNE’s sunk costs. As Figure 34 shows, the mining industry 
accumulates most of the capital goods produced for the period between 1996 and 2012, 
followed by electricity, gas and water. Figure 34 does not represent the services and 
housing sectors, since their inclusion do not allow to have a grasp of the development of 
productive potential in a country (Meller, 2013). Furthermore, Table 11 shows that the 
net stock of capital accumulated by the mining sector for the eight year period of the 
commodity super cycle almost doubles the amount of the period just before it. Electricity, 
gas and water also increased in absolute terms, as the expansion of the industry created 
new demands for such supplies, leading to the approval and construction of several 
power and water plants. Consequently, the net increase in capital goods by the two main 
industries related with the mining production, reinforces the decrease in the mining 
MNEs’ footloose capacity.  
Regarding the future stocks of capital, the projected investments of the mining sector are 
forecasted to keep increasing despite the current fall of copper prices (Table 12). This 
since, in the words of a mining MNE’s CEO, ‘you [as a mining MNE] are willing to have 
a long term relationship [with the host country]’ [INT32]. Moreover, when both mining and 
the energy sectors are considered, they represent up to 72.4% of the total projected 
investment (Table 12). This projection was made by SOFOFA in 2014, after the end of 
the commodity super cycle, which also considered the cancelled projects by the mining 
MNEs. Thus, despite the lower copper prices, the mining MNEs seem to be expecting 
market recovery, a common feature in the copper industry. Hence, the mining MNEs still 
have several new and reinvestment projects planned for the medium term, which will go 
together with the expansion plans of the energy capacity of the country.  
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Table 14: Net stock of capital by sector at constant prices in Million of US$. 
Sector 
Accumulated 
1996-2003 
Accumulated 
2004-2011 
% over total 
1996 - 2003 
% over total 
2004 - 2011 
Agriculture and fishing 45,110 56,257 4% 4% 
Mining 95,639 189,050 9% 12% 
Industry 84,114 123,278 8% 8% 
Electricity, gas and 
water 80,355 115,667 7% 7% 
Construction 13,351 17,365 1% 1% 
Commerce, 
restaurants and hotels 50,185 75,227 5% 5% 
Transport and 
communications 50,118 117,124 5% 7% 
Financial services 44,325 94,150 4% 6% 
Housing 448,262 567,673 42% 36% 
Social and personal 
services 161,571 229,037 15% 14% 
Total 1,073,030 1,584,827 100% 100% 
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Central Bank. 
 
Table 15: Projected investment, 2014 - 2018 in millions of US$. 
Sector 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
After 
2018 
Total 
general 
Total 
(%) 
Commerce 728 442 468 1,619 277 60 3,593 2.0% 
Energy 3,634 7,698 21,521 18,414 13,082 11,424 75,772 42.4% 
Industry 247 764 1,182 2,092 1,024 644 5,953 3.3% 
Infrastructure 257 2,029 3,553 761 3,784 19,043 29,427 16.5% 
Mining 196 3,201 1,745 7,666 12,260 28,578 53,645 30.0% 
Services 429 246 680 1,002 263 1,977 4,597 2.6% 
Tele-
communications 102 375 1,716 1,384 0 0 3,577 2.0% 
Tourism 62 101 61 82 39 1,947 2,292 1.3% 
Total 5,655 14,856 30,926 33,020 30,729 63,673 178,856 100.0% 
Source: SOFOFA (2014). 
 
Additionally, the mining MNEs also face exit barriers that diminish their footloose 
capacity, such as the geographically-located and capital intensive nature of the mining 
industry; and the legislation about the procedures to leave the exploitation in terms of 
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minimizing the impact for the environment and host communities (Phelps et al., 2015). 
In Chile ‘it is not as easy to close a mine whenever you want’ [Mining expert from the 
Mining industry, INT5] since, ‘there are some very complicated laws for closing a mine 
that imply high costs, since they [the mining MNEs] have to dismantle the installations, 
to pay the workers, so the decision is not easy’ [Mining Expert, INT13].  
Finally, other copper mining countries do not offer the same incentives as Chile for 
mining exploitation and rent capture like: the FDI friendly legislation, ores, access to 
markets and political stability, which together with the others mentioned in Chapter 6 
make the country extremely ‘sticky’ for copper investments. Henceforth, these 
characteristics are considered so desirable that even the approval of new laws such as 
the tax reform, or some presidential candidates and movements claiming for the 
nationalization of the industry, will not ‘spook the investments’ [INT12] as the projected 
investments of Table 12 show. Consequently, these attributes are also influencing a 
decrease in the footloose capacity of the MNEs to leave the country. Henceforth, the 
profits made, the investments already materialised and planned, the stock of capital 
goods, the exit barriers of the industry and the host region and country’s characteristics 
are all issues that could seriously hinder the mining MNE’s bargaining position by 
decreasing their footloose capacity. 
 
7.4.2 The role of public image  
 
The recent years have been characterised by the uprising of social movements all over 
the world, showing a more empowered civil society. Even though this research does not 
focus on this issue, it directly affects the mining MNEs’ functioning. Chilean civil society 
has shown an increasing capacity to organise itself in order to assure that the exploitation 
of minerals do not cause negative externalities, and secures a sustainable form of 
development. Hence, this newly empowered civil society has developed the capacity to 
stop or obstruct ongoing projects - despite its scale, stage of development or even level 
of investment – if they consider that the MNEs are or will cause more harm than good. 
An academic illustrated this point when talking about what the president of a mining MNE 
told him: ‘look, nowadays we [the mining MNEs] can have all the permits, the 
environmental ones, legal ones, governmental, but if a local community does not want a 
certain investment we are screwed [sic]’ [INT41]. 
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Likewise, there is a new breed of shareholders investing in the mining MNEs, which are 
concerned with the impact of mining over their host communities. These conscientious 
shareholders will disinvest if the mines are under civil criticism or involved in a major 
scandal. Additionally, home governments also play a part, by fining or putting MNEs on 
trial. Hence, the public image has turned into a critical issue for the mining MNEs in order 
to keep or get the social licence to operate they need in every node of the GPN.  
In Chile, the mining industry seems to have a poor image, shared by the political elite in 
Santiago and the population living in the non–mining regions. Regarding the former, a 
representative of a local industrial association posits that ‘they [politicians in Santiago] 
have some sort of anti–mining bias; that is almost desirable for Chile to forget about its 
minerals, to not exploit them’ [INT14]. This has happened as ‘the mining industry is 
concentrated in the north, so is not a topic that is internalised by the political leadership 
and by the authorities that usually do not know about the mining issues … they consider 
the mining industry only a cash machine’ [INT14].  
Moreover, the geographical location of the mining industry has also created a feeling of 
detachment in the southern regions. Hence, as a Vice–president of a mining MNE 
explains, ‘The country is fractured (…) so the [southern] Chilean person will ask you 
‘what has the copper given to me? Nothing!’ so the person does not see the benefits. 
Thus, this country does not love the mining industry’ [INT11]. There is also the perception 
that ‘mining is something distant, dangerous (…) it has several difficulties and you are 
away from your city and family for several days (…) the people still has the notion of [the 
miner] as someone with a shovel and a pillory’ [CEO of the Mining Council, INT40].  
Nonetheless, the Chilean population does acknowledge the vital role of mining in the 
national economy. According to a survey made by Moffat et al. (2014) to 1,598 Chilean 
citizens all over the country, most of them agree that mining is central for Chile and that 
it contributes significantly to its economy and future prosperity. However, the same work 
finds a critical perception of the consequences of the industry for the local and national 
development, especially related to issues of property structure, negative externalities, 
equity in the distribution of impacts, and governance capability. 
Regarding to the property structure, Moffat et al. (2014) found that the population is 
worried about Chilean dependence on mining and FDI, creating the belief that foreign 
property of the mines should be restricted; and that the mining resources should be 
exploited by national mining firms. Moreover, the population surveyed also perceives 
several social and natural negative externalities from mining like: the decrease in the 
quality and quantity of the water resources; the negative effects over the quality of life of 
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the host communities in terms of cost of life, income distribution and health issues due 
to pollution. These negative opinions are stronger in the mining regions, but also shared 
by the rest of Chile.  
Likewise, the unequal distribution of benefits and costs of mining has caused disbelief in 
the capacity of the local and national governments in regulating the industry. Interestingly 
though, the results also show a strong conviction that the civil society is able to defend 
its interests by itself and to influence the governmental policies related to the mining 
industry. Such belief may be rooted in the recent empowerment of the social movements 
led by the student protests. All this depicts a challenging scenario, where the mining 
MNEs may not have the trust needed to get their social licence to operate. As an 
academic summarized, ‘there is still the image that they [the mining MNEs] come to 
exploit the country and take everything away’ [INT15]. 
The mining MNEs have tried to fight this negative perception by implementing different 
CSR policies as it was previously established. However, there are several critical voices 
questioning the real utility of such policies. As a mining expert posit: 
‘Now the mining firms (…) have a good neighbour policy in which they help with some 
things, they build some schools, they give laptops to poor children (…) but those are just 
aspirins, I mean, they do not have a real preoccupation for the city (…) they do help, but 
only for specific cases, and I would say that is mostly to improve their public image, but 
not as a serious policy’ [INT13]. 
Hence, there is always a latent suspicion about the real objectives of the CSR 
implemented by the firms, since they are seen as ‘a whitewash of their public image’ or 
‘a form of charity’ [INT38]. This is reinforced by the relatively small amount of money 
assigned to such policies, usually up to 1% of the mining MNEs’ utilities; and the lack of 
real commitment. The latter refers to CSR policies being short term transfers ‘whose 
effects are erased in a very short time’ [INT38], which are not aligned with the long term 
strategic objectives of the host states and the civil society. Hence, several products of 
the CSR policies are now abandoned, unable to be used or have even decreased the 
quality of life of the targeted population as the critiques of this policies predicted 
(Campbell, 2012; Frynas, 2005; Hilson, 2012). 
For example, several touristic lookouts and a small museum located nearby built by 
Minera Escondida (BHP Billiton) in the southern part of Antofagasta, are completely 
abandoned due to the lack of maintenance (Figure 35). When consulted about this, 
people from BHP explained that the maintenance of such places was not their 
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responsibility. The mining MNEs have also changed dirt football fields for new payed 
fields with fake grass (a luxury in the world’s driest desert), lighting and changing rooms, 
but at a high cost. As a local expert in development issues explained, ‘the children are 
now playing in the streets! They can’t play in those football fields since they cost 60 
thousand Chilean pesos per hour [around £60]’. Thus, the perception is that since big 
mining firms know they will be here for a long term, ‘they try to make people greet them 
in the streets instead of cursing them’ [academic expert in mining, INT41] by using CSR 
policies. The issue is, however, they do not give what the community needs or wants.  
 
Figure 35: Abandoned lookout built by Escondida (BHP Billiton) outside 
Antofagasta.  
 
Source: Original picture, taken during fieldwork in 2016. 
 
Moreover, there is a second kind of CSR policies being implemented, involving several 
actors and the joint planning and upgrading a host city or a group of suppliers. These 
have been praised and criticised, but most of them are long term strategies whose results 
are difficult to evaluate today due to lack of information. However, they have managed 
to somehow counterbalance the negative image of the CSR policies only based in 
transferring goods or infrastructure to the community, since they have tried to integrate 
efforts between a wider range of actors, like host governments, local associations, 
academics and politicians.  
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Additionally, the mining MNEs have also faced difficulties trying to achieve a common 
view/discourse when facing critiques, scandals or new regulations. Despite this and their 
organisation by way of the Mining Council, they have failed several times in forming a 
tight block. As an example, when the royalty law was being discussed in the parliament 
in 2010, there were opposite views about it within the members of the Mining Council. 
As a member of the Mining Council explained ‘at the beginning there was going to be a 
common vision [about the royalty], but there were firms that did not follow it, that stepped 
aside, so there was a break–up and they [the mining MNEs] started to blame each other’ 
[INT40]. This ended up with the resignation of the Council’s president and the public 
perception of severe internal organisational issues.  
Likewise, the Council does not have strict rules about the expected behaviour of its 
members, in the sense that, if one of them is involved in a major scandal (environmental, 
political, etc.), the Council will probably not take any actions against it. In the words of a 
member of the Council: 
‘it is not that we have a strict ethical code saying ‘if someone misbehaves and 
contaminates the rest of the industry it will be expelled from the Mining Council’, such 
attribution does not exist (…) and we are working to have, I don’t know if something as 
strict as that, but at least a procedure (…) for when some of [the mining MNEs] fucks it 
up [sic] in something that has national public impact at least informs the Mining Council, 
(…) so we can say ‘these are the firm’s arguments and what is on the newspapers is 
distorted’’ [INT40,p.8].  
This discoordination has weakened both the Mining Council’s public image as well as 
their members, since there have been cases when mining projects have been shut down 
by political pressure from civil society groups, such as what happened with the Pascua 
Lama project. Pascua Lama is an open pit U$8.5 billion dollars mining project, owned by 
Barrick Gold. The project was heavily criticized by environmental and civil organisations 
due to its impact on nearby glaciers, leading the Chilean government to open a case 
against the mine. In 2013 the firm was fined with U$16 million dollars due to ‘very serious’ 
violations to the country’s conservational laws, the largest ever imposed in Chile, and 
instructing Barrick to halt the project (Jamasmie, 2015). When this happened, the 
president of the Mining Council recognized that Barrick made big mistakes, but it did not 
take any actions against the firm, something that took a great toll on the Council’s and 
its members’ public image. 
Even though Pascua Lama is a gold and silver mining project, is not the only one 
questioned or forced to stop its operations in Chile. The negative image of the mining 
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industry among the Chilean population, especially in their host regions; the 
empowerment of the civil society; the lack of governance shown by the government; and 
the lax legislation and inspection capacity of State’s institutions, have led the mining 
MNEs to hold several struggles with the local communities as predicted by Bebbington 
(2009; 2008). Indigenous associations, national and international NGOs, consumers, 
professionals, academics and unions have joined forces several times to bring the mining 
MNEs’ to court, due to their failure to fulfil their environmental, consultative and 
employer’s duties.  
As a consequence of this civil unrest, several copper mining projects have been fined 
and or cancelled due to strikes, lawsuits and local/national and international 
mobilisations. Just to mention some cases: BHP Billiton’s Escondida, fined for anti–union 
practices in in 2011 and 2015 (San Juan, 2015a); Anglo-American’s Los Bronces, fined 
for ‘serious and very serious’ environmental violations in 2015 (San Juan, 2015b), and 
El Soldado in 2014 and 2015 for destructing native species and grave environmental 
violations (Emol, 2014; Minería Chilena, 2015); SCM Lumina Copper’s Caserones, fined 
due to 17 environmental violations in 2015 (Mining Press, 2015); Antofagasta Mineral’s 
Los Pelambres, fined for serious environmental violations and destroying archaeological 
sites in 2013 and 2014 respectively (El Mostrador, 2014). This pressure has also stopped 
the construction of new hydro and thermoelectric plants aimed to supply energy to the 
mining projects, such as the thermoelectric Castilla in the north and Hidroaysén in the 
southern part of Chile. 
All of the above has led to a situation in which the mining MNEs have faced several trials 
started, and supported, by most elements of civil society: locally, nationally and 
internationally. Thus, since now ‘the requirements are higher due to millions of reasons 
(…) there has been a higher level of judicialisation (…) hence one would hope that there 
would be an intention from the mining MNEs to solve these issues, since at the end they 
are the ones that will have to stop their projects’ [Mining Ministry expert, INT5]. In this 
line, the mining MNEs have tried to communicate their intentions to the local 
communities, in the words of a CEO in charge of such relations ‘the important thing is 
that we [the mining MNE] irrefutably believe and work hard on the genuine establishment 
of relationships of trust with our interest group (…) through openness and transparency 
in the dialogue about what we do’ [INT27].  
However, this strategy has not given the expected results since the lawsuits keep 
increasing, especially due to environmental, labour and community related issues. 
Furthermore, despite civil society’s limited same financial resources compared to the 
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mining MNEs, they have managed to win several crucial trials, stopping projects and 
causing fines. This has led the mining MNEs to fear the judicialisation of processes and 
inspections, which can greatly increase the opportunity cost not only in monetary terms, 
but also due to the time invested in the trials and their loss of respectability. Thus, the 
mining MNEs will do everything in order to reach agreements with the communities to 
avoid going to the courts. As a CEO of a mining MNE explained ‘a bad deal is better than 
a good trial, I mean, with the trials nobody wins’ [INT27]. 
Likewise, the relatively bad image of the copper mining industry, has also led some 
concerned shareholders to put pressure on the mining MNEs’ headquarters. This 
pressure has also come from international NGOs; whose goal is promoting sustainable 
development in the host communities. As the leader of one of the most important ones, 
located in London, explained ‘several groups in recent years have used existing non-
judicial international mechanisms, notably, complaints procedures of the organisation for 
economic cooperation and development, to bring complaints against companies in their 
home countries’ [INT42].  
 
7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Mining MNEs hold several power resources than can be used in their bargains with the 
other actors in the Chilean copper mining GPN. Most of these are aligned with the ones 
predicted by the traditional and more updated bargaining models, some others have lost 
their relevance, while new strategic resources have also emerged. This chapter 
developed the main characteristics of the mining MNEs, to later describe the internal and 
external strategic resources they hold.  
In terms of their features, the mining MNEs operating in the Chilean copper mining GPN 
are few, concentrate most of the copper production and hold the most relevant mines. 
Moreover, the internal strategic resources hold by the MNEs identified are in line with 
the ones proposed by the bargaining literature, meaning the firms’ internal structure and 
organization; and the strategic assets they hold. The former has allowed them to have 
multi–level influence, and a higher dynamism and flexibility to adapt to market changes; 
while the latter relate to their access to substantive financial and physical capital, 
massive utilities, external markets, information and new technologies. 
Interestingly, the extremely relevant role of the international institutions for the two tier 
bargaining models literature (Ramamurti, 2001), has lost its relevance for the Chilean 
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case. Since Chile is a debt free country, such institutions have lost influence over its 
economic policies and to tilt the balance of the bargains in favour of the mining MNEs’ 
interests. This opens the question about how relevant are these institutions in a post 
Washington Consensus world, where the structural adjustment policies are widely 
dismissed in most of the extractive countries and regions due to their incapability to bring 
the long wished development. 
Furthermore, mining MNEs hold several external strategic resources, related to their 
connections with the host economic environment and agents of the copper mining GPN. 
In this sense, mining MNEs have developed strong relationships with the political elites 
in all the relevant nodes of the GPN by financing campaigns and lobbying. Additionally, 
they have evolved by organizing themselves in multi – level industrial associations, using 
CSR policies, spreading the image as job creators and payers of higher wages in order 
to get status and a social licence to operate; while also using their monopsonistic position 
as leverage in their bargains with the host states and suppliers. This evolution should be 
considered in the bargaining literature, since they have successfully shaped the host 
communities’ perception about mining. The identification of such new strategic resources 
could be considered a subsidiary contribution of this thesis. 
Regarding to the mining MNEs constraints, and contrary to the traditional bargaining 
models, the analysis finds that both, the degree of competition and concentration in the 
industry; and the extent to which the host country government is an important customer 
or distributor; are not relevant for the Chilean case. However, Moran’s suggestion about 
the sunk cost being an extremely important constraint for the mining MNEs once they 
are made, still holds but with some new additions. In this sense, this section explains 
that the sunk costs are part of a broader constraint, which is the decrease in the footloose 
capacity of the mining MNEs. Hence, such constraint is explained by the level of profits 
the mining MNEs get from the industry, the amount of investments they have 
materialised in the form of capital goods, the projected investments for the medium and 
long term, and the exit barriers present in the industry. 
Additionally, there is a second major constraint identified, related with the role of the 
public image to get the social licence to operate. The empowerment of the Chilean civil 
society occurred since the 2000’s has created a situation where the social actors have 
managed to organise and raise their voices against what they perceive as negative 
effects of the mining industry. These critiques focus on the extraction, transport and 
exportation of copper, but also on related industries like energy and water supply. The 
mining MNEs have tried to counter–balance this trend through the implementation of two 
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types of CSR policies: one focused on the transfer of goods, services or infrastructure to 
the host population; and a second, concerned about developing host cities and suppliers 
conjointly with the local agents. The first has been heavily criticized by all the sectors of 
society due to their short–term and vertical imposition, whereas the second one is still 
difficult to evaluate due to the lack of information. 
All of these have increased the number of judicial processes against mining MNEs. Thus, 
the once defenceless communities are now able to get mining MNEs fined, stop projects 
and put pressure on the State to supervise and augment the regulations regarding to the 
social, environmental and labour impacts of the mining industry. Additionally, the public 
image is a multi–level issue, since not only the local communities, but also the 
conscientious shareholders and home states are alert about the scandals related to the 
mining MNEs. When major scandals exploit, such agents can also pressure over the 
mining MNEs’ main headquarters. Consequently, the public image has turned into a 
double edged sword, since it can greatly facilitate getting the social license to operate, 
or it can cause the stopping or total closure of projects if the civil society’s demands are 
not satisfied. 
The next chapter explains how these strategic resources are used in the bargaining 
processes by the State and the mining MNEs, and how their constraints impede them 
for fully exerting the bargaining position. The analysis of such processes will be vital to 
understand the possibilities of achieving a strategic coupling between both actors’ 
objectives which, in turn, will determine the possibilities of sustainable development of 
the host region and country.  
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CHAPTER 8 
BARGAINING BETWEEN MINING MNES AND THE STATE IN THE CHILEAN 
COPPER MINING GPN AND ITS SPATIAL OUTCOMES 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapters have detailed the strategic resources and constraints of the main 
actors of this study, the copper mining MNEs and the Chilean State. Both are crucial for 
addressing the successive bargains taking place between them, as well as their 
consequences. This chapter analyses how these actors have (or have not) used their 
strategic resources while facing their particular constraints (as summarised in Figure 36) 
during the last copper GPN period.  
How the actors have bargained has also determined how much value is captured in the 
host region and country, as well as the degree of embeddedness of the mining MNEs. 
All these have implications for the sustainable development chances of the Antofagasta 
Region and Chile, something analysed in the last part of this chapter. Moreover, this 
section starts by resuming a significant and unexpected finding: that contrary to what the 
recent bargaining literature predicts (Moon & Lado, 2000; Nebus & Rufin, 2010; 
Ramamurti, 2001), multilateral arenas are not as important as they ought to be for the 
Chilean case.  
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Figure 36: Main components of the bargaining relationship between the copper mining MNEs and the Chilean State in the Chilean copper 
mining GPN. 
 
Source: Own elaboration.
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8.2 MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS AND BI (MULTI) LATERAL AGREEMENTS 
 
As a starting point, it is important to address the role that the international institutions 
play in the successive bargains that take place between the Chilean State and the mining 
MNEs in the London node. According to Ramamurti (2001), the bargains taking place in 
tier 1, between the host country and the MNE’s host country, will be indirectly influenced 
by the action of some multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank; and 
directly, through the signature of bi(multi) – lateral agreements.  
Regarding multilateral institutions, Chile’s financial health has strengthened since the 
early 1990’s as a result of it shedding much of its international debt, and hence, the 
country ‘does not depend on [the multilateral institutions] financially, we [Chileans] do 
not have obligations with them, as the matter of fact we lend them or we supply funding 
to the International Monetary Fund’ (Expert from the Chilean Central Bank, INT 12). This 
means that ‘Chile is out of the requests and rules that these [multilateral institutions] put 
on the [borrowing] countries’ (Mining expert, INT28), so the bargains taking place 
between the Chilean State and the mining MNEs are relatively free of the influence of 
such institutions. There are relations with those institutions, but their nature is reduced 
to exclusively technical issues since they have lost their capacity of ‘pulling strings over 
political discussions’ [INT12]. This is an unexpected finding, since most of the updated 
bargaining models highlight the relevance of such institutions in the bargains.  
Conversely, Chile’s extensive network of free trade agreements (FTAs) has greatly 
shaped the bargains during the last decades. Mining MNEs are always looking for the 
best conditions to operate, which usually means countries with fewer regulations. Hence, 
‘the governments in [the mining MNEs’] host countries advocate for free trade’ (INT1), 
by constantly pressuring for FTAs. For Chile, these agreements consist in long lists 
where the State promises a series of self–denial behaviours, such as not taxing certain 
items, not establishing trade barriers, not taking over the private property and a long 
etcetera. The number of FTAs hold by Chile have been widely used by the state as a 
strategic resource to lure mining FDI into the country, while also constraining its 
bargaining position, since they ‘impose a series of restrictions … which are not only 
related to commerce’ (INT 31).  
In this sense, Chile has recently signed the Trans–Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) 
in 2016, considered ‘one of the most ambitious free trade agreements ever signed’ (BBC 
News, 2016) since the signing countries represent 40% of the total world commerce. 
This FTA has been widely criticised due to the secrecy of its development and the serious 
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restrictions it imposes for the host countries by establishing several limitations in terms 
of intellectual property, labour and environmental laws. More importantly, there is great 
concern about the potential loss of sovereignty of the signing countries, since the MNEs 
are able to sue the signing countries if they violate any aspect of the agreement, greatly 
reducing the signing States’ bargaining position (Wofford, 2015).  
Furthermore, the TPP does not directly affect the copper mining industry, since it focuses 
on other industries, but it may affect transversal issues such as labour conditions, 
intellectual property and environmental requirements, all of which are vital for mining. 
This is worrying since, as the representative of an international mining NGO explained, 
the TPP ‘mirrors the kind of free trade agreement between North America and Central 
America, where companies are able to sue national governments for changing things 
(…) there is currently an example of a company suing a national government for raising 
the minimum wage’ [INT 42], raising questions about what should be the limits of such 
agreements and the real socio – political and economic consequences of them. 
Thus, despite what the updated bargaining models predict, multilateral institutions’ 
capacity to directly influence the bargains taking place within the Chilean copper mining 
GPN is quite limited today, since the country’s economic health has made it relatively 
independent from such institutions. Bilateral agreements, on the other hand, have greatly 
increased their relevance in directly influencing the bargains between the Chilean State 
and the mining MNEs, mostly due to the high number of FTAs signed by Chile since the 
mid 1990’s. The role of these agreements has significantly increased as a result of the 
recent signing of the TPP, which raises several questions regarding to the Chilean State 
sovereignty and capacity to exert its bargaining power in the bargains. A glimpse of how 
these bargains take place in the London node is presented next. 
 
8.3 BARGAINS IN LONDON 
 
There is a general consensus among the interviewees about London being where the 
most relevant bargains take place, since they set the framework in which mining MNEs 
will operate. As a professor puts it, these crucial meetings happen close to Westminster 
since ‘it symbolises the power of England (…) it is not a marginal place within London, it 
is the centre itself!’ [INT26]. Here, both actors, the Chilean State and the mining MNEs, 
use their strategic resources in the bargains in order to foster new flows of FDI into the 
country and to get the best conditions to operate, which are their main strategic 
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objectives. The mining MNEs use activities organised by the LME, the ICMM or by 
themselves in the form of expos and seminars; while the Chilean State actively organises 
meetings and activities to promote the country and establish negotiations though the 
Chilean Embassy in the UK. This section provides a sense of the decisions that are made 
in those spaces, as well as how the actors exert their bargaining power.  
On the one hand, the mining MNEs are completely aware of their strategic resources 
(see Figure 36), and they share a common goal summarised as maximising their 
profitability. Therefore, they aim to get the best conditions to operate when bargaining 
with the potential host countries. They are also conscious of the constraints they face, 
especially regarding to the increasing difficulty of getting the social licence to operate. 
This is why they have tried reaching a consensus about how they relate with the host 
countries and regions, while simultaneously minimising their sunk costs. To reach this 
consensus and to lobby with the extractive countries, they use at least two arenas: the 
LME annual dinner, used for lobbying; and the meetings at the ICMM, where they decide 
how to get the social license to operate.  
On the other hand, the Chilean State is also aware of its strategic resources which it fully 
uses to lure FDI into the country, which is its prime objective in this node. The Chilean 
State is also familiar with the constraints it faces (Figure 36), and works to assure to the 
potential investors that plans and policies are in motion to solve its competitive issues. 
The country organises several events through the Chilean Embassy in the UK, such as 
the Chile Day, where several ministers, politicians and entrepreneurs go to London to 
give presentations, hold meetings and celebrate dinners with the actual and potential 
investors and politicians from the mining MNEs’ home countries, promoting Chile as the 
best place for copper investments.  
Hence, once the bargains take place in this node, both actors are well informed about 
their bargaining position and will actively use their strategic resources to reach their 
objectives. The mining MNEs fully use the key assets they hold, such as their access to 
financial and physical capital, information and technology in order to demand the Chilean 
State for the best conditions to operate. Likewise, the Chilean State actively promotes 
the unique aspects of the copper mining industry in Chile, such as the quality, quantity 
of the copper resources, weather, infrastructure while also emphasizing the political 
stability of the country and the FDI friendly legislation it has. The outcomes of these 
bargains mostly set up the legal framework in which the mining MNEs will operate as 
well as the amounts of FDI that will materialize in the medium and long terms.  
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The bargains take place in several instances, but this research recognized at least three: 
the annual dinner organized by the LME, the ICMM and the relations between the firms’ 
home countries and the Chilean State. Regarding to the first one, the LME’s annual 
dinner is considered ‘the most important mining dinner of the world’ [INT14] and is used 
by the mining MNE to lobby with the Chilean politicians and businessmen to get the best 
conditions to operate. In the words of a mining expert ‘all of our executives [referring to 
politicians and businessmen], all of them! and (…) executives from all over the world, 
particularly from the producing zones, all of them travel to London to that dinner, to hear 
what is said there, while wearing a tuxedo’ [INT14].  
It is not possible to really know the details of the negotiations held in this dinner, but the 
interviews made clear that it gave birth to important changes in the Chilean national 
legislation and incentives promoted by the mining MNEs, who seem to use this instance 
to successfully exert a form of episodic bargaining power over the Chilean State. The 
State, on the other hand, seems to also use this opportunity to heavily promote the 
country to potential investors, or to convince current ones to increase their investments. 
Of course these decisions are made in the headquarters, but it is worth acknowledging 
that the Chilean State also exerts some degree of episodic bargaining power by luring 
FDI into the country. 
The second space for shaping the bargains used by the mining MNEs is through the 
ICMM. This institution was created with the sole purpose of changing the world’s 
perception about mining, so the mining firms get the social licence to operate. In the 
words of an important representative of the institution: 
‘what we [the ICMM] have tried to do is to change the discourse, or to propose that 
change, and stop talking about revenues, which is what people say when talk about 
mining, the revenues and how much we will capture from the rents (…) what we [propose 
is talking about] how the benefits are distributed, how the benefits of the mining industry 
reach the people’ [INT4]. 
The ICMM has established the adoption of ten principles as mandatory for its participant 
mining MNEs, in order to promote the sustainable development of the host regions and 
countries. According to their webpage, they have four programmes: social and economic 
changes; environment and climate change; health and safety; and materials 
stewardship; all of which depicts the extension of their approach.  
However, most (if not all) of the ICMM’s members have been accused of violating labour 
and human rights, as well as creating several grave negative externalities in the form of 
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pollution, destruction of natural environments and others in the host regions and 
countries. Hence, the ICMM has helped to create the misconception that the mining 
MNEs are addressing the root of relevant social issues such as indigenous rights or their 
environmental footprint, while they are actually not willing to fully address the most 
polemical or transcendental aspects of such issues unless the host country obliges them. 
A third instance for bargains are the international relations between mining MNEs’ home 
countries and the Chilean State, based in the shared discourse of developing and 
nurturing a mutually beneficial exchange. This is exemplified by the invitations that 
several mining MNEs make to Chilean Ministers to their headquarters ‘in Australia and 
London where [they are] very welcomed, since the firms are very interested in knowing 
about how their subsidiaries are operating in Chile and what are the Chilean needs’ [CEO 
of a State owned mining firm operating in London, INT3]. In these private meetings, as 
well as in the other activities organised by the Chilean Embassy such as the Chile Day, 
the Chilean State promotes the country by displaying all the strategic resources the 
country has to offer.  
All of these resources are extremely valuable and demanded by the copper mining 
MNEs, since there are no other countries offering the same operating conditions for 
producing, in terms of incentives, infrastructure and quality/quantity of resources. Hence, 
the Chilean government is able to exert a considerable amount of episodic bargaining 
power over the mining MNEs, by convincing them to invest in the country. These 
bargains have been perceived by both actors as ‘balanced (…) not an abusive 
relationship where one obtains more than the other, but rather a constructive relationship’ 
[Managing Director mining firm based in London, INT3]. 
However, Chile is currently facing several issues jeopardizing its relative bargaining 
position in the previously mentioned international bargaining instances. The fall in the 
copper prices due to the end of the super cycle; some serious competitive issues related 
to the lack of water, energy, human capital; the newly empowered civil society raising 
issues about the negative externalities caused by the industry; and the apparition of 
potential competitors, have all had an impact over the FDI flowing into the country.  
The discontinuity in the economic policies and lack of long term development strategies 
have also affected the international bargain. This, since the focus has been on 
encouraging FDI in the exploring and extractive part of the production chain, but not in 
the developing of a more diversified productive fabric through knowledge spillovers. In 
consequence, each time the Chilean country faces a new threat, the whole country’s 
economy stumbles, strengthening the mining MNEs bargaining position. Hence, the 
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Chilean State is currently facing a relative loss in its international bargaining position, 
which can be further endangered if it does not overcome its internal weaknesses.  
Furthermore, the outcomes of the bargains taking place in this node have several 
implications for the Chilean country as a whole, and for the Antofagasta Region in 
particular. Since both are extremely dependent on the copper industry, the amount of 
the FDI decided; the copper prices and demand; the perception of the mining industry; 
and the legal framework in which it will operate in Chile, will have deep consequences 
over the nation and region’s economy and development possibilities. Thus, the relevance 
of this node cannot be emphasized enough. Whatever is decided in London will 
ultimately determine the country’s economic sustainability. However, there is another 
node which is almost as important as this, which not only has influence over the whole 
Chilean country and Antofagasta Region, but whose bargains can also shape the world 
copper industry. This is Santiago, and is discussed next.  
 
8.4 BARGAINS IN SANTIAGO 
 
In order to comprehend how the bargains take place in the capital city of Chile, it is 
necessary to understand the context of the negotiations because Chile has very 
particular set of characteristics in terms of its ideology and the way it perceives the 
relationship between the different levels of the States and the private world. Such a 
perception has been shaped by decades of neoliberal policies that have deeply 
permeated all levels of the Chilean society, leading to a situation where a significant part 
of the population has naturalised the fact that the markets should be left alone and the 
State should not interfere. This has allowed the emergence of a national state which 
sees any form of interference in the markets as something that goes against the relations 
between the private sector actors involved, becoming a largely passive observer of the 
issues between civil society and the mining MNEs, in the same way Bridge (2004a) 
posited; forgetting all the valuable lessons from the Nitrate Era, becoming another 
example of what Pollitt (2000) called ‘Institutional Amnesia’. 
Even though this posture may sound attractive to the mining MNEs, it actually creates a 
vacuum where they have to deal with all sorts of matters that should be concerns of the 
State. Additionally, civil society has significantly increased its empowerment, putting 
pressure on the regional and national State to address some crucial issues related to the 
effects of mining over the environment and population, forcing the State to bargain with 
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the mining MNEs. This section develops these points, as well as what have been the 
kinds of bargaining power exerted by the agents in each bargain.  
 
8.4.1 The Chilean obsession with free markets  
 
After years of neoliberal policies implemented since Pinochet’s dictatorship, deepened 
after the return to democracy, most of Chilean society has been imbued with the idea 
that free markets are sacred and that any sort of State intervention would cause chaos 
and political/economic instability. Accordingly, since the 1990’s the Chilean State has 
stepped back from its role as a conductor of economic policy, aiming at sustainable 
development from the mining industry. In the words of a mining expert: 
‘The State kept the model installed by the military government during the decade of the 
1980’s which was a model exclusively centred in providing the guarantees to materialize 
investments, securing the private property rights and ensuring stability through clear 
rules of the game. This was left installed and, unfortunately, during the 1990’s a good 
part of the mining policies were based on that (…) [and now] the Ministry of Mining is 
one of the weakest as a consequence of this (…) because it was a ministry that nobody 
cared about and that followed the policy of not doing anything’ [INT 14]. 
This is a key point, since Chile has based its promotion strategy on selling its stability, 
on not being ‘like our neighbours, who change the rules of the game every time they 
have the chance’ [INT28], something greatly appreciated by the mining MNEs due to the 
long term profile of their investments. In the words of the Vice President of a mining MNE 
‘the most important for an investor is [a country] that has clear rules and that is not 
changing them every three or four years’ [INT11]. This political stability and the Chilean 
State’s commitment to free markets are embodied in the Constitution of 1980, which, 
despite being approved under dubious conditions by the dictatorship, is still operative 
today and strongly limits the state’s actions in the economy.  
Hence, Chile’s outstanding conditions to operate in terms of its political and economic 
stability is based; firstly, on the 1980s political constitution: and secondly, in the widely 
spread opinion by the political class that ‘the rules of the game have to be completely 
stable, and that if twenty five years ago particular [conditions] were offered, those rules 
of the game cannot change’ [INT38]. Interestingly though, since most of the mining MNEs 
participate in other extractive GPNs in which the initial conditions are regularly re–
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negotiated, some of the mining foreign MNEs’ CEOs are actually ‘puzzled about why we 
[the Chilean State] do not do it’, since ‘countries in general, even the developed ones, 
change the rules of the game (…) due to the changes and evolution they experiment. 
[The mining MNEs] understand that no rule is written in stone’ [INT 28-29].  
Nonetheless, it would be naïve assuming that the mining MNEs did not promote this 
ideology, since they have historically defended the (neo) liberalisation of the markets of 
the Chilean mining GPNs; even pressuring the British and American states to take an 
active role when their interests were endangered. As a professor explains, the mining 
MNEs have actively helped to ‘establish the discourse that the rules of the games could 
not be changed’ [INT38] which ultimately transformed into the dominant discourse.  
Consequently, Chile, despite having the best conditions to operate in the copper industry 
in terms of resources, infrastructure and incentives; and the extremely high price of the 
copper super cycle; is obsessed with the idea of not changing the rules of the game, 
something summarised in the endlessly repeated phrase by every Chilean government 
after the return to democracy: ‘we have to let the institutions work’. Hence, the mining 
MNEs have successfully exerted non–decisional bargaining power by leaving potential 
changes in the level of State intervention completely out of the political agenda, while 
also exerting ideological bargaining power by changing the Chilean perception about the 
desirability of having a national state not willing to even consider negotiating new 
conditions with them.  
Moreover, the mining MNEs have actively promoted free market discourse by using the 
threat of leaving the country if the initial conditions/rules of the game change. When 
consulted about this, the representative of the ICMM established that ‘if the price goes 
down [the mining MNEs] will close the project, and they [the mining MNEs] are doing it, 
they are closing mines, because they will not lose money (…) the mining firms have a 
social role but there is no obligation to provide jobs if they are losing money’ [INT4]. This 
opinion summarises the mining MNE’s continuous reminding of their footloose capacity, 
assuming they can always find another place to exploit if the rules change too much at 
their expense. However, the industry is anything but footloose, and the conditions offered 
and strategic resources hold by the Chilean country are far too good to leave. Even some 
of the mining MNEs’ representatives acknowledge the lack of substance of this threat, 
by calling it the ‘typical bravado’ of the mining MNEs [as coined by a Mining Council 
CEO, INT 40]. 
Furthermore, the active promotion by the mining MNEs’ and the political elite of 
respecting the status quo has led to an outdated legislation governing the industry and 
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a complete lack of initiative from the State. As an example, the most important laws 
framing the mining FDI: the DL. 600, established in 1974; the political constitution; the 
organic law on mining concessions; and the mining code, both effective since 1983; have 
not changed in more than 30 years. Likewise, the mining MNEs have successfully helped 
establish the idea that if a change happens in the rules ‘the mining MNEs will leave and 
we [the Chileans] do not have national firms able to take care of the mining production’ 
[INT38].  
This fear has taken a deep grasp of the Chilean society, leading to a significant portion 
the population actively resisting any substantial changes in the legislation. Hence, the 
Chilean governing class and mining MNEs have somehow justified the detachment of 
the national state, that only ‘makes sure things are being done according to what is 
written [in the laws] but not according to their spirit’ [academic, INT26]. This has led to a 
situation where the State’s institutions have even developed a sense of pride about its 
passive role, which is curious, since every single other case study consulted related to 
mining industries as well as all the bargaining models, assume that the State will wish to 
fully exert its position in a series of bargains with mining MNEs. All these, are further 
evidence of the exertion of both non–decisional and ideological bargaining power by the 
mining MNEs. 
This Chilean State’s passivity within the country contrasts with its passion in the 
international circuits, and it has been a constant trend from the beginning of the new 
copper mining GPN in the early 1990’s. This situation contradicts the bargaining models’ 
prediction of a strong first bargain in order to set the initial conditions of production, since 
the Chilean Sate has refrained from exerting its potential bargaining power with the 
mining MNEs, reducing its role as a mere witness. When consulted about how these 
initial bargains with the mining MNEs were arrived at, a member of the CIE (institution in 
charge of attracting FDI) posited ‘there is no bargaining process at all! In Chile, one of 
the things we repeatedly tell to the investors is that (…) if you want to invest in Chile, you 
just invest in Chile, there are no obstacles in getting the visas or that sort of things, there 
are no great difficulties’ [INT23].  
Likewise, a mining expert of the Ministry of Mining further supported this opinion by 
explaining that ‘there are absolutely no negotiation for starting a new mining project, I 
mean the country is open to anyone that wants to do it or develop it (…) there are no 
previous conversations between the [Mining] Minister, the firm only has to do what is 
said in the [Chilean] legislation’ [INT23]. These statements are illustrative how the two 
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major institutions in charge of the initial bargain with the mining MNEs have openly 
decided not to do so, letting the legal framework do that for them instead. 
Moreover, the mining MNEs have become used to this way of doing things, and when 
asked about the initial bargains they held with the Chilean State, most of the firms shared 
the opinion that ‘as private firms, we do not have too much interaction with the 
government’ [Superintendent of a mining MNE, INT32]. As another CEO of a mining 
MNE further explained: 
‘the [mining] firms do not have too much people dedicated to relate with the State (…) 
[we understand that] this is the law and we have to follow it and that is how we work, 
there is nothing beyond that (…) we only have to comply with the law and if the laws 
change, if this [change] is not convenient for our business, we will leave, but we comply 
with the law’ [INT10, p.8]. 
Hence, the initial bargain is dominated by the mining MNEs, and the role of the State is 
reduced to verifying the compliance of the legislation by the mining MNEs, in order to get 
all the permits they need to operate. Even for the concessions of lands and minerals, 
which have historically caused intense bargains between the State and mining MNEs in 
Chile, ‘there are no negotiations (…) the law establishes a mechanism to access a 
concession that is open, (…) is like buying a flat, a real state, exactly the same thing’ 
[Expert from the Ministry of Mining, INT5]. Hence, during the first bargain ‘there is no 
power struggle, the Chilean State is just a pawn in the power scenario of the copper 
industry (…) since it provides full concessions to the to the firms (…) which in legal terms 
means that the true owners of the copper are, in fact, the multinationals’ [Academic, 
politician, INT43]. 
This lack of initial bargaining is another unexpected finding of this research, since all the 
bargaining models assume that both actors will engage purposefully in successive 
bargains, especially before the investment is materialised. During what should be the 
initial bargain, the State acts as a mere witness, by making sure that the rules are abided 
by, creating the perception that the relationship between the mining MNEs and the State 
is extremely friendly, and that the mining MNEs are exemplary law abiding citizens, when 
in reality the mining MNEs are in a position to take full advantage of their bargaining 
position.  
Henceforth, due to the very particular characteristics in which the initial conditions are 
set for the mining industry, it is difficult to identify the bargaining processes taking place 
at that point since, apparently, there are none. The mining MNEs dominate this phase, 
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partly due to the neoliberal ideology deeply established in the Chilean society, and partly 
due to the mining firms’ continuous threat to leave. The former can be considered as a 
successfully created false consciousness or ideology, through the imposition of the 
mining MNEs interests over the successive bargains that took place since the 1990’s, or 
what this research calls ideological bargaining power. This ideology has created an 
institutional framework in which the State initially bargains indirectly through the 
institutions in charge of checking if the mining MNEs fulfil all the legal requirements.  
Moreover, the mining MNEs have continuously controlled the political agenda by 
opposing updates to the rules of the game through the threat of leaving, something that 
can be considered as an exertion of non–decisional bargaining power by the mining 
MNEs in the initial bargains. Finally, the mining MNEs continuously exert their influence 
in order to improve their operating conditions, by making the State keep liberalising the 
labour market, weakening the unions and criminalising the strikes, all of which can be 
considered as a form of episodic bargaining power exerted by the mining MNEs.  
Hence, in terms of the initial operating conditions bargained in the capital city of Chile, 
this research finds that MNEs have exerted the three forms of bargaining power defined 
here: episodic, by influencing the Chilean State to keep developing better conditions for 
the mining MNEs to operate; non–decisional, by successfully avoiding the issue of 
changing the current mining legislation meaning a control over the political agenda; and 
ideological, by making the Chilean society to defend a status quo that clearly favours the 
mining MNEs strategic objectives, at their own expense.  
The Chilean State, on the other hand, exerts little bargaining power in the initial bargain, 
due to its obsession with avoiding negotiations since those instances are perceived as 
an intervention in the free markets. The bargaining literature does recognize a more 
favourable position for the mining MNEs in the initial bargains, but not on the scale 
apparent in the Chilean case. However, the pressure from a newly empowered civil 
society has led the State to somehow change its passive position in the later bargains, 
pressuring for changing some of the sacred rules of the game. This has caused several 
reformulations of the bargains between the Chilean State and the firms, in a process 
detailed next. 
 
8.4.2 The new bargains and empowered civil society  
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From the early 2000’s, Chilean civil society has experienced an awakening, where it has 
left the post–dictatorship slumber to become increasingly active in demanding an 
improvement on the living conditions. Spear–headed by the student movement, this 
newly empowered civil society has not only claimed for better education, but for a better 
distribution of incomes and rights; a change in the outdated environmental, labour, tax 
and constitutional legislation; and a deep critique to the neoliberal system by looking to 
end the profit culture; something that can be summarised in a deep judgement of the role 
of the Chilean State and development path followed since the return to democracy.  
This social effervescence has also involved the mining industry, due to the crucial role it 
plays in the Chilean society and economy. Civil society groups have started to demand 
a better distribution of the gains of the copper GPN, as well as a shared recognition of 
its worst consequences, pressuring the State to fulfil its role as the organisation 
representing the people’s interests by challenging the once immobile rules of the game. 
It is relevant to highlight that most of the interviewees used the expression ‘empowered 
civil society’, acknowledging the increasing bargaining power that such actor has 
developed since the 2000’s. This empowerment means that the civil society ‘is more 
engaged, and does not relent (…) nowadays is not just going to a place start drilling (…) 
they [the mining MNEs] have lost that capacity and they know it’ [Academic, INT15], 
causing the halt of several extremely ambitious projects due to their negative impacts 
over the local communities; such as Pascualama (Barrick Gold), Pelambres – Caimanes 
(Antofagasta Minerals) and various power plants, just to name a few. Hence, the mining 
MNEs have had to ‘make a big effort with the communities, with the people whose quality 
of life that will be affected by these projects, by being very convincing and clear about 
the mitigation actions [they will implement] for the impacts of their projects’ [Director of 
processes of a mining firm, INT22], since otherwise they will not be able to get the social 
licence to operate they need.  
This empowerment is also captured in the survey made by Moffat et al. (2014) to 1,598 
citizens all over Chile, where most of the interviewed perceived that: the national 
governments are not able to demand responsibilities to the mining MNEs; the current 
legislation and legal system are not enough for securing the mining MNEs to do the right 
thing; the Chileans have a low opportunity to participate in the decisions the State makes 
about the mining industry; and the industry does not listen and respect the opinion of the 
communities. 
Conversely, the same survey found that people believe they can: successfully defend 
their collective interests and influence the government policies related to mining; make 
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the industry doing what is right; and force the consideration of the local communities in 
order to get the permissions to operate. Hence, this survey encapsulates the new attitude 
of the Chilean population, which does not accept the usual posture defended by the 
mining MNEs and Chilean elites where ‘the State should not intervene in the conflicts 
between the civil society and the firms’, since ‘those are problems between privates, and 
because of that are only regulated by the supply and demand laws’ [Union 
representative, INT30].   
Consequently, the pressure coming from the civil society has forced the Chilean State to 
take a more active role, leading to the creation of new institutions for supervising 
compliance with environmental, labour and other laws. This process has also started the 
discussion about changing of the rules of the game governing the mining industry. It is 
worth noticing that when asked about how they perceive these changes, the 
representatives of the mining MNEs interviewed agreed that ‘everything is completely 
negotiable’ [supply manager of a mining MNE, INT21], but when the Chilean State 
pushed forward laws directly affecting the industry, such as the royalty or changes in the 
tax system, the opinion of the firms is a lot more cautious, as a Superintendent of 
investments of a mining MNE explained:  
‘Look, what characterises Chile is its stability in the tax system, and the investment in 
Chile strongly depends on the foreign investment, so any change in the regulatory 
system, such as specific taxes and (…) royalties are usually well studied, those are not 
things that you apply from one day to the other’ [INT32]. 
Interestingly, the same interviewee later acknowledges that the mining MNEs are always 
alert to changes in the legislation, evaluating the impacts of such changes in the 
profitability of the firm, but he also notices that such scenarios ‘do not generate big 
impacts in the results of the company’ [INT32]. This means that the mining MNEs’ 
discourse about how new legislation can lower their profits rates significantly enough to 
make them leave, could be just a smoke screen to prevent any significant change in the 
neoliberal ideology threatening their bargaining position. 
The discussion of the royalty mining law projects in 2005 and 2010 serve as a good 
illustration of the intense exertion of bargaining power by mining MNEs taking place when 
there are proposals to change legislation is by the State in order to benefit the civil 
society. The first royalty law failed by becoming a specific tax for the mining industry, 
mostly due to the full exertion of the mining MNEs’ influence. According to the interviews, 
the firms used every single strategic resource at their disposal in order to stop the new 
regulations, especially the ones related with their linkages with the Chilean political class. 
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They did this by heavily lobbying the national congress through the Mining Council, and 
separately by using lobby firms and financing political campaigns; threatening to cut the 
advertisement of the magazines and newspapers that support or inform about the 
protests; increasing their CSR expenses and, of course, repeatedly threatening about 
leaving the country.  
Regarding to the second royalty law, a member of the Ministry of Mining explained the 
bargaining process that took place in 2010, in a context after an earthquake, where the 
Chilean government needed more revenues in order to start the reconstruction: 
‘We [the government] tried to negotiate, not to impose something (…) since we did not 
pretend to discourage [the mining MNEs] (…) we made the changes for having a more 
immediate revenue now, but that gives certain guarantees [to the firms ] for the future 
(…), I mean, if I am going to raise your taxes, there will also be more protections, like a 
fixed tax rate for a longer period of time (…) We did a very serious work to see what 
variables were influencing the firms to make their decision, and [that is why] when the 
law was approved there was a 99% acceptance of the firms’ [INT 5].  
However, this person does not mention that it was not a royalty that was finally approved 
in 2005 and 2010, but a specific tax income which is something completely different. 
This, since the specific tax is not a payment for using the land and the natural resources 
contained in it, but just a percentage of the net utilities of the mining firms. Thus, the 
Chilean State not only failed in passing a royalty law for the second time – something 
basic in every mining country –, but it also improved the initial conditions for the mining 
MNEs by giving them a further tax invariability.  
According to some of the interviewees, this can be explained by ‘the blatant intervention 
[of the firms] in the political world (…) these multinationals (…) put money on every side 
[of the political spectrum] so the one that gets elected will be demanded to play for them’ 
[INT30]. Such opinion has been supported by the recent scandals transversally affecting 
the whole political class, related to bribes, corruption and illegally funded campaigns by 
firms, such as what has happened with the nitrate firm SOQUIMICH (The Economist, 
2014), CORPESCA(Pérez, 2015), Penta and other high profile cases(The Guardian, 
2015). Hence, even though these scandals do not directly involve a copper mining MNE, 
they have somehow shed light on the strong influence that the private sector has over 
the Chilean political class. The best example of this in the mining industry is the fact that, 
since after the last royalty was discussed in 2010, ‘the topic has not been touched again’ 
[INT38], something attributed to the ‘lobbying and financing political campaigns, which is 
a vicious cycle’ [Mining expert, INT28].  
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Other ways in which the mining MNEs have tried to stall the changes in the rules of the 
game have been through the control of the mass media and an active expenditure in 
traditional CSR policies. Regarding the former, a journalist explained that when the 
media informs about an issue that damages the public image of the mining MNEs or is 
against their strategic objectives, such as pollution or labour problems, ‘there is always 
a pressure, since you know that the newspaper is not supported by the sales, but by the 
advertisement, which constraints you’ [INT 30]. He explained how when they publish a 
story that bothers the mining MNEs, they usually have to publish another one in a more 
positive tone, in order to balance the public opinion. Furthermore, the mining MNEs have 
also tried to get people on their side by doing CSR activities in the form of building 
stadiums, beaches, or by giving money to NGOs, which worked in the short term, but is 
now heavily criticised since it is perceived more as an image whitening than a substantial 
contribution.  
However, despite the considerable influence of the mining MNEs, the Chilean State has 
also been able to make some significant gains. Several institutions and laws have been 
created in order to make sure the mining MNEs are fulfilling their duties with the local 
communities, environment, and labour force. Among these, the environmental tribunals 
were created in 2012, in order to solve controversies related to the environment; there is 
a reform in the tax and labour legislation going on; there are some regulations regarding 
to the consultation process that has to take place between the mining MNEs and the 
indigenous communities before starting a project; and more importantly, there is a 
constitutional process happening during 2016 aiming to create a new constitution, where 
crucial issues such as the role of the State in the economy, the decentralisation of the 
political power and the desirability of the neoliberal model are being discussed.  
Finally, and returning to the key concepts related to bargaining power, it could be said 
that the mining MNEs have exerted a considerable amount of episodic bargaining power 
over the Chilean State in the successive bargains that have taken place during the last 
decade, especially when such bargains are about changing the rules of the game that 
frame the Chilean mining industry. Here, the mining MNEs have actively used both their 
internal and external resources to impede further changes in the legislation. Regarding 
to the former, the mining MNEs have continually threatened to leave the country if the 
conditions change too much, meaning that the country would lose access to the firm’s 
strategic assets depicted summarised in Figure 36. Additionally, the firms have also used 
their connections with political elites in order to hinder the discussion of new laws; have 
put pressure on the mass media that supports such discussions; and tried to get support 
from the civil society through CSR policies.  
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Hence, mining MNEs have successfully exerted; one the one hand, episodic bargaining 
power by stopping the two attempts to change the current legal status quo (such as 
creating a royalty) and, on the other, non–decisional bargaining power, by effectively 
omitting further discussions about the issue. However, the state has also been able to 
make some gains, by creating new institutions and laws that oblige the mining MNEs to 
change their behaviour. Hence, the Chilean State has exerted some degree of episodic 
bargaining power, but not in the same magnitude as the mining MNEs since it has had 
to face the limitations imposed by the dominant ideology that markets should be left 
alone, and the fear of scaring away the mining firms. Nonetheless, this constrain is slowly 
being fought by an increasingly empowered civil society, which has managed to pressure 
the Chilean State for some significant changes in the current legislation. This may have 
the potential to defy the actual neoliberal ideology constraining the State’s will to fully 
exert its bargaining power. 
One way to understand which agent has been exerting more bargaining power in the 
bargains taking place in Santiago is to return to what Moran (1974) proposed in his book. 
There, he proposed observing which actor is capturing the benefits of the mining activity 
after each bargain (shown in Figure 14, Chapter 5). Hence, a way to measure changes 
in the bargaining position of an actor is to look at the returns that both, the mining MNEs 
and the Chilean State, are getting from the participating in the copper mining GPN. 
According to the traditional bargaining models, after the FDI is materialised, there should 
be an expected shift in the bargaining position from the mining MNEs towards the host 
state, which would be represented in a decrease in the distance between the returns to 
foreign investors and to the host country (Moran, 1974). 
The analysis for the Chilean case is depicted in Figure 37, which considers the returns 
that the foreign investors represented in the GMP – 10 and the Chilean State have 
received between the years 1997 – 2010. This is an interesting period, since 1997 was 
the year the first major mining project (Escondida from BHP) started producing, and it 
takes into account how the trends changed after the beginning of the copper super cycle 
and the 2007 global crisis.  
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Figure 37: Moran's bargaining diagram applied for the Chilean case between 1997 
and 2010 in millions of US$. 
 
Source: own elaboration using data from CIPER and COCHILCO. 
 
Hence, according to Figure 37, the returns to foreign investors have largely and 
increasingly surpassed the ones flowing to the Chilean State in the form of taxes paid by 
the copper industry. Moreover, this gap between the two has significantly increased since 
the start of the copper super cycle, only briefly decreasing after the 2007/2008 global 
crisis. Consequently, and contrary to what Moran proposed, the Chilean State has not 
been able to shorten the distance with the mining MNEs, meaning that the firms have 
been able to exert their bargaining power successfully since the beginning of the current 
copper mining GPN, while also strengthening their overall bargaining position.  
This has deep implications in terms of who is capturing value and, more importantly, the 
possibilities of achieving sustainable development in the host territories. The figure 
shows how the mining MNEs have captured most of the bonanza produced by the copper 
super cycle which, according to the GPN literature, is a sign that a strategic coupling 
between the Chilean State and the mining may not arise - since the firms simply have a 
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better chance of imposing their interests in the bargains at the cost of the Chilean State’s 
strategic objectives. The implications of the relatively stronger bargaining position of the 
mining MNEs achieved at the national level are further developed in a later section, after 
the analysis of the bargains that take place in the Antofagasta Region. 
 
8.5 BARGAINS IN THE ANTOFAGASTA REGION  
 
One of the most relevant differences between the regional and the national bargains 
found was the open conflict between the discourses regarding the role the State should 
play in promoting a sustainable development based on the mining industry. The national 
discourse assumes that the national State should not negotiate with the mining MNEs, 
clashing with the regional uproar for a more active role of the State in developing the 
host mining regions - which grows stronger the closer the actors are to the production 
sites (Bebbington, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2008). However, the same regional politicians 
that advocate for a stronger State, consider bargains with the mining MNEs as something 
that should not be done. In the words of an important regional politician: 
‘We could not talk about a bargain! Because our institutions [referring to the Chilean 
State] do not allow it! To me, [to bargain] even smells bad, because I could not be 
negotiating with a mining firm! (…) so you cannot talk about bargains, there are no 
bargains, they should not exist!’ [INT33]. 
This highlights the depth of the ideological bargaining power exerted by the mining 
MNEs, which has spread all over the country and crystallised in the people’s automatic 
defensive response when asked about bargains directly. Thus, the mining MNEs have 
successfully helped to reinforce the neoliberal ideology so deeply into the Chilean 
population that even its main critiques are not able to get rid of its influence when aiming 
for a stronger state. Nonetheless, this influence gets weaker the more localized the 
bargain is held, since the bargains that take place in the cities or municipalities located 
next to mining production have to deal directly with the consequences of the industry, 
making them less influenced by the dominant neoliberal ideology, and thus, less 
sensitive to the exertion of ideological bargaining power in the negotiations. 
Furthermore, the kinds of bargains taking place in the Antofagasta Region are completely 
different in scope, intensity and aims compared to the ones in Santiago or London. The 
regional State representatives have to face several constraints in terms of their 
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comparative size with the mining MNEs and the completely centralized political regime 
and resistant bureaucracy in Chile. Besides, the region itself is quite centralised, where 
the regional capital city of Antofagasta concentrates most of the political institutions and 
positive externalities associated with the mining industry.  
The bargains take place at different levels within the region, where the regional interests 
are represented in two main political actors: the intendentes at a regional scale, who are 
elected by the central government to represent the president in the regions and vice 
versa; and the mayors, in the local scale, who are democratically elected to administrate 
the municipalities and cities. This section depicts the bargains that take place in the 
region between the mining MNEs and the local state, as well as their relevance for the 
overall copper mining GPN.  
 
8.5.1 The bargains between the regional government and mining MNEs 
 
In terms of the bargains taking place at a regional level between the regional government 
and the mining MNEs, the interviewees firstly and constantly mentioned two considerable 
constraints on the region’s bargaining position: the centralisation of the most strategic 
decisions in Santiago; and the high level of bureaucracy that limits the actions of the 
regional representatives. Regarding the former, an opinion broadly shared is that 
‘everything depends on Santiago, the decisions are made by Santiago, the resources go 
to Santiago, from the desks in Santiago they decide what happens in our municipalities’ 
[city mayor, INT34].  
This centralism is ultimately embodied in the polemical figure of the intendente, who is 
unilaterally designated in Santiago by the president in order to govern the region. Most 
of the intendentes of the Antofagasta Region have been heavily criticized by the local 
population and representatives of the municipalities and cities since, despite being in 
charge of the most important copper producing region of the world, they are perceived 
as ‘not representing us [the cities] (…) because instead of understanding or listening to 
what is happening in the municipalities, they question the social movements and the 
mayors and do not sit to work together with them’ [mayor, INT34].  
The criticism focuses on the perception that the intendentes mostly defend the position 
of the central government instead of the regional and local interests, while also interfering 
in the bargains that may take place between the municipalities and mining MNEs. Hence, 
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the intendentes have sometimes facilitated the exertion of non–decisional bargaining 
power by the mining MNEs by effectively leaving relevant issues out of the regional 
government agenda. Moreover, the few intendentes that try to go against this trend are 
not only limited by the president’s will, but also ‘by the government structure, which 
makes impossible for you [as an intendente] to get too creative (…), since at the end, 
the only thing that matters is the economic criteria’ [former intendente, INT 33], which 
could be understood as a way to defend or deepen the current neoliberal ideology.  
Additionally, the mining MNEs do not relate with the regional and local governments ‘in 
a horizontal way’ since ‘they have the certainty (…) that when they have serious 
problems or want to tackle very strategic issues, they have to deal with the ministries at 
a central level. Even their headquarters are in Santiago, so they only maintain some level 
of philanthropy or a relationship [with the regional and local representatives] which is 
rather formal’ [INT33]. This lack of embeddedness with host territory has been shown 
when the regional government was trying to develop a long term agenda with the mining 
MNEs, where ‘they were invited to build it (…) to share projects so they could visualize 
which ones were going to leave installed capacity in the region, but they never 
compromised, quite the opposite’ [INT33]. All of these, heavily constraints the bargains 
between the regional state and the mining MNEs, and shows an overall lack of intentions 
from the mining MNEs about actively engaging with the region’s necessities and 
demands.  
However, despite the relative indifference of the mining MNEs, some bargains have 
taken place between the intendencia and the mining firms, where the former has been 
able to exert some degree of episodic bargaining power, but only when the latter have 
been interested and willing to do it. This usually happens when the regional government 
bargains in order to build new infrastructure such as highways or ports, which benefit 
both the mining firms and the region. Nonetheless, as a former intendente explained, 
when these bargains have taken place and even reached a strategic coupling between 
both actors’ interests, the central government has not allowed the necessary 
permissions.  
Apparently, the central government does not want to promote these regional bargains, 
since ‘they would not have the power to decide’ [INT33] the terms and conditions of such 
agreements, which may ultimately strengthen the bargaining position of the regional and 
local government not only while facing the mining MNEs, but also the central State. 
Moreover, when some intendentes have insisted on forcing bargains with the mining 
MNEs regarding issues they are not comfortable with, such as the negative externalities 
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of the industry, the firms directly exert their influence over the political elite in Santiago, 
in order to stop the situation and prevent such issues from reaching the political agenda. 
As a mining expert explained:  
‘When an intendente starts putting problems to the [mining] industry, they [the firms] go 
to the Mining Council and say ‘the intendente of the Antofagasta Region is being a pain 
in the ass [sic], so we should go and talk to the President [of the Republic]’, then they go 
there while also sending their lobbyist and say ‘you know what? The intendente is being 
a pain in the ass’ so what does the President does? He says [to the intendente] ‘what 
the hell are you doing there?’ (…) this is because they [the intendentes] lack the political 
influence to produce a change’ [INT 16A]. 
Hence, at the regional level there are stark difference in the capacity to exert every kind 
of bargaining power between the regional government and the mining MNEs. The latter 
focus their bargains to the capital city of the country, exerting episodic and non–
decisional bargaining power indirectly over the region through Santiago, while also 
looking to deepen the neoliberal ideology by exerting ideological bargaining power in 
every node of the copper mining GPN. 
The exertion of the ideological bargaining power can be observed by looking at other 
State institutions operating in the region, such as the SEREMIAS, which limit their actions 
to act only as an intermediary when a conflict arises. Hence, they ‘do not have the 
attributions to get involved unless a law is violated’ [former SEREMI, INT 18] reproducing 
the central discourse of a detached state. Furthermore, these institutions have a very 
weak presence for actually doing something else, like establishing bargains with the 
mining MNEs, or even fulfilling their obligations, since they are heavily under staffed and 
working with limited budget and attributions. As regional politician explained:  
‘When I was an intendente, the Mining SEREMIA had four people in total: the SEREMI, 
a secretary, a driver and an intern (…) the SERNAGEOMIN had 17 inspectors for all the 
region! (…) and when I asked the central government to increase the people they said 
that (…) they considered the State had too much fat’ [INT33].  
The Mining SEREMIAS are the direct representatives of the Mining Ministry in the 
regions, and SERNAGEOMIN is the organization in charge of regulating the mining 
activity. Hence, both are crucial State institutions holding several strategic resources that 
could be used in bargains, which is not the case. Consequently, there is a shared opinion 
in the region that the Chilean State is ‘weakened in the central Ministries, in the regional 
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services, it is weakened in the whole country’ [INT33], something in line with the 
neoliberal ideology imposed by the ideological bargaining power from the mining MNEs.  
Nonetheless, despite the relative weakness of the central State’s regional institutions in 
bargaining with the mining MNEs, the municipalities and cities of the Antofagasta Region 
have managed to pressure the mining MNEs to bargain about certain issues, through 
several strikes, mobilisations and protests. It is in this level where the conflict between 
the mining MNEs and the local communities reaches its highest point. 
 
8.5.2 The bargains between the local government and the mining MNEs 
 
Similarly to the differences in the bargains at the national and at the regional level, the 
local governments have a yet more rebellious and critical position towards the mining 
industry they host. Most of the cities and municipalities located next to the production 
ores, or that serve as ports for exporting the copper, have to deal with the immediate 
externalities caused by the mining industry, since they are perceived as ‘dormitory cities, 
which do not receive the proportional social retribution in terms of expenses in education 
and health compared to what they contribute to the national production’ [INT28,]. Hence, 
the host local spaces receive most of the negative externalities from the industry, like all 
sorts of pollution causing various catastrophic diseases; raising cost of living; lack of 
diversification in the productive fabric; family issues due to the shift system; high 
commutation rate; and a strong presence of unregulated sexual commerce among many 
others.  
Thus, the representatives of the host local spaces have historically raised their demands 
in order to create a sustainable development path based on the mining industry, by 
pressuring the regional and central governments to take a more active role in supporting 
the local bargains with the mining MNEs, and in putting some relevant issues in the 
regional and national political agenda. However, despite the joint effort between the local 
society and its political representatives, the crucial bargains needed in order to reach a 
strategic coupling between the local and private strategic coupling have not been free of 
restrictions. 
The most relevant constraint for the local bargains is the issue of centralism, both at a 
national and at a regional level. The local representatives have tried to overcome this 
matter by creating the Association of Mining Municipalities, which gather mayors from 
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most of the mining cities. This, since as a mayor explained ‘we have been years talking 
and drinking coffee [with the central State and mining MNEs], (…) so we thought it was 
time to take more concrete actions’ [INT34]. By concrete actions he meant two things: 
first, celebrating direct bargains between the host cities and the mining MNEs, to make 
them lessen the negative externalities over the cities and the region, while also 
developing a sustainable and diversified productive fabric; and second, bargains with the 
central state in order to secure a fairer distribution of the mining revenues for the local 
cities and region. 
Consequently, the local representatives have tried to reverse this situation by continually 
calling for bargains with the mining MNEs in order to increase the value captured in the 
Antofagasta region and cities, but such efforts have been systematically hindered by the 
national state. An example of this is provided by a former mayor, who explained that ‘we 
[the mayors of the mining cities] have tried to [bargain] that 100% of the taxes related to 
mining (…) should be paid in the locality, but we have not been able to achieve that (…) 
because of the centralism of our country’ [INT33]. Hence, the national State is not willing 
to allow a greater bargaining position of the local representatives, since the copper 
industry ‘is the main resource that this country has, and thus the Treasury will not resign 
to allow all or even part of the money coming from it to stay here [in the Antofagasta 
Region]’ [INT33], something that hinders the local capacity for exerting episodic and non 
– decisional bargaining power.  
Thus, the local governments have had to deal with the restrictions imposed from the 
central State before being able to bargain with the mining MNEs since, paradoxically, 
the municipalities lack the tools and resources for doing it, even though they are next to 
the biggest and richest copper ores and mining projects of the world. This situation is so 
serious that the city mayors ‘are barely governing and taking care of our [the mayor’s] 
duties (…) because our budget is extremely poor’ [city mayor, INT 34]. Furthermore, the 
lack of autonomy of the local governments is worsened since they ‘cannot even decide 
about several issues related to their budget’ [INT28]. This situation has enraged the 
region’s civil society and representatives of its cities, while also creating a wide 
perception that only the negative effects are distributed in the region while all the positive 
externalities concentrate in Santiago.  
The belief that nothing is being left in the mining regions has been nourished by the 
continuous scandals related to mining MNEs capturing the State’s strategic resources; 
such as the water, where mining firms enjoy full concessions of the scarce water 
resources; and energy, in the sense that the region has extremely high energy prices 
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due to the mining industry’s demand; while also facing several fines for polluting the 
environment and cities with arsenic and lead. Because of this, the Region has seen a 
strong uprising from the indigenous communities to recover and secure their water 
access in the driest desert of the world, as well as several strikes and manifestations 
from the people of Tocopilla, the city located right next to thermoelectric plants. 
Regarding to the pollution issue, the Antofagasta Region has cancer as the biggest 
cause of death (Rojas, 2014). The mining MNEs are fully aware of this situation, which 
they call environmental dumping, and they recognise this ‘will be punished, sooner or 
later’ [CEO mining MNE, INT9].  
What is more, the central State has not only not addressed this situation, but it has also 
directly interfered in favour of the mining MNEs when there have been manifestations 
and strikes, which has only deepened the feeling of injustice and the idea that the region 
is a sacrificed space, leading to more manifestations as a way to pressure the central 
State and mining MNEs (Reyes, 2015). Again, the Chilean’s national state passivity has 
facilitated the exertion of both non–decisional and episodic bargaining power by the 
mining MNEs in the region by securing the freedom of the markets. 
This perception of ‘sacrificed spaces’ is related not only to the high level of negative 
externalities, but also to the lack of amenities and proper infrastructure and the high cost 
of living. In this sense, mining workers ‘prefer to live in other cities, because [Antofagasta] 
is too expensive, so they leave their families in cheaper regions, they [the mining 
workers] just pass through the city’ [Mining journalist, INT37]. Hence, when mining 
workers are sent to live in some of the cities located next to mines, like Calama, they see 
this ‘as a punishment, which is not compensated by your wage at all’ [INT28]. This image 
is further explained by the CEO of a mining MNE ‘if you get the option to live in a city 
with amenities and good quality of services like Santiago, (…) you will try to stay there, 
you spend the higher wages you get in Antofagasta coming to Santiago’ [INT10]. 
Moreover, the mining MNEs are not interested in bargaining with the local authorities. 
When bargains do happen, is in a situation extremely asymmetrical for the local agents 
since ‘each mining firm has an incredible strength in the region it operates, because they 
are located in regions where there are no other sources of industrial development’ 
[Mining Firm representative, INT3]. The mining MNEs know the restrictions the local 
representatives face, the dependency of the regions of the mining activity, and also take 
full advantage of established discourse about mining regions ‘having no power’ and that 
‘every time there is a conflict, the authorities have to go from Santiago [to solve it]’ 
[INT28].  
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Hence, the firms use those constraints in their favour to avoid bargains that may go 
against their strategic objectives. This leads to several situations in which the local 
agents continually try to establish bargains with the mining MNEs but ‘the CEO of a 
mining MNE will only attend you if he wants to, and if you need to talk to him he will not 
care at all because who is going to oblige him? Nobody.’ [Former director of a regional 
agency, INT16A].  
Despite the above, the local representatives have been using their strategic resources, 
as well as making alliances with the civil society in order to oblige the mining MNEs to 
engage in some bargains by threatening their social licence to operate. These alliances 
have become stronger since, as a mayor explained ‘we [the mayor’s office] stand up with 
the people in the streets and join them until the end, which meant to be detained and to 
suffer the same repression [ordered from Santiago] the people did’ [Mayor, INT34]. 
Responding to this, the mining MNEs have chosen to direct such bargains into the CSR 
field, by ‘making the local governments participating in the activities we organize related 
to labour and sustainability issues, such as the support to SMEs’ [CEO Mining MNE, 
INT21]. Hence, the firms consider incorporating some representatives and social actors 
into their CSR policies as what they call the model of the ‘three legged table’, where 
private firms relate with the State and the civil society in a sign of ‘the good and direct 
relationships as allies’ [Director CSR related organization, INT17]. 
These kinds of negotiations mostly consist in deciding what and where the mining MNEs 
will build football stadiums, artificial beaches or others, all of which are ‘visible things 
where the [mining MNEs] can plant their sign (…) which is ten times worth the price of 
what they bought!’ [INT33], a broadly shared opinion. Lately, the mining MNEs have 
developed more ambitious CSR programmes, such as the World’s Suppliers, the CREO 
Antofagasta, and the Calama Plus, created in order to tackle issues such as how to 
develop the local productive fabric, the cities and to secure the socio – economic 
sustainability of the host region.  
Moreover, according to the mining MNEs, they have been forced to develop these 
programmes in order to secure some basic infrastructure in the Region, since there is no 
continuous national or regional development strategy currently aimed at this. As a former 
person in charge of a development programme posit ‘we [the Chilean State] do not have 
long term development policies, we do policies according to who is in power (…) there 
is no continuity!’ [INT20]. However, the results of such private development strategies 
have been far away from what was promised, sometimes even deepening the same 
issues they were supposed to solve. Hence, the policy gap left by the national state and 
245 
 
high centralisation is a backlash for the mining MNEs, making them reconsider if 
promoting the neoliberal ideology is in their best interest. 
Finally, the local communities and representatives have managed bargain about what 
they consider crucial issues for the sustainable development but these negotiations only 
take place when the laws oblige the mining MNEs to do so. Some example are the 
bargains taking place due to the ILO 169 convention, which obliges the mining MNEs to 
make a consultation to get their social licence to operate. However, the mining MNEs 
are the ones organizing the consultations, bringing support from experts that use 
advanced technical language inaccessible for the local indigenous communities. 
Moreover, as an academic who participated actively in several of these bargains 
explained, the mining MNEs can potentially tackle all the relevant issues for the 
communities, ‘everything is negotiable’, but ‘none of the agreements [of these bargains] 
is [legally] binding’ [INT26]. Moreover, the mining MNEs have been involved in several 
scandal over bribing local community representatives (Miño, 2015; Sargent, 2013) ‘in 
order to divide them [the community], to make them not oppose the project’ [INT26], 
since the law only demands to have a consultation. 
Additionally, the mining MNEs are also backed up by the Central State, which sends its 
intendentes or other representatives to the consultations. The Central State formally 
participates in every part of the bargaining process between the communities and mining 
MNEs, but it  
‘intervenes all the decisions, (…) but in favour of any action the firm requires, because 
its role is to facilitate that the firm does what it has to do to make the project happen, but 
when something go wrong and the problems start, the State does nothing, cannot do 
anything (…) because they consider this ‘as a problem between privates’ (…) so the 
people is defenceless, in an absolute defencelessness’ [INT26]. 
Consequently, the mining MNEs have full control of the discussion, being able to decide 
what topics are addressed and what not, hence fully exerting non–decisional bargaining 
power. The central state and sometimes even the regional representatives intervene but 
only in favour of the mining MNE’s interests, being present in every part of the bargain 
‘bringing all the people from the environmental impact assessment system, with all its 
apparatus, but [they] only attend to serve the coffee!’ [INT26]. Consequently, when the 
mining MNEs face the local communities regarding to any negative externalities, where 
they can dominate the agenda, neglect agreements made in the consultation and use 
the Central State as a bodyguard of their interests, exerting a large amount of episodic 
and non–decisional bargaining power over the regional and local actors. 
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This concludes the analysis of the regional bargains and this section which posited that 
there are different kinds of bargains taking place in each node of the Chilean copper 
mining GPN. The outcomes of such bargains will also differ in terms of spatial scope. 
Such outcomes are crucial for understanding the chances that both the country and the 
Antofagasta Region have for reaching sustainable development through mining, as will 
be shown next.  
 
8.6 BARGAINING OUTCOMES IMPLICATIONS FOR VALUE CAPTURE AND 
TERRITORIAL EMBEDDEDNESS  
 
All of the previous bargains taking place in the different nodes of the Chilean copper 
mining GPN have deep implications for the sustainable development possibilities of the 
country and the Antofagasta Region. However, the lack of initiative shown by the central 
State, as well as the constraints it has imposed over the regional and local bargains have 
been an unexpected finding. The mining MNEs have fully exerted the different kinds of 
bargaining power in each node, whereas the Chilean State has acted more as a witness 
instead of actively taking place in the negotiations, as the theory predicted.  
Additionally, the linkages between the Chilean political elite and the mining MNEs have 
also strengthened the dominant neoliberal ideology of free markets, underpinning the 
ideology that the State should not intervene at all. This ideology is not shared by the 
regions which have to deal with the direct outcomes of the mining activity. Hence, this 
section offers a glimpse of the effects of the bargaining processes over the possibilities 
of the Chilean country and Antofagasta region to capture value and the degree in which 
the mining MNEs are embedded in the national and regional territory. 
 
8.6.1 The problems of having a national State not willing to exert its bargaining 
power 
 
As previously mentioned, the mining MNEs have had to face a considerable backlash 
associated to the inactivity of the witness Chilean State they helped to create. The lack 
of a clear development strategy and planning at the national and regional level have 
caused a loss in the mining industry competitiveness, meaning higher operational costs 
due to the lack of energy, water and human capital needed to produce - something 
247 
 
exacerbated by the decrease in the copper prices and the quality of the ores. 
Furthermore, the inadequate planning of the mining cities and mining supplier 
capabilities, among several other issues that should be addressed by the Chilean State, 
have led the mining MNEs to intervene in areas that are outside their field of expertise, 
such as creating development strategies for the whole nation and mining regions. These 
strategies can be separated into two kinds: development of proper infrastructure in the 
host region and cities; and development of productive inputs. 
The regional strategies aim to develop the necessary infrastructure and amenities in the 
mining cities and regions in order to secure the exportation of minerals. Some examples 
are the CREO Antofagasta, and the Calama Plus programmes. Regarding the 
development of productive inputs, the mining MNEs have built several technical training 
institutes, schools and helped institute degrees related to mining in order to develop 
better human capital; while also actively promoting a cluster policy to upgrade their 
suppliers. The cluster policy is a clear example of how far the mining MNEs have 
replaced the State, since this was born as a continuation of the mining cluster initiative 
started by the Chilean State in 2008 quickly fading in 2010. Some mining firms, such as 
BHP and CODELCO, understood that a better set of suppliers, capable of providing 
advanced technological solutions was crucial for their development, and thus, decided 
to state the World Class Suppliers Programme, also initially known as the Mining Cluster.  
Both initiatives have been born due to the indifference of the State to tackle these issues, 
where the mining MNEs have taken the lead inviting the national, regional and local 
representatives to contribute in programmes whose aims have already been defined by 
them. However, these programmes are far from achieving their initial objective. The 
World Class Suppliers programme, for example, aimed to ‘produce 250 world class 
supplier by 2020’ [CEO of a mining MNE directly involved in the programme, INT39], a 
date recently changed to 2035, due to the inability of the programme to develop such 
suppliers based on the weak involvement of the mining MNEs and the Chilean State 
(Valdes, 2016). 
The other programmes have also faced similar criticism due to their failure in producing 
the promised outcomes (El Nortero, 2012; Huerta, 2013). This has turned into a 
considerable issue for the mining MNEs since, as a professor argued, the Chilean central 
state has adopted a witness position where it believes that ‘the big firms should take care 
of [the social issues] (…) transferring all the social responsibility to the firms’ [INT41]. 
The mining MNEs are out of their field of expertise when they create development 
policies and strategies, leading numerous failures and rising frustration. In the words of 
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a mining CEO ‘until when will we [the mining firms] have to do things to solve social 
issues?! We pay taxes!’ [INT11].  
Hence, the national state’s passivity and detachment from the mining industry has turned 
into a distraction and a source of problems for the mining MNEs; while also leaving the 
Antofagasta Region and the country completely aimless in terms of its development path. 
The central State is mostly worried about ‘letting the institutions work’ while capturing 
most of the value produced, while the Antofagasta Region has tried to develop some 
medium and long term development strategies to redistribute the capture of value locally, 
and to increase the degree of territorial embeddedness of the mining MNEs. Hence, the 
question of who captures value and where it is captured turns into a crucial issue in order 
to evaluate the sustainable development chances of both the Antofagasta Region and 
the country as a whole. 
 
8.6.2 Who, where and how? Value capture and territorial embeddedness 
 
From all of the information presented above, it is especially clear that the mining MNEs 
are capturing most of the value within the Chilean copper mining GPN. As Figure 29 in 
Chapter 7 (Utilities of the GMP - 10 before taxes) and Figure 37 (Moran's bargaining 
diagram) show, the magnitude and speed in which the mining MNE’s utilities have grown 
since 2003 has long overcome the returns that Chile is getting from the copper industry. 
Only between 1997, when Escondida started, until 2010, the GMP10 accumulated 
85.000 million US$. This is 3.6 times what the Chilean State received from taxes, which 
was almost 24.000 million US$ during the same period. To have some perspective, BHP 
initially invested around 836 million US$ during the 90’s to start Escondida (Minería 
Chilena, 2014), the largest copper producer in the world, a sum that represents less than 
1% of the total accumulated utilities from the GMP10 between 1997 and 2010, meaning 
the whole investment has been far recovered.  
Hence, the mining MNEs have successfully captured most of the benefits of the copper 
mining industry and the super cycle, since they have had the upper hand in most of the 
bargains celebrated along the whole copper mining GPN. The mining MNEs have 
exerted the three proposed forms of bargaining power in each node, making the Chilean 
State and regions adapt their behaviour so the firms could achieve strategic objectives, 
namely, maximise their utilities. Not only this, but they have also contributed to the 
development of a indolent and detached national state by feeding the free market 
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ideology, where the central state not only limits its actions to merely observing that laws 
are being abided by, but it also impedes bargains between the regions and communities 
and the mining MNEs. 
Moreover, due to the extreme centralism of the country, most of the value kept within 
Chile stays in Santiago. The capital monopolises the crucial bargains with the mining 
MNEs, collects their taxes and re–distributes the incomes from the mining industry to the 
rest of the country in the form of regional funds for promoting the development – which, 
significantly, do not reflect each region’s contribution to the national income. As Table 13 
shows, the Antofagasta Region only receives an average of 3% of the fiscal spending 
despite its crucial contribution to the country’s GDP and exports. The same table shows 
how the Metropolitan Region concentrates most of the total investment for the period 
available, a third of the total, something confirmed by the director of a mining agency:  
‘In the case of Chile, 99% of the revenues from mining is going to the central government 
and the redistribution is an issue, there is not a fair policy, so the regions are not 
comfortable with the tax situation’ [INT47]. 
This extreme centralization of public expenditure and value capture not only affects 
Antofagasta, but also the whole mining region located in the northern part of the country. 
As Table 13 shows, the four most important mining regions: Arica and Parinacota, 
Tarapaca, Antofagasta and Atacama, concentrate less than 10% of the total fiscal 
expenditure between 2013 and 2015. This contrasts with the central regions of 
Valparaiso and Metropolitana, concentrating an average of 40%; as well as the rest of 
the southern regions, which sum around 45%.  
Hence, the mining regions, especially Antofagasta, only capture value directly through 
the patents the mining MNEs pay, and the CSR expenditures, which are not proportional 
to their contribution to the national wealth at all. Similarly, these regions capture value 
indirectly through the fund called Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional (National Fund 
for Regional Development), a grant fund based on projects, and what is left in the local 
supplier companies and workers that live in the region. All these have been considered 
insufficient by all the local politicians, experts and representatives interviewed. A 
transversally shared explanation for this concentration was that the political and 
entrepreneurial elite live in Santiago or in the southern cities, as well as most highly 
payed workers of the mining MNEs. This groups represent the political Chilean elite, 
which controls the allocation of public funds through the Treasury. Consequently, the 
political and entrepreneurial elite will promote the expenditure of public funds in the cities 
where they reside, Santiago or other Southern cities, using the mining regions only as a 
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place to work. This phenomenon creates a secondary source of value capture by the 
central and southern regions, through the commutation of mining workers to the mining 
regions. 
 
Table 16: Fiscal spending assigned by region. Values in million pesos of 2015. 
Region 
% of the total 
2013 
% of the total 
2014 
*% of the total 
2015 
Arica and 
Parinacota 1.72% 1.80% 1.82% 
Tarapacá 2.18% 2.33% 2.30% 
Antofagasta 3.44% 3.23% 3.25% 
Atacama 2.09% 2.13% 1.96% 
Coquimbo 4.47% 4.77% 5.00% 
Valparaíso 11.30% 10.91% 11.02% 
Metropolitana 29.24% 28.93% 30.14% 
O’Higgins 5.32% 5.10% 5.00% 
Maule 6.72% 6.51% 6.17% 
Bio Bio 14.10% 13.64% 12.93% 
Araucanía 6.99% 7.34% 7.68% 
Los Ríos 2.81% 3.09% 2.85% 
Los Lagos 6.22% 6.73% 6.41% 
Aysén 1.45% 1.50% 1.38% 
Magallanes 1.95% 1.97% 2.10% 
TOTAL 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
*The year 2015 is missing some data. 
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Observatorio del Gasto Fiscal en Chile, 
DIPRES and INE. 
The long distance commuting of mining workers has become a relatively new 
characteristic of the Chilean mining industry, a process facilitated by the higher wages 
and benefits offered, the shift system and decrease in transport costs that allows the fly–
in, fly–out of the labour force, the high living costs of some of the mining regions. This 
issue is especially pervasive in the Antofagasta Region, which according to Atienza et 
al. (2012) and Aroca and Atienza (2008) has the highest net rate of regional commuting 
in the country. They estimate that, in 2002, around 10% of the total workers in the region 
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were commuting from other parts of Chile, reaching around 18% in 2016 according to 
the data from the INE. From these, 75% belong to activities directly related to the mining 
industry, and most of them live in Santiago or other southern cities, where they spend 
the most significant part of their wages. Hence, the high commutation is another way 
through which a significant portion of value generated in the Antofagasta Region is 
captured in Santiago or other regions; while also reinforcing the idea of Antofagasta as 
a sacrificed space. 
Related to the commuting issue, is the composition of the labour force hired by the mining 
MNEs. This has drastically changed from being completely integrated into the firms in 
the 1970’s, to a situation where almost 70% of the total labour force working on the 
mining MNEs is now subcontracted or outsourced (Atienza, Lufin, Soto, & Cortés, 2015; 
Atienza, Lufin, Soto, Cortes, et al., 2015). Hence, the mining MNEs have outsourced all 
the parts of the production chain which are not considered extremely strategic (Phelps 
et al., 2015; Urzúa, 2012). Moreover, the labour conditions offered to the outsourced 
workers are a lot worse compared to the workers contracted by the mining firms, in terms 
of lower wages, less benefits and scarce possibilities to form unions. This has created 
all sorts of social issues, but also an additional way to capture value in other regions, 
since most of the workers hired by the mining MNEs commute; whereas the outsourced 
workers usually live in the cities close to the mining ores due to their lower wages. 
Another way in which value is captured either by the mining MNEs or other regions is 
related to how the mining MNEs interact with the local productive fabric and communities. 
Such issues are directly intertwined with the degree of territorial embeddedness of the 
mining MNEs, in the form of the economic linkages developed by the mining MNEs with 
the local suppliers, which are the most strategic actors in developing a diversified and 
sustainable economic local development.  
The economic linkages developed between the mining MNEs and the local SMEs 
suppliers have been a traditional way to understand the level of territorial embeddedness 
in the mining industry. This is a decisive element, since the number, quality and kind of 
economic linkages developed within the region will determine the potential diversification 
that the productive fabric can develop, ultimately meaning increasing the chances of 
reaching sustainable socio – economic development.  
The economic linkages of the copper mining MNEs with the Antofagasta Region have 
been profoundly studied recently, to respond how sustainable is the regional economy if 
the main foreign firms decide to leave the country (Aroca, 2001; Cademartori, 2002, 
2008). These studies have mostly found that, contrary to the nitrate era, the copper 
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mining MNEs have developed a great number of economic linkages with SMEs regional 
suppliers. However, they also found that most of the linkages developed are related to 
products and services that do not require or promote new technological advances. Most 
of the purchases made by the mining MNEs in the Antofagasta Region are related with 
basic services such as catering, transport and accommodation; and some basic goods 
for feeding and maintaining the labour force in the mining camps, all of which are 
activities that will not survive if the mining activity ceases. 
Moreover, there is an extreme dependency of the mining suppliers from the mining MNEs 
as it has been shown by the works of (Atienza et al., 2009; Atienza et al., 2012; Atienza 
et al., 2006). They interviewed 447 SMEs in the Antofagasta Region in 2005 and 597 in 
2009, finding that around two thirds of the sales of such SMEs are direct supplies for the 
mining industry, and that almost 85% of the sales of the direct and indirect SME suppliers 
of the mining industry are concentrated in only one client (Atienza et al., 2012). This trend 
was underlined by a politician who explained that ‘the degree of dependency of some of 
our [local] medium entrepreneurs who depend almost 70% on one contract is disastrous’ 
[INT33].  
Hence, the monopsonistic nature of the mining industry due to their hub and spokes 
topology, and the dependency developed by the local SMEs supplying them, have led to 
some very unequal relationships. This relates to what Phelps (1996) argues by stating 
that, despite the rise of networks, buyer supplier relations are often hierarchical and 
involve dependency. In this sense, the mining MNEs defend the idea that they aim to 
have a ‘pact (…) win–win agreements’ [Superintendent mining MNE, INT32], but the 
reality shows exactly the opposite. For the critics, the mining MNEs ‘are not collaborative 
with their partners’, since ‘the mining industry is too cost orientated and not very value 
orientated (…) so the prices are extremely relevant’ [CEO of a big supplier, INT24]. This 
focus on prices means that ‘at the end several of the decisions are taken considering the 
cheapest suppliers instead of the most efficient ones’ [mining expert, INT25] since ‘in 
general in the mining industry you only compete through costs, you have to keep the 
costs low despite what happens with the [copper] price’ [Superintendent mining MNE, 
IN32]. 
Consequently, the initial bargains held between the mining MNEs and the local SMEs 
suppliers are ‘extremely asymmetrical’ since when ‘a supplier that is small and has a 
contract with a [mining MNE] and the [mining MNE] needs to reduce costs, it will 
immediately say to the supplier ‘hey, lower the cost by half or get out of here’ and the 
[supplier] is obliged to reduce costs’ [mining expert, INT28]. Moreover, the SMEs 
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suppliers do not have the capacity to bargain with the mining MNEs, as ‘they do not know 
how to defend their business and are always fighting for getting the biggest part of the 
cake’ [Mining expert, INT20], an opinion that highlights how successful have been the 
mining MNEs in making the suppliers compete instead of joining forces to improve their 
bargaining position. 
Thus, the asymmetrical bargaining situation has allowed the mining MNEs to fully exert 
their bargaining power over the SMEs suppliers in several dimensions. As an example, 
the decrease in the copper prices has caused the unilateral renegotiation by the mining 
MNEs of several contracts, since: 
‘As soon as the copper [price] starts going down, the first thing they [the mining MNEs] 
do is to renegotiate their contracts with the SMEs, I mean, the first thing they say to the 
SMEs is that they ‘have to be solidary’’ [INT20]. However, when ‘the copper [price] goes 
up they do not tell us [to the SMEs] ‘look we are better now, so we will going to give you 
more now in order to compensate for the period in which you had less profits’, that does 
not exists’ [CEO of a local SMEs supplier, INT24]. 
Additionally, the mining MNEs usually pay their suppliers on a deferred basis, which can 
take 30 or even 60 days after they received the good or service purchased, something 
imposed through a culture of fear where the SMEs do not dare to question the mining 
MNEs position. A mining expert that worked with the SMEs suppliers explained that 
‘several SMEs entrepreneurs came [to me] asking for help! Asking me to please tell the 
mining MNEs to pay! Because (…) the entrepreneurs hired personal and supplies, and 
the [mining MNEs] (…) say ‘this month we are going to pay to this or that supplier or we 
are going to invest the money’ (…) so they [mining MNEs] can negotiate as they want, 
there are no restrictions for them (…) and sadly several entrepreneurs have gone 
bankrupt and lost everything’ [INT20]. 
Regarding the fear culture, while interviewing the CEOs of the mining SMEs suppliers 
some of them requested not be recorded and one began crying when asked about their 
firm’s relationships with the mining MNEs, because they were afraid of possible 
retaliations. One of the CEOs of a SMEs supplier disclosed that when any SME tries to 
ask for better conditions, the mining MNEs immediately say ‘that person is complicated, 
we should set [him/her] aside (…) so I have to be very careful’ [INT 19]. Even the big 
suppliers are affected by this, since as the CEO of one of such firms with international 
scope and based in Santiago explained, the mining MNEs do not take it very well when 
the suppliers actually do not comply with unilateral renegotiation of prices and conditions: 
254 
 
‘They [the mining MNEs] get angry and do not invite you [to negotiate] in two years! (…) 
there is a lot of discomfort, and they take it very personal, which is not the case with other 
industries (…) the mining culture is different than the other industries, because they are 
somehow convinced that they are the wage of Chile, and thus, all the ecosystem 
surrounding them has to do what they want (…) and the small firms generally surrender 
to this, but is not the case of our firm’ [INT24]. 
Not only this, but the mining MNEs also demand high quality and standards in the 
production of the goods and services they require, as an expert regarding to the local 
SMEs explained ‘if you [as a supplier] do not have a management system from the start 
(…) if you are not certified it means that you are not a reliable firm, so they [the mining 
MNEs] will not consider you’ [INT20]. This attitude has created two problems: one related 
to the high indebtedness of the SMEs suppliers since the certificate process is quite 
expensive and the industry requires several certifications; and another associated with 
the mining MNEs demanding high quality standards and low prices, all of which 
destabilizes the SMEs and make them exit the market.  
Hence, despite the fact that there are programmes such as the ‘World Class Suppliers’ 
promoted by some mining MNEs, as well as a discourse promoting strong partnerships 
and linkages with the local suppliers to develop technological spillovers and 
collaboration, the relationship between them to develop innovations ‘is quite 
asymmetrical (…) since the suppliers want to get paid by the innovation and for all the 
human capital they use, and not only for the man – hours they spent (…) because they 
[the mining MNEs] only pay the man – hours and not all the test and errors that happened 
in order to bring them a new knowledge’ [INT28]. All of these issues have led to a 
creation/destruction rate of firms in the region that is above the national average (Atienza 
et al., 2009; Atienza et al., 2012). 
More critically, recent research shows that around 75% of the suppliers of the mining 
industry are located in the central region, and only around 25% in the Antofagasta Region 
(Valdes, 2016). This reinforces the value capture in the Central Regions, while also 
raising several doubts about how beneficial is the mining industry for the host region. 
Moreover, the supplying network of the mining industry is globally spread, and most of 
the strategic goods and services are being imported to the country by the mining MNEs. 
This leaves the Antofagasta Region specialized in routine tasks, with scarce 
technological content, making the creation of a diversified local productive fabric based 
on goods and services with a high content of value added, extremely difficult (Phelps et 
al., 2015). 
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Hence, the mining MNEs’ degree of embeddedness with the local fabric, one of the most 
relevant for the local sustainable development, is extremely weak, since they have the 
upper hand in all the bargains taking place locally and nationally when facing their 
suppliers. This has permitted the capture of most of the value by the mining MNEs; and 
the capture of whatever value is left in the country by the Metropolitan Region. The latter 
being done by concentrating the fiscal expenditures, commuters and the strategic 
suppliers of the mining industry. However, several cluster policies have been promoted 
in order to make the territorial distribution of value more equitable with the host regions 
and to change the previous enclave formation, raising the question: is the Antofagasta 
Region closer to a sustainable cluster or does still have elements from an unsustainable 
enclave? 
  
8.6.3 Sustainable cluster or unsustainable enclave based GPN? 
 
What can be called the mining cluster/enclave debate in the copper mining GPN has 
been present from the early 1990’s, and today and twenty six years later is far from 
concluded. It started as part of the discussion of a national development strategy in Chile, 
when the ECLAC was heavily promoting clusters as a way to diversify the local 
productive fabric; to reach the evasive sustainable development in resource rich regions; 
and to avoid the re–appearance of the disastrous traditional mining enclaves. Later, 
cluster policy was promoted by the local industrial association AIA and it materialized in 
the Regional Development Strategy 2000–2006, which promoted the creation of a mining 
cluster and the Antofagasta Region. At this point, the cluster policy became the flagship 
of the Regional government, and had a limited participation of the mining MNEs. The 
mining cluster augmented its scope, becoming a national policy in 2008 as part of the 
National Competitiveness Strategy, where the national clusters were thought as a viable 
option. Hence, in 2008 both cluster policies, the regional and the national, coexisted, with 
a larger participation by the mining MNEs, the national and local states and local 
associations (Atienza, 2015). 
However, in 2009 the newly elected right wing government stopped the State’s active 
participation in the cluster policy, since they believed in a ‘no discrimination policy’ 
between the different productive sectors and in the ‘separation between business and 
development’ [INT45]. In this context, BHP decided to start the Mining Cluster Program 
of World Class Suppliers. This brief story of the cluster policy has a common 
denominator, the overall assumption that there is an instant strategic coupling between 
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the mining MNEs and local/national strategic objectives (Yeung, 2016), and that this 
coupling will occur naturally thanks to the free market forces leading to a sustainable 
development for both the host region and country.  
Lately, the discussion about the mining cluster has taken another turn, in which the last 
mining policy, the Alta Ley programme, does not even mention the word cluster once, 
while also only focusing on the national scale, completely ignoring the regional dimension 
(Comisión de Minería y Desarrollo de Chile, 2014). Moreover, some influential 
academics have been promoting the idea that if there is a mining cluster, it encompasses 
a national scale, meaning a national mining cluster. This idea clashes with what the local 
associations and politicians in Antofagasta aimed with the cluster policy, who pretended 
to develop more and better economic linkages between the mining MNEs and the region. 
Hence, there are two major collapsing views about where should the mining cluster be 
located. The national cluster view is summarised by an academic from Santiago, expert 
on the mining industry: 
‘They [the local associations in Antofagasta] invented this concept of cluster in 
Antofagasta, and they said that the cluster existed in Antofagasta, because it was the 
main producer of copper, which I think is not a very intelligent idea, because if you look 
at the data, the cluster is located here [in Santiago] (…) 80% of the companies have 
headquarters here’ [INT48]. 
This opinion has been heavily criticized by academics, local industrial associations, local 
SMEs and local politicians and representatives of the Antofagasta Region, all of which 
highlight the relevance of the positive externalities that a specialized agglomeration 
around the big copper mining industry for the local development possibilities. An 
interesting statement summarizing this shared opinion comes from a politician, who 
posited that this shift from the regional to national scope had to do with a ‘dispossession’ 
of value from the centre. In the politician’s words: 
‘In my time [as a representative] I had the feeling of dispossession in the sense that the 
[central] government of that period installed the cluster in Santiago, and that is when they 
started talking about a national cluster. The mining cluster had been located here [in 
Antofagasta], its director and everything were here in the region, (…) but it moved to 
Santiago (…) and that caused us to lose control absolutely (…) because we are such a 
centralised country, our resources are managed so centrally through the Treasury, which 
decides what and where to spend, that obviously they [the central government] wanted 
to have the control of these topics’ [INT33]. 
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All this discussion also assumes that the traditional nitrate enclaves have been overcome 
long ago in Chile. However, there is a growing body of empirical works which disagree 
with this vision. The works of Cademartori (2008) and Phelps et al. (2015) shave asked 
if the enclave logic is really a thing of the past, of if there are some elements of it still 
pervading the mining industry, operating under a new form. In this sense, is possible to 
create two opposite ideal types of agglomeration that can develop in a mining region, 
based on the Marshallian externalities: the existence (or not) of a thick labour market, 
economic linkages and knowledge spillovers in the Antofagasta Region.  
By doing this, it has been found that the Antofagasta Region is closer to what can be 
considered a modern mining enclave rather than a hub and spoke cluster a la Markusen 
(1996). This since, despite the regional growth rate shown during the last copper GPN 
era, the labour market is functionally specialized in routine physical tasks with limited 
decision–making capacity and largely depends on outside workers; the economic mining 
MNEs have weak linkages with the productive fabric; and there is a limited vertical 
transference of knowledge from the headquarters of the mining MNEs to the local firms.  
All these raised several questions about the sustainability of the regional growth and long 
term possibilities for local development.  
Furthermore, the work of Phelps et al. (2015), posit that the enclave formation can be 
considered as part of the dark side of belonging to a mining GPN. Their work offered a 
deeper interpretation of the several intermediate implications that the current mining 
camps may have in terms of developing agglomeration economies or new forms of 
mining enclaves. This research finds that the Chilean copper mining GPN is a good 
example of how the traditional enclave has opened its fences in the sense that, despite 
the abandonment of the traditional mining towns, the newly developed mining camps 
around the ore, the shift system and the commutation of workers, could mean that the 
enclave is not tightly delimited into a specific territory but is spread all over the regional 
and national territory. Hence, they conclude, there is evidence that Chile represents a 
nation as enclave due to the lack of significant localization economies in the Antofagasta 
Region, but that this is also debatable due to the signs of something of an agglomeration 
of mining services suppliers in Santiago (Phelps et al., 2015). 
Considering all the above, there is no absolute response to which kind of agglomeration 
is being produced by the Chilean copper mining GPN. However, the evidence seems to 
show that the current agglomeration is closer to what can be considered a modern mining 
enclave at a regional and national level. At a regional level, there are no signs of strong 
localization economies or Marshallian externalities needed for the development of a 
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mining cluster. At a national level, there is a high value capture by the mining MNEs, a 
strong mono–dependency on the copper industry, a scarce development of 
technologically advanced suppliers, or activities that add value within the country.  
All of this is complemented by the findings of this thesis regarding to the stark power 
asymmetries between the regional and national State and the mining MNEs. The 
detachment from the mining industry developed at a national level has impeded the 
national state to hold bargains with the mining MNEs, while also deterring regional 
bargains between the local representatives and the mining MNEs. This has caused a 
strategical void, where the mining MNEs have had to assume the State’s role in 
developing a regional and national development strategies for the mining industry, in 
order satisfy their needs of basic inputs and services usually provided by the state.  
Moreover, the Chilean copper mining GPN is not only dependent in an economic sense, 
as all the previous works about the mining enclave demonstrated, but also in a deeper 
way through the neoliberal ideology that shields the mining MNEs from being pushed to 
bargain better conditions for both the nation and host regions. Likewise, the mining 
MNE’s continuous exertion of their episodic and non–decisional bargaining power over 
the regional and national actors have led to a situation in which the growth shown by the 
mining industry is not sustainable, since the country has not developed a diversified 
productive fabric; it has not been able to increase its share of value captured; and 
centralises both the direct economic benefits as well as the indirect ones in the 
Metropolitan Region. All this reinforces the idea that the current copper mining GPN is 
closer to the dark side, in the form of a regional and national mining enclave, rather than 
the promised sustainable cluster, since the country and the Antofagasta region have not 
been able to reach a strategic coupling with the mining MNEs due to the stark bargaining 
power imbalances. 
 
8.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has developed the bargains taking place in the three most important nodes 
within the Chilean copper mining GPN, namely, London, Santiago and Antofagasta. In 
each node, the mining MNEs operating in Chile and the Chilean State use their strategic 
resources in a different way, some times more aggressively than others. The London 
node is the one where the main bargains take place for all the copper mining industry, 
since is where the copper is traded and the main headquarters are located. Here, the 
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Chilean State uses every chance it has in order to promote further FDI into the country, 
by marketing all the strategic resources the country has. On the other hand, the mining 
MNEs also try to get the best deal in order to keep investing.  
Furthermore, and contrary to what the theory proposed, there are not too many bargains 
taking place in Santiago. The Chilean national State has become detached and passive, 
by reducing its participation in the economy to just making sure the mining MNEs abide 
the current regulations. Hence, the mining MNEs have been able to fully exert their 
episodic, non–decisional and ideological bargaining power in this node, which has had 
several crucial impacts over the development chances of the country. 
Finally, the bargains that should take place in the Antofagasta region between the mining 
MNEs and local representatives have been systematically interrupted by the central 
government. This, since due to the magnitude and relevance of the mining industry, the 
central government wants to monopolise their influence over it. However, several social 
movements have pressured the local and national representatives in order to bargain 
and regulate the mining industry.  
All of this, has had several implications for the national and local development. The 
presence of an uninvolved national state has caused issues to all the agents involved in 
the copper mining GPN. Additionally, most of the value has been captured by the mining 
MNEs, and the little fraction left in the country has been captured by the Metropolitan 
Region, leaving the Antofagasta region in a very precarious situation. This, since the 
region has not been able to develop a diversified productive fabric, or to benefit from 
localized spillovers, while suffering all the costs of the mining production.  
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Figure 38: GPN approach summary. 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Hence the bargaining power asymmetry found for this case, has caused a situation 
where both the Antofagasta Region and the country seem to be closer to what be 
considered a new form of mining enclave (see Figure 38), meaning unsustainable growth 
and hindering their development chances. All of this is in line with what the GPN 
framework predicts, since the power asymmetry lead to high value capture by the mining 
MNEs and central regions, a lack of territorial embeddedness, and a disconnection 
between the strategic objectives of the private firms and the States, meaning that this 
GPN has not been able to develop a strategic coupling. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This research inserts itself within the long-standing discussion about the effects of FDI 
for mining regions and countries under the latest globalisation process. This debate 
comprises a vast literature about the nature of such effects, where some argue that 
countries and regions benefit from the FDI inflows and presence of mining MNEs, while 
others are more critical about the sustainable development possibilities the mining 
industry offers. Both approaches have historically focused on the national level, limiting 
the regional and international dimensions to a background context, where the positive or 
negative spillovers take place. 
However, the outcomes experienced by the host regions and countries heavily depend 
on how the actors participating in a GPN take advantage of their strengths, despite the 
constraints they face, when bargaining with each other. In this line, resource-rich 
countries have historically faced a ‘resource curse’, being unable to overcome their 
dependency to the natural resource, diversify their economies and, therefore, develop in 
a sustainable way. Moreover, this discussion has not fully analysed the consequences 
of the uneven development happening within a nation State. As the Dependencia 
literature shows (Cardoso & Faletto, 2007), a country can enjoy high growth rates at a 
national level, creating an illusion of growth. However, this growth has traditionally 
depended on the formation of extractive enclaves in the host regions (Cademartori, 2008; 
Weisskoff & Wolff, 1977), where most of the value is captured and social costs are 
externalised by the extractive MNEs. 
This research aims to contribute in this debate, especially regarding to the effects of the 
mining industry over uneven development along the mining GPN. To do this, it considers 
the Global Production Network (GPN) approach, which explicitly acknowledges how 
uneven development may be taking place in the spaces hosting FDI and MNEs. This 
approach highlights the relevance of reaching a strategic coupling between the strategic 
objectives of the main actors of the GPN, namely, the MNEs, the civil society and the 
local/national State. This coupling process takes place through several bargains 
between the main actors, in every relevant node of the production network. Likewise, the 
outcomes of these bargains in terms of who and where value is captured, are ultimately 
determined by the power asymmetries between the agents, which are also related to the 
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level of embeddedness of the MNEs with the host region and country (Coe et al., 2008a; 
Coe et al., 2008b; Coe et al., 2004; Coe & Hess, 2011; Henderson et al., 2002). 
However, the GPN approach can usefully be developed further. Firstly, it has not 
theoretically and empirically opened what some call the ‘black box of power’ ; and 
secondly, apart from the work of Bridge (2008), it has not been fully adapted and applied 
to the study of the mining industry despite recognition of its relevance (Coe et al., 2004). 
Thus, this research tries to unpack the black box of power by: incorporating and updating 
the bargaining models developed in international business literature as a way to develop 
operational definitions of bargaining power; adapting the GPN approach for the study of 
a mining GPN, specifically, the Chilean copper mining industry; and focusing and re–
evaluating the role of the State in bargaining processes with mining MNEs. 
Hence, this research responds the four research questions raised at the beginning: 
1. How can the GPN approach be incorporated in analysing the extractives industries, 
specifically the mining one, and in determining the chances of reaching (or not) 
sustainable development in the host region and country? 
 
2. How can the concept of bargaining power, crucial in GPNs, be conceptually unpacked; 
in order to explain issues related to value capture, such as where and how is value being 
ultimately captured and by whom? 
 
3. What kind of empirical evidence about the successive bargains taking place between the 
mining MNEs and Chilean State in different nodes can be provided, and what are the 
implications for sustainable development of the outcomes of these bargains? 
 
4. What is the role of the State in the successive bargains taking place with the mining 
MNEs in the current Chilean copper mining GPN? 
The research makes a theoretical contribution by incorporating some new (and old) 
elements into the GPN approach, to address how the host regions and countries can 
improve their sustainable development chances. It also provides empirical evidence 
related to how the historical bargaining processes have taken place in the mining industry 
in Chile, and the outcomes these bargains have produced. The focus is on the current 
globalization period, by identifying what are the main strategic resources hold by the two 
actors studied, the mining MNEs and the State, while also pinpointing the major 
constraints each actor faces while trying to exert (or not) the different kinds of bargaining 
power.  
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The research is organized by firstly introducing the GPN literature as a broad framework 
to study uneven development in the extractive industry, where power asymmetries 
determine the strategic coupling possibilities during the successive bargains taking place 
between the actors involved. It later tries to unpack the black box of power, by proposing 
three operational definitions based on the power debate and bargaining literature. It also 
stipulates the possible spatial outcomes that the exertion of bargaining power can cause. 
Then, the Chilean copper GPN is proposed as the case study, leading to an historical 
analysis of the previous mining GPNs existing in the country. This, in order to evaluate 
how the bargaining power asymmetries between the Chilean State and mining MNEs 
and development outcomes have evolved. Afterwards, the focus is on the current 
neoliberal era, where the research describes each actor’s strategic resources and 
constraints in order to have a grasp of their potential bargaining power. Finally, the 
research analyses the bargains among these actors in each spatial node, in terms of the 
episodic, non-decisional and ideological bargaining power they exert, as well as the 
spatial implications of them. A summary of the main findings of these research is detailed 
next.  
 
9.2 MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
9.2.1 Adapting the GPN approach to the study of the copper industry by 
incorporating bargaining models. 
 
As previously established, this research aims to contribute both in a theoretical and 
empirical way. Regarding to the theoretical addition, it firstly adapts the GPN approach 
by following the work of Bridge (2008) for the oil industry to study the copper mining 
industry, considered the most important of metals. Hence, using this as a guideline, the 
research addresses the always latent issue of how to deal with power by incorporating 
and updating the literature about bargaining models. This literature was firstly proposed 
during the 1970’s in the obsolescence bargaining models (Bergsten et al., 1978; Fagre 
& Wells, 1982; Kobrin, 1987; Moran, 1974), which proposed that resource rich countries 
would have to initially bargain under unfavourable conditions with the mining MNEs due 
to their lack of technology, financial capital, know–how and market access, to then hold 
the upper hand after the investments were made and the costs sunk – allowing them to 
change the initial conditions and capture a higher proportion of value.  
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This theoretical body only focused on the State–mining MNE tier of bargain, and it was 
progressively abandoned. However, it has been recently revived in the form of new 
research incorporating a secondary tier. In these two tier models, the nation State also 
bargains with the countries where the headquarters are located, while also being 
influenced by some international institutions that intervene influencing the bargains to 
favour the mining MNE’s interests (Nebus & Rufin, 2010; Ramamurti, 2001). Moreover, 
the GPN literature explicitly mentions the bargaining models as a way to open the black 
box or power (Bridge, 2008), so the updated traditional obsolescence bargaining models 
become a decisive way in determining the value capture and potential development 
outcomes for the FDI hosting spaces. 
Consequently, this research incorporates the recent two tier bargaining models into the 
GPN approach, while also recognizing that bargains take place in multiple tiers: between 
the nation state and the firms; between the nation state and the international institutions 
and headquarters; but also in a subnational level between regional states and the mining 
MNEs. Hence, this is an additional theoretical contribution, tested by the empirical work 
of this thesis. The empirics focused in the bargains taking place in the three tiers, while 
also addressing how the international institutions could influence the bargains.  
The empirical work found that, effectively, several bargains take place in the most 
important nodes of the Chilean copper mining GPN: The Antofagasta Region as the 
place of production; Santiago, political and economic capital of Chile; and London, home 
of main headquarters and copper trading places and most important mining institutions. 
The results showed that the bargaining outcomes varied in scope and relevance 
according to the hierarchy of the node where they took place. The higher the hierarchy, 
such as London, the higher the relevance of the bargains for the whole industry, as well 
as the scope of the outcomes. However, the bargains taking place in lesser hierarchy 
nodes, such as Antofagasta, could also potentially affect the whole industry, meaning 
that the bargaining outcomes are not vertical but a flow of positive and negative effects  
(Bridge, 2008; Coe et al., 2008b; MacKinnon, 2012; Yeung & Coe, 2015). This result 
means that considering the ‘bright and dark sides’ from belonging to a GPN is crucial for 
future research and, therefore, more studies should focus on the latter, due to the 
potentially disastrous consequences for developing host economies and regions. 
Moreover, most of bargains related to luring further FDI into Chile happened in London, 
as well as the ones related to the conditions offered to the mining MNEs to establish new 
or further projects. Santiago hosts several of the bargains related to the national 
legislation, especially regarding to the way in which the incomes from the industry are 
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distributed, while the Antofagasta Region has witnessed an increasing social pressure 
for bargaining with both the national State and mining MNEs in order to increase the 
capture of value in the region and promoting a diversified productive fabric and 
sustainable development. Consequently, these findings emphasise the need to focus on 
subnational bargains (regional and local) in future GPN research, especially the way in 
which the exertion of power in bargains determine strategic coupling and sustainable 
development. 
Additionally, and despite what the recent literature about bargaining posits, the empirical 
work presents interesting and unexpected findings about the role of international 
institutions: they have little to no effect in the successive bargains taking place in the 
Chilean copper mining GPN, since the country is not indebted. Thus, the mining MNEs 
have not been able to influence the Chilean State through institutions such as the IMF 
and World Bank, in the same way they used to do it during the previous Chilean mining 
GPNs, such as the early copper one, where the American copper mining MNEs 
successfully managed to get the American government involved in a similar way the 
British mining MNEs did during the nitrate era. This is an unexpected finding, since most 
of the updated bargaining models (Nebus & Rufin, 2010; Ramamurti, 2001) consider the 
international tier as a crucial space of influence to tilt the balance of bargaining power 
towards the mining MNE’s interests. This could potentially mean that the Chilean State 
is in a stronger position due to its independence from international funding which, 
paradoxically, is not the case due to the exertion of the mining MNE’s of bargaining power 
through other means, as developed next. 
 
9.2.2 Shedding light on the black box of power: the proposed operational definition 
of bargaining power. 
 
To unpack the concept of power, this research makes an initial effort in operationalizing 
bargaining power. Thus, by mirroring the discussion developed in the power debate, the 
research defines three kinds of bargaining power: episodic (Dahl, 1961), non–decisional 
(Bachrach & Bachrach, 1962) and ideological (Lukes, 2005). All of these are based on 
the notion that power cannot be possessed as a material thing, it is intrinsically spatial 
and it can be measured by looking at how the actors use their strategic resources while 
facing their particular constraints in order to get their strategic objectives. Hence, the 
strategic resources are considered as power resources or potential bargaining power.  
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The episodic bargaining power relates to how an actor actively uses its strategic 
resources in order to make the other to do something that would not have done 
otherwise. The non–decisional bargaining power implies an actor being able to control 
the political agenda by leaving out the discussions issues that may go against its 
objectives. Lastly, the ideological bargaining power is exerted when an actor manages 
to completely change the other actor’s perception, so the latter defends the interests of 
the actor exerting this kind of power over him as if these were their own. This is the most 
profound way to exert bargaining power, since it implies a change in the ideology of an 
actor, by creating a false consciousness, and can be only exerted when an actor 
successfully imposes its will over the other through several bargains over time. Chile is 
a good example of this, since the mining MNEs have greatly contributed to further 
develop the neoliberal ideology established during Pinochet’s dictatorship, by creating 
the belief that if the State intervenes in the market in any form or shape, the mining MNEs 
will immediately leave the country (Harvey & Harvey, 2007; Moulian, 2002). This gave 
birth to a national state in the central level that refuses to actively intervene or exert its 
bargaining power within the country, while also impeding bargains between mining MNEs 
and other actors. This also means that Chile has developed a strong case of ‘institutional 
amnesia’ (Pollitt, 2000), where the hard-learned lessons from the Nitrate era and 
nationalization of copper were forgotten. 
Hence, these three definitions of bargaining power primarily rest on the strategic 
resources held by each actor, and how these resources are used in order to reach their 
strategic objectives while, simultaneously, facing several peculiar constraints. These 
strategic resources and constraints are different for each actor, and their relevance also 
varies in relation to the node the bargaining is taking place. Consequently, due to the 
multi–scalar nature of a mining GPN, this research acknowledges that bargaining power 
can be exerted at one or every level of the network, in a top–down or bottom–up kind of 
way, where the successive outcomes of each bargain can potentially affect a part or the 
whole GPN. 
This research uses these definitions of bargaining power to empirically determine what 
are the strategic resources and constraints of each actor, as well as how they exert (or 
not) their potential bargaining power in each node. This way to operationalize the 
bargaining power allows the analysis of the more easily observable outcomes, related to 
the episodic bargaining power, while also providing a way to understand deeper 
structural ways in which power is exerted in a GPN, like the control of the political agenda 
and ideological shaping (Allen, 2003; Haugaard, 2002; Lukes, 2005).  
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Furthermore, as the GPN approach strongly highlights, the continuous bargaining power 
asymmetries in favour of the mining MNEs mean they capture of most of the value, while 
also hindering the possibilities for reaching a strategic coupling and, ultimately, leading 
unsustainable development, all of which is considered the dark side of belonging to a 
GPN (Bridge, 2008; Coe et al., 2004). All this is deeply related with the role that the State 
plays in the consecutive bargains with the mining MNEs, which is the focus of the 
empirical work. 
 
9.2.3 Re – evaluating the role of the State in bargaining with the mining MNEs 
 
9.2.3.1 The historical role of the State in the Chilean mining GPNs 
 
A third aim of this work was to re – assess the role that the host states play in promoting 
a sustainable development in both the national and regional levels while bargaining with 
the mining MNEs. Hence, the research focuses on the relationship between the Chilean 
State and the copper mining MNEs in the three main nodes of the Chilean copper mining 
GPN: where the extraction and production happens (Antofagasta Region); where the 
national political elite and mining headquarters are located (Santiago); and where the 
copper is traded and most of the main decisions regarding to the copper industry as a 
whole take place.  
Most of the empirical work aims to provide evidence related to the strategic resources 
and constraints of the Chilean State and mining MNEs, to somehow determine the 
potential bargaining power hold by each actor. In this sense, the analysis starts with an 
historical analysis of the previous mining GPNs in which Chile has been embedded, the 
most notorious being the nitrate industry. During the nitrate era, the Chilean State 
allowed the British nitrate MNEs to take full control of the industry by becoming an ally 
of the foreign interests, leading to the creation of traditional enclaves in the form of mining 
towns.  
These towns were located next to the ore and were characterised by the mining MNE 
completely replacing the State in several of its most fundamental functions. The full 
control of the mining MNEs over the mining industry also showed the darkest side of this 
GPN, due to the blatant violations of human and labour rights and the total collapse of 
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the Chilean economy after the apparition of synthetic nitrates (Cademartori, 2008; Meller, 
2007; Phelps et al., 2015). 
After this deep crisis, the Chilean State learned the lesson and increasingly strengthened 
its position. Consequently, between the 1920’s and 1973, the Chilean State fully exerted 
its bargaining power in the way predicted by the obsolescence bargaining models 
(Moran, 1974). Thus, the Chilean State was cautious when luring FDI into the country, 
allowing the mining MNEs to enjoy their relative stronger bargaining position in the pre–
investment bargains, to then take advantage of the high sunk costs made by the mining 
MNEs to bargain better conditions for the national interests.  
The Chilean State increasingly augmented its participation in the mining industry and the 
overall economy, leading to a point where it fully nationalized the copper mining industry. 
This was clearly the prime of the Chilean State’s bargaining power capacity over the 
mining MNEs, since most of the value produced stayed within the country’s frontiers. 
However, this would not last long due to the latter political pressures over the mining 
MNE’s home countries to reverse the nationalizations or get what they considered a 
proper retribution (Meller, 2007; Salazar, 2003; Salazar & Pinto, 2002).  
The era of a strong Chilean State abruptly ended with the coup of 1973, which fully 
transformed the Chilean economy and society. This research tries to unravel this 
transformation by focusing in the latter period, called the neoliberal copper GPN. At this 
point, it is worth noticing that the Chilean history is a clear example of the shifts in both 
the shifting nature of the relative strength of the Chilean State and mining MNEs, as well 
as the actor’s will to fully exert its bargaining power. Interestingly, there have been 
periods where the mining MNEs have been able to fully exert their bargaining power due 
to a high level of complicity with the Chilean State, which happened despite the extremely 
negative consequences for labour and the economic fabric. Conversely, the Chilean 
State has also historically been able to become a strong agent when bargaining with the 
mining MNEs, by fully exerting its bargaining power and making sure of capturing most 
of the value produced in the industry. 
 
 
9.2.3.2 Strengths and constraints in the bargains of the Chilean copper mining 
GPN 
 
269 
 
If one believes that historical events are revealing of progress, it is tempting to think that 
most of the worst consequences of belonging to a mining GPN have been long 
overcome, and that countries like Chile can now focus in getting the best of the latest 
globalisation wave. Nonetheless, history tends to repeat itself if the hardly learned 
lessons are deliberately or unintentionally forgotten (Pollitt, 2000). Hence, this research 
provides empirical evidence to assess if the Chilean case is closer to the brighter or 
darker side of outcomes from participation in a copper mining GPN. 
To do this, the strategic resources and constraints of both the Chilean State and mining 
MNEs are detailed as well as the way in which each actor uses (or not) these resources 
to exert their bargaining power. Regarding the Chilean State, it is found that its most 
strategic resources are the quantity and quality of copper deposits found in the country; 
its legal and taxation regimes extremely favourable to FDI; its political and economic 
stability; the high copper prices due to the commodity super cycle; and the international 
perception of Chile as a land of opportunities for FDI. Most of these resources are 
extremely localized and valued by the mining MNEs, and thus the chances finding 
another country with similar features is remarkably difficult, if not impossible at this 
moment. This would theoretically imply that the Chilean State holds a considerable 
amount of bargaining power when facing the mining MNEs. 
The constraints the Chilean State faces, conversely, relate to three broad categories: 
competitiveness concerns; issues related with the structure and functioning of the State; 
and political affairs. Some of these heavily undermine the Chilean State bargaining’s 
capacity, such as the relatively small size of the Chilean State compared with the mining 
MNEs, and the extremely high level of centralism. Moreover, there are several lost 
opportunities, like the underutilized role of the State owned CODELCO in promoting a 
more diversified regional and even national economic fabric; as well as the sheer 
discontinuity in its socio–economic policies. 
Among the latter, the Chilean State has failed to create medium and long-term national 
and regional development strategies, and when it has made the effort to start such crucial 
discussions, these are promptly dismissed as soon as a new coalition takes charge of 
the national government (Pollitt, 2000). This has left both the national and regional 
governments completely aimless in terms of their long term objectives, which of course, 
impedes focusing the bargains towards promoting regional and national sustainable 
development.  
The strategic resources and constraints of the mining MNEs are also detailed. Regarding 
to the firms’ strategic assets, they are divided in two groups: the strategic resources 
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internal to the firm; and the resources related to the connections and linkages of the firms 
with the other actors. The former comprise the elements related to the internal structure 
and organization of the firms, such as their geographically spread location and influence, 
flexibility and adaptability to the stark shifts of the markets. These internal resources also 
account the traditionally identified strategic assets held by the mining MNEs, such as 
their access to financial and physical capital, markets, technology and information 
(Moran, 1974).  
Likewise, the linkages the mining MNEs have developed with other actors comprise their 
relations with the political elites in each node, their newly developed ties with the civil 
society thought the CSR policies, their images as creators or employment and higher 
wages and their strong monopsonistic position when facing their suppliers. 
Most of the strategic resources internal to the firms were already considered and 
developed in the traditional bargaining models, but some of them are new and have 
increased the mining MNE’s relative bargaining position, like the aggrupation of MNEs 
in industrial associations and the high degree of CSR. The former aims to become a 
lobby platform for getting the best conditions to operate, while the latter aims to getting 
the social licence to operate. The CSR policies have, in some cases, effectively changed 
the perception about the mining industry; while in others it has seen as a mere marketing 
tool and fiercely criticized (Frynas, 2005). For the Chilean case, the mining MNEs have 
faced both opinions, but despite the criticism these policies have received, it has allowed 
the mining firms to smooth the edges with the civil society in a way it did not exist before. 
Related to the constraints faced by the mining MNEs, this research found a considerable 
difference with what the traditional bargaining literature identifies as the main elements 
inhibiting the firms’ bargaining power (Moran, 1974; Vernon, 1971). This, because the 
degree of competition and concentration in the industry, and the extent to which the host 
country government is a relevant customer or distributor do not seem relevant for the 
Chilean case. However, the third and most important element described in this literature, 
the sunk costs, are still a major bind for the firms.  
This is interesting, since the mining MNE’s have actively tried to establish a discourse in 
which they seek to be perceived as footloose, claiming that if the ‘rules of the game’ 
change too much, they can immediately leave the country. However, this research has 
proven this as a smoke screen, since the sunk costs are too significant, and the particular 
characteristics of Chile are too good to abandon the country. Furthermore, there is a new 
constraint related to the mining MNE’s public image, which directly impacts on the 
difficulty in getting their social licence to operate. This has become a decisive issue, 
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since the newly empowered Chilean civil society has managed to stop multi–billion 
dollars ongoing or planned projects related to the mining industry, as long as they feel 
these threaten the environmental or socio–economic fabric. Hence, these constraints 
and resources will determine the potential bargaining power each actor can use in their 
successive negotiations and their identification is another main contribution of this work. 
Even though each particular GPN is likely to have a different set of strategic resources 
and constraints distributed among its main actors, the ones depicted in this research, as 
well as the proposed bargaining definitions, could be used as a starting point for future 
research, especially – but not exclusively – on extractive industries. 
 
9.2.3.3 The Chilean State’s way of bargaining (or not) for sustainable regional 
development 
 
Most of the GPN and bargaining literature assume that both actors are rational when 
defining their objectives, meaning that the mining MNEs try to achieve maximum profits 
in the minimum time, while the State is expected to promote sustainable development in 
the host region and country as a whole. However, this research finds that, for the Chilean 
case, only the assumption regarding to the mining MNEs holds. The Chilean central 
government plays a dichotomous role, both as an uninvolved and passive national state, 
behaving like a referee for issues between privates; while also actively promoting FDI in 
the international circuits, and interfering with the local bargains between the regional 
agents and mining MNEs. Such findings go against what was expected from the 
literature, since the central Chilean State does not seem to be promoting sustainable 
development in a serious planned way, and in any spatial scale, creating all sorts of 
issues. This may be better understood by looking at the bargains taking place in the 
different nodes. 
In the bargains taking place in London, the Chilean State heavily promotes the country’s 
unique features in the copper industry, in order to lure new or increase the existing FDI. 
These characteristics are widely recognized by the whole copper industry, giving the 
Chilean State a great bargaining potential. The mining MNEs, on the other hand, bargain 
to get the best operating conditions directly with the Chilean State, or indirectly through 
some industrial international institutions or important social activities. The firm’s home 
countries also put some pressure over these bargains, in an overall distended way.  
272 
 
However, the international institutions which were the base of Ramamurti’s (2001) 
updated two tier bargaining model, are not as relevant as he predicts. Since Chile has 
enjoyed a strong fiscal health, has passed from a debtor to a contributor of the 
international funding institutions, which have lost their influence over the Chilean 
Economy. Withal, the Chilean State’s relative bargaining position at this level is 
significantly constrained by their dependency on mining FDI, as well as the several FTAs 
that holds.  
Further bargains take place in Santiago, the capital city of Chile, where the State adopts 
an extremely passive role, becoming more of a witness instead of actively engaging in 
bargains with the mining MNEs. This research finds that this behaviour is shaped by the 
outcomes of the neoliberal ideology imposed by Pinochet’s dictatorship, and later 
deepened by the mining MNEs since their arrival in the 90’s, in what is an example of 
their exertion of ideological bargaining power (Harvey, 2005; Harvey & Harvey, 2007; 
Mayol & Ahumada, 2015). This particular behaviour goes against to every prediction of 
the bargaining models, while also meaning that the mining MNEs have been able to exert 
all sorts of bargaining power during the last decades, being unmatched by the national 
State.  
This has created a power vacuum, recently filled by the newly empowered civil society, 
which have heavily pressured the State to address issues related to the environment, 
labour conditions and other negative externalities of the industries (Bebbington, 2009; 
Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington & Williams, 2008). The State’s absence has also 
created problems for the mining MNEs, which have had to deal with the increasing 
demands from the population by even having to create development strategies due to 
their inexistence in the national and regional level. These strategies, despite being well 
intentioned, have not been able to satisfactorily cope with the issues being raised by civil 
society, leading to a situation where the mining MNEs are actually demanding a more 
active Central State, since they feel surpassed by the scope of this task which also 
detracts them from their ultimate purpose: producing and exporting copper. These novel 
results directly challenge most of the orthodox views related to the desirability of 
implementing free market policies to reach sustainable development, and should be 
further investigated by economic geographers, development and political economists, 
and any social scientist focused on uneven development issues alike. 
The last node analysed is the Antofagasta Region, where the Central State changes its 
passivity for a passionate role in blocking the negotiations between the regional and local 
representatives and the mining MNEs. Here, there is an intense discussion about the 
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role of the mining industry for the region, as well as several local and regional initiatives 
to bargain with the copper mining MNEs optimal solutions for everyone involved. 
However, the extremely centralized nature of the Chilean State does not allow this to 
happen. The Central government explicitly and continuously blocks such negotiations 
since, as this research finds, it is interested in capturing most of the value in the capital 
city to then re–distribute it to the rest of the country. This has led to an increasing 
confrontation between the regional and local communities and central government, 
where the former complain the character of a sacrificed space the region seems to have 
for Santiago. The region has to deal with most of the worst negative externalities of the 
industry, while being unable to capture any significant portion of value that may help to 
reach sustainable development.  
Hence, the findings of this research reveal how the Chilean State has gone full circle in 
terms of its bargaining behaviour, providing a prime example of severe ‘institutional 
amnesia’ (Pollitt, 2000). This has caused a situation in which Chile has experienced great 
growth during the last decades, but possibly due to the existence of an extremely high 
and long super cycle in the commodities, which increased the copper prices to their 
highest ever.  
However, this growth has proven to be unsustainable. The Chilean copper mining GPN 
has not been associated with a diversification of the regional and national productive 
fabric, to promote the technologically advanced firms capable of exporting, or to create 
a development policy based on the mining industry. This is reminiscent of the enclave 
era, in which the country collapsed when nitrates were substituted (Phelps et al., 2015). 
As the GPN literature warns, when there are stark power imbalances favouring the 
MNEs, the host region and countries will be not able to capture the value they need in 
order to promote their sustainable development (Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 
2002). Similarly, the Chilean copper mining GPN shows several indications about a new 
form of mining enclave taking place in the regional level, which may have some positive 
effects on the national scale (Phelps et al., 2015). However, these effects are 
unsustainable if the country does not manage to deal with mono–dependency on the 
most basic kind of production of minerals (Bridge, 2004a, 2008). Hence, it is possible to 
argue that Chile is closer to what can be considered the dark side of belonging to a 
mining GPN instead of the widely heralded bright side.  
In this line, this research is just another step in fully incorporating the GPN analysis in 
general, and the bargaining power concept, specifically, in studying the effects of the 
mining industry on (uneven) development. What started as a way to study the 
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mechanism in which the national and regional State were able to obtain gains from the 
successive bargains celebrated with the mining MNEs suggested by the theories, ended 
up in a re–evaluation of the role that the State can play in promoting sustainable 
development.  
Thus, the main point and contribution of this research is twofold. First, it aims to highlight 
the relevance of studying the extractive industries for understanding uneven 
development in resource rich spaces. This industry has been largely forgotten in the 
social sciences, despite being the base of every single consumption good produced in 
every other GPN. Moreover, the industry is a prime example of the difficulties of reaping 
benefits for the host region in an industry usually dominated by large MNEs, power 
asymmetries and a strong spatial division of labour.  
Second, it claims that bargaining power asymmetries among the actors of a GPN are 
crucial in determining the development possibilities for the host spaces, especially for 
developing countries and regions dependent of extractive resources. This is not 
something new, since the history of resource rich regions is the history of power exerted 
along the different nodes comprising a production chain (Mann, 1986). Bargains have 
historically taken place under conditions of asymmetric power among the different actors 
involved in an extractive production network, since the pre-Columbian times to the recent 
globalisation period, usually with dire consequences for the natural resource holders. 
Hence, the study of bargaining and power exertion is crucial for all research aimed at 
understanding how host spaces can lift their ‘resource curse’ and reach sustainable 
growth and development. In this line, the GPN approach provides an extremely unique 
conceptual framework to undertake this task, by allowing the multi-scalar analysis of the 
bargains among the actors of the production network, as well as how the exertion of their 
bargaining power determines value capture, and ultimately, the chances of reaching a 
strategic coupling. Consequently, the incorporation of bargaining models that help to 
identify each actor strategic resources and constraints, as well as further theoretical and 
empirical developments in the unpacking of the power concepts, would allow to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the uneven development issues mostly associated with 
capitalism, which are especially strong in developing and resource rich spaces. 
Furthermore, while this research was taken place, it became clear that more questions 
need to be answered to have a comprehensive understanding of how can a mining GPN 
promote a strategic coupling between all the actors participating in it, all of which are 
described next. 
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9.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
9.3.1 Deepening a multi-scalar research agenda on bargaining processes 
 
One of the main contributions of this work is the discussion and development of three 
bargaining power definitions, aimed to encompass the different level in which bargaining 
power can be exerted within a particular GPN (Haugaard, 2002; Moran, 1974). However, 
this opens several lines of future research, both empirical and theoretical, as detailed 
next.  
In theoretical terms, these bargaining power definitions could be incorporated in the 
newly developed GPN 2.0 analysis, as a way to explicitly develop and specify the causal 
mechanisms linking the conceptual categories of power, value and embeddedness to 
the dynamic configurations of global production networks (Yeung & Coe, 2015) - this 
since the GPN 2.0 literature has explicitly highlighted the vital role of ‘extrafirm 
bargaining’ in strategic coupling and industrial upgrading in host regions (Yeung, 2016; 
Yeung & Coe, 2015).  
In this sense, GPN 2.0 proposes that these bargains between firms and nonfirm actors 
will be actively pursued by the former, to reach: market power in industries where the 
state controls the access to attractive resources (such as the extractive industries); 
proprietary rights; and political legitimacy with the civil society and host states. 
Interestingly, this framework posits that these bargains are ‘over and above cost-specific 
gains derived from bargaining with state and non-state institutions’ (Yeung & Coe, 2015) 
such as tax concessions, environmental issues, etc., all of which are the focus of the 
bargains studied in this research and bargaining literature. Hence, there is common 
ground to merge both kinds of bargains in one theoretical synthesis. 
Moreover, an increasing number of empirical studies show that non-firm actors, such as 
the state and civil society, are not as supportive of MNEs as theory has assumed. This 
is a decisive issue since, as this and other empirical research find (Bebbington, 2009; 
Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington & Williams, 2008), the newly empowered civil 
society has become a progressively influential actor in the bargains taking place in 
mining GPNs and it should also be considered a vital agent in further GPN analyses.  
Even though the role of civil society has been previously highlighted by the GPN 1.0 
literature (Coe et al., 2008b; Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2002), this has not been 
studied enough, and to some extent is also a shortcoming of this thesis. However, this 
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and other empirical works, leave several burning questions unanswered which deserve 
attention, such as: the speed at which most of these movements appear and disappear; 
how to track the evolution of the movements; and what could be their potential political 
influence over later bargains within a particular GPN. The latter is especially relevant in 
contested industries, like mining and garments, since civil society has the capacity to 
completely bypass the regional and national government by resorting to international 
courts, organisms, institutions and NGOs. 
Furthermore, the peculiar characteristics of the extractive industries regarding those host 
states controlling the access to the resources, and the need of political legitimacy in order 
to secure the social licence to operate, highlight the importance of incorporating an 
analysis of these industries in GPN 2.0 analysis. This is all the more pressing since one 
perceived shortcoming of the GPN 2.0 framework is its focus on firms in comparison to 
the initial GPN 1.0 with its greater orientation towards the worst effects of uneven 
development historically suffered by resource rich regions and countries. Hence, by also 
considering the extractive industries, the GPN 2.0 framework could potentially expand 
its relevance to more of the developing world. 
Another theoretical challenge is developing a better understanding of the bargains taking 
place in the sub–national nodes which may be relevant for the whole GPN. As noted by 
Yeung (2016), new research should ‘be focused on the strategic coupling of actors at 
multiple spatial scales – from local and regional to national and global’. This research 
explicitly takes up this challenge by focusing on three nodes, adding the regional one to 
the traditional bargaining models. However, a better conceptualization of the way in 
which each bargain differs in terms of the scope of its outcomes, is still due. Even sub-
national bargains taking place at the local level in the negotiations between indigenous 
communities and mining MNEs could potentially set a precedent and shape international 
legislation. However, any multi-tier bargaining model implied in this might be complex 
and intractable if each bargain even at the smallest scale is considered. It may be 
important therefore for ideal types of finite and empirically testable situations to be 
developed in order to keep the discussion manageable and aid comparative empirical 
analysis 
Moreover, there is also a need for further empirical research related to the exertion of 
bargaining power within the extractive industries and between different industries. In this 
sense, there at least two comparative studies that should be carried out. The first one 
might usefully compare case studies within the copper mining GPN, ideally between 
nations/regions considered to have successfully reached sustainable development 
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based on the extractive resource extraction in the form of mining clusters; and among 
nations/regions that have failed in achieving this by developing new forms of mining 
enclaves. For the copper mining industry in particular, it would be interesting to compare 
how bargains take place in successful copper mining countries, like Canada and 
Australia, with extremely dependant and unsustainable nations, like Chile, Peru and 
Zambia. Likewise, it would be extremely interesting to compare the strategic power 
resources and constraints and how bargains take place among countries embedded in 
different GPNs. Thus, a comparative study between developing extractive countries in 
Latin America and service-oriented or technologically advanced countries in East Asia, 
could shed light over the similarities and differences in the sources and dynamics of 
bargaining power exertion, and provide valuable policy lessons for the cases considered 
and others sharing similar characteristics. 
 
9.3.2 Developing understanding of the role of elites in promoting institutional 
amnesia and non - bargaining states 
 
A further challenge that remains open is how to address what can be considered as 
Institutional Amnesia (Pollitt, 2000) and the role that elites have in this process 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). As Pollitt (2000) explains, most of the focus today is on 
how institutions learn and remember, whereas the ‘declining ability – and willingness – 
of public sector institutions in many countries to access and make use of possibly 
relevant past experiences’, have been widely overlooked. This is a deciding issue, since 
as the Chilean case shows, history tends to repeat itself unless the institutions remember 
the – usually painfully – learned lessons, especially when bargaining with MNEs within 
a GPN. The more an institution like the state remembers these lessons, the more likely 
it will be to exert its bargaining power in the best way to promote what it should be its 
ultimate goal: sustainable development. 
Moreover, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) find, a change in political institutions for 
economic institutions, as in the neoliberalization of Chile, can create a pattern of 
‘captured democracy’ where a democratic regime may survive by imposing economic 
institutions favouring the elite. Consequently, in a captured democracy, the central State 
will not be willing to exert its bargaining power in the traditional way, leaving the market 
to deal with the effects of the mining industry, thus effectively creating a ‘non-bargaining 
state’. This research did not address this issue due to time and resource constraints, but 
the findings raised the hypothesis that mining MNEs have continuously and deliberately 
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exerted ideological bargaining power over the Chilean population and political elite since 
the early mining GPNs. Hence, a deeper analysis building the theoretical bridges 
between the institutional amnesia and the power elite literature can help shed light on 
the appearance of non – bargaining states. Moreover, it is not as if an appreciation of 
the role of elites in institutional amnesia and captured democracy takes one far away 
from earlier literature in the dependencia tradition (Cardoso & Faletto, 2007) but rather 
recasts it in a new light; the more that things change, the more that they stay the same.     
Likewise, it can be interesting to compare the extreme Chilean case of institutional 
amnesia and non – bargaining national state with the situation found in East Asia, since 
the latter managed to quickly overcome their status of developing countries due to the 
existence of developmental states. Recent work has applied the GPN 2.0 framework to 
study the latter countries (Yeung, 2016), so there seems to be space for undertaking this 
comparison. Welfare European States would be also an interesting point of comparison 
for multiple case study research. Both, developmental and welfare states could provide 
a stark contrast with the behaviour of the Chilean State. Furthermore, comparisons 
between several states participating in the copper mining GPN can also be of interest. 
All these potential comparative studies can help to better understand the role of elites in 
the relevance and strength of the states for reaching strategic couplings and, equally 
importantly, in situating the host countries inside the bright or dark side of belonging to a 
GPN (Bridge, 2009; MacKinnon, 2012). Likewise, such studies would permit an 
examination of the diversity of stances in strategic coupling that exists and an evaluation 
of how Chile’s detached state compares unfavourably to the more interventionist East 
Asian States and European welfare states – echoing earlier work on state-MNE relations 
(Bailey et al., 1994; Safarian, 1993). 
The analysis of the role of elites in promoting institutional amnesia and the comparison 
among several case studies leads on to relevant policy implications for the host states, 
especially regarding the potential for counterbalancing strategies when elites have 
created non – bargaining national states, something particularly interesting in the fields 
of Economic and Political Geography.  
 
9.3.3 Focusing on mining MNE-SMEs supplier asymmetries and their implications 
for strategic coupling and sustainable development  
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A last line of inquiry that could be further developed is how mining MNE and SMEs’ 
supplier relationship affect strategic coupling possibilities and, thus, the chances of 
diversifying the host region productive fabric and reaching sustainable development.  In 
this sense, the GPN (Henderson et al., 2002; Yeung, 2016), bargaining (Moran, 1974; 
Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1971) and agglomeration literature (Gordon & McCann, 2000; 
Markusen, 1996; Phelps, 2004) fit together extremely well in order to understand how 
and when mining MNEs develop strong linkages with the local productive fabric and the 
chances of witnessing technological spillovers and other positive externalities could lead 
to a cluster formation (Phelps, 2004) – in other words those situations in which the host 
region is capable of developing new mining based industries that produce, enhance and 
facilitate the value capture within the region.  
As the GPN and bargaining literature propose, power asymmetries between the actors 
are crucial in determining who captures value and where. This research has focused on 
the state and mining MNEs as two of the main actors of any mining GPN but, as 
agglomeration theory explains, the relationship between the mining MNEs and their 
SMEs suppliers are decisive for the form of economic development – sustainable or 
otherwise - that will appear in any host region and country (Markusen, 1996). Moreover, 
as Phelps (1996) argues, despite the upsurge in global networks, buyer–supplier 
relations are usually hierarchical, and involve dependency of SMEs on MNEs. This is 
particularly acute in the extractive and mining industries, where MNEs enjoy a 
monopsonistic position that allows them to fully exert their bargaining power when 
negotiating with their suppliers, leading to the formation of new forms of extractive 
enclaves (Cademartori, 2008; Phelps et al., 2015).  
Consequently, the often asymmetric bargaining relationship between mining MNEs and 
their SME suppliers, have several direct policy implications that should be investigated. 
As this research and others have found (Phelps et al., 2015), mining cluster policies have 
been widely applied in mining regions and countries, under the assumption that the 
positive agglomerative effects will take place automatically, leading to a diversified 
productive fabric. However, these policies have completely overlooked the power 
asymmetries that the monopsonistic position, size and other strategic resources confer 
on mining MNEs. This, together with the Chilean  detached state, has led to a situation 
where not only the cluster has not developed but, as Phelps et al. (2015) found, there 
are new enclave formations being created that could be easily confused with clusters. 
Such new enclaves have created several issues, not only for the host region and country, 
but also to the mining MNEs, pressuring the latter to take full command of the 
development and application of cluster policies to produce ‘world class suppliers’ 
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(Valdes, 2016). This situation where MNEs replace the State in some of its most 
fundamental functions brings us full circle, reminding us of the traditional enclaves and 
highlights the need of appropriate policies regarding buyer-supplier relationships within 
the mining GPN. 
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APPENDIX A. INFORMATION SHEET USED FOR FIELDWORK INTERVIEWS 
 
Information Sheet for Fieldwork Interviews      
                               
You will be given a copy of this information sheet. 
Title of Project: Mining Multinational Enterprises and host States: Bargaining 
power and its outcomes for the development possibilities of the Chilean Mining 
Global Production Network. 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project 
ID Number): 7449/001 
Name Martin Arias 
Work Address Bartlett School of Planning, UCL. Central House 14 Upper Woburn 
Place, WC1H 0NN, London 
Contact 
Details  
Martin.loyola.11@ucl.ac.uk  
We would like to invite ___________________________ to participate in this 
research project.       
Details of Study:  
The project is part of a PhD thesis, which tries to determine how the bargaining 
power held by the multinational enterprises, the state and civil society can shape 
and determine the development possibilities for a region and a nation. The project 
focuses on the Chilean mining industry, by studying three important nodes in 
which the bargains take place: London, Santiago (Chile) and Antofagasta (Chile). 
This work will use secondary and primary data, the latter represented by 
interviews with some Chilean representatives of the mining multinational 
enterprises, politicians and member of different civic organizations. This will allow 
to frame the discussion, and to shed light over the results obtained by analysing 
the secondary data. The research aims to fill in the gap in the economic 
geography about power and its consequences for development, as well as to 
propose policies regarding of how avoid extreme power asymmetries in mining 
countries. 
We hope to interview 10 representatives in total from the government, mining 
multinationals and civic organizations. If you agree to take part, we will decide a 
date and place for an interview with you. This will be whenever suits you best. 
The interview will be between 30 and 45 minutes long, and we will ask your expert 
opinion about how power is being exerted by the organization to which you 
belong too, as well as how the power imbalances can affect regional and national 
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development. The interview will be recorded and transcribed only if you agree to 
it, and we will take all the precautions to anonymize your opinion, manage the 
data confidentially and destroy the interview after a period of 5 years. You will be 
sent a digital copy of the thesis once is published if you want to. Also,  
 You can withdraw at any time, or decide to not take part, which will not 
affect the standard of care you receive.  
 
 You may withdraw your data from the project at any time up until it is 
transcribed for use in the final report (December 2016). 
 
 Recorded interviews will be transcribed (written up) and the tape will then 
be wiped clear. 
 
 If you decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep 
and be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
 What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong? If this study 
has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the 
conduct of the study you can contact UCL using the details below for 
further advice and information: Nicholas Phelps, n.phelps@ucl.ac.uk, 
Bartlett School of Planning. 
   
Please discuss the information above with others if you wish or ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not; choosing not to take part will 
not disadvantage you in any way. If you do decide to take part you are still free 
to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering take part 
in this research.  
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Informed Consent Form for _____________________ in Research Studies           
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research.  
Title of Project: Mining Multinational Enterprises and host States: Bargaining 
power and its outcomes for the development possibilities of the Chilean Mining 
Global Production Network. 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project 
ID Number): 7449/001 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to 
take part, the person organising the research must explain the project to you. 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation 
already given to you, please ask the researcher before you to decide whether to 
join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any 
time.  
Participant’s Statement  
I ____________________________________________ 
 I have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet, and 
understand what the study involves. 
 I understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part 
in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw 
immediately.  
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes 
of this research study. 
 I understand that my participation will be recorded and I consent to use 
of this material as part of the project. 
 I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a 
report and I will be sent a copy. Confidentiality and anonymity will be 
maintained and it will not be possible to identify me from any publications. 
 I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential 
and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 I agree that the research project named above has been explained to 
me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in this study. 
Signed:         Date: 
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Interview 
Code Type of actor Node 
Date of 
interview 
Recorded 
and 
transcribed 
INT1 
International mining NGO 
volunteer London 12/05/2013 Yes 
INT2 
International mining NGO 
representative London 14/06/2013 Yes 
INT3 
Director of a state owned mining 
MNE London 18/06/2013 Yes 
INT4 
CEO of an international mining 
association London 27/06/2013 Yes 
INT5 
Expert of the Chilean Mining 
Ministry Santiago 18/07/2013 Yes 
INT6 CEO of a mining supplier MNE Santiago 19/07/2013 Yes 
INT7 Entrepreneur, former politician Antofagasta 25/07/2013 Yes 
INT8 
Entrepreneur, founder and 
former CEO of a regional 
industrial association Antofagasta 26/07/2013 Yes 
INT9 
CEO of a state owned mining 
MNE Santiago 01/08/2013 Yes 
INT10 CEO of a mining MNE Santiago 02/08/2013 Yes 
INT11 Vice-president of a mining MNE Santiago 06/08/2013 Yes 
INT12 
CEO of the Chilean Central 
Bank Santiago 07/08/2013 Yes 
INT13 Mining expert Santiago 12/08/2013 Yes 
INT14 
CEO of a regional industrial 
association Antofagasta 12/08/2013 Yes 
INT15 
Mining and technological 
development expert, academic 
and former vice provost of a 
local university Antofagasta 15/08/2013 Yes 
INT16 
Former director of a regional 
development agency, mining 
expert Antofagasta 15/08/2013 Yes 
INT17 
CEO of a mining MNE in charge 
of CSR policies Antofagasta 20/08/2013 Yes 
INT18 
Politician, mining expert and 
authority Antofagasta 21/08/2013 Yes 
INT19 
CEO of a local SME supplier of 
mining MNEs Antofagasta 21/08/2013 Yes 
INT20 
Former CEO of regional cluster 
programme Antofagasta 22/08/2013 Yes 
INT21 
CEO of a mining MNE's 
subsidiary Antofagasta 25/08/2013 Yes 
INT22 
CEO state owned mining MNE 
in national headquarters Santiago 27/08/2013 Yes 
INT23 
Director of a state institution in 
charge of attracting FDI Santiago 27/08/2013 Yes 
INT24 CEO of a big mining supplier Santiago 27/08/2013 Yes 
INT25 
Mining expert of a state 
institution Santiago 27/08/2013 Yes 
INT26 
Academic, mining expert, 
anthropologist, director of a 
cultural center Santiago 28/08/2013 Yes 
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INT27 
CEO of a mining MNE in 
national headquarters Santiago 28/08/2013 Yes 
INT28 
Director of a state institution 
related to the mining industry Santiago 03/09/2013 Yes 
INT29 Mining expert, researcher Santiago 03/09/2013 Yes 
INT30 
President of regional workers' 
union Antofagasta 06/09/2013 Yes 
INT31 
Mining and technology expert, 
academic Antofagasta 06/09/2013 Yes 
INT32 
Superintendent of a mining MNE 
subsidiary Antofagasta 06/09/2013 Yes 
INT33 Politician Antofagasta 09/09/2013 Yes 
INT34 City mayor Antofagasta 10/09/2013 Yes 
INT35 
CEO of a big local mining 
supplier Antofagasta 10/09/2013 Yes 
INT36 
Secretary of a mining MNE's 
union Antofagasta 11/09/2013 Yes 
INT37 Journalist, mining expert Antofagasta 16/09/2013 Yes 
INT38 
Academic, mining expert, 
economist Antofagasta 23/09/2013 Yes 
INT39 
CEO of mining MNE in national 
headquarters Santiago 25/09/2013 Yes 
INT40 CEO of the Mining Council Santiago 26/09/2013 Yes 
INT41 
Academic, mining expert, 
economist Santiago 26/09/2013 Yes 
INT42 
Director and representative of a 
multinational mining NGO London 13/12/2013 Yes 
INT43 
Politician, academic, mining 
expert, economist London 16/01/2014 Yes 
INT44 
Mining expert, former member of 
the Mining Ministry Santiago 16/11/2015 Yes 
INT45 
Academic, mining expert, 
economist Santiago 21/06/2016 Yes 
INT46 
CEO of a mining MNE in 
national headquarters Santiago 22/06/2016 Yes 
INT47 
Director of a state institution 
related to the mining industry Santiago 23/06/2016 Yes 
INT48 
Academic, mining expert, 
economist Santiago 24/06/2016 Yes 
INT49 
Representative of the London 
Metal Exchange London 11/06/2013 No 
INT50 CEO of a mining supplier MNE Santiago 06/08/2013 No 
 
 
  
298 
 
APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTION EXAMPLE 
 
INT42. (13.12.13) – London 
Interviewer: (I) 
Interviewee: (Y) 
Y: How a company gathers and deploys power and the… initial, the most obvious form 
of power that a company has is its financial power, it’s got loads of money that obviously 
the amounts differ with the size of companies, but even with a smaller company relative 
to the local community it’s got lots of money and that money can be deployed to buy 
people off, to divide communities, to bribe, I don’t mean to bribe in the legal sense, is 
money as a soborno to make them do what we want, but for instance it may go to the 
Shanty in Tolino in Colombia while is trying to get permission to open a huge cast coal 
mine, sponsored the local football team, sponsored the local radio station, so… in that 
road… it would say these are social responsibility activities that are helping the local 
community, but of course is… it’s… persuading people to drop their opposition to a 
project that could be very damaging to the agriculture way of life of people, so… that way 
of using financial power is… in a way the more pleasant option, but less pleasant option 
is the use of financial power to pay armed security to protect the companies’ operations 
and… the… country which I am most familiar is Colombia, and certainly the companies 
feel the need for armed security for their operations and they pay private security, and 
they pay for security by the national military as well, that’s not secret, they are perfectly 
open about that, their excuse being they need to defend their operations against guerrilla 
attacks, but it also leads to intimidation of people who’ve got nothing to do with guerrillas 
or armed groups of any kind… so… in that way, the financial power gets translated quite 
early to military power, so we not only have huge amounts of money but we also therefore 
have the capacity to kill. There’s political power too, national governments, often regional 
governments sometimes local governments want mineral projects to go ahead against 
the will of local populations and so they, they make thing as easiest possible for a 
company and bigger companies can deploy their own financial power in direct influence 
of… governments so that governments policy’s changes to make life easier for 
multinational investment and here there is a use of diplomatic power , rather running of 
all over the place I suppose, I am speaking from the perspective of fair multinational mine 
investment, I am not thinking primarily of local or national companies, still less 
nationalized companies, I am thinking of the companies that we deal with here, so a 
British based companies can rely on UK government diplomatic power and that counts 
for something, so the UK government will exert its authority other national governments 
in order to get those national governments to adopt policies that are friendly towards 
British multinationals, and an example of that happening with a small British company is 
the UK Trade and Investment Department which is part of Department Business 
Innovation Skills trying to use its influence in Bangladesh to persuade the government of 
Bangladesh to grant a mission to GCM Associates, a British company, to begin open 
cast coal mining at Fulbani, in Northwest Bangladesh, he is a project that has led to huge 
local opposition, tens of thousands of people repeatedly protesting against possibility of 
an open cast coal mine, and the project has been stall sin August of 2006 when there 
was a huge demonstration in which 3 protesters were shot dead by the Bangladesh 
Riffles, which is a part of the armed forces, and GCM Associates is losing money 
because of the fact that they are unable to proceed this project, which is its only project, 
so it’s been to rely on the British government to try to persuade the government of 
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Bangladesh to allow the mine to go ahead, this is still not succeeded but I thing British 
diplomatic power is important, another example of British diplomatic power being used 
to back the power of the British company was in Peru with Monte Rico Metals, can’t 
remember the year, but sir Richard Ralph was UK ambassador in Lima, and the travelled 
to the area around the company’s Rio Blanco project, copper project to try to persuade 
local people that having an open cast copper mine would be good and they should not 
fear the destruction of their agricultural livelihoods and the resigned asn ambassador 
and then was made chairman of Monte Rico Metals, the company evolved. Bigger 
companies, Angloamerican for instance, can rely on support from the foreign office and… 
I am not sure of the particular examples of supporting foreign office, but a few years ago 
I met with the person of the foreign office with responsibility for relations with the 
countries in the Andes, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and he told me straight back that “fine 
by me if groups like ours criticized Angloamerican, because it kept him in the job”, 
because part of his job is to support Angloamerican in their line of project with Colombia 
and Peru, so we have financial power leading to kind of bribery power in the broadest 
possible sense, military power, political power, diplomatic power, there is a complete 
power imbalance between the companies that enjoy that kind of support and the 
communities, are shoot giving other example, of course… companies, multinational 
companies want freed to trade and reduction of taxes, so the governments in their home 
countries advocate free trade which assists, which is for multinational companies, and 
within that there is also pressure for a lowering of taxation, and some, I don’t know if the 
British government has done this, but the Canadian government, as part of its 
international aim, provided advice to the Colombian government about reform of its 
mining code, I think this was in 2001, and part of the reform involved the lowering of 
taxes and royalties, and I think that among the Canadian government personal were 
people seconded from multinational mining companies, so there again there’s political 
power being wielded by multinational companies in order to achieve their own aims, so 
that’s the power that they have, that’s how hey deploy it. 
I: That sounds really interesting, you gave me a very broad perspective on this issue, so 
how do you think or what do you think are the power sources that governments or local 
institutions have in order to contrarrest these other power from multinational 
corporations? 
Y: Well, certainly there are judicial processes and… again using Colombia as an 
example, I apologise but so many of those are more familiar with them, in the… struggle 
of communities forcibility removed by the Sevenhail coal mine in northern Colombia, 
because of judicial action taken by lawyers working on their behalf, the rights were 
gradually better recognized, so for instance, first of all, the need for people to be moved 
at the company’s expense out of the way of the line, then to make sure that there was 
some kind of compensation, then to make sure there were some kind of re-housing, one 
of the communities, Tabaco, achieved a Colombian supreme court decision, I think this 
was in May of 2002 which said that the… I think is that the company has to pay for… 
part of this, also the local municipality has to provide a site where the village could be 
reconstructed and that utilities should be provided, so that was judicial victory, although 
here we are more than 11 years later and is still not been implemented, also in Colombia 
a small Canadian owned, I think ultimately Canadian owned company called Muriel 
Mining was exploring in north western Colombia and wanting to open a mine at a place 
called “Mande Norte” I think it was copper gold and molybdenum, and there had been 
militarization of the area to protect the exploration activities and abuses alleged by local 
people as a result of militarization and lurking behind this company was the British 
multinational Rio Tinto, which was not getting its own hands dirty, but had an agreement 
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with Mirial Mining to fund exploration activities or depart from exploration activities with 
the option that later on if things were promising Rio Tinto could come in and do the mining 
or… whip profits at the mininig, and the Mirial mining believed that it had consulted local 
communities, but the local communities contested this and said that the consultation 
done had been inadequate and not according to the Colombian constitution of 1991, and 
this went all the way to the constitutional court, the highest court in Colombia, and the 
constitutional court judged that the whole consultation process with indigenes and 
African decedents communities had to be done again because it had not been done 
properly and the constitution gives those 2 sets of communities the right to, prior 
consultation before developing projects on their land, but because by this time the UN 
declaration of the rights of indigenous people had been finalized in 2007 and including 
indigenous people’s right to prior an informed consent, the constitutional court said “not 
only must this consultation process be done again, be done properly, but we must 
receive the consent of communities before you go ahead” so this was the contested by 
the Colombian government, I don’t know at what stage is now at, but it had stopped the 
company’s activity because of that, so there are judicial victories. In the case of GCM 
resources in Bangladesh what has kept the company from pursuing its project has been 
massive local and national mobilizations, huge numbers of people out in the streets 
taking strike action, occupying the area, so although they’re not being, as far as I know, 
judicial activities, there not being political decisions, just the strength of this popular 
mobilization that has held up the project. Back to Colombia, in the case of Cerro Haul, 
there is also been a lot of mobilization around the company’s expansion plans because 
they have a plan to expand within the current mining plan which they’re doing, but they 
also have a plan to expand the mine further in a way that will necessitate the diversion 
of the river Rancheria, which is the only major water                          course in the province 
of Localhira, which is quite a dry province, and this plan has united unionized mine 
workers, communities of African descent and indigenous people against the company’s 
plan and there have been big popular mobilizations about that, party is a result of which 
the company has put those plans on hold and said “for the time being we will not pursue 
them” so those are… both important ways of exercising power against multinational 
companies, the judicial and popular mobilization, another thing… other examples of that, 
there are combination of popular mobilization and the judicial has been the fight at 
Dongria Con people around the Neangharian hills in southern eastern India where British 
Medanta PLC which is really an Indian company but is registered here and listed in the 
London Stocking exchange, it… wants to mine both sides in the Neongharian hills which 
is sacred to the Dongriacon indigenous people and the Dongriacon have said “you won’t 
mine both sides, we will all die before you die both sides, we will defend our land to the 
last drop of our blood” so that’s being the key thing, but along with that… an Indian 
organization, I think it was Indiaronics took the case, took a legal case about the way 
that legal decision had been made allowing the company’s activities to go ahead and as 
a result… I think it was the supreme court made the decision that the state government 
had to hold consultations with 12 Dongriacons communities and be bound by their 
decisions, and every single one said unanimously “we don’t want this mine” and so 
because of the legal framework the government disbanded to not allow the mine to go 
ahead because of the decision by those indigenous, so there was a strong combination 
of the popular mobilization and the judicial, both of which had been backed up by 
international solidarity, and that’s another important factor, communities in northern 
Colombia have told us that they don’t think they would have made even the level of 
progress they have made against Serahound coal, which is owned by 3 London listed 
companies, if it were not for support from groups in this country, United States, Germany, 
Switzerland, Australia, because… support from here have created much greater 
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pressure on the multinational owners of the mine, the pressure not over mass movement 
here, but of embarrassment, they don’t want their community members abroad to annual 
general meetings of their company here to say in front of shareholders in bold what we 
are doing is bad, we don’t want it, you’ve got to do things differently, they don’t like when 
members of parliament raise questions in parliament about companies’ record, they don’t 
like when the Guardian prints critical articles about the, and the Daily Mail as well, so 
those things that we are able to add to what’s being done in the host countries, that’s 
important, so mobilization, judicial route, international solidarity, a fourth possibility which 
is linked most closely with the international solidarity but is related to the judicial root is… 
several groups in recent years have use existing non judicial international mechanisms 
notably the complains procedure of the organization for economic calibration and 
development to bring complains against companies in their home countries, so there was 
a complaint broad against BHP Billiton in Australia and against Xstrata in Switzerland for 
what they were doing in Seracon, there was a complaint brought against Bedanta in 
Britain for what they were doing in the Hungarian hills, there is currently a complaint 
against GMC resources in Britain against what they are doing in Bangladesh, and in the 
case of Seracon those complains led to, Seracon setting up an independent panel of 
inquiry with international expert to look into the impact of its operations and this 
independent panel found that a lot of what we’ve been saying was true, and the company 
agreed to abide by most of the panel’s recommendations, so it’s still being a struggle to 
make them to do it, but I think they sensed a public relations disaster and this was the 
way to handle it off, in the case of Bedanta, it would have nothing to do with the 
complaint’s process , it said here is a company which delivery listed on the London Stock 
Exchange to get all the benefits of money and prestige that you get for listing in London, 
even though is controlled by a single Indian family, but as soon as they face in the UK 
an investigation by the UK National Contact Board for the OECD complain process, they 
said “oh we don’t have to listen to them, we are Indian” so they would have nothing to do 
with the process, so the UK National Front made their judgement against the company 
and that was a public relations disaster for the company and it held some ethical 
investors to decide to pull out of the company which also was bad for the company’s 
public relations, so the company still goes doing what it does, but that was a blow to its 
___ in the case of GCM resources… since the world development movement here in 
London and the international accountability project in San Francisco brought the OECD 
complaint against GCM resources, GCM resources has lost even more money, I mean 
in the past year has lost I think 3 and a half million pound, its share prices gone down, 
all its directors have resigned and being replaced, it’s chairman has resigned and being 
replaced, is being replaced by the chairman of the British investment ___ resources, so 
the company was suffering anyway, and the fact that the UK National Content want look 
where there was a case to answer and decided “yes, there is a case to answer, we will 
investigate this” that itself was a blow to the company, so there we are, use of complains 
mechanisms, non-judicial processes. 
I:Actually for what you tell me there are 2 actors involved, the people, indigenous people, 
organized people and on the other hand the multinational corporations, but, it calls my 
attention the fact that the state apparently is not involved at all, is not involved in 
Colombia, well in Chile it doesn’t exists, according to a lot of professors there was a 
process between the beginning of the XIXth century where the MNC appeared, the first 
globalization, where the states where mainly trying to attract them, but then something 
happened, especially in Latin American countries, the states learned from the past 
experience of letting the MCN to do whatever they want, so after that we see a process 
where the states were very powerful and they were waiting for the…investment to be 
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done and after that they would usually the rules of the game, but nowadays after the 70s 
or after the cold war we see the complete opposite, so what do you think about this 
process, because apparently the governments have forgotten these valuable lessons 
from the past. 
Y: I don’t think they’ve forgotten those lessons, the states have been run by the political 
class which also runs the MNCs and they, there has been a total victory of neoliberal 
politics, which is being fall back against some places, none of which is perfect like 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, which also offered trick local communities ___ but at least 
they took the view that the national government ought to have more power over national 
resources than multinational companies and… so, I think because of the triumph of 
neoliberalism a lot of the kind of legislative structure which would have constrained 
multinational mining companies has been dismantled in order to maximize multinational 
profits, and then the governments who have deliberately been made indebted are 
desperate for foreign exchange, so is the payback this entirely illegitimate debts, so they 
don’t want to do, well on the face of it they don’t want to do thing to discourage 
international investment, but behind the scenes they are all friends anyway and all 
represent the same class of people. However, like… within a company there will be 
people of good will, of good conscious who wants to do things in a good way, within 
states there will be people who wants to do things in a good way, so I think the Colombian 
state for instance is controlled by people that represent a certain set of families within 
Colombia who own 50% of the land surface of the country and had done for hundreds of 
years, who want things done in a particular way, but within the state’s structure we may 
well find excellent people like defensores del pueblo, do you have those in Chile as well? 
Defensores del pueblo? 
I: I don’t think so. 
Y: Is entirely alien to anglo saxon political and legal structures, but… ___ a government 
department which job is to make to make sure that people’s rights are not violated by the 
state and… and so the local defensor del pueblo in the case of Tabaco, he was doing 
his best to stop the destruction of the village when the people were being evicted in 2001, 
so he was a representative of the Colombian state, but in my view he was a good 
representative of the Colombian state, and the judicial is part of the state apparatus and 
clearly the Colombian judicially has made some decision that in my view were good just 
decisions, so the state is a mix entity which at time can and does act in favour of local 
communities in dispute with mining companies, but generally speaking at the moment, 
states, particularly national act as if they were primarily there to support the multinational 
mining companies. There are interesting examples in the Philippines and Argentina, 
where local municipalities or even regions have said “we will not have open cast mining, 
we are against it, we voted against it, the local population have voted us in and we voted 
against it” and national government said “you can’t, national policy is we want open cast 
mining, you don’t have the power at municipal level to override national mining policy” 
so there are big fights there, but there are again, you see, elements of the state in dispute 
with other elements of the state.  
I: What do you think local communities or host regions can benefit from this mineral 
resources, because so far a lot of people believe that this is a curse instead of a bless, 
how do you think that especially in the southern regions, these countries have benefits 
from these resources? 
Y: Well, I am jaded in my view because of the fact that I work with communities that don’t 
want mining. If I had personal dealings with communities that do want mining I would 
303 
 
have developed my thinking about this more, but I know that are communities that want 
mining, primarily communities who have done that for years to have a tradition of mining, 
and I think actually this is the key thing, nobody is going to benefit from mining at local 
level if they don’t want mining and London Mining Network came together, I mean, 
among the groups in our networks there were widely different views of all sorts of things, 
but the point of unity is being communities what happens on their land, and if a 
community does not want mining then, in our view, they should not have mining, it should 
not be imposed on… and it won’t benefit them, because of the very fact of imposing on 
against their will it means that is a dis-benefit and one of the things about the 
documentary about Caimanes that was showed last night was… people were saying that 
“we don’t want the mine, we want our valley back, we want our river back”. One of the 
things that was clear from Jasmina Romero, from Fuerza de Mujeres from la Guajira en 
Colombia who was with us in October for the BHP Billiton AGM… she was explicitly 
saying in the companies AGM, “we don’t want your money or your social responsibility 
project, we don’t want any of that, no amount of money has any meaning for us, mining 
is against indigenous tradition, is a violation of mother earth, you are tearing out the 
organs of mother earth, if you divert a river you are cutting the veins of mother earth, we 
want you to get out” so there is nothing that the company can do that would benefit those 
people, because those people will not see there is a benefit, and in order for a company 
to insist that there is a benefit, is a pure act of cultural imperialism, is the most stark 
exercise of power, is to say, which is being said for the past 521 years, your world view 
is rubbish, one world view is 100% right, so if we tell you that money is good and valuable, 
more valuable than undisturbed land you’ve just got to accept that view, we are telling 
you this is the benefit, and if you don’t think it is you are wrong, you are stupid, you are 
primitive and we are right, so that’s the first thing: consent, if there is no consent there is 
no benefit, and consent must be free consent, no coerced consent, not the kind of 
consent that happens if the other possibilities have been denied, here is an example of 
that: I first became involved with indigenous people in 1983 when I lived in the north in 
Shain indian reservation in Montana, he… was a jovial mind, very beautiful group of 
people, many of them became dear friends of mine who exactly 100 years previously 
had been forcedly deprived of their livelihood because their livelihood was to follow herds 
of bison on the plains and live by hunting, but the bison had been deliberately killed, 
almost to the point of extinction and the people had been, by military force, prevented 
from wandering about, hunting remaining buffalo, and they were confined to a 
reservation and told “you’ve to farm” which it never worked. It happened had to their 
tradition hundreds of years before in a different part of the continent but it was not part 
of their living tradition and the land is not good for agriculture and the people did not have 
experience in agriculture and they didn’t make a go off it and there was great poverty, 
and is a… intensely rural location, so… any form of industrial activity is not much of a 
viable economic proposition, so the Sharan people were under continuous pressure to 
allow open cast mining on their lands, because underneath their land lie huge amounts 
of coal and to the north of the reservation there is an open cast mine, the south there are 
several open cast coal mines, to the east there is coal and is being a big struggle about 
whether or not there will be open cast coal mine to the east of the reservation and then 
there on the reservation there is coal, and people including very dear, very very dear 
friends, elders in the people who bear in themselves the indigenous tradition, these 
people, they voted for coal mining, not because is part of their tradition, but because the 
young people ending up on drugs, addicted to alcohol, committing suicide because there 
were no opportunities for them, and they thought “we must have jobs for our people” that 
is not free consent, that is the consent that you get after the lengthy process of brutal 
militarized imperialism, so that’s point one, if a group of people wants mining, perhaps 
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because they have a tradition of mining like the coal mining communities in Britain who 
wanted to maintain their tradition in mining and it was deliberately destroyed, partly was 
deliberately destroyed because the British government at the time knew that the opening 
of the Sierra coal mine in Colombia which took its coal to the export port on a railway 
provided by British Steel, the word British Steel imbued on the track of the railway we 
saw when we went there, so they knew that could get coal from there from a place where 
people did not want mining at the cost of destroying the mining tradition of people in this 
country did want mine. How can it be a benefit to people under those circumstances? 
Well, first of all, they need to be well paid, safe unionized jobs for local people who want 
them, there also need to be really good health and safety legislation, properly enforced, 
there need to be a tax regime properly enforced, which doesn’t allow transfer pricing and 
which allows for benefits to be filtered at local level and not simply at national government 
level, prefferently mining should be done by entities where the majority of the dividends 
come back into that country, I read a study the other day an analysis by a man called 
Patrick Bond whose… he is in South Africa, analyses the mining industry and his view 
was “even if we could get rid of transfer prices, tax evasion, bribery, corruption, all of 
that, still mining by multinational companies is a net dis benefit to African countries, 
because the amount of benefit that flows back into the country is less than the value of 
the mineral that they are taken out of the country and whose value flows into the pockets 
of shareholders who are based not in the country, but in Britain or United States or 
whatever it may be, so it needs to be attention paid to who is the major beneficiary, 
financial beneficiary in the operations and how… where is the balance between the value 
of what is being taken out of the country and what comes come into the coffins of that 
country at national and local level. Then there needs to be rigorous properly enforced 
environmental legislation, including the proper… restitution of demand side, but here is 
the major problem, it’s not possible truly to restore a mine site, you… you won’t really 
get back what was there, you won’t be able to restore the… water sources that have 
been destroyed, if it is a self-find deposit you will get acid mine drainage for the rest of 
time, and again from the South African example, there are lots and lots of abandoned 
gold mines across parts of South Africa, deep mines rather than cast… where the… the 
owning companies pump water out of the mine to prevent the build-up of acid mine 
drainage for a number of year after closure and then stop, so the mine are filled up with 
acidified water which has now polluted the entire water table in the region around 
Johannesburg and is now so close to the surface that it threatens actually to destroy 
agriculture and drinking water in the entire region, and when you talk about something 
that needs to be done forever… I studied late antique medieval history university… to 
assume that people in the future will have the same technological knowhow that people 
have now is an unsafe assumption to make, people who believe in the myth of progress 
and who haven’t studied medieval history, appear to believe that will go on and go on 
becoming more advanced technologically. Actually, as far as I can see, giving the lack 
of political will to do anything about climate change, by the end of this century our current 
civilization would have completely collapsed, even if it hasn’t I just don’t think is safe to 
assume that tasks can be done into the forever future, and with that in mining drainage 
you have to go on pumping forever, and ever, and ever, until the whole solidified rock 
has dissolved! When you’re talking about uranium mining, you’re talking about wastes 
that are extremely dangerous to the health of all living things for hundreds of thousands 
of years, so for far longer than homo sapiens have existed in our current form, and 
nobody has come up with good ways of… dealing with radioactive wastes, so… I think 
that is the horrible sting in the tale of mining, we can say “ok, our community consents to 
mining, positively wants it, is good, well payed, safe, unionized employment, there is 
good health and safety, there is good taxation, the country is benefiting economically, if 
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we wait for this enterprise and there is good mine restitution and there is good dust 
suppression and there is good detoxification of water and that… but forever?” There isn’t 
the possibility of making it safe forever, which is why I think any mining needs to be 
undertaking only after the most serious consideration of whether is really, really 
necessary, if there is absolutely no alternative, if we really cannot retrieve minerals that 
have already been mined, in order to reuse them, it cause environmental damage caused 
by ___ that is so severe and goes on for so long. 
I: Well, I just have two more questions, I think you may have to do something else or 
maybe are tired already but, do you think that there are any differences between a 
national owned mining corporation or Multinational Corporation like CODELCO and just 
a multinational corporation? And the other is… what do you think is the role of multilateral 
organizations in this topic, for example, the World Trade Organization, maybe the United 
Nations, do they have anything to say about this, or the IMF, the World Bank? Because 
until the 70s or 80s they were really powerful trying to promote neoliberal policies but so 
far they seem to be more quiet in the last 10 or 20 years for some reason, at least in 
Latin America which is the case that I know, in Chile, so do you think that they have 
anything to say in this topic? 
Y: On the first question first… is there a difference between national and multinational 
mining entities?... in terms of their behaviour not necessarily, a nationalized company is 
just as capable of behaving in an oppressive militarized manner and tramping over the 
rights of local communities as a multinational company and in some cases even may be 
worse, because of the fact that a multinational company also have to take account of 
public opinion in their home country, but on the other side the multinational companies 
are going to be surfing out value from the country where the mineral is, to the countries 
where the shareholders are, and that’s not going to be the case with the national 
companies so… for that reason I think that it is better that mining should be done by 
national entities rather than multinational capitalist companies. The other thing on the 
side of multinational companies is that, especially with the larger ones, because of the 
break of expertise that they can turn, they may well be better developing more ___ 
technologies than a nationalized company might do, so ways need to be found for, if all 
the mining industry through the world were nationalized, it would be important for 
different countries to share skills and technology with one another to develop the best 
possible practices.  
On the multilateral institutions, the world trade organization is unfortunately not dead, is 
just raised his head again I think last week I think, and in any case there are… regional 
free trade agreements being pursued like the… what do they call now? There is the… 
trade partnership of the Pacific, something like that and a similar one for the Atlantic, and 
as I understand these agreements mirror the kind of agreements that have been signed 
in the Americas like North American free trade agreement and the free trade agreement 
between North America and Central America, where companies are able to sue national 
governments for changing things, I’ve forgotten the country and the company, there is 
currently an example of a company suing a national government for raising the minimum 
wage, so… in those ways I think those international trade agreements are entirely 
maleficent, destructive, the IMF and World Bank have certainly done huge damage 
through their funding of extractives industries, just at the moment… they have attempted 
to come up with standards that they plan use on companies that they lent to, which I 
supposed to do things like insuring that if agricultural communities have to move because 
of a mining project, they owed a land of an equivalent value… that kind of thing can exert 
a pressure to raise minimum standards, and at the moment multilateral funding 
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institutions can exercise helpful pressure in decision about what they want fund, so the 
World Bank has just said that is not going to be funding anything to do with the nuclear 
industry, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has joined a 
number of other multilateral founders in saying that is not going to fund coal projects 
except under most peculiar circumstances, so they’ve been doing a lot of bad by the 
things they’ve been funding but they are changing their policies, they exert pressure for 
good. United Nations, during the time when it had body working on transnational 
corporations, the name of which I forget… that was a way of putting pressure on 
multinational corporations to behave better, but that was a victim at the end of the cold 
war and now we have these UN guidance principles drawing up by John Ruggi , the 
protect respect a ___ framework, are you familiar with that?  
I: No 
Y: Basically western government torpedoed efforts of the United Nations to have 
international regulation of multinational companies, they wanted to stop that and they 
succeeded in stopping it, but because there was then a kind of a vacuum and a 
continuing argument about who should maintain vigilance over multinational 
corporations, an academic from Nova Scotia I think, John Ruggi, either put himself 
forward or was put forward to look into this matter and see whether he could come up 
with a system that would be acceptable to all parties, so after several years of looking 
into the matter he came up with this framework of protect, respect, remedy, where 
individual states have the duty to protect human rights, multinational corporations have 
the duty to respect human rights and the legislation protecting human rights and if they 
don’t local communities and workers need to have some kind of remedy, but the problem 
is that companies have such power that they put pressure on national governments to 
have low standards anyway so the basic standard is going to be set low and if the 
companies fail to respect human rights ant the state fail to protect human rights, and fail 
to sanction companies that don’t respect human rights, what remedy do people have? 
And at the moment this supposedly an aspiration that people have remedies, but the 
kind of remedies that are available to people at the moment are too weak, there are 
judicial processes that might be very lengthy and hugely expensive. In this country the 
government has just cut some of the legislation that enable people overseas to bring 
cases against British registered companies for things that they’ve done on other 
countries, so in fact the British government has moved in the opposite direction, with the 
non-traditional remedies, like the OECD complains procedure, there is no sanction 
against a company other than embarrassment, loss of reputation, so that whole process 
is far too weak in the view of many people, quite a lot of NGOs who believe is too weak, 
and nonetheless trying hard to use it as best they can for the benefit of communities and 
one of the things that people are pushing for, including within coalitions organizations in 
this country, including London Mining Network, pushing to ensure that British 
government ties up legislation here to make British based or British listed companies 
keep to human rights and environmental agreements to which the UK has signatory, but 
that’s a difficult battle. More recently, a number of countries in the UN led by the 
government of Ecuador have started calling again for some kind of international body to 
have power over multinational corporations and that seems to a lot of us to be a very 
much better idea than having national governments doing it, we have an international 
criminal court, we ought have some kind of international court to deal with the crimes of 
multinational corporations. 
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I: Thank you very much, I just wanted to ask you what is your perception about Chile, 
like whereas… in your work have you ever heard about the situation in Chile or just you 
know about Caimanes? 
Y: Well… Chile was the first country that I got involved with when I went to university in 
1978, I joined the Oxford’s students Chilean Society, because, simply because there was 
a man at the fresher’s fair with a banner saying “sensitive people care about Chile” and 
I though “oh, I am sensitive, so I should care about Chile” I knew nothing about it, but I 
joined and I got to know exiles from the Pinochet dictatorship, so at that time I was very 
active on Chile, but I knew nothing about mining, some of my friends in this country are 
people who fled from Pinochet and are still here and… so part of my perception about 
Chile is what they have told me, and… I am sad that well not only I am sad about the 
vicious brutality of the military regime, or the blood that was shed, or the evil that was 
done, but also sad that an experiment in socialist democracy was destroyed and 
replaced by neoliberalism without liberty, and among my Chilean friends here some 
accepted the policies of the Concertacion thinking “this is the best we can do under the 
circumstances” and I am very critical of that, thinking that it was a sellout, so my 
perception is that large rich private interests have triumph completely in Chile, and also 
vaguely aware of the Mapuche struggle from their land rights in the south and the 
repression that they have faced and continued to face and often a lack of understanding 
of the indigenous rights even on the part of the ___ of the non-indigenous part of the 
Chilean population, but one thing that I learned last night, which I didn’t know before, is 
that apparently this now there is going to be a process of constitutional reform in Chile, 
so finally to move away from the Pinochet constitution and that is a sign of hope, I think 
is a sign of hope.  
I: Yeah me too but it will be difficult because, I don’t know, I was part of the student 
movement for many years and we had a massive fight against the concertacion because 
they were trying to privatize everything, they won and 3 years ago the same lady 
Bachelet, which will be probably the new president, she promised to make a change in 
the constitutional law about education, so she made a change which was basically a 
change in the title of the law, so I am very sceptical about this process. Thank you very 
much for your time. 
 
 
